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Preface
More than five million persons suffer work-related injuries or diseases each
year. l Most of these incidents require only medical treatment or involve brief
interruptions of work, but annually over two million workers experience workrelated injuries or diseases that disable them for more than a day. For at least
100,000 of these workers (more likely, for over 250,000) the consequences
include permanent disabilities: that is, losses of actual earnings or of earning
capacity even after maximum medical recovery. These permanent disabilities
are usually partial, rather than total: the workers continue to have some earn
ings or retain some of their preinjury earning capacity.
Benefits for workers who are permanently and partially disabled are the most
expensive portion of workers' compensation, the program for work-related
injuries and diseases. 2 Although permanent partial cases account for less than
25 percent of the workers' compensation cases paying cash benefits, the cash
benefits in these cases account for more than 60 percent of all such payments
(Price 1984, table 4).
Permanent partial benefits not only are the most expensive part of workers'
compensation, they are the most controversial and complex aspect of that pro
gram. The statutes and practices used to compensate partial disability vary
widely among states. To mention but one example, cash benefits for minor
permanent partial cases represent less than 10 percent of all payments in ten
states, but more than 30 percent in seven others. 3
The overall expense of permanent partial benefits, the considerable varia
tions in their costs among states, and the many controversies over the pro
cedures and standards used to determine the benefits make them a crucial area
for reform. Indeed, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compen
sation Laws concluded in its 1972 report that reforming permanent partial
benefits was one of the two problems "so important that the vitality of the
state systems will be tested by the ability of states to resolve them satisfactori
ly" (National Commission 1972, p. 129). Nonetheless, because the issue was
so intractable and the time available to the National Commission so limited,
in its 19 essential recommendations the Commission refrained from making
precise recommendations for restructuring permanent partial benefits, concen
trating instead on expansion of coverage to previously unprotected workers
and increases in the amount and duration of benefits for total disability and
death (National Commission 1972, p. 67).
vn

Workers' compensation developments in the years 1972-86 bear the imprint
of the National Commission's report. Impediments to coverage, such as the
exemption of small employers, were eliminated in many jurisdictions, and the
proportion of employees covered by workers' compensation increased from
84 percent in 1972 to 88 percent in 1980 (Price 1984, table 1). Perhaps even
more impressive is the improvement in benefits. In 1972, for example, only
six of 51 jurisdictions had temporary total maximum weekly benefits that were
at least 66 2/3 percent of the state's average weekly wage. 4 This meant that
the majority of workers did not receive the nominal replacement rate for total
disability found in most statutes namely 66 2/3 percent of preinjury wages
but received less because the maximum held down their benefits. By 1986,
benefits generally were much more adequate. Thirty-one jurisdictions (out of
51) in 1986 had maximums for temporary total disability that were at least
100 percent of the state's average weekly wage, and only 9 had maximums
less than 66 2/3 percent of the state's wage. Durations of benefits also im
proved. For example, whereas in 1972 only 17 jurisdictions paid benefits for
life or the entire period of disability in permanent total cases, in 1986, 35
jurisdictions paid for the extended duration.
These improvements in coverage and benefits were accompanied by a surge
in the costs of workers' compensation. Benefits paid in 1972 totalled $4.1
billion; by 1984 (the latest year for which data are available) the total was
$19.5 billion (Price 1984, table 3, and Price 1987, table 1). The costs to
employers, including insurance premiums and administrative expenses, were
$5.8 billion or 1.14 percent of payroll in 1972; by 1984 they were $25.3 billion
or 1.66 percent of payroll (Price 1984, table 7, and Price 1987).
These escalating costs caused apprehension among employees, carriers, and
state legislators. One particular area of concern is permanent partial disability
benefits, the cost of which appears to have grown proportionately faster than
the costs of benefits for death and total disability since 1972 despite the Na
tional Commission's emphasis on the latter types of benefits. Permanent par
tial benefits accounted for 65.20 percent of all cash benefits in 1968, declined
to 62.64 percent by 1973, and then rebounded to 64.96 percent by 1982. 5
The result of these cost developments is that a second wave of reform has
been sweeping through workers' compensation in recent years. Whereas the
first wave primarily focused on improvements in coverage and adequacy of
benefits, the current wave is emphasizing efficiency in the delivery system
and restrictions on benefits to those workers who are perceived as receiving
awards far in excess of their lost wages. Some aspects of the current reform
movement, such as the use of open competition in the rate-setting process for
Vlll

workers' compensation insurance, are beyond the scope of this study. Much
of the recent reform effort, however, has centered on permanent partial disabili
ty benefits, with a number of jurisdictions reassessing, and in some cases chang
ing, the procedures or criteria for these benefits.
The pressures for reform of permanent partial benefits often relate to prac
tices that were tolerable only so long as workers' compensation was relatively
inexpensive. For example, in states that paid benefits on the basis of the
workers' physical impairments, such as Florida and New Jersey, the long
standing approach of litigating almost all cases involving permanent disabilities
and routinely making settlements with substantial benefits for minor injuries
increasingly became anathema to employers. And in Michigan and other states
that conditioned permanent benefits on the occurrence of actual wage loss,
the frequency with which substantial benefits were awarded when actual wage
losses were questionable especially in the case of retirees spurred employers
to increasingly feverish efforts for change.
In some states, the first wave of reform was accomplished without trigger
ing the second. In Wisconsin, permanent partial disability benefits had never
been out of control, and thus the higher benefits did not produce excessive
costs. In other states, the improvements in benefits and coverage resulted in
cost increases that precipitated the permanent partial reforms. Florida is the
classic example of this sequence. In other states, such as California, the first
wave of reform either never was accomplished or was delayed for many years
because the concern about misallocation of resources in permanent partial cases
surfaced early, forestalling the benefit improvements.
Our research on permanent partial disability benefits began in 1975 and 1976,
when we conducted extensive field work for a report submitted to the National
Science Foundation (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman 1979). The time of this
investigation corresponded roughly with the end of the first wave of reform.
We updated our information between 1982 and 1986, at a point well into the
second wave. Several of the states we examined had made extensive changes
between our initial contacts and the 1980s, and part of what we will do is to
review the dynamics of reform in recent years. We believe that the current
handling of permanent partial disability benefits in many jurisdictions can be
understood only by knowing where those jurisdictions were in 1975-76, because
it is the responses to problems as they were then perceived that led these states
to their current positions.
The problems that existed in the mid-1970s and still exist today are not
unique many are common across states and many are old problems in new
guises. Nor are the solutions that the states have endorsed or considered in
IX

recent years unique or new many of them are old palliatives in new garb.
We have seen some states turn to "innovative" approaches that are
simultaneously being abandoned in other jurisdictions as deficient. If the states
are laboratories of experiment, to use Brandeis's phrase, then it would be nice
if they learned from the failures elsewhere. We hope to provide a systematic
catalogue of approaches that were discarded with good reason.

Plan of This Volume
The basic concern of our research is the adequacy and equity of permanent
partial disability benefits, and the efficiency of the procedures and standards
used to provide these benefits. The report contains four parts.
Part I is a general introduction to permanent partial disabilities. Chapter 1
presents a conceptual framework used to view disability among the working
age population: terms such as "impairment," "work disability," and "func
tional limitations" are defined so as to facilitate comparisons among different
jurisdictions. Chapter 2 first presents the rudiments of workers' compensa
tion, then reviews the objectives of the workers' compensation program and
explains the criteria of adequacy, equity, and efficiency used in this report.
Part II contains our Ten-State Study. The 10 jurisdictions in our sample,
which were selected to provide a good representation of the various procedures
and standards used to provide compensation payments for permanent
disabilities, are California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. 6 An in
troduction (chapter 3) is followed by chapters examining the states' procedures
for permanent partial disability benefits and the criteria used by the states for
scheduled benefits and for nonscheduled benefits. (For convenience, we will
often refer to the District of Columbia as a state.) Because of the national at
tention the 1979 changes in Florida's law have received, a separate chapter
is devoted to that state.
Part III presents a summary of our Wage-Loss Study. In three of the states
in our sample California, Florida, and Wisconsin we examined the rela
tionships among workers' disability ratings, the workers' compensation benefits
they received, and their actual losses of earnings caused by work-related
injuries.
In Part IV we draw on the conceptual materials and data from parts I-III
to evaluate the adequacy, equity, and efficiency of the permanent partial disabili-

ty benefits in the jurisdictions examined. The study concludes with a discus
sion of possible reforms for permanent disability benefits in workers'
compensation.
NOTES
1. The sources of data in the first paragraph are provided in Burton and Vroman 1979, footnote 1.
2. The basic nature of the program is described in chapter 2.
3. See table 3.5, below.
4. The 51 jurisdictions are the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The data on benefits in
this paragraph are from U.S. Department of Labor (1987), as supplemented by a quarterly release
dated January 1, 1986.
5. See table 3.3, below.
6. Chapter 3 explains why these 10 jurisdictions were selected.
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Part I
Introduction to
Permanent Partial Disability
and Workers' Compensation

Chapter 1
Disability Among the
Working-Age Population
A Conceptual Framework

Our ultimate purpose in this study is to prescribe benefits and ser
vices for workers who experience permanent disabilities because of
work-related injuries or diseases. That prescription is possible, however,
only if we provide a proper framework for analysis. Not only do the
criteria and procedures used to provide benefits and services to workers
with permanent disabilities vary substantially among jurisdictions, but
different jurisdictions, as well as different groups and individuals, use
different terms to describe the same phenomena. Some, though not all,
of the apparent differences among various programs are due to the in
consistent use of terminology.
In describing the conceptual framework to be used throughout this
book, we will employ much of the terminology in use within the workers'
compensation field, including the terms in the glossaries of The Report
of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1972, p. 137) and of the American Medical Association's Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1984, pp. 225-27). However,
we also take some concepts from literature concerned less with workers'
compensation per se than with disability programs in general, including
the disability insurance program under Social Security.

Causes of Injury or Disease
Chart 1.1 briefly categorizes injuries and diseases. We define an in
jury as damage to the body resulting from an acute traumatic episode,
and a disease as damage to the body resulting from a cause other than
an injury. These definitions differ from those usually used within the
workers' compensation program. Injury, for example, is commonly
defined so as to include disease. In some states, this broad use of in
jury results from court interpretations. The original intent of the framers
of the legislation, to cover only traumatic episodes, was extended to
cover diseases as well, even though these often result from cumulative
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nontraumatic episodes. In some other instances, the term injury has been
broadly applied by design. For example, the model Workmen's Com
pensation and Rehabilitation Law, prepared by the Council of State
Governments in the mid-1960s, defines injury so as to encompass vir
tually all diseases. We follow the Report of the National Commission
in treating injury and disease as mutually exclusive (rather than mak
ing disease a subset of injury) because this use of the terms is more
consistent with generally accepted usage in the medical literature.
An injury or disease can result from one or more of the causes listed
in chart 1.1. There are many possible taxonomies, but, consistent with
our particular interest, we have indicated a primary division between
(1) work-related causes and (2) nonwork-related causes.
Chart 1.1
Causes of Injury or Disease
1. Work-Related
(a) employer at fault
(b) employee at fault
(c) neither at fault

2. Nonwork-Related
(a) congenital
(b) degenerative
(c) other nonwork-related
(i) other person at fault
(ii) no other person at fault

One way to subclassify work-related causes is by assignment of fault:
in some cases the employer is at fault (la),in some cases the employee
(Ib), and in some cases neither party (Ic). The term fault, of course,
can be variously interpreted. For example, it could be taken to mean
the standard of negligence defined by traditional tort law; or one could
resuscitate the definition of fault acted on in most states in the days before
workers' compensation, when employers made effective recourse to
several extraordinary defenses against liability in tort suits.
In general, the fault issue is no longer of major significance in workers'
compensation (as is discussed in chapter 2, below). It is of some im
portance, however, when we consider the workers' disability income
system and not just the workers' compensation program. For instance,
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work-related injuries that result from the negligence of a third party,
such as a supplier to an employer, can lead to successful causes of ac
tion by employees against the third party under the legal doctrines used
in many states.
Several types of nonwork-related causes of injury and disease affect
the working-age population. Some workers have congenital conditions,
such as blindness, that affect them throughout their lives. Others have
degenerative conditions that reflect hereditary predispositions and the
toll of aging; heart disease often, though not always, is in this class.
Other nonwork-related causes can be divided between those for which
a person other than the injured worker is at fault (2c-i in chart 1.1) and
those for which no one other than the injured worker is at fault (2c-ii).
For example, an off-the-job automobile accident in which a worker is
injured may be the fault either of another driver (2c-i) or of the worker
himself (2c-ii).
This classification system is designed with an analysis of the workers'
compensation program in mind. It reflects the division between workrelated and nonwork-related causes, a key element in the workers' com
pensation program, and it indicates the necessity to go beyond a twoway classification even in workers' compensation. As discussed below,
determining whether an injury or disease is work-related, as a criterion
for awarding compensation, is not always a straightforward matter, par
ticularly since the causes catalogued in chart 1.1 are not mutually ex
clusive categories. Indeed, for certain types of injuries and diseases,
notably back injuries and heart diseases, the relative importance of workrelated and nonwork-related factors in explaining the occurrence of the
injury or disease is often at issue.

Consequences of Injury or Disease
The various consequences of injury and disease (chart 1.2) can be
categorized as temporary and permanent, a distinction that has an im
portant bearing on the types of benefits provided under workers' com
pensation. The differentiation we utilize between temporary and per
manent is consistent with the use of those terms in the Report of the
National Commission. Temporary refers to the period from the onset
of injury or disease until maximum medical improvement (MMI) has
been achieved; permanent refers to the period following MMI. 1 Not
every statute would draw the dividing line between permanent and tem
porary this way. Further, in practice, that line may be unclear. For ex-
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ample, in California the "permanent" status is equated with a perma
nent and stable medical condition, but in fact permanent partial benefits
may have to be paid before such a medical condition is reached.
In this book, temporary and permanent refer to mutually exclusive
time periods. All workers who have an injury or disease temporarily
experience some or all of the consequences indicated in chart 1.2. A
minority of workers also permanently suffer some of those consequences.
Chart 1.2
Possible Consequences of an Injury or Disease

Impairment

Functional
Limitations

Work and Nonwork
Disability

_ , , _
Other Influences

Impairment and Functional Limitation
The initial consequence of an injury or disease is an impairment. An
impairment "is an anatomical, physiological, intellectual or emotional
abnormality or loss" (Nagi 1975, p. 8). Similarly, the National Com
mission Report (1972, p. 137) defines permanent impairments as "any
anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after maximum medical
rehabilitation has been achieved." 2 Examples of impairments are an
amputated limb and an enervated muscle.
An impairment can be manifested (and perhaps measured) in several
ways. Some manifestations, such as restricted motion or ankylosis, may
be regarded as "objective." Subjective manifestations include pain,
which may be constant, intermittent, or dependent on the activities under
taken by the worker. Other subjective manifestations are weakness and
limited endurance.
The impairment experienced by the worker may not lead to functional
limitations, the next concept shown on chart 1.2. When it does not,
we term it "nonlimiting." More often, however, impairments do give
rise to functional limitations (or limitations in the worker's
performance). 3
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Although overlapping in some respects, three dimensions
of performance are . . . separable: physical, emotional and
mental. Physical performance refers to sensory-motor func
tioning of the organism as indicated by limitations in such
activities as walking, climbing, bending, reaching, hearing,
etc. Emotional performance refers to a person's effectiveness
in psychological coping with life stress and can be manifested
through levels of anxiety, restlessness, and a variety of
psycho-physiological symptoms. Mental performance denotes
the intellectual and reasoning capabilities of individuals which
have been most commonly measured through problem-solving
(I.Q.) tests. (Nagi 1975, p. 3)
A few examples may clarify some of the terms we have introduced:
(1) Temporary nonlimiting impairment. A worker is injured by fly
ing glass, which inflicts a minor laceration on his arm. The result is
a physiological disturbance of the skin (impairment). However, the
wound is cleaned and bandaged, and is completely healed in a few weeks.
Even during the healing period, the impairment is not limiting; that is,
there are no resulting functional limitations.
(2) Temporary limiting impairment. A falling box breaks a worker's
great toe. The result is a physiological disturbance of the bone struc
ture (impairment), which manifests itself in pain and, after the bone
is set, in temporary ankylosis. During the healing period, the impair
ment limits the worker's ability to walk and climb (functional limita
tions). After the healing period is over, however, there is no residual
impairment.
(3) Temporary limiting impairment and permanent nonlimiting im
pairment. A worker is scalded on his back by hot acid. The temporary
result is burnt tissue (impairment), accompanied by pain and weakness,
which results in temporary inability to bend and lift (functional limita
tions). After the healing period, the worker's back is still scarred (im
pairment) and painful when touched, but the worker is able to bend,
lift, and perform all other activities he could before his injury.
(4) Temporary and permanent limiting impairments. A falling box
strikes a worker's back and causes a compression fracture of a vertebra
(impairment), which manifests itself in pain and complete loss of mo
tion in the back. During the healing period, the worker is unable to
walk, bend, and so on (functional limitations). Even after maximum
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medical rehabilitation is reached, a physical abnormality (impairment)
remains and the worker has limited motion in his back. Moreover, when
the worker is asked to lift a 25-pound object, he is weak (barely able
to lift the object), he experiences increasing levels of pain with con
tinued lifting, and he is only able to lift the object twice (limited en
durance). These manifestations of his impairment (weakness, pain, and
limited endurance) are indications of a functional limitation (inability
to lift).
These examples enable us to contrast the varying approaches to the
assessment of impairment and functional limitations. The AM A Guides,
for example, largely confine the measurement of impairment to objec
tive manifestations, such as restricted motion. The reason given (1971,
p. iii) is that "competent evaluation of permanent impairment requires
adequate and complete medical examination, accurate objective measure
ment of function, and the avoidance of subjective impressions." Sub
jective manifestations of impairment, however, are considered impor
tant for certain types of injuries and diseases by workers' compensa
tion programs in a number of jurisdictions, such as California. Thus
a medical examiner following the AMA Guides approach in evaluating
the extent of permanent impairment in example (4) above would con
fine himself to determining the limitations of motion in the back,
whereas, following the California approach, he would also consider the
subjective manifestations of pain, weakness, and limited endurance.
Disabilities
As a result of functional limitations, a worker may experience a
disability. A broad definition of disability is offered by Nagi (1975,
pp. 3-4): "inability or limitations in performing social roles and ac
tivities such as in relation to work, family, or to independent community
living." We distinguish two types of disability in chart 1.2, namely,
work disability, a loss of actual earnings or earning capability as a con
sequence of the impairment, and nonwork disability, the other conse
quences for the worker included in Nagi's broad definition.
In much of the literature on disability, including the Report of the
National Commission, that term has been treated as synonymous with
work disability as defined above. Nonwork disability, as defined above,
is not included in the glossary of the Report, but for our purposes it
is worthwhile to recognize the consequences for workers resulting from
functional limitations other than the consequences for the work role.
In later chapters, however, when we use the term disability without
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the modifier work or nonwork, we intend it to mean work disability as
defined here.
As mentioned, not all impairments are attended by functional limita
tions. Similarly, not all functional limitations are attended by a disability;
some functional limitations are "nondisabling." For example, an im
pairment may render a worker unable to lift heavy objects, but lifting
ability may be irrelevant to the worker's job (college professor).
Other Influences on Disabilities
One aspect of both the work disability and the nonwork disability
concepts is that the extent of a given worker's disability depends not
only on the extent of his functional limitations but also, as indicated
in chart 1.2, on other influences. For example, the loss of actual earn
ings or decrease in earning capacity (that is, work disability) depends
not just on functional limitations, but on the worker's personal
characteristics (age, education, experience, and other factors), the labor
market conditions in which he must compete for employment, and the
sources of assistance available to him (including cash benefits, such as
workers' compensation and welfare, and other assistance, such as
medical care and rehabilitation services).
Age, education, and previous work experience are examples of per
sonal characteristics that might interact with a worker's functional limita
tion to affect the extent of his work disability. Thus an older worker
with a given impairment may have more difficulty finding employment
than a younger worker with the same impairment. An employer may
be reluctant to pay for retraining the older worker, given his relatively
short expected job tenure. Also, a given functional limitation may af
fect a highly educated worker less than a poorly educated worker,
because the more educated worker is likely to rely on mental rather
than physical skills for his job market success. Similarly, a worker with
greater experience prior to his work-related injury or disease, who can
draw on this reservoir of skills to overcome a functional limitation, may
also have an easier adjustment.
The relationships among functional limitations, workers' personal
characteristics, and work disabilities are complex, and only relatively
few hypotheses describing them have been adequately tested in terms
of actual labor market experience; great care must therefore be taken
in making judgments about them. An important general point, however,
and one that appears quite likely on the basis of what we know about
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the operation of the labor market from studies by economists, is that
any factor that may influence the employability of a worker, whether
it be a functional limitation, age, education, or other personal
characteristic, will interact with the other factors in determining the
earnings experience of that worker.
The actual work disability experienced by workers with functional
limitations will also be affected by general labor market conditions. It
seems likely that workers with functional limitations will be more
adversely affected when labor market conditions deteriorate than workers
who are otherwise equivalent except for the functional limitations.
The extent of work disability (and nonwork disability) that results
from a particular functional limitation also depends on the sources of
assistance for disabled workers. Here it is useful to draw a distinction
between work disability in the sense of loss of wage-earning capacity
and disability in the sense of loss of actual earnings. The actual loss
of earnings for a worker with a given functional limitation will certain
ly depend in part upon the alternative sources of income for the worker
and his family. Thus, as workers' compensation benefits are increas
ed, at least beyond certain limits, a worker's incentive to overcome a
given functional limitation and return to work may decline. Because
of this effect, disability (earnings loss) may increase as workers' com
pensation benefits increase. The same relationship can be expected for
increased availability of benefits from programs such as disability in
surance, welfare, and private pension plans.
We do not want to suggest that we are opposed to increases in benefit
levels for these programs. Indeed, one of the purposes of workers' com
pensation benefits is to reduce the pressures on workers to return to
work under onerous conditions. There are complex policy issues
(discussed later in this book) concerning the proper trade-off between
the work disincentive effects of higher benefits and the purpose of pro
viding workers adequate support in a period of adversity. The main
point here is simply that the extent of disability (as measured by earn
ings loss) in the working age population is affected by the nature of
the income programs available to disabled workers.
Disabled workers have sources of assistance other than cash benefits,
including medical care and rehabilitation services. At a conceptual level,
it is again important to stress that the quality and quantity of these other
forms of assistance are interrelated with the extent of work disability
and nonwork disability that will occur for a worker with a functional
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limitation. For example, a worker whose work-related back injury makes
it impossible to continue a previous job involving lifting may, after
rehabilitation, find a new job, such as sales work, in which his func
tional limitation does not affect his work performance. 4
Actual Loss of Earnings
Graph 1.1 illustrates an example of the actual loss of earnings resulting
from a work-related injury or disease. In this example, wages increas
ed through time from A to B, reflecting the worker's increasing pro
ductivity, as well as economy wide inflation. At point B, the worker
experienced a work-related injury that permanently reduced his earn
ings. Had he not been injured, his earnings would have continued to
grow along the line B-C. Although these potential earnings cannot be
observed, they can be estimated from information such as the worker's
preinjury earnings, age, occupation, and work experience. The worker's
actual earnings in this example dropped from B to D and continued

Graph 1.1
Economic Consequences of a Work-Related Injury
(for Workers with Permanent Disabilities)
Potential Earnings
(Earnings if Injury
Had Not Occurred):
B-C

Actual Earnings:
A-B-D-E-F-G

Date of
Injury

"True" wage loss
due to in-jury

worker's potential
earnings after the
date of injury (BC)

Date of Maximum
Medical
Improvement
worker's actual
earnings after the
date of injury (BDEFG)
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at this zero earnings level until point E, when the worker returned to
work at wage level F. Thereafter, actual earnings grew along the line
F to G. As this example is drawn, it is assumed that the worker's ac
tual earnings never return to the potential earnings (line BC) that he
would have earned if he had never been injured.
Of course, not all workers with permanent impairments or perma
nent functional limitations have wage histories that correspond to the
example in graph 1.1. Some may return to their old jobs at the wages
they would have earned if they had never been injured; others may ex
perience a total loss of earnings after their injuries. The example shown
illustrates an intermediate case, in which the worker has a partial but
not total loss of earnings.
As previously discussed, permanent disability cases are defined as
those for which the worker has consequences that extend beyond the
date of maximum medical rehabilitation, or maximum medical improve
ment (MMI). In a workers' compensation program, the date of MMI
is when the worker's medical condition is considered stable, so that
he can be rated for the purposes of deciding the permanent disability
benefits to which he is entitled. For the case illustrated in graph 1.1,
MMI occurs after the worker returns to work, which is a typical
sequence.

Questions To Be Answered
The conceptual framework presented in this chapter raises several
questions which must be answered by any program that compensates
disability. These include:
(1) Which causes of injuries and diseases (as shown in chart 1.1)
should be covered by the program?
(2) Which of the consequences of an injury or disease (as shown in
chart 1.2) should be compensable? That is, should temporary conse
quences or permanent consequences or both be compensable? And which
of impairments, functional limitations, work disability, and nonwork
disability should be compensable?
(3) What should be the amount of compensation for those conse
quences that are compensable?
(4) How should compensation benefits be distributed among workers?
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(5) How should the delivery system for compensation benefits be
evaluated?
The next chapter develops some answers to these questions.
NOTES
1. The glossary of the 1972 National Commission Report, in defining permanent impairment,
indicates that permanent means the medical condition must be declared stable or nonprogressive
by a physician (p. 137).
2. The definition of permanent impairment contained in the glossary of the National Commis
sion's Report is virtually identical to the definition in the 1st edition of the AMA Guides (1971,
p. iii). The 2nd edition of the AMA Guides (1984, p. 225) defines impairment as "the loss of,
loss of use of, or derangement of any body part, system or functions" and permanent impairment
as "impairment that has become static or well stabilized with or without medical treatment, or
that is not likely to remit despite medical treatment of the impairing conditions."
3. We rely on the classification system developed by Nagi (1975), which distinguishes among
impairments, functional limitations, and disability. The definition of impairment in the AMA Guides
(1984, p. 225) includes functional limitations, and thus has only two consequences of an injury
or disease: impairment and disability. Another three-consequence classification system published
by the World Health Organization (1980) utilizes impairment (which includes functional limita
tions), disability, and handicap. The Nagi system is the most useful in explaining the operational
approaches in workers' compensation.
4. Medical care and rehabilitation services will also affect the extent of impairment and func
tional limitation that result from a given injury or disease, a relationship not shown in chart 1.2.
Although this is an important relationship, it is largely beyond the scope of this study.

Chapter 2
The Objectives
of Workers' Compensation

The Basic Nature of Workers' Compensation
There is a workers' compensation act for each of the 50 states and
for the District of Columbia. There also are two federal workers' com
pensation programs. l No two acts are exactly alike, but most have similar
basic features. 2
Workers' compensation provides cash benefits, medical care, and
rehabilitation services for workers who suffer work-related injuries and
diseases. To be eligible for benefits, normally an employee must ex
perience a "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment." All of the laws provide benefits for workers with oc
cupational diseases, although many states restrict the coverage of oc
cupational diseases through provisions such as minimum duration of
exposure rules.
In general, the effect of the phrase "personal injury by accident aris
ing out of and in the course of employment" is to exclude some in
juries and diseases from the scope of the program. However, the
distinguishing feature of workers' compensation is that it provides
benefits for many workers who could not win suits for damages under
the common law because of the difficulty of proving that the employer
was at fault. Workers' compensation benefits are paid even when the
employer is free of negligence or other fault; they are the employer's
exclusive liability for work-related injuries and diseases.
When an injury or disease falls within the scope of the workers' com
pensation program, the employer must furnish medical care, usually
unlimited in time and amount. Most states also provide vocational and
medical rehabilitation services, or supervise the services if they are fur
nished by the employer. In addition, all states require the employer to
pay cash benefits to the worker if certain conditions are met.
15
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Cash benefits usually are classified as temporary total, temporary par
tial, permanent total, permanent partial, and death benefits. After a
specified waiting period, temporary total benefits are paid if the employee
is unable to work. The benefits continue as long as the worker remains
totally but temporarily disabled. Temporary partial benefits are paid
during a period of reduced earnings and continue until the worker returns
to full wages or is found eligible for permanent total or permanent par
tial benefits. Permanent total benefits are paid to a worker disabled com
pletely for an indefinite time. Permanent partial benefits are paid if
the worker incurs an injury or disease that causes a permanent impair
ment or if the worker experiences a permanent but partial loss of wages
or wage-earning capacity. Death benefits include burial expenses and
benefits to specified dependent survivors. For each category of benefits,
each state prescribes a maximum weekly benefit and usually a minimum
weekly benefit. Some states prescribe limits on the duration or total
amount for certain benefits, including permanent partial, permanent total,
and death benefits.
In all but four jurisdictions, an administrative agency adjudicates
disputes concerning eligibility for benefits and extent of disability. Deci
sions of these agencies may be appealed for review by the courts. In
four states, the courts decide all of the disputed claims.
Despite the role of the states in workers' compensation, it is largely
a privately administered and funded program. The workers' compen
sation statutes provide that each employer shall compensate disabled
workers using specified formulas for benefits, but normally the employer
has some choice about how to provide these benefits. In all but three
states, the employer, if it can meet the state financial standards, may
self-insure the risk of work-related injuries and diseases. In 45 jurisdic
tions, the employer may purchase workers' compensation insurance from
private insurance carriers. There are 19 states that operate insurance
funds, but 13 of these compete with private carriers. Faced with these
choices, employers usually make private insurance arrangements to meet
their statutory obligations. In 1984, private insurance carriers were
responsible for 59.3 percent of all benefits paid, self-insurers for 20.3
percent, and government funds for 20.4 percent. 3
Workers' compensation benefits are financed by charges in the form
of insurance premiums and rates related to the benefits paid. The rela
tionship between benefits paid and the employers' costs is most direct
for self-insuring employers. Other employers are rated on the experience
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of their class by state insurance funds or private carriers. Typically,
several hundred insurance classifications are used in each state. The
individual employer usually pays a rate related to the benefits paid by
all employers in his class, but employers with sufficiently large premiums
can have their rates modified to reflect their own record of benefit
payments relative to other firms in their class. 4
This brief description of workers' compensation serves as a starting
point for answering the questions posed in chapter 1.

Which Causes of Injuries and Diseases Should Be Covered?
Which of the several causes of injuries and diseases enumerated in
chart 1.1 should be covered by the workers' compensation program?
The origin of the workers' compensation program provides some
guidance to the answer. 5
Industrial accident rates reached their all-time peak in the first decade
of this century. For example, in 1907 over 7,000 workers were killed
in just two industries railroading and bituminous coal mining. Especial
ly in view of the enormity of the industrial injury problem, the schemes
available to compensate disabled workers were deficient.
Employees were required to bring legal actions against their employers
based on the common law. The worker was the plaintiff in such cases,
and therefore had the burden of proving the employer's negligence.
Given the complexity of the work situation and the reluctance of fellow
workers to testify for fear of losing their jobs, the worker often found
himself unable to carry this burden of proof. Moreover, the employee
was at a disadvantage because of the availability to the employer of
that "unholy trinity of defenses": (1) contributory
negligence—the worker could not recover if he himself had
been negligent in any degree, regardless of the extent of the
employer's negligence; (2) the fellow-servant doctrine—the
employee could not recover if it could be shown that the in
jury had resulted from the negligence of a fellow worker;
(3) assumption of risk—the injured man could not recover
if injury was due to an inherent hazard of the job of which
he had, or should have had, advance knowledge (Somers and
Somers 1954, p. 18).
The grossest deficiencies of the common law soon became apparent,
and dating from the 1850s there were legislative attempts, known as
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employers' liability laws, to modify these common law defenses. These
laws still forced the employee to prove employer negligence, however,
and their contribution to the ability of injured workers to recover from
their employers was minimal.
Several shortcomings of the common law and the employers' liabili
ty laws were generally acknowledged. A system that protected workers
only when someone was negligent was an anachronism: accidents were
often an inevitable result of hazards inherent in industrial employment.
Awards were glaringly inconsistent, ranging from nil to substantial.
Society was forced to assume a burden in the form of "charity" for
uncompensated injured workers. In short, as Arthur Larson has observ
ed, "the coincidence of increasing industrial accidents and decreasing
remedies had produced in the United States a situation ripe for radical
change" (National Commission 1972, p. 34).
Most of the numerous objectives for a new system of compensating
injured workers took their inspiration from the weaknesses of the com
mon law. The new program was to provide benefits that were predeter
mined and adequate. The payments were to be prompt and certain,
primarily to eliminate wasteful litigation. Adequate medical and
rehabilitation services were to be provided. And the most radical ob
jective was the establishment of an entirely new economic and legal
principle liability without fault. This principle would make it much
easier for employees to recover. In turn, employers were to receive
a limit on their liability. Workers' compensation benefits were to be
the only recovery against the employer, and there was to be no possibility
of a negligence suit against the employer.
The origins of the program thus support the idea of broad coverage
of work-related injuries and diseases, since that approach helps over
come the deficiencies of the common law. More recently, the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws has endorsed the
approach. One of the five objectives for a modern workers' compensa
tion program spelled out in the Commission's Report (1972, p. 35) is
broad coverage of employees and work-related injuries and diseases:
"Workmen's compensation protection should be extended to as many
workers as feasible, and all work-related injuries and diseases should
be covered."
Workers' compensation statutes generally meet the objectives of broad
coverage of work-related injuries and diseases. Several qualifications
must be added, however. The idea of broad coverage includes the no-
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tion that fault of the employer or employee is irrelevant. Nonetheless,
some states do permit extraordinary recoveries for workers whose
damages result from particularly egregious conduct by employers. Con
versely, some states will reduce the worker's benefit under workers'
compensation when the worker's injury or disease can be traced to his
own gross misconduct.
The counterpart of making all work-related injuries and diseases compensable is to make all injuries and diseases arising from nonwork-related
causes noncompensable in the workers' compensation program. The
argument for noncompensability provided by the National Commission
Report (1972, p. 51) is that the function of workers' compensation
is not to protect against all sources of impairment or death
for workers. One of its objectives is to provide incentives
to employers to improve their safety record. Impairments
to his workers from non-work-related sources are largely
beyond an employer's control. Moreover, there are many
private and public benefits which are available to workers
and their families regardless of the source of disability or
death. Therefore, despite our sympathy for resolving doubts
in favor of employees, we would not extend workmen's com
pensation to cover impairment and deaths that are not
work-related.
A particularly difficult matter, at least conceptually, is establishing
the extent of the employer's liability when an injury or disease is deter
mined to be a result of both nonwork- and work-related causes. The
National Commission noted that "in general an employee has been eligi
ble for full workmen's compensation benefits if any nontrivial portion
of his disability was due to a work-related source" and recommended
that full workers' compensation benefits be paid "if the work-related
factor was a significant cause of the impairment or death" (National
Commission 1972, p. 51). Although this policy has been accepted in
principle in most jurisdictions, substantial practical problems remain
in determining causality. In most states, the issue of cause must be resolv
ed by deciding whether the fact situation in a particular case meets the
"arising out of and in the course of tests. Often the "facts" are com
plex or ambiguous or both, and it is difficult to decide. In most jurisdic
tions, however, once work-related factors are established as being of
some significance, the relative importance of the work-related and
nonwork-related factors becomes secondary. 6
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Despite the general practice and the Commission's recommendation,
some states, such as California, adjust the amount of workers' com
pensation benefits according to the relative importance of work-related
and nonwork-related causes of damages. Among the more important
and common cases in which factual determination of the relative im
portance of each factor can become quite difficult are those involving
heart damage, which may result from an interaction of congenital,
degenerative, and work-related factors; and those involving diabetes,
which, although its etiology includes hereditary and degenerative pro
cesses, can be aggravated by an incident or a condition of work.
The complexities of workers' compensation and its concern with deter
mining the causes of injuries or diseases are considerable. Putting those
complexities aside for the present, it is sufficient to restate two simple
generalizations about the treatment in workers' compensation laws of
the causes of injuries or disease: eligibility is conditioned upon the
presence of a work-related cause of injury or disease; and, with minor
exceptions, once that cause is established, determination of whether the
work-related cause was due to the employee's or employer's fault, and
of whether there were also nonwork-related factors present, are
irrelevant.

Which Consequences Should Be Compensable?
As outlined in chapter 1, the permanent consequences of work-related
injuries and diseases include impairments, functional limitations, work
disability, and nonwork disability. This section reviews some of the
judgments made about which of these consequences should be
compensable.
This review is complicated by two factors. First, those who com
ment on the goals of workers' compensation generally do not use a con
ceptual framework as elaborate as the one used in this report. Second,
and more serious because the consequences are sequential and in
terdependent, a particular consequence may be endorsed as compen
sable because it serves as a convenient proxy for other consequences
that are the primary concern of the commentator. Thus, a commen
tator may argue that impairments should be compensated when the real
concern is for work disabilities and nonwork disabilities that generally
flow from the impairments. An indirect route to compensate these
disabilities may be chosen because impairments may be easier to measure
than disabilities. Unfortunately, the commentators who favor payment
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for impairments do not always make clear whether this payment is for
the existence of an impairment by itself or as a proxy for a disability.
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
considered the question of which consequences of work-related injuries
and diseases should be compensable. The Commission defined two types
of cash benefits (1972, p. 54): impairment benefits, paid to a worker
with an impairment caused by a work-related injury or disease, whether
or not any wage loss results; and disability benefits, paid when an
employee has impairment and actual or potential wage loss, both due
to a work-related injury or disease. The primary basis for permanent
partial benefits, the National Commission concluded, should be disabili
ty, although impairment can also serve as a secondary basis for this
type of benefit.
The National Commission placed primary emphasis on disability as
a basis for benefits because it concluded that one of the basic objec
tives of a modern workers' compensation program is the substantial
protection against loss of income. Both the National Commission's
description of disability benefits and its rationale for those benefits in
dicate that its concept of disability accords with the concept of "work
disability" as used in this study.
It is necessary to reconcile the National Commission's "impairment
benefits" with the concept used in this paper. The glossary of the Na
tional Commission's Report defines impairment in terms virtually iden
tical to those used in chapter 1. The rationale offered by the National
Commission (1972, p. 38) for impairment benefits, however, is that
"many workers with work-related injuries or diseases experience losses
which are not reflected in lost remuneration. Permanent impairment
involves lifetime effects on the personality and on normal activity" a
description broad enough to include some of the aspects of functional
limitations and nonwork disability as defined in chapter 1. The National
Commission thus appears to have based its impairment benefits not on
impairment per se but on impairment as a convenient proxy for the func
tional limitations and nonwork disability that result from the impairment.
Arthur Larson, the leading legal scholar in workers' compensation,
stresses the primary importance of work disability (as that term is used
in this study) as the basis for benefits (1973, pp. 33-34). He recognizes
that some jurisdictions pay benefits based on evaluations of impairments,
but argues that such evaluations are made only as rough estimates of
actual or potential disability. The jurisdictions, in short, compensate
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the impairment because it serves as a proxy for work disability. Larson sees disability benefits as serving the social purpose of allowing
workers to maintain their incomes in periods of distress, but payments
for impairments per se as in the nature of recompense for damages,
a concept more appropriate to negligence cases than to a social insurance
program. Workers' compensation should cover medical and legal ex
penses related to the work injury, however, lest the income-sustaining
purpose of the benefits be undermined.
The National Commission's and Larson's views on compensability
do not represent the full range of approaches that have been offered.
They are typical, however, in their argument that work disability should
be the primary, if not exclusive, basis for permanent partial benefits.
The National Commission's argument that impairment (and, inferentially, functional limitations and nonwork disability) is also a suitable
basis for permanent partial benefits, although unusual, is not without
precedent.

What Should Be the Amount of Compensation ?
Once the issue of which permanent consequences of work-related in
juries and diseases should be compensated has been decided, the next
question is how much compensation to award. One criterion for
evaluating permanent partial benefits is that they should be adequate.
Adequacy of Disability Benefits
The National Commission defines adequate as "delivering sufficient
benefits and services to meet the objectives of the program." For disabili
ty benefits, the relevant objective of the program is to "provide substan
tial protection against interruption of income." The rationale for pro
viding substantial benefits, tied to the worker's loss of income, rather
than an amount tied to the worker's economic needs, is that workers'
compensation is an insurance program, not a welfare program (National
Commission 1972, pp. 36-38). The history of workers' compensation,
which distinguishes that program from other forms of social insurance,
supplies the justification for offsetting a substantial proportion of the
loss of income in the form of benefits. In exchange for the benefits pro
vided by workers' compensation, workers surrendered their right to
sue their employers in common law for full damages including pain
and suffering. (One reason for limiting workers' compensation cash
benefits to less than the full amount of lost income, on the other hand,
is that benefits nearly equal to lost income might seriously reduce
workers' incentive to return to employment.)
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The National Commission did not make specific recommendations
for permanent partial disability benefits that would permit a translation
of providing "substantial protection against interruption of income"
into a numerical or quantitative standard. For temporary total and per
manent total disability, the National Commission recommended that,
subject to the state's maximum weekly benefits, the total disability
benefits be at least two-thirds of the worker's gross weekly wage. 7 If
a similar degree of protection were provided for permanent partial
disability, the permanent partial disability benefits would be two-thirds
of the difference between the worker's earnings (or earning capacity)
before and after the injury or disease.
This definition of adequacy can be visualized by use of graph 2.1,
which is a modified version of graph 1.1.
The measure of earnings loss used in the discussion of graph 1.1 cor
responds to what is labeled on graph 2.1 as "true" wage loss. This
measure of wage loss is equal to the worker's potential earnings after
the date of injury (BC) minus the worker's actual earnings after the
date of injury (BDEFG). Although this version of wage loss is ap
propriate for many purposes, including the assessment of the total con
sequences of a work-related injury, it is not the measure of wage loss
typically encompassed in a workers' compensation statute. Rather, the
statute usually measures what is termed in graph 2.1 as "restricted"
wage loss. That is, the worker's earnings as of the date of injury, which
were at level B, are projected into the future at that level, namely along
the line BH. Then the "restricted" wage loss that serves as a basis for
workers' compenation benefits is measured as the difference between
the line BH and the worker's actual earnings after the date of injury
(BDEFG). As is obvious, the "restricted" wage loss is smaller than
the "true" wage loss. Indeed, there is a date at which the actual earn
ings line FG crosses the line BH, which means there is no additional
"restricted" wage loss after this date even though there is continuing
"true" wage loss.
Adequacy for temporary total disability benefits using this restricted
definition of wage loss requires that 66 2/3 percent of the area lying
above DE and below BH be replaced by benefits. Adequate temporary
partial disability benefits requires that 66 2/3 percent of the area be
tween BH and FG be replaced between the time the employee returns
to work (EF) and the date the medical condition stabilizes (the date of
maximum medical improvement, or MMI). For permanent partial
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disability benefits to be adequate, 66 2/3 percent of the area between
BH and FG must be replaced after the date of MMI. 8 (These examples
assume the worker's benefits are not affected by maximum or minimum
weekly benefit amounts.)
Graph 2.1
Actual Loss of Earnings for a Worker with a Permanent Disability

Potential Earnings
(Earnings if Injury
Had Not Occurred):
B-C

Actual Earnings:
A-B-D-E-F-G
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Date of Maximum
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due to injury

worker's potential
earnings after the
date of injury (BC)

worker' s actual
earnings after the
date of injury (BDEFG)

"Restricted" wage
loss due to
injury (as recog
nized by most
workers' compen
sation programs)

worker's wage at
date of injury
projected into
postinjury period
without escalation
(BH)

worker's actual earnings
after the date of
injury (BDEFG)

Adequacy of Impairment Benefits
Adequacy for impairment benefits is not well defined by the National
Commission. The Report (1972, p. 38) indicates that impairment benefits
"should be of secondary importance" and "limited in number and
amount." In a discussion of suggestions for restructuring permanent
partial benefits (pp. 68-70), a scheme for impairment benefits is of-
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fered which relates the duration of the benefits to the extent of the
worker's impairment compared to total impairment. If total impairment
were defined as warranting 400 weeks of benefits, a worker with 50
percent impairment would receive 200 weeks of benefits. The Report
does not, however, suggest an appropriate amount of weekly benefits,
which leaves the scheme incomplete. 9
The National Commission, although obviously not specifying exact
ly what was meant by "limited," did offer several reasons why the
impairment benefits should be limited. One is the historical exchange,
or quid pro quo, which established the principle of liability without fault
in exchange for limited benefits (National Commission 1972, p. 38).
Another reason for limited impairment benefits is a concern for effi
ciency. Since the determination of the degree of impairment is inherently
complicated and expensive, by limiting impairment benefits the Com
mission felt it would be providing for "far less time consumed in
evaluating such claims" (National Commission Report, p. 38).
Presumably, time would be saved because the relatively low amount
of the impairment benefits would reduce the incentives for litigation,
or because benefits for minor permanent impairments would be pro
scribed. (See National Commission 1972, p. 70.)
How Should Compensation Benefits
Be Distributed Among Workers?
The second criterion for permanent partial benefits is that they should
be equitable. The National Commission defines equitable as "deliver
ing benefits and services fairly as judged by the program's consistency
in providing equal benefits or services to workers in identical cir
cumstances and its rationality in providing benefits and services in pro
portion to the impairment or disability for those with different degrees
of loss" (1972, p. 137). 10
Equity of Disability Benefits

The application of the equity criterion to disability benefits is fairly
straightforward at an abstract level. Workers with equal losses of earn
ings (or losses of earning capacity) should receive equal benefits; workers
with different losses should receive benefits proportionate to their losses.
The difficulties become much more severe when the equity criterion
is applied to real-world situations (a generalization also true of the ade
quacy criterion). As indicated in chart 1.2, the extent of work disabili-

26 The Objectives of Workers' Compensation

ty proceeds not only from the workers' functional limitations, but from
their interaction with a variety of other influences (age, education, and
so on). For a given worker who is earning less after a work-related
injury or disease than before, the drop in earnings may be due to a work
disability (caused by his functional limitations interacting with the other
influences) or to factors entirely unrelated to his work-related injury
or disease (he won the Illinois lottery and decided to retire, or was ar
rested for gambling and incarcerated). Until the cause of the drop in
earnings is ascertained (and there are likely to be multiple causes), it
is not possible to determine if the assigned benefits are equitable com
pared to other workers' benefits (or, for that matter, adequate).
Equity of Impairment Benefits
The application of the equity criterion to impairment benefits also
is fairly straightforward at an abstract level. Workers with equally serious
impairments should receive equal benefits, and workers with different
degrees of impairment should receive proportionately different benefits.
One problem is that the measurement of impairment is at best controver
sial and at worst almost impossible (some of the difficulties are discussed
in part II). Another problem is that sometimes impairment benefits are
meant to compensate not only for impairment per se but also for a
worker's functional limitations and nonwork disabilities, and it is ex
ceedingly difficult to determine the extent of these other losses. For
example, the extent of nonwork disability is a result of complex interac
tions among such factors as the worker's functional limitations, age,
education, and family situation. The problem of determining the ex
tent of nonwork disability makes it difficult to assess the adequacy and
equity of benefits that are meant, at least in part, to compensate for
nonwork disability.
How Should the Delivery System
for Compensation Benefits Be Evaluated?
The benefits and services in workers' compensation are provided by
a delivery system comprising employers, carriers, state agencies, at
torneys, and doctors that was briefly described in the first section of
this chapter. How should this delivery system be evaluated? The third
criterion for permanent partial benefits is that they should be provided
efficiently. The term efficiency is used in this study to describe two con
cepts, which are illustrated in graph 2.2. The horizontal axis measures
the administrative costs of providing benefits incurred by the participants

The Objectives of Workers' Compensation 27

in the workers' compensation delivery system, including employers,
insurance carriers, workers, attorneys, and state agencies. The vertical
axis measures the quality of the workers' compensation benefits, where
quality is assessed on the basis of one or more criteria such as ade
quacy and equity. Graph 2.2 is constructed so that the desired outcomes
(high quality and low costs) are furthest from the origin.
Graph 2.2
The Efficiency of Workers' Compensation Benefits
QUALITY OF BENEFITS
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One meaning of efficiency, which will be termed panoramic efficiency,
is that benefits of a particular quality are provided at the least possible
administrative costs. A complementary definition of panoramic efficiency
is that benefits of the highest possible quality are obtained for a given
amount of administrative costs. Panoramic efficiency is illustrated by
the difference between policy option 1, which has high administrative
costs and medium-quality benefits, and policy option 2, which also has
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medium-quality benefits but lower administrative costs. Moving from
policy option 1 to policy option 2 (perhaps by ending unnecessary litiga
tion) improves panoramic efficiency. Policy option 2 lies on the quali
ty/costs constraint line, which means that the administrative costs can
not be further reduced for medium-quality benefits. 11
Panoramic efficiency is also illustrated by the difference between
policy option 3, which has medium administrative costs and low-quality
benefits, and policy option 2, which has medium administrative costs
and medium-quality benefits. Moving from policy option 3 to policy
option 2 (perhaps by increasing the level of benefits in a state with in
adequate benefits) improves panoramic efficiency.
Another meaning of efficiency, which will be termed myopic effi
ciency, is only concerned with reducing administrative costs, without
concern for the quality of the program. Myopic efficiency is illustrated
by the difference between policy option 2, which has high administrative
expenses, and policy option 4, which has medium administrative ex
penses. Moving from policy option 4 to policy option 2 thus reduces
administrative costs. Because it is impossible to move outside the quali
ty/cost constraint line, however, the movement from policy option 4
to policy option 2 requires a reduction in the quality of benefits. Myopic
efficiency means that the move from policy option 4 to policy option
2 is made, regardless of the decline in quality of benefits, solely because
of the reduction in administrative costs. 12
As indicated by graph 2.2, the three criteria adequacy, equity, and
efficiency are to some extent competitive. A reduction in litigation
expenses can improve efficiency without reducing equity if a horizon
tal move can be made toward the quality/costs constraint line. But even
tually, further reductions in administrative expenses can be achieved
only by movements along the constraint line, which represents only a
gain in myopic efficiency because of the reduction in the quality of the
program. These trade-offs among the criteria are examined at length
in part IV of this study.
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NOTES
1. The federal programs are the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, which is applicable to
federal employees, and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which is
applicable to employees working on navigable waters, excluding the master or crew of a vessel.
These federal programs are beyond the scope of this study, which is concerned with the 51
jurisdictions the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As used in this study, the term state
includes the District of Columbia.
2. This section is adapted from material at pp. 32-33 of the National Commission Report (1972).
Current data are from U.S. Dept. of Labor, Administration Profiles (1985) and U.S. Dept. of
Labor, State Laws (1986).
3. The percentages are for data excluding the federal black lung program and are from Price (1987).
Competitive state funds were authorized in 1983 in Minnesota and in 1985 in Hawaii, but the
Hawaiian fund is not in operation.
4. More information on the insurance arrangements in workers' compensation is included in Burton
and Krueger(1986).
5. This section is adapted from material at pages 33-35 of the National Commission Report (1972).
6. The relative contributions of work-related and nonwork-related causes may be relevant if the
case qualifies for partial payment of the benefits from the second injury fund. Under stipulated
statutory conditions that vary from state to state, these funds will pay for a portion of the workers'
compensation benefits when the injury or disease experienced by the worker interacts with im
pairments that existed prior to the worker's current employment. See Larson and Burton (1985).
7. Although the National Commission supported a benefit formula that replaces 66 2/3 percent
of the worker's gross weekly wage, the formula preferred by the Commission makes total disability
benefits at least 80 percent of spendable earnings (National Commission 1972, pp. 60, 64). Spend
able earnings are gross earnings minus deductions for the social security payroll tax and the federal
income tax. Variants of the spendable earning approach are used in the Alaska, District of Col
umbia, Iowa and Michigan workers' compensation programs.
8. The National Commission also recommended that permanent total benefits be increased through
time in the same proportion as increases in the state's average weekly wage. Similar protection
for permanent partial disability would require permanent partial disability benefits to be escalated
through time, reflecting the increase in the worker's earnings (or earning capacity) that would
have occurred if he had not been affected by a work-related injury or disease. This definition
of adequacy requires permanent partial disability benefits to replace 66 2/3 percent of the area
between BC and FG after the date of MMI (graph 2.1).
9. One difficulty in establishing the appropriate amount for impairment benefits is the lack of
an objective measure of the nonwork disability that results from the impairment. The standard
for disability benefits is the worker's loss of earnings, which can be measured (although with
some difficulty). An equivalent standard for impairment benefits is lacking since the disutility
associated with nonwork disability cannot be directly measured.
10. The National Commission's definition of equitable implies that vertical equity requires a strict
proportionality of benefits to losses. That is, a worker with twice the losses of another worker
should receive exactly twice the benefits. More generally, vertical equity only requires that there
be a consistent relationship between losses and benefits. Society may decide, for example, that
the proportion of benefits to losses should decrease (or increase) as losses increase. The desired
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relationship between benefits and losses may be nonlinear, which is consistent with the use of
minimum and maximum benefits. Evaluation of workers' compensation benefits becomes much
more complicated when the test for vertical equity is something other than strict proportionality
between losses and benefits. Nonetheless, even the National Commission did not strictly adhere
to its own definition of equitable (because the Report at p. 38 concluded "there is an uneasy case
for maximum and minimum benefits"), and part IV of this report will consider the implications
of using a more general test of vertical equity when the performance of workers' compensation
programs is evaluated.
11. In order to provide permanent partial benefits that are reasonable and equitable e.g., benefits
that vary among workers reasonably with respect to their varying work disability a certain amount
of supervision by the workers' compensation agency is necessary. Cutting administrative costs
by reducing the agency budget will, after a certain point, jeopardize the supervisory role and
reduce equity.
12. A move from policy option 1 to policy option 4 increases both panoramic and myopic effi
ciency, as those terms are defined in the text.

Part II
The Ten-State Study
of Workers' Compensation
Procedures and Standards

Chapter 3
An Introduction
to the Ten-State Study
The previous chapters provided a general introduction to workers'
compensation and to permanent disability benefits. In this part of the
study, we provide a detailed examination of the procedures and stan
dards used to provide compensation for permanent disabilities in 10
jurisdictions.
An Overview of Permanent Disability Cases
The national experience with permanent disability cases in recent
decades provides a useful backdrop for our intensive examination of
the experience in 10 jurisdictions. The best data on permanent disabili
ty cases are available from the National Council on Compensation In
surance (NCCI), the organization that helps establish workers' com
pensation insurance rates in most states.
The NCCI data are collected for use in the rate-making procedure
for workers' compensation insurance and bear the imprint of that use.
The data are national only to the extent that they are provided by private
insurance carriers and some competitive state funds. Excluded entirely
from the data are six states with exclusive state funds, plus the experience
of self-insuring employers and of some competitive state funds. Despite
these exclusions, the data encompass most benefit payments in the United
States and represent the most comprehensive available national and state
information on benefits broken down by type of case.
The NCCI data used in this chapter are based on reports on the ex
perience of carriers with insurance policies sold during particular policy
years. Because of the time lag between the issuance of the policies for
a given policy year and the compilation of the statistical reports per
taining to that year, the most recent data as of the writing of this study
(summer 1986) are for policies written in 1982.'
The data collected by the NCCI distinguish among five types of cases
with indemnity (cash) benefits: death, temporary total, and, of particular
33
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interest to us, permanent total, permanent partial major, and perma
nent partial minor. The distinction between permanent partial major
and permanent partial minor relates to the seriousness of the injury.
The procedure used to distinguish between major and minor has changed
through time. 2 Currently, permanent partial disability cases are classified
as major or minor depending on the amount of cash benefits paid in
the case, with the critical values varying by state. 3 Comparisons through
time and among jurisdictions of the proportion of cases classified as
major or minor permanent partial must be used with caution, but the
data provide a rough guide to the distribution of such cases.
Table 3.1 shows the number of permanent disability cases for selected
years since 1958. Permanent total cases have never totalled as many
as 2,000 cases per year, and have represented from 0.10 percent to 0.16
percent of all cases. Their relative lack of frequency helps explain why
the main focus of this study is on permanent partial disability benefits.
There were 20,994 major permanent partial disability cases in 1958,
which was about 3 percent of all cases. By 1982, the number of major
permanent partial disability cases had increased to 82,687, about 6.5
percent of all cases. Minor permanent partial disability cases have always
been the most common type among permanent disability cases, although
the absolute number in 1982 of 217,736 only represented about 17 per
cent of all cases, down from about 24 percent of all cases in 1968.
The combined total of all permanent disability cases (consisting almost
entirely of permanent partial disability cases) was 188,653 in 1958,
representing 26 percent of all cases. The percent of cases accounted
for by permanent disability peaked in 1968 at almost 29 percent, and
then declined to about 24 percent of all cases in 1978 and 1982. In short,
there is evidence that permanent disability cases have become numerical
ly less prevalent than other cases (almost all of which are temporary
total disability).
Although the number of permanent disability cases has been declin
ing relatively in recent decades, the average costs of such cases have
been increasing in both absolute and (at least through 1978) relative
senses (see table 3.2). In 1958, the national average cost of indemnity
benefits for permanent total cases was $19,322, which represented 6,490
percent of the average cost of a temporary total case ($298) that year.
By 1978, permanent total cases cost on average $78,788, which was
8,602 percent of the average cost of a temporary total case ($916) that
year. Between 1978 and 1982, the average cost of a permanent total

An Introduction to the Ten-State Study 35
Table 3.1
Number of Permanent Disability Cases,
U.S. Totals, 1 1958-82
Type of Cases

Year
19582
Number
Share of all cases (%)3
19682
Number
Share of all cases (%)3
1973 2
Number
Share of all cases (%)3
19782
Number
Share of all cases (%)3
19822
Number
Share of all cases (%)3

Permanent
total

Major
permanent
partial

Minor
permanent
partial

All
permanent
disability

All with
indemnity
benefits

808

20,994

166,851

188,653

715,999

0.11

2.93

23.30

26.35

100.00

919

39,207

217,854

257,980

895,847

0.10

4.38

24.32

28.80

100.00

1,692

42,114

213,228

257,034

1,030,740

0.16

4.09

20.69

24.94

100.00

1,876

71,576

259,945

333,397

1,392,192

0.13

5.14

18.67

23.95

100.00

1,869

82,687

217,736

302,292

1,259,770

0.15

6.56

17.28

24.00

100.00

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensa
tion Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st Report Basis," exhibits dated:
for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and
for 1982, June 1986.
1. U.S. refers to the states that provide data to the National Council on Compensation Insurance,
and thus excludes Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Califor
nia no longer provides certain data to the National Council, and so California 1981 policy year
data are used for the columns pertaining to 1982. The 1982 data thus pertain to 44 states plus
the District of Columbia. For these 45 jurisdictions, the data encompass the experience of private
insurance carriers and some competitive state funds; excluded are data for self-insuring employers
and some competitive state funds.
2. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to
the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the 1982 data are for insurance policies in
effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
3. The share is the number of the type of cases shown as a percentage of all cases paying indem
nity (cash) benefits. Types of indemnity cases not shown individually are death and temporary
total disability.
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case increased in dollars to $92,055, but declined relative to the average
cost of a temporary total case to 7,293 percent. Major permanent par
tial disability costs went from an average of $6,879 in 1958 to $21,456
in 1978, both figures roughly 2,300 percent of the average cost of tem
porary total cases in the corresponding years. In 1982, the major per
manent partial cases had an average cost of $25,139, almost 2,000 per
cent of the cost of a temporary total case. Minor permanent partial
disability costs averaged $1,253 in 1958 and $4,013 in 1978, both about
430 percent of the average cost of temporary total cases in those years.
The minor permanent partial cases had an average cost of $4,953 in
1982, about 390 percent of the average cost of a temporary total case.
The weighted average of all permanent disability cases went from $1,957
in 1958 to $8,178 in 1978 to $11,013 in 1982, increasing the relative
costs compared to temporary total cases from 657 percent to 893 per
cent followed by a modest decline to 872 percent. This substantial escala
tion in relative costs between 1958 and 1982 reflects, in part, the in
creasing proportion of permanent disability cases accounted for by major
permanent partial disability cases (see table 3.1), which are considerably
more expensive than minor permanent partial disability cases.
The total costs of permanent disability cases, shown in table 3.3, reflect
the developments in the numbers of such cases and their average costs
as shown in the previous two tables. The share of all benefit payments
represented by payments for permanent total cases increased from 2.64
percent to 3.54 percent between 1958 and 1982. Major permanent par
tial disability cases increased their share of all benefit payments from
24 percent to almost 43 percent, primarily because of the increasing
share of all cases accounted for by these serious injuries. In contrast,
minor permanent partial disability cases' share of all costs dropped from
35 percent to 22 percent, due to the numerical decline of such cases
compared to other cases. Overall, the 24-year period saw permanent
disability cases increase their share of all benefit payments from 62 per
cent to 68 percent, while the dollar amounts for permanent disability
cases increased from $369 million to $3,329 million.
Two additional observations are warranted. Since 1968, the approx
imately two-thirds share of all cash benefits accounted for by perma
nent disability cases has been quite stable. Also, the notion sometimes
advanced that too much of workers' compensation resources are
dissipated on minor permanent partial disability cases seems increas
ingly less accurate, since the share of all benefits going to such cases
has declined in each successive subperiod shown in table 3.3. This obser-

An Introduction to the Ten-State Study 37
Table 3.2
Average Costs of Permanent Disability Cases,
_______U.S. Averages, 1 1958-82_____________
Type of Cases

Year
19582
Cost (dollars)3
Cost relative to
temporary total (%)
19682
Cost (dollars) 3
Cost relative to
temporary total (%)
1973 2
Cost (dollars)3
Cost relative to
temporary total (%)
1978 2
Cost (dollars) 3
Cost relative to
temporary total (%)
1982 2
Cost (dollars) 3
Cost relative to
temporary total (%)

Permanent
total

Major
permanent
partial

Minor
permanent
partial

All
permanent
disability

Temporary
total

19,322

6,879

1,253

1,957

298

6,490

2,310

421

657

100

35,606

9,983

2,055

3,379

434

8,207

2,301

474

779

100

37,544

13,265

2,627

4,599

560

6,704

2,369

469

821

100

78,788

21,456

4,013

8,178

916

8,602

2,342

438

893

100

92,055

25,139

4,953

11,013

1,262

7,293

1,992

392

872

100

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensa
tion Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st Report Basis," exhibits dated:
for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and
for 1982, June 1986.
1. U.S. refers to the states that provide data to the National Council on Compensation Insurance,
and thus excludes Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Califor
nia no longer provides certain data to the National Council, and so California 1981 policy year
data are used for the columns pertaining to 1982. The 1982 data thus pertain to 44 states plus
the District of Columbia. For these 45 jurisdictions, the data encompass the experience of private
insurance carriers and some competitive state funds; excluded are data for self-insuring employers
and some competitive state funds.
2. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to
the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the 1982 data are for insurance policies in
effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
3. The cost is the average cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for the type of cases shown. The
cost of medical benefits is excluded.
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Table 3.3
Total Costs of Permanent Disability Cases,
U.S. Totals, 1 1958-82
Type of Cases

Year
19582
Cost ($ millions) 3
Share of all costs (%)4
19682
Cost ($ millions) 3
Share of all costs (%)4
1973 2
Cost ($ millions) 3
Share of all costs (%)4
19782
Cost ($ millions)3
Snare of all costs (%)4
19822
Cost ($ millions)3
Share of all costs (%)4

Permanent
total

Major
permanent
partial

Minor
permanent
partial

All
permanent
disability

All with
indemnity
benefits

15.612

144.418

209.103

369.133

590.709

2.64

24.45

35.40

62.49

100.00

32.722

391.384

447.578

871.684

1,286.793

2.54

30.42

34.78

67.74

100.00

63.524

558.630

560.246

1,182.400

1,786.198

3.56

31.27

31.37

66.20

100.00

147.807

1,535.737

1,043.063

2,726.607

4,042.086

3.66

37.99

25.81

67.46

100.00

172.051

2,078.689

1,078.366

3,329.107

4,860.672

3.54

42.77

22.19

68.49

100.00

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensa
tion Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st Report Basis," exhibits dated:
for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and
for 1982, June 1986.
1. U.S. refers to the states that provide data to the National Council on Compensation Insurance,
and thus excludes Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Califor
nia no longer provides certain data to the National Council, and so California 1981 policy year
data are used for the columns pertaining to 1982. The 1982 data thus pertain to 44 states plus
the District of Columbia. For these 45 jurisdictions, the data encompass the experience of private
insurance carriers and some competitive state funds; excluded are data for self-insuring employers
and some competitive state funds.
2. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to
the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the 1982 data are for insurance policies in
effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
3. The cost is the total cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for the type of cases shown. The cost
of medical benefits is excluded.
4. The share is the total cost of indemnity benefits for the type of cases shown as a percentage
of all indemnity benefits. Types of indemnity cases not shown individually are death and tem
porary total disability.
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vation must be used with caution, however, since the dividing line be
tween major and minor permanent partial disability cases is somewhat
arbitrary, and the trend showing relatively less importance for the minor
category may in part be a statistical artifact. 4 Most of our analysis in
this report relies on the total costs of all permanent disability cases in
various states, a statistic that is not affected by the division between
the major and minor permanent partial disability categories.
Limitations in the data shown in tables 3.1 to 3.3 make some qualifica
tion necessary. One limitation is that the information is all derived from
the first reports from insurance carriers on the policies written in the
given policy years. The first report is submitted 18 months after the
policy begins, and obviously only covers developments in cases to that
point, although reserves for expected future payments in the cases are
recorded. Subsequent developments in these cases or for new cases that
can be traced back to the particular policy year are reported on an an
nual basis thereafter. 5 Between the first and subsequent reports, some
cases that were initially classified as minor permanent partial disability
or temporary total are reclassified as major permanent partial disabili
ty or permanent total. 6 In some cases that are not reclassified as to type,
the amount of benefits paid or reserved for future payments is increas
ed. The result is that between the first and subsequent reports, typical
ly the number of permanent disability cases increases, while the average
costs for these cases also increase, both in dollars and relative to the
costs of temporary total disability cases.
Table 3.4 shows changes in 1982 permanent disability cases between
the actual first report on these cases and the simulated ultimate report
basis. 7 Several results are apparent. The most dramatic change involves
permanent total cases, for which the number almost doubled and total
costs more than doubled. Indeed, permanent total cases on the ultimate
report basis account for more than 7 percent of all cash benefit payments.
Major permanent partial disability cases also show a marked increase
in numbers and costs, accounting for almost 52 percent of all benefit
payments on the ultimate report basis. Permanent partial disability minor
cases, in contrast, show almost no increase in absolute numbers be
tween the first and ultimate report basis, in part because some of these
cases are transformed into permanent total or major permanent partial
disability cases. As a result, permanent partial disability minor cases
account for about 16 percent of all costs in the ultimate report, down
from about 22 percent on the first report basis.

£

Table 3.4
Permanent Disability Cases, 1982
Comparisons of First Report Basis and Ultimate Report Basis
Type of cases
and report basis
Permanent total
First report
Ultimate report

Number of
cases

1,869
3,640

Share of
all cases
(percentage)

0.15
0.28

Average cost1
(dollars)

92,055
137,021

Cost relative to
temporary total
(percentage)

7,293
9,881

Total costs2
($ millions)

Share of
all costs
(percentage)

172.051
498.756

3.54
7.07
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Major permanent partial
First report
Ultimate report

82,687
99,855

6.56
7.66

25,139
36,638

1,992
2,642

2,078.689
3,658.445

42.77
51.85

Minor permanent partial
First report
Ultimate report

217,736
218.853

17.28
16.78

4,953
5,210

392
376

1,078.366
1,140.291

22.19
16.16

All permanent disability
First report
Ultimate report

302,292
322,348

24.00
24.72

11,013
16,434

872
1,185

3,329.107
5,297.493

68.49
75.08

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," and similar exhibit on "Ultimate Report Basis," both June 1986. California data from the 1981 policy year were added since California
did not provide the 1982 policy year data to the National Council on Compensation Insurance.
1. The cost is the average cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for the type of cases shown.
2. The cost is the total cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for the type of cases shown.
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The overall significance of permanent disability cases is magnified
by moving from the first to ultimate report basis. They are more
numerous, more expensive on average, and account for 75 percent of
all cash benefits, more than 6 percentage points higher than on the first
report basis.
Although the data on an ultimate report basis provide a more accurate
picture of the number and cost of permanent disability cases, the balance
of this report will focus on first report data for two reasons. First, the
National Council on Compensation Insurance only began to develop
the countrywide exhibits on a simulated fifth report basis in 1979 and
on the simulated ultimate report basis in 1984, and therefore data on
an historical basis comparable to those shown in table 3.4 are unavailable.
Second, the procedures used to develop the simulated ultimate report
basis from the first report data are not comparable among all states.
In particular, the development procedures for three of the states ex
amined intensively in this report California, New Jersey, and New
York are inconsistent with those used for the other states for which
the NCCI provides data. 8
Another limitation to the data provided in tables 3.1 to 3.3 that af
fects the previous observations is that the information pertains to na
tional experience and thus masks significant differences in developments
in permanent disability benefits at the state level. Table 3.5 provides
an introduction to the diversity that underlies the national averages. In
1982, for example, the percentage of benefit costs accounted for by
permanent total cases ranged from zero percent in South Dakota to 13.10
percent in Hawaii. For major permanent partial disability cases, the
range was from 5.39 percent in Missouri to 79.63 percent in Rhode
Island. For minor permanent partial disability cases, the percentages
varied from 3.01 percent in Rhode Island to 49.10 in New Jersey. The
percentages for particular types of permanent disability benefits were
partially offsetting (as in Rhode Island), but the share of all costs ac
counted for by all types of permanent disability benefits ranged from
40.59 percent in Arizona to 84.21 percent in Rhode Island, each a con
siderable distance from the U.S. average of 68.49 percent. A major
purpose of this study is to explain some of the reasons for this diversity.
The Selection of Ten States
Each state controls its workers' compensation program, and there are
substantial differences among jurisdictions in the criteria and procedures

Table 3.5
Costs of Permanent Disability Cases,
by Jurisdiction, 1982

3
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Introducti
Permanent total

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

Major permanent partial Minor permanent partial

All permanent disability

Share of
Share of
Share of
Share of
Cost1
all costs2
Cost 1
all costs2
all costs2
Cost1
all costs2
Cost 1
($ millions) (percentage) ($ millions) (percentage) ($ millions) (percentage) ($ millions) (percentage)
1.386
3.029
1.197
0.819
17.782
3.000
1.114
0.495
1.937
7.491
3.434
5.260
0.497
6.770
0.539
1.589
1.693
2.895
10.273
3.237
2.889

3.13
9.18
2.05
2.13
2.79
2.47
1.24
5.22
7.17
4.88
4.01
13.10
2.23
2.04
1.26
2.59
2.83
5.20
6.76
5.97
3.31

19.244
16.688
17.794
21.153
289.126
75.859
44.001
3.203
17.761
75.223
48.362
20.028
5.498
173.783
16.185
29.594
34.790
34.551
96.528
30.258
32.229

43.46
50.59
30.43
55.10
45.29
62.35
49.18
33.77
65.70
49.03
56.43
49.89
24.74
52.43
37.75
48.23
58.25
62.01
63.55
55.82
36.93

8.213
5.599
4.744
5.488
217.269
16.820
17.017
1.822
1.162
14.277
11.934
7.335
8.383
68.475
7.203
9.189
8.600
3.768
14.324
7.653
28.642

18.55
16.97
8.11
14.30
34.03
13.83
19.02
19.21
4.30
9.31
13.92
18.27
37.73
20.66
16.80
14.98
14.40
6.76
9.43
14.12
32.82

28.843
25.317
23.735
27.461
524.177
95.678
62.132
5.520
20.860
96.991
63.730
32.623
14.378
249.028
23.928
40.372
45.083
41.214
121.125
41.147
63.760

65.13
76.75
40.59
71.53
82.11
78.64
69.45
58.21
77.16
63.22
74.36
81.26
64.71
75.12
55.81
65.80
75.48
73.97
79.74
75.91
73.07
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Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Total

3.821
3.952
1.987
0.448
3.256
1.073
0.875
1.689
4.847
1.003
2.735
1.567
4.979
1.260
31.172
0.598
0.791
0.000
1.387
22.384
0.244
0.039
1.863
2.751

1.69
2.54
1.81
1.54
3.88
2.94
3.81
5.59
2.75
2.26
0.98
2.38
3.68
1.65
11.27
1.56
1.72
0.00
2.06
3.97
2.11
0.31
2.74
3.07

112.111
84.690
56.082
16.389
4.528
22.969
10.543
18.564
45.007
25.379
102.792
25.948
54.246
8.274
61.210
30.519
23.767
2.873
34.697
157.629
6.946
5.477
31.543
34.652

49.56
54.37
51.01
56.29
5.39
62.97
45.91
61.42
25.58
57.20
36.71
39.35
40.08
10.84
22.12
79.63
51.64
38.21
51.48
27.94
59.93
43.45
46.47
38.64

14.919
18.444
18.069
3.414
34.400
1.485
3.883
1.256
86.391
7.753
51.122
15.424
37.700
37.455
50.506
1.154
9.239
1.551
11.779
171.603
1.136
1.863
9.971
19.929

6.60
11.84
16.44
11.73
40.98
4.07
16.91
4.15
49.10
17.47
18.26
23.39
27.85
49.05
18.25
3.01
20.07
20.62
17.48
30.42
9.80
14.78
14.69
22.22

130.851
107.086
76.139
20.251
42.184
25.527
15.301
21.509
136.245
34.134
156.649
42.940
96.925
46.990
142.888
32.271
33.798
4.424
47.863
351.616
8.326
7.379
43.377
57.332

57.84
68.75
69.26
69.56
50.25
69.99
66.63
71.16
77.44
76.93
55.95
65.11
71.61
61.54
51.64
84.21
73.43
58.83
71.01
62.33
71.84
58.55
63.91
63.92

172.051

3.54

2 ,078.689

42.77

1,078.366

22.19

3,329.107

68.49

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance , "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated June 1986.
1. The cost is the total cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for the type of cases shown. The cost of medical benefits is excluded.
2. The share is the total cost of indemnity benefits for the type of cases shown as a percentage of all indemnity benefits. Types of indemnity cases
not shown individually are death and temporary total disability.
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used to compensate permanent disabilities. The data in table 3.5 pro
vide some evidence on the extent of this diversity, although even some
states that devote similar percentages of benefits to permanent disabili
ty cases may reach the parity by different routes.
This study provides an examination of the approaches to permanent
disability benefits used in 10 jurisdictions. It was not feasible to ex
amine a larger number because the paucity of information on criteria
and procedures made extensive field work, reviews of published and
unpublished documents, interviews, and analyses of court decisions
necessary.
The 10 jurisdictions were selected at the beginning of a research project
sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) that commenced
in 1974. An advisory committee composed of academics and practi
tioners familiar with workers' compensation aided in the selection. The
field work took place in 1975-76 in most jurisdictions, and following
completion of an intensive statistical analysis of data from three states
(California, Florida, and Wisconsin), a final report was submitted to
the NSF in 1979 (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman). The information
on the 10 jurisdictions was updated by correspondence and interviews
between 1982 and 1985.
Among the factors considered when we chose the jurisdictions for
our study were: the relative emphasis placed on impairment, as oppos
ed to disability, as a basis for benefits; the administration procedures
used to assess the extent of impairment and disability; the relative im
portance of litigation in determining the amounts of benefits; the com
parative level of benefits; the attention devoted to rehabilitation by the
state workers' compensation agency; and the relative importance of selfinsurance, private insurance carriers, and state insurance funds.
Three states California, Florida, and Wisconsin were chosen partly
because they were included in the "wage-loss study" summarized in
part III of this volume, but also partly because of their distinctive at
tributes. California is the most populous state, and it uses a unique com
prehensive schedule for rating the extent of permanent partial disabili
ty. Before 1979, when our original field work was completed, Florida
had an unusual procedure that allowed workers to choose whether their
permanent injuries would be rated on the basis of impairment or on
the basis of disability. Since 1979, Florida has achieved fame or notoriety
because of the adoption of the wage-loss approach to permanent partial
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disability benefits. As for Wisconsin, its workers' compensation pro
gram is widely regarded as among the best-administered in the country.
To supplement these three states, New Jersey was an obvious can
didate. One of the authors (Berkowitz) had done previous work in the
state, which is widely know for its practice of evaluating permanent
partial disabilities on the whole man theory. New York was included
for several reasons. Not only is it the second largest state and the only
one with a hearing system that mandates an inquiry in each case before
closure, but it also has a unique combination of approaches to perma
nent disability benefits. We included the District of Columbia not only
because it measures loss of wage-earning capacity in the nonscheduled
permanent partial cases, but because when we began this study, it was
a federal jurisdiction operating under provisions of the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers' Act. Subsequently the program has been taken
over by the local government.
Nevada and Ohio were included in part because we wanted to describe
and analyze their experience with exclusive state funds. Another reason
for Nevada's inclusion was the 1972 amendment to its law that man
dated the use of the American Medical Association's Guides for the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Ohio was interesting not only
because it was an exclusive fund state, but also because it was the only
state besides Florida to use a choice of procedures approach for
nonscheduled cases. Michigan and Pennsylvania were chosen because
we thought they represented wage-loss states. We were particularly in
terested to learn why Michigan made more prominent use of redemp
tion settlements (compromise and release agreements) than did
Pennsylvania.
The initial reasons for selection of the 10 jurisdictions have in some
cases been rendered moot by subsequent changes in state laws.
Nonetheless, as we will indicate, the changes themselves in jurisdic
tions such as Florida, New Jersey, and Michigan have particular
significance in understanding the continuing quest for an effective way
to provide permanent disability benefits.
Historical Data for the Ten Jurisdictions
The historical data that follow, describing the numbers and costs of
permanent disability cases in the jurisdictions included in this study,
are based on National Council on Compensation Insurance informa
tion, and are therefore consistent with the data in tables 3.1 3.5. Two
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states in our 10-state study Ohio and Nevada are exclusive fund states
for which the NCCI does not collect information, and therefore they
are omitted from subsequent tables (as they were from earlier tables).
The shares of each state's indemnity cases accounted for by perma
nent total cases in 1958, 1968, 1973, 1978, and 1982 are shown in table
3.6. In 1958, the average proportion of all cases represented by per
manent total cases across the 45 states for which the NCCI collects in
formation was 0.1128 percent. Among the eight states considered here,
the range in the percentage of all cases accounted for by permanent
total cases was from 0.0406 percent in the District of Columbia to 0.1723
percent in Pennsylvania (36 percent and 153 percent of the U.S. average
share, respectively); the eight-state average was 0.0935 percent, or only
83 percent of the U.S. average share.
Through time, the share of all cases accounted for by permanent total
disability at the national level has varied in a fairly narrow range: roughly
0.10 percent to 0.16 percent. The eight-state average has fluctuated more
widely, dropping from 1958 to 1968, then increasing to 1973 and again
to 1978, and then dropping by 1982. In 1982, the eight-state average
share (0.13 percent) was about 88 percent of the national average (0.1348
percent).
The relative importance of permanent total cases in the eight states
has fluctuated considerably in some jurisdictions. In Michigan, for ex
ample, the share was 137 percent of the national average in 1958; down
to 53 percent in 1968; then, by 1978, up to fully 331 percent; only to
drop again to 130 percent in 1982. In Wisconsin, the figure was 51
percent in 1958, but had wound down to 29 percent by 1982. As of
1982, only Michigan and Pennsylvania had permanent total shares that
were more than 20 percent above the national average share for per
manent total cases; California, New Jersey, New York, and Wiscon
sin had shares more than 20 percent below the national average; the
District of Columbia and Florida were within 20 percent of the national
average.
The shares of each state's indemnity cases accounted for by major
permanent partial disability cases are presented in table 3.7. As previous
ly reported (table 3.2), the major cases share at the national level in
creased from 2.93 percent in 1958 to 6.56 percent in 1982. The na
tional experience has been closely tracked by the eight-state average,
which has consistently been within about 10 percent of the national
figure.

Table 3.6

Number of Permanent Total Disability Cases as a Share of All Cases,
1958-82, in Eight States
1958'

Jurisdiction(s)

19681

Share in
Share of state as %
all cases2
of U.S.
(%)
share

Share of
all cases2
(%)

19731

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all cases2

(%)

1982 1

1978'

Share in
Share in
state as % Share of state as %
of U.S.
all cases2
of U.S.
share
(%)
share

Share of
all cases2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

U.S. average

.1128

Eight-state average

.0935

82.85

.0685

66.77

.1079

65.73

.1342

99.62

.1300

87.62

California

.0666

59.02

.0883

86.12

.0796

48.47

.0430

31.93

.0428

28.82

District of Columbia

.0406

36.00

.0227

22.12

.1543

93.99

.1217

90.33

.1492

100.58

Florida

.0820

72.67

.0742

72.35

.1253

76.33

.1161

86.17

.1582

106.63

Michigan

.1546

137.01

.0547

53.31

.2511

152.99

.4455

330.62

.1926

129.79

New Jersey

.0793

70.28

.0517

50.37

.0944

57.50

.1422

105.52

.0938

63.19

New York

.0895

79.32

.0285

27.83

.0542

33.04

.0825

61.19

.0506

34.11

Pennsylvania

.1723

152.64

.1540

150.16

.2293

139.69

.3518

261.05

.3100

208.92

Wisconsin

.0574

50.88

.0404

39.36

.0624

38.02

.0174

12.95

.1026

.1641

.1348

.1484

.0430
28.96
SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The share is the number of permanent total disability cases as a percentage of all cases paying indemnity (cash) benefits in the state.
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Table 3.7
Number of Major Permanent Partial Disability Cases as a Share of All Cases,
1958-82, in Eight States
1958'

Jurisdiction(s)
U.S. average

Share of
all cases2
(%)

19681

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

2.93

Share of
all cases2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

4.38

1973 i

1978 1

Share in
Share of state as %
all cases2
of U.S.
(%)
share

Share in
Share of state as %
all cases2
of U.S.
(%)
share
5.14

4.09

§

1982'
Share of
all cases2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

CL
0
5'
3
O
f

6.56

H

Eight-state average

2.70

92.16

4.29

98.01

4.53

110.79

5.40

105.05

5.86

89.30

California

4.18

142.74

6.98

159.48

7.76

189.82

7.12

138.46

8.01

122.11

District of Columbia

2.23

76.20

3.43

78.29

8.92

218.26

13.75

267.52

12.06

183.76

<T>
GO

Florida

1.91

65.00

3.28

75.04

3.84

94.04

6.71

130.58

5.03

76.63

B
CL

Michigan

2.50

85.20

4.96

133.35

4.10

100.24

7.04

136.93

7.17

109.27

New Jersey

1.83

62.36

2.77

63.30

3.20

78.37

4.24

82.42

4.20

64.02
89.26

New York

2.34

79.88

2.17

49.62

2.82

68.98

4.36

84.90

5.86

Pennsylvania

3.46

117.87

4.82

110.15

1.89

46.30

1.47

27.58

1.40

21.26

Wisconsin

0.96

32.58

2.11

48.23

1.36

33.18

2.14

41.57

3.15

48.05

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The share is the number of major permanent partial disability cases as a percentage of all cases paying indemnity (cash) benefits in the state.
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The share of all cases accounted for by major permanent partial
disability cases has varied considerably through time in some jurisdic
tions, however. In the District of Columbia, the share was only 76 per
cent of the national average in 1958, but it soared to 268 percent of
the national average by 1978 and was still 184 percent of the national
average in 1982. The Florida share increased from 65 percent to 131
percent of the national average between 1958 and 1978, but slid to 77
percent in 1982. As of 1982, the share of all cases going to major per
manent partial disability was within 20 percent of the national average
only in Michigan and New York. States with shares at least 20 percent
above the national average were California and the District of Colum
bia. At the other extreme were Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, with shares
at least 50 percent below the national average share.
Table 3.8 provides the shares of all cases accounted for by minor
permanent partial disability cases. Nationally, the share increased from
1958 to 1968 and thereafter declined, and this general pattern was match
ed in the eight states on average, with the eight-state share consistently
within 10-20 percent of the national average share.
In contrast to permanent total and major permanent partial disability
cases, the experience of individual states with the shares of all cases
going to minor permanent partial disability has not varied dramatically
through time. Only Florida had a swing in its share relative to the U.S.
share in excess of 40 percent over the 1958 to 1982 period (up from
45 percent of the national average to 89 percent by 1978, and then back
to 43 percent). The other states have had relatively stable shares over
that period. New Jersey has consistently had a share of minor perma
nent partial disability cases in excess of 230 percent of the national
average; California and New York have consistently been within about
30 percent of the national average; and the District of Columbia,
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have always been at least 30
percent below the national average.
The share of all indemnity cases accounted for by all types of perma
nent disability cases (permanent total, major permanent partial, and minor
permanent partial) is provided in table 3.9. As previously noted (table
3.1), all permanent disability cases accounted for 26 percent of all in
demnity cases in 1958. That share increased to almost 29 percent in
1968, then declined to 25 percent in 1973 and 24 percent in 1978 and
1982. This pattern was closely tracked in the eight states on average:
their share consistently ran about 10-15 percent above the national
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Table 3.9
Number of All Types of Permanent Disability Cases as a Share of All Cases,
1958-82, in Eight States
1958'

Jurisdiction(s)

Share of
all cases2
(%)

1968 1

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all cases2
(%)

1973'

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all cases2
(%)

1978'

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all cases2
(%)

1982'

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all cases2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

U.S. average

26.35

Eight-state average

28.62

108.61

32.09

111.45

29.37

117.77

26.69

1 1 1 .46

22.18

92.44

California

26.61

100.98

37.60

130.58

34.94

140.10

28.58

119.36

29.95

124.82

District of Columbia

11.13

42.25

14.77

51.30

20.18

80.91

23.49

98.09

18.90

78.77

Florida

12.54

47.58

20.46

71.06

19.17

76.88

23.46

97.97

12.53

52.24

Michigan

28.80

24.94

23.95

24.00

9.24

35.06

16.54

57.44

17.82

71.46

17.09

71.35

17.63

73.48

New Jersey

68.99

261.82

61.30

212.88

53.18

213.24

54.22

226.43

45.28

188.70

New York

32.93

124.97

33.93

117.83

29.89

119.86

28.58

119.35

27.86

116.11

8.15

30.95

10.19

35.38

11.45

45.90

9.53

39.80

11.57

48.20

13.14

49.87

14.65

50.86

12.28

49.23

11.50

48.02

13.74

57.24

Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The share is the number of all types of permanent disability cases (permanent total, major permanent partial, and minor permanent partial) as a percent
age of all cases paying indemnity (cash) benefits in the state.
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average share from 1958 to 1978, and as of 1982 was about 8 percent
below.
The eight states' movements in the three types of permanent disability
cases as shown in tables 3.6 to 3.8 were partially offsetting. For exam
ple, in Pennsylvania the increased shares of permanent total and minor
permanent partial disability cases were partially offset by a decrease
in the share of major permanent partial disability cases. Nonetheless,
the percentage of all cases accounted for by permanent disability cases
changed dramatically in some states. The District of Columbia's share
relative to the national average share increased from 42 percent in 1958
to 98 percent in 1978, and then fell to 79 percent in 1982; Florida's
from 47 percent to 98 percent to 52 percent; Michigan's from 35 per
cent to 71 percent to 73 percent. New York and California began and
ended the 20-year period with permanent disability cases accounting
for shares within about 30 percent of the national average shares. New
Jersey's permanent disability cases as a percentage of its total cases were
always in excess of 180 percent of the national average, while the shares
in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin were always less than 60 percent of the
national average shares.
The average costs of the various types of permanent disability cases
are analyzed in the next series of tables. Table 3.10 shows the average
costs of permanent total cases in the U.S. and in the eight states in 1958,
1968, 1973, 1978, and 1982. In 1958, the national average was $19,322,
compared to $24,107 (almost 25 percent more) in the eight states. The
range among the eight states that year was from $17,526 in Michigan
to $52,364 in Wisconsin (91 percent and 271 percent of the national
average, respectively).
The average cost of permanent total cases increased nationally from
$19,322 in 1958 to $92,055 in 1982. The average permanent total cost
in the eight states increased more rapidly than the national average, so
that by 1982 the eight-state average ($149,978) was about 163 percent
of the national average.
The relative cost of permanent total cases varied widely within the
eight jurisdictions between 1958 and 1982. Michigan had the lowest
average cost in 1958 (91 percent of the national average) and the next
to the lowest in 1982 (75 percent), but in 1968 its average cost was
164 percent of the national average, ranking it fourth among the eight
jurisdictions that year. Wisconsin had the highest average cost in 1958
and in 1978 (271 percent and 180 percent of the national averages in

Table 3.10
Permanent Total Disability Cases in Eight States, 1958-82
Average Costs and Costs Relative to U.S. Averages

Jurisdiction(s)

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U .S. cost
(%)

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

37,544

35,606

1982 1

1978 1

1973 »

19681

1958'

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

Cost2

(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

92,055

78,788

U.S. average

19,322

Eight-state average

24,107

124.77

53,084

149.09

56,759

151.181

94,738

120.24

149,978

162.92

California

31,420

162.61

63,673

178.83

67,525

179.86

139,745

177.37

199,803

217.05

District of Columbia

30,500

157.85

27,000

75.83

163,000

434.16

132,800

168.55

322,902

350.77

Florida

25,000

129.39

38,208

107.31

45,796

121.98

62,648

79.51

97,291

105.69

Michigan

17,526

90.71

58,238

163.56

36,988

98.52

43,686

55.68

69,339

75.32

New Jersey

32,500

168.20

66,464

186.67

63,396

168.86

87,944

111.62

107,704

117.00

New York

19,714

102.03

33,280

93.47

42,358

112.82

62,925

79.87

60,789

66.03

Pennsylvania

17,742

91.82

35,148

98.71

64,776

172.53

138,076

175.25

180,187

195.74

Wisconsin

52,364

271.01

88,364

248.17

47,333

126.08

141,667

179.81

161,812

175.78

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The cost is the average cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for permanent total disability cases in the state.
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those years), but in 1982 ranked only fourth out of the eight jurisdic
tions. These fluctuations reflect in part the relatively small number of
permanent total cases: a few cases can significantly affect a state's
average costs. Nonetheless, a few stable patterns are evident. For ex
ample, in each of the five years, California and Wisconsin had perma
nent total costs at least 25 percent above the national average, while
Florida and New York had costs within 35 percent of the national
average.
The average costs of major permanent partial disability cases are shown
in table 3.11. As previously discussed, the national average for this type
of case increased from $6,879 in 1958 to $25,139 in 1982. The eightstate average also increased through time, but at a slower pace until
recently. In 1958, the average cost of major permanent partial disabili
ty cases in the eight states was 119 percent of the national average; in
1968, 109 percent; in 1973, 103 percent; and in 1978, 90 percent. Then
in 1982 the eight-state average cost shot up to 135 percent of the na
tional average cost.
Major permanent partial disability costs declined relative to the na
tional average during each of the subperiods shown in table 3.11 in three
states: California, New York, and (with one exception) New Jersey.
Pennsylvania was a clear exception to the pattern of declining relative
costs. Pennsylvania's average major permanent partial disability costs
were about 93 percent of the national average in 1958, then fell to 70
percent in 1968; but by 1982 they had soared to $78,575, more than
312 percent of the national average and far higher than in any of the
other seven jurisdictions.
Table 3.12 presents the average costs of minor permanent partial
disability cases. The national average increased from $1,253 to $4,953
between 1958 and 1982. The eight states on average were within 3 per
cent of the national average in 1958, 1968, 1973, and 1982; in 1978
their average minor permanent partial disability cost had declined to
only 89 percent of the national average. In all but New Jersey and Penn
sylvania, minor permanent disability cases were relatively less expen
sive (compared to the national average) in 1982 than in 1958. As with
major permanent partial disability costs, Pennsylvania provided the most
striking increase, beginning at 92 percent of the national average in 1958
and increasing through time until by 1982 its minor permanent partial
disability costs were more than 185 percent of the national average.
As of 1982, New York's minor permanent partial disability average

Table 3.11
Major Permanent Partial Disability Cases in Eight States, 1958-82
Average Costs and Costs Relative to U.S. Averages
1958'

Jurisdiction(s)

Cost2
(dollars)

U.S. average

6,879

Eight-state average

8,169

California
District of Columbia

1973 1

1968'

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost

9,983
118.75

10,890

Cost2
(dollars)

1978'

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost

13,265
109.09

13,602

Cost2
(dollars)

1982'

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost

21,456
102.55

19,379

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost

25,139
90.32

34,119

135.72

8,442

122.73

10,005

100.23

12,516

94.35

15,776

73.53

17,330

68.93

10,900

158.45

11,987

120.08

17,242

129.99

38,266

178.34

36,620

145.67

Florida

5,491

79.82

9,692

97.09

12,070

90.99

19,276

89.84

30,728

122.23

Michigan

8,705

126.55

18,209

182.41

20,226

152.48

26,666

124.28

39,892

158.68

New Jersey

8,451

122.85

10,308

103.26

11,713

88.30

15,344

71.51

22,314

88.76

New York

8,897

129.34

12,368

123.90

14,337

108.08

18,534

86.38

19,730

78.48

Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

6,413

93.23

6,956

69.68

20,062

151.24

54,904

255.89

78,575

312.56

10,448

151.88

10,899

109.18

15,775

118.92

20,890

97.36

27,766

110.45

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The cost is the average cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for major permanent partial disability cases in the state.
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costs were more than 40 percent below the national average; Penn
sylvania's were more than 85 percent above; and costs in the other five
states were within 25 percent of the national average.
Table 3.13 provides the average cost for all types of permanent
disability cases from 1958 to 1982. The increase in the national average
during this period was from $1,957 to $11,013; these figures reflect
the dominant number of minor permanent partial disability cases. The
eight-state average cost for all permanent disability cases was within
4 percent of the national average in 1958, 1968, and 1973, declined
to only 88 percent of the national average in 1978, and then soared to
133 percent of the national average in 1982.
Average permanent disability costs declined relative to the national
average in each of the successive subperiods between 1958 and 1982
in California and New York. In Wisconsin, costs were lower in 1982
than in 1958, although between 1978 and 1982 costs did increase. In
Michigan and New Jersey, costs increased between 1958 and 1968, then
declined in 1973 and 1978, and finally increased between 1978 and 1982;
in both states average costs relative to the national average were lower
in 1982 than they were in 1958. In the District of Columbia (up from
202 percent of the national average in 1958 to 249 percent in 1982),
Florida (up from 115 percent to 145 percent), and Pennsylvania (up
from 191 percent in 1958 to 201 percent in 1982) the relative costs in
creased during the 24-year period.
As of 1982, the eight states could be divided into three distinct groups
in terms of their average costs for permanent disability cases compared
to the national averages. Michigan, Pennsylvania, and the District of
Columbia had permanent disability costs that on average were 80 per
cent or more above the national average; New Jersey and New York
had costs more than 40 percent below the national average; and Califor
nia, Florida, and Wisconsin all had costs within 45 percent of the na
tional average.
The total costs of permanent disability cases in the eight jurisdictions,
shown in tables 3.14 to 3.17, reflect the developments in the number
of such cases and their average costs shown in the two previous sets
of tables. 9
Nationally, the share of all cash benefits accounted for by permanent
total disability cases increased from 2.64 percent in 1958 to 3.54 per
cent in 1982 (table 3.14). In the eight states, the permanent total share

Table 3.13
All Types of Permanent Disability Cases in Eight States, 1958-82
Aversige Costs and Costs; Relative to U.S. Aiverages

>

3

(-H

1958'

Jurisdiction(s)

Cost2
(dollars)

U.S. average

1,957

Eight-state average

1,964

1968 1

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

1973 1

Cost
Cost2
(dollars)

relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

3,379
100.39

3,400

Cost2
(dollars)

1978 1

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

4,599
100.62

4,485

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

8,178
96.44

7,218

3

1982 1

Cost2
(dollars)

Cost
relative to
U.S. cost
(%)

11,013
88.26

14,693

O
CL
0

o'

3
O
O)

133.41

H
3i

California

3,064

156.57

4,127

122.14

5,398

117.38

7,290

89.14

8,407

76.34

District of Columbia

3,956

202.19

4,707

139.29

10,711

232.89

24,933

304.87

27,447

249.22

f?

Florida

2,249

114.92

3,699

109.49

4,910

106.75

8,450

103.33

15,898

144.35

C/5

Michigan

4,231

216.25

8,494

251.40

8,397

182.58

14,784

180.78

20,519

186.31

New Jersey

1,141

58.29

2,015

59.64

2,617

56.90

3,711

45.38

6,269

56.92

New York

1,616

82.60

2,430

71.92

3,072

66.81

4,997

61.10

6,322

57.41

Pennsylvania

3,735

190.86

4,866

144.01

7,585

164.91

19,903

243.37

22,133

200.97

Wisconsin

2,789

142.54

3,775

111.73

4,520

98.27

7,107

86.90

10,549

95.79

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The cost is the average cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for all types of permanent disability cases (permanent total, major permanent partial, and
minor permanent partial) in the state.
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increased even more rapidly, rising from 2.59 percent of all cash benefits
in 1958 (98 percent of the national share) to 4.43 percent in 1982 (125
percent).
Among individual states, the shares of all cash benefits accounted
for by permanent total cases are quite volatile, reflecting in part the
relatively small number of such cases. Every state had a swing in its
share (as a percentage of the national average share) of at least 40 per
cent during the 20-year period. An extreme example is the District of
Columbia, where the permanent total share was 22 percent of the na
tional average in 1968, 261 percent in 1973, 62 percent in 1978, and
202 percent in 1982. Only New York had a permanent total share below
the national average in all five years; only Pennsylvania was consistently
above the national average. As of 1982, Pennsylvania (with a 318 per
cent figure) was far above the other jurisdictions in its share of cash
benefits accounted for by payments for permanent total cases; Florida
and the District of Columbia were also above the national average; and
California, Michigan, New Jersey, and Wisconsin were from 10 to 30
percent below the national average. New York's share was almost 75
percent below the national average. The high cost in Pennsylvania is
due both to its relatively large number of permanent total cases (table
3.6) and the relatively high cost of each case (table 3.10). New York
achieved the lowest share of cost accounted for by permanent total
benefits in 1982 (table 3.14) both because its average cost for perma
nent total cases was lower than in the other seven jurisdictions (table
3.10) and because permanent total cases were quite rare in the state
(table 3.6).
Major permanent partial disability cases accounted for an increasing
share of all cash benefits nationally through time, rising from 24 per
cent in 1958 to 43 percent in 1982 (table 3.15). The average share in
the eight states for major permanent partial disability benefit cases was
consistently within 5 percent of the U.S. share. There were, however,
large swings in some states. In Florida and Michigan, major perma
nent partial disability costs as a percentage of the national average in
creased by 25 percent or more, while Pennsylvania's share dropped
from 154 percent of the national average in 1958 to 52 percent in 1982.
As of 1982, the District of Columbia stood apart in terms of the cost
of major permanent partial disability cases: they accounted for 66 per
cent of all cash benefits in that jurisdiction, a share that was 154 per
cent of the national average share. In Michigan, the share for major
permanent partial disability benefits was more than 25 percent above

Table 3.15
Total Costs of Major Permanent Partial Disability Cases as a Share of All Cash Benefits
1958-82, in Eight States

Share in

Jurisdiction(s)

Share of state as %
of U.S.
all costs2
share
(%)

Share of

all costs2
(%)

19781

1973'

19681

1958'

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all costs2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share of
all costs2
(%)

19821

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

42.77

37.99

31.27

Share of
all costs2
(%)

U.S. average

24.45

Eight-state average

25.35

103.70

29.08

95.60

32.45

103.77

37.41

98.47

42.18

98.63

California

33.38

136.52

37.38

122.90

42.61

136.25

43.85

115.41

45.29

105.90

District of Columbia

33.10

135.40

38.07

125.18

56.68

181.24

73.44

193.30

65.70

153.62

O
CL

Florida

20.97

85.78

25.64

84.29

31.39

100.38

46.56

122.54

49.03

114.65

o

Michigan

22.68

92.76

39.27

129.11

34.26

109.55

48.65

128.05

54.37

127.13

New Jersey

16.45

67.27

15.49

50.92

18.20

58.19

23.99

63.14

25.58

59.81

New York

21.73

88.89

18.67

61.37

25.07

80.16

30.97

81.50

36.71

85.85

Pennsylvania

37.66

154.04

30.86

101.45

23.32

74.57

22.55

59.34

22.12

51.73

n>
H

Wisconsin

17.19

70.33

27.45

90.27

22.56

72.12

30.30

79.75

38.64

90.34

GO

30.42

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The share is the total cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for major permanent partial disability cases as a percentage of all indemnity benefits in the state.
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the national average; California, Florida, New York, and Wisconsin
were within 15 percent of the national average; and New Jersey and
Pennsylvania were each more than 40 percent below the national average.
In Pennsylvania, a high average cost for each major permanent partial
disability case (table 3.11) was more than offset by the relative scarci
ty of such cases (table 3.7). The District of Columbia, on the other ex
treme, had both high average costs and a relatively large number of
these cases.
Minor permanent partial disability cases represented a decreasing share
of all cash benefits nationally between 1958 and 1982 (table 3.16). The
importance of minor permanent partial cases declined on average in
the eight states as well, with the eight-state and national shares within
8 percent of each other in each of the five years. Again there were
divergences among the individual states and some dramatic movements
at that level. In the District of Columbia, for example, the share of all
cash benefits represented by minor permanent partial disability cases
relative to the national average share decreased by more than 50 per
cent between 1958 and 1982, while in Pennsylvania there was a more
than 50 percent increase. (Even with this increase, Pennsylvania re
mained below the national average in the relative importance of minor
permanent partial disability benefits.) As of 1982, the shares of all cash
benefits devoted to minor permanent partial disability cases were more
than 50 percent above the national average share in New Jersey and
California, and at the other extreme, at least 40 percent below in
Michigan, Florida, and the District of Columbia. In New York, Penn
sylvania, and Wisconsin, the shares were within 20 percent of the na
tional average.
The shares of dollars accounted for by all three types of permanent
disability cases (permanent total, major permanent partial, and minor
permanent partial) are examined in table 3.17 and in graph 3.1. Na
tionally, the share increased from 62 percent in 1958 to 69 percent in
1982. The experience in the eight states on average was similar, with
an increase from 65 percent in 1958 to 68 percent in 1982.
Within individual states, the percentage of total benefits represented
by all permanent disability benefits combined did not undergo as much
change during the 20-year period as did the percentages represented
by individual types of permanent disability benefits, in part because the
movements of the particular types were offsetting in some states.
Nonetheless, there were some significant movements through time, and
as of 1982 the individual jurisdictions diverged widely.

Table 3.17
Total Costs of All Types of Permanent Disability Cases as a Share of All Cash Benefits
1958-82, in Eight States
19581

Jurisdiction(s)

1973 1

19681

Share in
Share of state as %
all costs2
of U.S.
(%)
share

U.S. average

62.49

Eight-state average

64.57

103.33

California

76.99

District of Columbia

59.86

Florida
Michigan

Share of
all costs2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

67.74

19781

Share in
Share of state as %
all costs2
of U.S.
share
(%)
66.20

Share of
all costs2
(%)

100.26

123.21

83.07

122.63

82.81

125.10

81.37

95.79

64.45

95.14

79.68

120.38

81.73

56.50

90.41

60.97

90.01

63.72

96.26

71.33

40.75

65.26

61.08

90.17

61.90

93.51

New Jersey

83.74

134.01

67.03

98.91

67.54

New York

55.50

88.81

57.30

84.59

56.99

69.45

1982 1

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

67.46

67.92

104.91

68.87

>

a

Share of
all costs2
(%)

Share in
state as %
of U.S.
share

a

68.49
102.09

I

§
do

67.52

98.59

120.62

82.11

119.88

121.16

77.16

112.66

OO

105.75

63.22

92.30

CL

65.47

97.06

68.75

100.37

102.03

74.25

110.08

77.44

113.06

86.10

54.67

81.05

55.95

81.69

Pennsylvania

51.74

82.80

45.61

67.34

53.35

80.60

53.02

78.61

51.64

75.40

Wisconsin

63.13

101.02

65.99

97.41

58.52

88.41

55.45

82.21

63.92

93.33

SOURCE: National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Experience Including Certain Competitive State Funds 1st
Report Basis," exhibits dated: for 1958, no date; for 1968, March 15, 1972; for 1973, July 1976; for 1978, April 1982; and for 1982, June 1986.
1. The data shown are for the insurance industry policy years that most closely correspond to the calendar years shown. For Pennsylvania, e.g., the
1982 data are for insurance policies in effect between April 1982 and March 1983.
2. The share is the total cost of indemnity (cash) benefits for all types of permanent disability cases (permanent total, major permanent partial, and
minor permanent partial) as a percentage of all indemnity benefits in the state.
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In three jurisdictions—California, New Jersey, and the District of
Columbia—the share of all benefits going to permanent disability cases
in 1982 was at least 10 percent above the national average share, but
the three reached that status by different routes. The California share
was consistently above the national average share by about 20 percent
for all five years between 1958 and 1982. New Jersey began as the
highest share state in 1958, dropped slightly below the national share
in 1968, and has steadily increased its share since 1973 so that by 1982
it ranks only behind California. The District of Columbia has an even
more volatile history, ranking below the national average share in 1958
and 1968, then increasing rapidly so that by 1978 the jurisdiction rank
ed first among the eight states in share of benefits devoted to perma
nent disability benefits, and then declining somewhat between 1978 and
1982, but still remaining about 13 percent above the national average.
In two jurisdictions—New York and Pennsylvania—the share of all
benefits going to permanent disability benefits in 1982 was at least 10
percent below the national average share, a record these jurisdictions
had consistently maintained over the 1958 to 1982 period.
Three jurisdictions—Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin—were within
10 percent of the national average share of benefits going to permanent
disability benefits as of 1982. Florida had always been within 10 per
cent of the national average share between 1958 and 1982. Michigan
had been well below the national average share in 1958, but was within
10 percent of the national average from 1968 to 1982. Wisconsin had
begun with a share of benefits going to permanent disability cases slightly
above the national average in 1958, had seen that share steadily decline
to 82 percent of the national average share in 1978, and then rebound
ed to 93 percent of the national share as of 1982.

Significance of the Data
The causes and significance of the movements in the numbers and
costs of permanent disability benefits will be examined in more detail
in subsequent chapters that deal with individual states. Here one aspect
of the significance will be examined: the relationship between the share
of all benefits accounted for by permanent disability benefits and the
employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance.
Information on the employers' costs of workers' compensation in
surance for a representative sample of employers is presented in table
3.18. 10 The figures are adjusted manual rates, which are insurance

Table 3.18
as a Percentage of Payroll, 1958-74, in Nine States
Insurance
Compensation
Workers'
of
Costs
Employers'

Jurisdiction
U.S. average
(28 states)
California
D.C.
Florida
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin

1972

1965

1958

Costs

Costs in
state as
% of U.S.
average

Costs

Costs in
state as
% of U.S.
average

0.618
0.707

—
114.4

0.791
1.183

—
149.6

0.450
0.911

72.8
147.4

0.715
1.039

90.4
131.4

0.627
0.355
0.523

101.5
57.4
84.6

0.820
0.386
0.603

103.7
48.8
76.2

Costs

Costs in
state as
% of U.S.
average

0.783
1.102
0.737

—
140.7
94.1

0.914
1.224
0.864
0.885
0.387
0.505

1984 high

1978

116.7
156.3
110.3
113.0
49.4
64.5

Costs

Costs in
state as
% of U.S.
average

1.420
2.135
3.502
2.641
1.890
1.687
1.770
1.550
1.173
0.752

150.4
246.7
186.0
133.1
118.8
124.6
109.2
82.6
53.0

1984 low

Costs

Costs in
state as
% of U.S.
average

Costs

Costs in
state as
% of U.S.
average

1 .434
.936
.911
.674
.798
.231
.107
.521
.339
().846

—
135.0
133.3
116.7
125.4
85.8
77.2
106.1
93.4
59.0

1.368
.936
.909
.552
.283
.231
1.079
1.521
1.235
0.846

—
141.5
139.5
113.5
93.8
90.0
78.9
111.2
90.3
61.8

>
3

5*

"1
O
0
O
D

SOURCE: U.S. average: weighted observations from Burton, Hunt, and Krueger (1985), table 28. Individual state data from Burton, Hunt, and Krueger
(1985), table 26.
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Graph 3.2
Employers' Costs of Workers' Compensation (1984) as a Function of the Share of All Cash Benefits
Accounted for by Permanent Disability Cases (1982)
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premiums in dollars per $100 of payroll. The adjusted manual rates
can be interpreted as the percentage of payroll expended on workers'
compensation insurance after factors such as experience rating and
dividends are considered. The data are for selected years between 1958
and 1984 that roughly correspond to the years shown in the previous
tables in this chapter dealing with numbers and costs of permanent
disability benefits. The data are available for nine of the states in our
study. As shown in table 3.18, data for the nine states are available
only since 1978, and so the discussion focuses on insurance costs in
1978 and 1984. Two sets of data are presented for 1984—high adjusted
manual rates, which reflect the traditional factors that modify insurance
rates, such as experience rating and dividends, and low adjusted manual
rates, which also reflect the competitive devices that have emerged in
recent years in workers' compensation, including open competition and
deviations. Hunt, Krueger, and Burton (1985) argue that the low ad
justed manual rates are the most accurate measure of costs in 1984,
and so we use these rates.
There is a considerable range in workers' compensation insurance
rates in 1984 among the jurisdictions in our study, with California about
40 percent above the national average (28 states) and Wisconsin about
40 percent below. The relationship between insurance costs and share
of all benefits accounted for by permanent disability cases is examined
in graph 3.2. Eight of the ten states (all but Ohio and Nevada) have
appropriate data and are shown in the graph. There is a general positive
relationship between the share of permanent disability benefits and the
cost of workers' compensation insurance. The District of Columbia and
California are among the three high-share states and are the two highcost states. Pennsylvania and New York are among the three low-share
and three low-cost states.
The generally positive relationship between share and costs for the
eight states shown in graph 3.2 is hardly conclusive, given the small
sample size. More persuasive evidence is summarized in table 3.19.
There are 45 states with data on the 1982 share of all costs accounted
for by permanent disability benefits (table 3.5) for which data are
available on the employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance
in 1984. There is a positive correlation between the variables; the regres
sion results suggest that a 10 percent increase in share is associated with
an increase in workers' compensation premiums of $0.24 per $100 of
payroll. This regression result is shown on graph 3.2 as the "45-state
relationship" line. The eight states of particular concern in our study
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are scattered along this line (although most are above, suggesting higher
costs than would be expected given the share of costs accounted for
by permanent disability benefits in these states).
Table 3.19
Statistical Relationships Between Employers' Costs
of Workers' Compensation and Share of All Cash Benefits
Accounted for by Permanent Disability Cases
Data

Correlation
coefficient

Regression results with
costs as dependent variable2

1982 share/ 1984 costs'

0.401

-0.431
(.575)

+

.024 share
(.008)

1978 share/1978 costs

0.364

-0.453
(.724)

+

.028 share
(.011)

1978-1982 change in share/
1978-1984 change in costs'

0.381

-0.259
(.079)

+

.030 share
(.011)

SOURCE: 1982 share from table 3.5; 1978 share from source cited in table 3.1, n.l; 1978 and
1984 cost data from Burton, Hunt, and Krueger (1985), table 26.
1. 1984 costs are low adjusted manual rates.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.

The relationship between 1982 share of costs due to permanent disabili
ty benefits and 1984 insurance costs is positive and the relationship is
statistically significant. Statistical results that tend to confirm the positive
relationship between shares and insurance costs are included in table
3.19. For 1978 shares and 1978 insurance costs, the relationship is also
positive; the regression results indicate that a 10 percent increase in
share is associated with a $0.28 increase in workers' compensation
premiums per $100 of payroll. In addition, there is a positive relation
ship between changes in shares in each state between 1978 and 1982
and changes in insurance costs in each state between 1978 and 1984;
the regression results indicate that a 10 percent increase in share over
time is associated with a $0.30 increase in workers' compensation
premiums per $100 of payroll.
The similarity of the results for the three regressions reported in table
3.19 lend support to the view that share of costs going to permanent
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disability benefits and workers' compensation insurance costs are
positively associated, especially since the relationships between the
variables are statistically significant in each of the regressions. We do
not wish to overstate the importance of the relationship between per
manent disability benefits and costs. Burton and Krueger (1986) have
argued that changes in the levels of all types of benefits were important
determinants of insurance cost developments between 1972 and 1983
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. In addition, a statistical
examination by Krueger and Burton (1984) shows that interstate dif
ferences in benefit levels other than permanent partial benefits and dif
ferences among states in insurance arrangements are significant deter
minants of interstate differences in insurance costs. It is obvious from
graph 3.2 that factors other than the share of costs accounted for by
permanent disability benefits must account for some of the interstate
differences in insurance costs. Nonetheless, the differences in shares
appear to be one important factor in explaining interstate cost differences,
which underlines the relevance of the present study's focus on perma
nent disability benefits.

Conclusions
The extensive data in this chapter can be viewed at several levels of
aggregation. At the national level (tables 3.1 to 3.3), the numbers of
permanent disability cases relative to all types of cases declined be
tween 1958 and 1982, while the average costs of such cases relative
to the costs of temporary total cases increased. The shares of all cash
benefits accounted for by permanent disability cases increased from 1958
to 1978, but subsequently have consistently been about two-thirds of
all cash payments. Thus, at the national level, the appearance is one
of relative stability and gradual movements in the number and costs
of permanent disability cases. The average experience in the eight states
with permanent disability benefits also is relatively stable. Numerical
ly, between 1958 and 1978 all permanent disability cases accounted for
about a 10 percent larger share in the eight states than nationally (table
3.9); by 1982, the eight-states share was about 10 percent below the
national share. Meanwhile, average costs for all permanent disability
cases in the eight states declined from about 100 percent of the national
average in 1958 to 88 percent in 1978 and then increased to about 33
percent above the national average in 1982 (table 3.13). The conse
quence of the offsetting trends is that the share of total cash benefits
accounted for by permanent disability cases in the eight states has con-
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sistently been within a few percentage points of the national average
share from 1958 to 1982 (table 3.17).
The relative stability and gradualness of change at the national and
eight-state levels of aggregation mask a great deal of diversity among
the states as of 1982 in the relative numbers and average costs of per
manent disability cases and in shares of all cash benefits accounted for
by those cases, and belies the significant changes that have occurred
from 1958 to 1982 in many jurisdictions. The full extent of diversity
and change can be appreciated only by studying the individual state ex
perience over the twenty years, but the intermediate level of aggrega
tion in graph 3.1 provides a useful summary.
In the balance of part II of this study we attempt to explain some of
the more significant developments in numbers and costs by examining
changes in procedure and criteria in the states since 1958. We also at
tempt to show how the changes in cost levels from 1958 to 1982
generated pressures for change in the approaches to compensating per
manent disabilities that in some jurisdictions resulted in statutory or ad
ministrative changes by 1986, the terminal point in our study.
NOTES
1. The policy years vary among states and do not always correspond with calendar years. For
example, the 1982 data for the District of Columbia shown in the tables in this chapter pertain
to policies written between February 1982 and January 1983.
2. At one time, the distinction was based on the severity of the injury. Thus, an impairment of
50 percent or more of an arm was treated as a major permanent partial, while an impairment
of less than 50 percent of an arm was treated as a minor permanent partial. Since 1967, the distinction
between major and minor permanent partial has been based upon the amount of cash benefits
paid in the case. For example, for policies written in the District of Columbia in 1982, the "critical
value" was $10,000. The critical values are changed for each state whenever the benefit levels
for permanent partial are amended.
The distinctions between major and minor permanent partial disability cases in states with in
dependent rating bureaus may depend on procedures different from the critical value procedure
used in states that rely on the National Council on Compensation Insurance for rate making. States
with independent rating bureaus that are part of our ten-state study are California, New Jersey,
and New York. The potential inconsistency among the jurisdictions in the procedures used to
separate major and minor permanent partial disability cases is a reason why most of our analysis
in this report relies on the total costs of all permanent disability cases in various states, a statistic
that is not affected by the division between the major and minor categories.
3. The use of the critical values is explained in note 2, above. As of 1982, the critical value was
$10,000 in the District of Columbia, $16,000 in Michigan, and $14,500 in Wisconsin.
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4. The critical values discussed in the preceding two notes are changed only when there are statutory
changes in permanent partial disability benefits. In most cases, the amounts of permanent partial
disability benefits depend in part on the workers' preinjury wages. Thus as wages increase through
time in a state without statutory changes, there is likely to be a shift in cases from the minor
to the major permanent partial disability categories. For example, the critical value was $10,000
in the District of Columbia between 1972 and 1984, which probably is a factor explaining the
declining share of minor permanent partial cases in the District between 1973 and 1982 shown
in table 3.8.
5. Some cases may be filed two or more years after the policy year expires but are nonetheless
charged to that year. This might happen, for example, for a work-related disease where the ex
posure took place in the policy year but the disease did not manifest itself until years later.
6. Other movements between types of cases are possible. For example, a case initially classified
as temporary total may result in a payment of death benefits. Cases can also move to less serious
categories.
7. The actual ultimate report on 1982 cases is not yet available because not enough time has elapsed,
but a simulated ultimate report on 1982 cases has been prepared by the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance. The simulation is based on data showing the first to ultimate report develop
ment factors for reports from earlier policy years for which actual ultimate data are already available.
8. For exhibits on an ultimate report basis prepared by the National Council on Compensation
Insurance, all states were developed by injury type to an ultimate report basis for losses and to
a fifth report basis for the number of cases. There are several exceptions, including New Jersey
where losses are not developed by any type of injury (just for indemnity losses for all types of
injuries combined) and New Jersey and New York, where losses are only developed to a fifth
report basis.
9. Actually the share of all costs within a state accounted for by permanent disability cases depends
on the number of such cases and their average costs relative to the costs of other types of cases
within that state, and in particular temporary total disability cases, which account for the bulk
of each state's cases.
10. The methodology used to derive the data on the employers' costs of workers' compensation
insurance is presented in Burton and Krueger (1986).

Chapter 4
Procedures for Permanent
Partial Benefits
Workers' compensation procedures are carried out by both private
parties and public agencies. Typically five actors are involved—the in
jured worker, his employer, the insurer of the employer's liability, the
provider of medical care, and the state agency—although one actor may
double and play two roles at a time. For example, the employer may
self-insure and thus dispense with the services usually provided by a
private insurance carrier, although the company may still hire a ser
vice bureau to.administer its claims. Or, if the state has an exclusive
state insurance fund, the state agency may carry out the claims manage
ment functions usually performed by private carriers. But no matter
how these roles are distributed, all workers' compensation claims in
volve an injured worker, his employer, the insurer of the employer's
liability, the provider of medical care, and a workers' compensation
agency.
Any of these actors may be represented by legal counsel. The worker
may be represented at some stage of the process by a lawyer, and the
carrier and the employer may also employ counsel if the case reaches
the contested level. The legal aspects of the administrative process have
traditionally received the most attention. We do not ignore these, but
choose to emphasize the other aspects.
The process is complex, not only because of the number of parties
with or without their legal representation, but because of the blending
of private administration with public interest. The laws mandate specific
payments but generally leave the claims management in private hands.
The exact combination of public standards and private administration
in workers' compensation is not encountered either in the administra
tion of tort suits or in the public income transfer programs.
The Claims Management Function

Common to all systems, whether tort suits, workers' compensation
cases, or social security claims, is the payment of a claim. The claims
management function consists of the following five procedures:
75
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(1) Opening procedures. Usually a claim for benefits is made,
although in some instances news of the event may by itself trigger an
administering agency to proceed with payment.
(2) Validation procedures. In all systems, the validity of the claim
for payment must be scrutinized. Was the person insured, or did he
otherwise fall within the population eligible for receipt of the benefits?
Did the event occur as claimed? Did it result in the alleged consequence?
Is the extent of the injury or monetary loss as large as is claimed? What
standard shall be used to measure these losses? In some tort cases it
is necessary to determine who was at fault; in workers' compensation
it is sufficient to determine whether the injury was connected with the
insured activity. In either case, if reserves are to be set aside, estimates
must be made of the eventual total cost of the claim.
(3) Payment procedures. In a sense this is the heart of the matter.
Whether it is cash transfers or payment in kind, the appropriate account
must be debited, and the payments made and delivered in a timely fashion
as prescribed by the statutes or agreement of the parties. The payment
may be made in a lump sum or in periodic installments. Separate and
more complex procedures are required for processing medical claims
and other benefits in kind, since another party, the provider, is involved.
(4) Contested procedures. If the claim is denied and the injured party
protests, administrative procedures must allow for reconsideration of
such claims and possible modification of the initial decision. If the matter
is not satisfactorily settled and the case is controverted, further legal
procedures come into play. The dissatisfied claimant may hire an at
torney who may perform, or cause to be performed, additional ad
ministrative procedures. Another investigation of the claim may take
place, other examinations to determine medical condition may be
authorized, and a whole new cadre of people may become involved.
(5) Closing procedures. In the event that the claim is denied, or at
the expiration of the period of payment, the file is closed and the case
ended.
Responsibility for Claims Management
In a public program, such as the social security system, these claims
procedures become the responsibility of a governmental unit such as
the Social Security Administration. The agency requires information
from the applicant, the physician, and possibly vocational experts.
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However, the central administrative responsibility remains with the agen
cy that administers, supervises, and eventually pays or denies claims,
subject to appeals to the courts.
In tort cases, the administration of the claims management function
is usually the responsibility of a private insurance carrier whose ac
tivities are constrained by various statutes and decisional law. The
claimsperson is a guardian of the assets of the carrier and, in general,
seeks to minimize the amounts the carrier pays. The claimant is naturally
concerned with maximizing the amounts due him. The resolution of
that contest becomes a matter of public concern only in the event of
an appeal to the judicial system.
The administration of workers' compensation is a blend of private
and public interests. The administration of the claims management func
tions is the responsibility of the insurer, whether it is a private insurance
company, a competitive or exclusive state fund, or (if it is self-insured)
the firm itself. It is the insurer under the workers' compensation law
that has the primary responsibility for the administration of the claims
management function. It pays the claim. And, unless the workers' com
pensation agency itself administers an exclusive state fund, the state
agency does not pay the claim. Thus, unlike the Social Security Ad
ministration, the workers' compensation agency does not pay benefits
to injured workers, nor does it pay treating physicians or any other pro
vider of services. Yet there comes a time, at differing stages of the
claim's process depending upon the jurisdiction, when the workers' com
pensation agency is charged with substantial responsibility for ad
ministrative procedures.
The patient suing his physician in a malpractice suit can settle for
any amount that is agreeable to him, his doctor, and the insurance car
rier. No state agency will interfere with the voluntary settlement on
the grounds that it is not sufficient. At the opposite end of the ad
ministrative spectrum, the person qualifying for disability insurance
benefits under Social Security will receive a specific amount stipulated
by statute. Nongovernmental parties have little or no influence on the
amount of the benefits. Workers' compensation stands between these
models. The claims management function and considerable control over
the amount of the benefits rests with the insurer, which is normally in
the private sector, but the state workers' compensation agency super
vises the application of the statute to ensure that the objectives of workers'
compensation are met. This blending of public and private roles adds
to the complexity of workers' compensation administration.
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The Objectives of Workers' Compensation
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1972, p. 99) considered an effective delivery system to be one of the
five objectives of a modern workers' compensation program. It recogniz
ed that such a system is required in order to achieve the four basic ob
jectives: broad coverage, adequate income maintenance, necessary
medical care and rehabilitation services, and safety incentives. The Com
mission saw an effective delivery system as a means to an end, not an
end in itself. Its performance was to be evaluated relatively in com
parison with other systems, and absolutely by the degree of accomplish
ment of the four basic objectives of workers' compensation.
The whole theory of workers' compensation administration is based
on the assumption that there should be a direct public interest in the
compensation paid to workers injured at work. The type and amount
of such payments, the conditions under which they are to be made, and
the medical care workers are to be provided are prescribed in general
terms by the state statutes, which also establish an administrative agen
cy to insure these prescriptions are satisfied.
There are, however, wide variations among states in the procedures
used for permanent partial disability cases. Each state workers' com
pensation agency keeps records, monitors claims that are paid, provides
some system to evaluate permanent partial disability, and also provides
a forum for the adjudication of disputes. We will discuss each of these
functions further. First we provide a general description of state agen
cies' administrative procedures, a description that is applicable in some
measure to all states, but fully applicable to none.

General Introduction to Procedures
Uncontested Cases
A claim typically begins with an accidental injury, which triggers
notice by the employee to the employer, and the filing by the employer
of a First Report of Injury. In the typical state in which a private in
surance carrier has the primary responsibility for paying claims, a copy
of the report will go to the carrier, alerting it to the fact that a possible
claim is pending, and a copy will also go to the state agency.
The EFR may be the document that initiates a claim for benefits, or
a separate form may be required. In some states, it will be necessary
for the carrier to file the additional report, or a simple notice to the
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agency that payments have actually begun may be sufficient. Initial
payments typically are for temporary total disability benefits.
As noted, the payment of these benefits can begin simply by the car
rier accepting the claim without further formality. In some states, the
carrier is called upon either to contest the claim or to begin payments
within a stipulated number of days; in other states some form of paper
work, possibly an agreement with the employee, must be consummated
before payments begin. Usually temporary disability benefit payments
stop once an employee goes back to work, or, if he does not return,
after maximum medical rehabilitation has been achieved. The extent
of permanent disability is assessed at that time or (in some states) a
stipulated number of weeks after that date. In a minority of cases, such
as amputations without further complications, the amount of benefits
may be determined exclusively by a schedule, in which case there may
be no controversy and payment may be made soon after the injury occurs.
Contested Cases

In the more typical case, the fact of permanent disability is conced
ed, but the exact nature and extent of permanent disability, and the
translation of the nature and extent of disability into a particular dollar
benefit, are matters of some controversy. This is not to say that the
case cannot be handled voluntarily by the carrier and without resort
to the controverted procedures. In California, the extent of the appli
cant's impairment may be determined by the rating bureau based upon
medical reports, and the carrier may pay the amount suggested by the
informal rating. If accepted by the employee, the processing of the case
comes to an effective end.
In other states where no rating bureau exists, the carrier might have
the worker examined by a physician, who assesses the percentage of
disability and consequently the benefits to which the worker is entitl
ed. Obviously, the likelihood that that amount will be accepted is greater
in a case of some uncomplicated anatomical loss than in cases involv
ing subjective complaints. Even in simple cases, in the event of some
disagreement, the impairment may be rerated by the carrier based upon
whatever additional information may be supplied.
If dissatisfaction persists, in some states the case moves to an infor
mal procedural level. A referee may hear the case and possibly have
the worker examined by a state physician, and, based upon the doc
tor's findings and medical records contained in the file, suggest an
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amount appropriate for that particular permanent disability. Typically,
such findings are not binding on either party, and the employee, if
dissatisfied, has recourse to a more formal proceeding.
The formal procedures vary greatly among the states. Typically, the
agency's file in the case will be part of the record. The hearing officer
will have available to him all prior determinations made at the infor
mal level, the contentions of the parties at the several stages through
which the case may have passed, and the reports of examining and
treating physicians. Although formal rules of evidence are usually not
followed, a stenographic transcript may be taken, some orderly pro
cedure will be followed, and the hearing officer will make rulings as
to the relevance, materiality, and admissibility of the evidence before
him. In some states, the hearing room appears much like a court room,
with the judge sitting on a raised bench. In other states, an informal
atmosphere prevails. For the most part, the hearing officer will make
a decision based upon the evidence before him, but in some instances
he may request impartial medical information.
The principal witnesses on both sides will usually be physicians. In
an industrial illness case, an industrial hygienist may testify as to the
conditions prevailing at the workplace. The employee's "testifying physi
cian" will state that the claimant suffered a particular injury and that
his present condition is a direct result of that accidental injury. He will
then give his medical opinion as to the nature and extent of what in
the compensation law is usually termed "disability." If it is a so-called
schedule case, the physician will estimate the percentage of the arm
or other extremity that he finds to be the extent of the residual perma
nent partial disability. If it is a nonschedule case, the percentage may
be based on some arbitrary number of weeks selected as the sum for
complete disability. If earnings capacity is the criterion, the physician
may also testify as to the worker's inability to perform particular types
of work and the employee's counsel may elicit corroborating testimony
from a vocational expert.
The physician for the carrier or the defendant/employer will offer
similar but opposing testimony. His estimate of the percentage of disabili
ty based upon the same schedule will be less than that offered by the
physician retained by the plaintiff/employee. The equanimity and cer
tainty with which one physician calls forth the numbers is usually not
affected by his almost certain knowledge that his colleague on the op
posite side will have equally firm contrary opinions. In some states,
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percentage assessments by the opposing physicians will differ by predic
table amounts.
The hearing officer also has some idea of how each physician will
testify, what the differences will be, and where his assessment ought
to lie. The lack of scientific precision is usually taken for granted, as
is the fact that the assessment will be tinged by the parties' biases.
Where the estimate is to be made based on wage-earning capacity
rather than on impairment or functional limitations, the attorneys for
both sides may argue their cases based upon the "other" attributes of
the injured worker. They may refer to his age and education, and the
state of the labor market. Even in states where impairment or func
tional limitations presumably are the sole criteria, the physicians may
shade their medical judgments based upon their estimates of the worker's
chances in the labor market. In some states, the assessment of the "other
factors" explicitly falls within the purview of the physician's estimates.
In other jurisdictions, both the physician and the hearing officer may
take these into account in some unknown and unpredictable fashion.
If the issue is actual wage loss, rather than extent of impairment or
wage-earning capacity, evidence will be forthcoming as to what the
employee has been earning in the labor market. Evidence, based upon
his pay stubs, may be introduced as to what his actual wage loss has
been. In addition, vocational experts may testify as to what he should
be earning in the labor market and physicians may testify as to the work
he could be doing, had he made efforts appropriate to his physical
condition.
In other wage-loss cases, the employ ability of the worker may be at
stake. In these cases, the burden may be upon the employer to show
that the employee can now, in fact, return to his former job or to some
other employment. The employer may offer testimony indicating that
the employee has refused job offers and buttress it with medical testimony
that the employee is perfectly capable of performing the work that was
offered. Or, again, testimony might be forthcoming from vocational
experts indicating that jobs of a particular character are available and
that the employee could fill these had he the will to do so.
In yet other cases in some states, it might be workers' compensation
agencies themselves that bring the case to a hearing before a hearing
officer. The screening of the so-called direct settlements made by the
employer and employee may raise some questions as to equity or ade-
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quacy, and the case may be scheduled for a hearing. The usual avenue
to the formal hearing, however, is a petition filed by the employee.
It is not unusual for cases to continue for more than one hearing.
Crucial medical testimony may be lacking, or (as pointed out above)
the hearing officer may want the employee to undergo an examination
by a specialist. Eventually, the record in the case is closed. The hear
ing officer then has a stipulated amount of time in which to issue a for
mal opinion. His written decision may be buttressed by a short opinion
or, in cases where new issues are raised, a lengthy exposition.
Many issues might be raised at the hearing that are not concerned
with the nature and extent of disability. A controversy may arise over
the wages that the employee was earning or over one of the many an
cillary questions connected with where the accident occurred, whether
the worker was an employee within the meaning of the Act, and so on.
Once a decision is issued and served on the parties, either party has
a specified number of days in which to appeal. In states without a
workers' compensation commission, such as New Jersey, the only ap
peal from a decision of the judge of the compensation agency is to the
courts, where the cases are handled in much the same manner as other
civil matters. More typically, however, there are provisions for appeal
within the agency, possibly to a panel of the workers' compensation
commission or board. At that point, procedures vary a great deal. The
appeal may be based upon the record, supplemented perhaps by writ
ten briefs from both parties; or, in some cases, oral hearings may be
held to supplement the record. In yet other cases, there is, in effect,
a new hearing with completely new testimony presented at the board
or commission level.
Appeals from either the hearing officer level or, if it exists, the ap
pellate body within the agency are usually to the court system of the
state. There may be a trial de novo before a judge, or even (as in Ohio)
before a jury. Alternatively, the case may be heard on the basis of the
record and the hearing officer's findings accepted if supported by the
evidence, substantial evidence, or a preponderance of evidence, depend
ing on the rule in the jurisdiction.
In those states in which there is an exclusive state fund with which
employers are required to insure their liability, many of the administrative
functions entrusted to the carriers are now transferred to the agency
administering the fund. In the case of competitive, rather than exclusive,

Procedures for Permanent Partial Benefits 83

state funds, the procedures depend on whether or not the workers' com
pensation agency itself is a custodian or operator of the fund, or whether
the fund merely operates as another insurance carrier. For example,
in California and New York, the state funds are competitive state funds
and occupy the same relationship to the workers' compensation agen
cy as does any other insurer in the state.
Administrative Functions for Permanent Disability Cases
The procedures described in the preceding section can be grouped
under four headings: record keeping, monitoring, evaluation, and ad
judication. We first briefly describe these functions and then more in
tensively examine the four functions as they are performed in the ten
jurisdictions that are the primary concern of this study.
The record keeping Jhnction is present in all agencies. Each workers'
compensation case begins with a report to the employer of an injury
or disease, a copy of which is sent to the carrier and eventually to the
agency. Each state requires some subsequent reporting about the in
dividual case and its eventual disposition. States vary greatly as to the
kinds of case records the agencies maintain and the diligence with which
administrators follow up requests for records that do not come to them
in the normal course. However logical it may be to proclaim a public
interest in these matters, the total extent of some agencies' involvement
may be in recording and filing what the parties themselves have done
voluntarily.
Some, possibly most, states go further and are concerned with the
monitoring function. The state agency is concerned with the equity and
adequacy of the payments made voluntarily by the insurance carrier.
The agency may also be concerned with the worker's rehabilitation in
cases where his return to work is delayed. The agency may police the
carrier's activities designed to maximize the probability of the worker's
return to his job. The monitoring function may involve procedures for
checking on the carrier's general performance and providing advice or
sterner strictures if the carrier's performance falls short.
A third group of procedures has to do with evaluation of the perma
nent partial disability. Some agencies have prescribed procedures to
evaluate, or to aid the parties in evaluating, the extent of permanent
partial disability. In some states, the agency itself will take on the respon
sibility of determining the extent of the permanent partial disability.
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In other states, the agencies will do almost nothing in this area; the parties
either reach some agreement or resort to the contested procedures.
The fourth function is adjudication, which is undertaken by the state
agencies in almost all states. Each agency has procedures to adjudicate
disputes between the parties. The disputes of primary concern in this
study are those concerning the liability of the employer for permanent
partial benefits and those concerned with measuring the nature and ex
tent of permanent disability.

Variations in Procedures Among the States
The 10 jurisdictions examined in this study differ in how they per
form the functions of record keeping, monitoring, evaluation, and ad
judication. The differences in part reflect the magnitude of the ad
ministrative burdens assigned to the states workers' compensation agen
cies (table 4.1). The numbers of workers covered by the workers' com
pensation program and the numbers of first reports of injuries vary by
a factor of 20 between the largest state (California) and the smallest
jurisdictions (the District of Columbia and Nevada). The amounts of
benefits for which the workers' compensation agencies are responsible
to insure accuracy of payments are at least 10 times greater in Califor
nia than in the District of Columbia, Nevada, and Wisconsin. The
resources allocated to the workers' compensation agencies to perform
the administrative functions also vary considerably among the 10 jurisdic
tions. The figures for Ohio and Nevada are not comparable to those
in other jurisdictions since the staff and budget figures include resources
devoted to administering their exclusive state funds. The New York
staff figure is not entirely comparable since the personnel who administer
the nonoccupational disability benefits program are included. 1
The number of staff members per million covered workers and per
thousand first reports are shown in the final columns of table 4.1. Nevada
and Ohio have the highest ratios—reflecting the responsibilities of ad
ministering exclusive state funds. Among the other jurisdictions, Wiscon
sin stands out because of its low staff ratios—an impressive result in
light of the state's reputation of excellence in administration. New York
is distinguished by its high ratios—a consequence in part of its unique
method of monitoring, in which each indexed case must be scheduled
for a hearing before an administrative law judge prior to closing.
The balance of this section reviews the approaches to the procedural
functions in the 10 jurisdictions and provides observations that repre
sent inputs to a model for permanent disability benefit procedures.

Table 4.1
Administrative Burdens and Resources of the Workers' Compensation Agencies in Ten Jurisdictions
Number of staff members

Jurisdiction
California

Covered
workforce
(millions)
9.800

First reports
(indemnity
cases)
408,000

Benefits paid
1984
(millions $)
2,687

Agency
staff
816

Agency
budget
(millions $)

Per million
covered
workers

Per thousand
first
reports

37

83

2.0
4.4

District of Columbia

0.400

13,396

74

59

2.3

148

Florida

3.800

64,834

692

523

20.3

138

8.1

60

2.7

•I
8

1,446'

55.7'

O.
!-t

4.8
9.3 3

Michigan

3.290

74,045

630

Nevada

0.413

10,726

106

197
597'

6.6
25'

New Jersey

3.825

37,7942

446

182

4.8

New York

6.600

174.6202

857

1,627 3

51.3

48
247 3

Ohio

4.625

101,315

1,121

1,383'

47.6'

299'

13.7'

Pennsylvania

5.000

127,388

888

317

11

63

2.5

239

84.5

3

44

1.4

Wisconsin

1.920

61,499

SOURCES: Benefits Paid 1984 from Price (1987, table 2); other data from U.S. Department of Labor, Administration Profiles (1985).
1 . Includes staff and budget for exclusive state fund.
2. Includes all reports filed, not just reports on indemnity cases.
3. Includes staff that administers nonoccupational disability benefits program.
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Record Keeping
Ideally, procedures should place the least burden on the parties and
agency consistent with fulfilling the system's objectives. If one of these
objectives is the promotion of safety, the records should allow state agen
cies to examine the universe of work-related injuries. However, some
states, such as Wisconsin and Michigan, receive reports only on poten
tially compensable cases. Accidental injuries in which the worker did
not lose time beyond the waiting period or sustain a permanent injury
will not come to their attention. On the other hand, efficiency considera
tions would require not placing an undue burden on the parties. New
Jersey, which requires an employer's first report on all accidental in
juries involving lost time, also requires an additional report on com
pensable cases. The purpose of the second report is not at all clear.
The parties ought not to be required to report the same information
to more than one agency. The question of duplicate reporting brings
up the relationship of the workers' compensation system to the rules
and regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). All employers covered by OSHA are required to fill out a
form (Form 101 or an acceptable substitute) for "OSHA-recordable"
cases. These include, in addition to lost time and permanent disability
cases, loss of consciousness, restriction of work or motion, transfer
to another job, and medical treatment other than first aid. Employers
are not required to transmit OSHA 101 forms, but the forms must be
kept on file and are the source of information for the employer's an
nual report to OSHA.
The very existence of OSHA may have engendered an attitude in some
state administrators, and perhaps some employers as well, that safety
has somehow become the concern of OSHA and the federal govern
ment and need no longer occupy the attention of the state workers' com
pensation agencies. To perpetuate such a notion would be to deprive
the state agencies of one of their traditional and essential functions. To
discharge these functions, the agencies should have not only knowledge
of all work-related injuries and diseases, but also the capability of prepar
ing reports and analyses to fulfill the objective of promoting safe and
healthful working conditions in the state.
The problem always is where to draw the line. To require employers
to send in the forms in all OSHA-recordable cases might involve a flood
of "medical only" cases and complicate the administration of the en
tire program. The net is cast wide in the OSHA-recordable criteria,
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and although it may suit OSHA's legislative purposes, it may result
in a flood of forms coming to the workers' compensation agencies and
discourage any meaningful analysis. In any event, none of the states
under consideration here requires reports on all OSHA-recordable cases;
all maintain the more traditional requirements of reporting on lost-time
injuries or on some even narrower universe.
If the employer's first report is used not only for safety purposes but
as the first document in the case file, there is an additional problem
of confidentiality. The fear is sometimes expressed that if the docu
ment is used in case processing, employers will be less frank in record
ing the event, lest the information be used against them. Thus, in New
Jersey and in California, where first reports are required on all cases,
the analysis and the processing of these forms are not done by the same
division that administers the workers' compensation statute.
More universally accepted than the safety objective is the objective
of assuring the payment of adequate benefits promptly. For this pur
pose, the agency must be aware of all potentially compensable cases
and of whether the first payment is being made within a reasonable time.
In states where private insurance prevails, three general opening pro
cedures can be identified. First is New York's unique system. The
employer files a first report on all lost-time cases and agency person
nel make the preliminary judgment as to whether compensation benefits
will become payable. Such cases are indexed. The employer is notified
and is required to respond to the notice of indexing by indicating pay
ment or intent to controvert. Once indexed, a case cannot be closed
without a hearing.
Second is the procedure in Pennsylvania, where the employer's first
report on all lost-time injuries becomes the first document in the file.
Within 21 days, the carrier submits another report indicating either pay
ment or intent to controvert. Essentially the same system is followed
in Wisconsin and Michigan, except that in these states the employer's
first reports are filed only in potentially compensable cases. The third
procedure is found in New Jersey, which calls itself a direct payment
system state. There the employer must file a first report on all losttime cases and then a form accepting liability and setting forth some
details. But the second form does not report when the compensation
payments are to be made, nor is any employer form routinely required
if the case is controverted.
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The Pennsylvania procedure places the least burden on the employer
and employee consistent with the information the agency must have to
discharge its functions. An employer's first report is filed in all losttime cases; within a stipulated period, the carrier must give notice either
that the employer will pay or that the employer will not pay; subse
quently the carrier is required to file forms indicating any change of
status; and at the close of payments, it must submit a final receipt of
compensation. Further, the carrier must file annually for each open case
a statement showing the compensation details and the amounts to be paid.
If the sole objective were assurance of benefits, the New York pro
cedure would seem to be preferable. It can be criticized only on the
grounds of efficiency; the resources used in conducting a final hearing
or offering the opportunity for such a hearing in each case before clos
ing might better be used elsewhere. The system also places a burden
on agency personnel, who are required to decide which cases should
be assembled and indexed. In the Pennsylvania procedure, the carrier
is obligated to make this decision, to advise as to whether payments
have begun, and, if they have not, to advise as to the reason for
nonpayment.
Exclusive state-fund states have obviously different problems. Infor
mation is required on all work-related injuries that involve any type
of expenditures, even for minor first aid cases. The fund must be ad
vised on all items that will result in charges. In Ohio's exclusive state
fund, detailed reports are required from employers before claims can
be paid. In the case of Ohio self-insurers, however, the state's function
is not to pay but to oversee payments, and reports are not required un
til such time as permanent partial disability is to be assessed.
Closing procedures in states are likely to differ not only because of
the method of insuring liability, but also according to what criteria are
used to assess disability—wage loss, impairment, or functional limita
tions. In New Jersey, where an assessment of impairment is the rule,
the final report filed by the employer lists the percentage of disability
and amount of benefits and some medical information, but it is not ac
companied by a physician's report.
New York requires a physician's report on a periodic basis, in part
because these reports are useful to the carrier to audit the treatment and
the physician's fees. The physician is chosen by the employee in New
York; in New Jersey the carrier has control over the choice of physi
cian and the agency does not require physicians' reports.
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In New York, the case cannot be closed without a hearing and con
sequently the agency has knowledge of the settlements reached in all
cases. Even if the parties do not appear for a hearing, presumably the
file information is sufficient for the agency to audit the adequacy of
the payments.
To assure adequate payments to a worker where such payments are
made voluntarily, the agency needs information on the amounts being
paid, the reason they are being paid, medical condition, and the worker's
current employment status. A further obligation of the agency is to audit
and analyze these reports and take action on the basis of the informa
tion. Such considerations bring us to the next group of procedures, name
ly those having to do with the monitoring function.
Monitoring

The extent of monitoring that can be done in any state is crucially
dependent on the type of records kept. Obviously, monitoring is dif
ficult or impossible if no information is forthcoming from the parties.
As we have seen, all states require some documents from interested
parties. Most states review these documents as they come in, even if
only to check the accuracy of the parties' computation.
The patterns of monitoring are quite different from state to state. In
New York, all indexed cases are scheduled for a hearing, and monitor
ing is an integral part of the case processing. All cases presumably come
under the scrutiny of an administrative law judge before they can be
closed. Whether anything substantive is done in routine cases, which
are handled at rates of more than 100 per day, and whether an individual
judge can give very serious consideration to these cases is another mat
ter. Nonetheless, there is at least some review.
New Jersey from time to time, depending on the availability of per
sonnel, checks on the direct settlement made between the parties. The
efficacy of such activity is dependent on the budget allocated to this
process. Obviously, if the screening is entrusted to an untrained clerk,
he will only be able to apply the mechanical criteria given him. On the
other hand, if the screening is done by a trained administrator or physi
cian, more significant questions might be raised as to the adequacy of
the benefits paid. No field investigations are undertaken in New Jersey,
and cases that are questionable can only be set down for a hearing.
Wage-loss states have other items to check. In Michigan, if payments
cease and the worker is not back to work, the agency will investigate
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the matter, sometimes on its own initiative. The use of an investigative
staff by an agency is a relatively rare event, however, except in the
exclusive fund jurisdictions. The more usual procedure when discrepan
cies are suspected is to notify the parties and schedule the case for a
hearing. In some instances, however, the hearing officer may make a
judgment that further information is needed and will initiate a request
for further medical testimony.
Wisconsin takes an active interest in pending cases. Formal checks
of computational accuracy are made in mechanical fashion, but the agen
cy also follows through, telephones the parties, and in general is will
ing to investigate questionable situations.
Another method of monitoring, used in Wisconsin and Michigan
among other states, is to provide information to the employee on a
routine, regular, and continuing basis. In both states, the worker is sent
copies of forms so that he can check on what the employer has reported.
In Pennsylvania, copies of the first reports are given to the injured
employee and the reverse side of the copy lists his rights. Notices of
the compensation payable must be sent to the injured employee by the
carrier, and, in general, the employee is kept informed of developments
in his case.
The concept of monitoring carrier performance is not appropriate in
the exclusive fund states. The workers' compensation agency pays
benefits and, of course, must keep a constant check on what is happen
ing in the case so as to decide whether or not particular benefits are
justified.
In California, each employer that voluntarily begins payments of com
pensation is supposed to file a form setting forth the basic information
about the claim. Similarly, a form is supposed to be filed at the end
of the case. Not all employers abide by the requirement for the first
form and fewer still comply with the requirement for the final form.
California has adopted a computerized system of monitoring these forms.
Each goes through a basic editing process and obvious errors are spot
ted by the computer check. The system appears to be capable of effi
cient superficial checking of forms that are filed; it fails, however, to
systematically check as to whether such forms are filed in the first place.
It is wasteful and inefficient to audit forms and then do nothing fur
ther. The objectives of monitoring, which may be to assure that the
law is being administered in an equitable fashion or to provide reliable
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information to improve the administration of the law, must be clearly
specified. Whatever the purpose, it is worthwhile to follow up on cases
flagged for attention. In Wisconsin, employers and insurance carriers
know that if their forms are not complete, or if they have deviated from
established procedures, the matter will be called to their attention by
a phone call, a letter, or other means. Because the administrators care
about information that comes in, those who forward material are careful
about what they send.
The monitoring function requires a type of administrative talent that
is not always found in the state agencies, with their sharp division of
personnel between clerical employees on one hand and hearing officers
on the other. The monitoring function requires one or more investigators
charged with following up flagged cases to see that the appropriate in
formation is forthcoming, and to assure that the worker receives his
rights.
The line between monitoring and our next category, "evaluation,"
is a thin one. By monitoring, we mean to include all activities deigned
to provide information to the employee and to advise the parties of their
rights in an attempt to deliver benefits equitably, quickly, and without
litigation when no genuine dispute exists. All monitoring activities de
pend upon information coming from the parties and, hence, on a good
record keeping and data system. Once in effect, an efficient system would
audit these forms in the least-cost manner; in a larger state, auditing
to check on the accuracy and completeness of the information can be
computerized.
The second element of a good monitoring system is providing infor
mation and advice to the employee so that he is aware of what the
employer intends to do and the basis for the action. Obviously, excessive
monitoring can result in a paternalistic system. The agency should keep
the employee informed about his rights and about the significance of
the actions of the employer under the law; whatever actions the employee
takes (or fails to take) normally are his own choice, although in some
instances the agency may need to override the decision.
The third element of a monitoring system is to take active stepsfield investigations to learn the facts in questionable cases, concerted
attempts to advise the parties of their rights under the law—to avoid
unnecessary litigation. One way to work toward this end, obviously,
is to provide criteria for the evaluation of the permanent partial
disabilities.
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Evaluation
What procedures have been set up to allow the parties to evaluate
permanent partial disability? If an employer seeks to pay permanent
partial disability benefits voluntarily, can he arrive at the amounts that
ought to be paid by complying with these procedures? If he does com
ply, does he have any assurance that the payment will dispose of the
matter without further litigation?
Possibly the most developed evaluation procedures are California's.
On request, the permanent disability rating bureau prepares an infor
mal rating for a permanent disability case. If both parties accept the
rating, payment of compensation due may begin without further pro
cedures. The informal rating has no legal significance unless the par
ties voluntarily accept it. It does not constitute evidence of the existence
of permanent disability or of the factors of disability. Available evidence
suggests that the informal rating is most effective in the resolution of
cases involving minor injuries. The more serious injuries are almost
always the subject of disputed cases. It may have been hoped that Califor
nia's rating system would assure objective disposition of cases, but the
fact is that litigation has become the rule rather than the exception in
California. The fault may be with the subjective nature of the criteria
used in the state.
New Jersey's procedure at the informal hearing level bears some
resemblance to California's rating procedure, but the differences are
significant. The employer in New Jersey can begin to pay permanent
partial disability benefits without securing any rating from the agency.
It may, however, bring the matter to the informal level, a procedure
that is voluntary on the part of both employer and employee. The
referee's recommendation, made after hearing both sides, has no legal
significance, but if accepted by both parties, it may be the effective
end of the matter, with the employer filing a final report on the case.
In Ohio, an exclusive-fund state, a separate section of the Commis
sion evaluates all applications for permanent partial disability benefits.
The evaluation may be based on medical information in the file or the
section may order an examination by a medical specialist.
The wage-loss states have no specific evaluation procedures. Evalua
tion of impairments and function limitations is confined to scheduletype injuries. An issue that arises more commonly in permanent partial
disability cases is the question of whether an employee is able to return
to his work, or to other work that is available to him.
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In the scheme by which we have chosen to describe workers' com
pensation procedures, evaluation procedures lie between monitoring pro
cedures (designed to insure that the law's objectives are carried out)
and adjudication procedures (governing the settlement of disputes), in
asmuch as they are concerned with allowing the parties themselves to
settle on the amount and type of permanent partial disability benefits.
If the state discourages any voluntary payment of these benefits until
agency personnel have had an opportunity to rate the extent of the im
pairment, evaluation is close to monitoring. And to the extent that evalua
tion procedures substitute for adjudication, such as in the informal hear
ing or rating bureau procedures, evaluation becomes almost the first
step in the adjudication procedures.
Even were there a perfect and universally accepted set of objective
criteria with which to evaluate cases, there would remain the question
whether it is necessary to have each and every case come before some
tribunal or bureau of the state workers' compensation agency or whether
workers need appear personally in order for their cases to be evaluated.
In California, workers need not make a physical appearance at the rating
bureau. The initial rating is done on the basis of medical information
and forms filed by the employer, which include input from the employee.
In Nevada, although it is unnecessary for the worker to appear at a hear
ing, a high percentage of all but the most trivial of the permanent par
tial benefit cases do appear before a referee for evaluation, which usually
entails an examination of the employee by the state doctor.
The ideal criteria would be sufficiently clear and objective to allow
the parties to comply with evaluation procedures and determine the
benefit amount. Such determination could be reviewed by the agency,
and only settlements that fell outside acceptable bounds would be ad
judicated on the agency's motion. Whatever the ideal, the fact remains
that a high percentage of cases in most states are decided on a con
troverted level. Each state has some provision for the adjudication of
disputes.
Adjudication
Broadly speaking, the adjudication procedures of the states examin
ed in this study are very similar. An exception is New York, in which
all cases must be considered at some point by an administrative law
judge (ALJ). But in New York, the adjudication procedure often begins
after the ALJ's decision, when one of the parties appeals the decision
to the Board.
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In general, however, all contested cases begin with some type of a
petition, followed by a pretrial conference, a hearing before a hearing
officer, and then possibly an appeal from that hearing officer's decision.
Efficiency considerations require that adjudication procedures be used
only after voluntary settlement procedures have failed. Controversy
should be a last resort, and efficient procedures would allow the par
ties to present all their evidence fully and completely at a hearing before
a competent trier of the facts. An appeals procedure would then be
reserved only for the unusual case in which new and important issues
are raised, or in which proceedings at the lower level are deficient.
Adjudication procedures do, of course, vary from state to state. In
New Jersey there is a hearing before a judge of compensation, who
operates in a fairly formal capacity and whose decision can be appeal
ed only to the state court system. By contrast, in Wisconsin there is
a less formal hearing before an attorney-examiner, with appeals to a
review commission of the department in which the compensation agency
is located, and from there to the court system.
In Ohio, the Commission's rulings concerning the extent of disabili
ty cannot be appealed, but other matters may be appealed to the courts,
where the case may be heard de novo and possibly before a jury.
Differences among the states in their adjudication procedures reflect
in large part the differences among state constitutions and court systems.
It would be most difficult and probably not worth the effort to standar
dize adjudication procedures. The ideal procedures, however, would
seem to require a full hearing at some stage before a hearing officer
with an appeals step within the Commission. Such a decision should
be dispositive of the facts, with appeals to the court system confined
to interpretation of law, with findings of the fact supported if the courts
find that they are based on substantial evidence.

Summary and Conclusions
We have accepted the National Commission's emphasis on the im
portance of the delivery system, seconding its plea for an active ad
ministrative agency that concentrates on administrative functions other
than adjudication. Our concern has been with agency procedures in
volved in the processing of claims for permanent partial disability
benefits. We have not examined all aspects of administration, but have
taken many of the factors as given. We recognize that the particular
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insurance arrangements in effect, the civil service structure, the type
of compensation system, and a great many other variables affect ad
ministration. Our focus has been on the administrative procedures of
the state agency to the exclusion of the claims management functions
entrusted to the insurer. We have adopted a fourfold classification of
administrative functions involved in processing permanent partial
disability cases.
The Record Keeping Function

An efficient delivery system requires record keeping for several pur
poses. The record keeping function furthers all of the basic objectives
of the modern workers' compensation program. Without adequate
knowledge of what is happening to all workers who become injured
in the state, the agency will not be able to determine whether the pro
gram provides for broad coverage of employees with work-related in
juries or diseases. Without knowing what happens to workers who
become involved in industrial injuries, administrators will not be able
to determine whether the system provides substantial protection against
interruption of income. Without adequate reporting, it will not be able
to tell whether provisions for medical care and rehabilitation are ade
quate; and, of course, without reporting from employers of the wide
range of injuries and illnesses that are work-related, it will not be able
to fulfill the objective of encouragement of safety.
Desirable though it would be to possess complete information, it is
clear that in a world of limited resources most agencies must live with
an information system that has obvious gaps. California has good in
formation about the nature and type of all lost-time injuries in the state,
but not about their consequences. In Wisconsin, the agency's field of
vision is restricted to compensable injuries and illnesses, but for these
the system develops considerable information about the types of injuries
involved and the benefits paid. Both systems have defects and advan
tages. Pennsylvania's example shows that it is possible to have both
extensive reporting of injuries and illnesses and a system that follows
what happens in compensable cases.
No state has an ideal system, but pieces that could be assembled into
a nearly ideal system are scattered throughout various states. It remains
to bring them together and to convince the states that doing so will be
worth the cost. Unfortunately, as of this writing no such eclectic design
has (to our knowledge) been seriously advanced; nor are the data for
thcoming that would allow for a cost-benefit analysis.
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The Monitoring Function
To discharge its obligations to further the objectives of the program,
a state agency must monitor the activities of the principal actors in the
system. It must have sufficient information to act promptly in cases where
the letter and the spirit of the law are not complied with. It must routinely
monitor the system so that workers are guaranteed substantial protec
tion against interruption of income and so that sufficient medical care
and rehabilitation services are assured.
The monitoring function can range from mere checks on the correct
ness of arithmetic calculations to a thorough follow-up of cases. It will
vary among states according to the type of law; according to the obliga
tion of the carrier either to pay a claim or controvert, or to delay pay
ment until after some formality; and according to the type of notice,
if any, the payer must file before payments are suspended. As with the
other administrative functions, much will depend on whether the agen
cy adopts an active or passive stance. Fears of acting too paternalistically
may prevent a state from adopting an active role in the monitoring func
tion. If the agency detects something amiss, it may limit itself to schedul
ing a hearing and allowing the parties, if they choose, to protect their
own interests.
The monitoring function can be carried out to further the program's
objectives without the agency acting in an excessively paternal manner
and without displacing the legitimate functions of the legal profession.
As with the other categories, we cannot point to one jurisdiction as having
the ideal system, and we recognize that any system, to be pronounced
perfect, must pass the economic test. We can, however, suggest an eclec
tic system based on our examination of all 10 states.
Once a workers' compensation program grows to the point that it
receives thousands of reports annually, computerization of routine pro
cedures may be worthwhile. Computer programs are admirably suited
to checking on completeness of forms, auditing computations, and con
ducting simple logic checks. It does not take a sophisticated program
to determine when a date is omitted, when the weekly compensation
rate times 10 weeks comes to less than 10 times the rate, or when the
date of injury occurs after the date of first payment. Assigning such
checks to a computer can free personnel for a more meaningful audit
of reports.

Procedures for Permanent Partial Benefits 97

Once potential errors are discovered, some method of rectifying them
must be set into motion. An ideal monitoring system would provide
a budget for phone inquiries and for field investigations. The carriers
discharging their claims processing functions in a timely fashion deserve
plaudits; those deficient should have their shortfalls called to their
attention.
Clearly, it is not paternalistic for the worker to be kept advised of
the status of his claim at all stages. An ideal monitoring system is depen
dent on a system of records on one hand and, on the other, a system
of evaluation that affords the parties some guidance.
The Evaluation Function
The evaluation category encompasses all administrative functions
designed to provide guidance to the parties in their evaluation of the
nature and extent of permanent disability. Unlike some of the other
categories of administrative procedures, in the case of evaluation, the
particular type of procedures used may be less important than whether
the agency has promulgated any guidelines to aid the party in making
such determinations.
As the system now operates, the rating of a particular person's disabili
ty or impairment depends on judgmental factors, but variability can be
reduced if the agency is able to provide guidance to the parties—a feat
that obviously requires the formulation of standards and an active ad
ministration to promote them.
The evaluation functions can be performed in a number of ways, but
if they are neglected, the result will be extensive litigation, with each
case being decided on an ad hoc basis and with the inevitable possibili
ty of uneven and inequitable treatment. Our examination of the evalua
tion procedures is developed in subsequent chapters. Whether these pro
cedures are carried out by means of an agency rating bureau or by the
promulgation of general guidelines, the assertion of interest by the agency
in these matters and the requirement that settlements be made to con
form to some uniform standard would go far toward the achievement
of equity.
The Adjudication Function
Adjudication remains an inevitable characteristic of the administrative
system of state workers' compensation agencies. Unfortunately, in many
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state agencies, the greatest part of the administrative energy and resources
goes into discharging the adjudication function.
The claim petitions must be docketed and served on the appropriate
parties. Strict controls must be kept over contested case files whose
contents may be subject to subpoena. Due process requires notice to
the parties. Hearing officers' time must be scheduled; decisions and
opinions must be typed and sent to the parties. Appeals must be dealt
with within legally specified time limits. Transcripts may be taken at
hearings, and these must be preserved and distributed. The procedures
are, of necessity, regularized, but they must give due attention to the
legal rights of the parties. Care is also necessary because deficiencies
in procedures may cause reversals of decisions at appellate levels.
The care and attention given to these adjudication procedures serve
as a standard that should govern the record keeping, monitoring, and
evaluation functions. It is understandable that when budgets are limited,
adjudicative functions receive priority. But to the extent that the other
functions are neglected, the adjudicative role becomes more necessary,
extensive, and expensive.
Record keeping, monitoring, and evaluation are complementary func
tions. To monitor effectively requires records, and the standards that
are monitored largely come from the evaluation function. But these three
categories of administrative functions may substitute for some ad
judicative activities. To the extent that funds for the records, monitor
ing, and evaluation can be found, adjudication funds might be saved.
If the parties know what to do (evaluation), if they believe that what
they do is a matter of concern (monitoring), and if the agency has
knowledge of what they do (record keeping), to that extent, disputes
(adjudication) should be minimized. The contested forum can then be
reserved for genuine disputes, in which novel issues are explored and
new directions taken.
NOTE
1. The annual budget of the New York State Workers' Compensation Board of $56,580,700 in
cludes $5,258,300 to administer the nonoccupational disability benefits program (U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Administration Profiles, 1985, p. 238). A similar breakdown of staff is not provided, but
the budgetary division suggests that most Board personnel are involved in administering the workers'
compensation program.

Chapter 5
Scheduled Benefits
Scheduled Versus Nonscheduled Injuries
The essential task of the workers' compensation program is to pay
appropriate benefits to injured workers. In this chapter, we explore the
criteria used for deciding on appropriate benefit amounts in cases in
volving scheduled injuries of a permanent and partial nature. In chapters
6-9 we deal with the nonscheduled, permanent partial injuries.
As is often the case in describing workers' compensation programs,
the terms "scheduled" and "nonscheduled" are not used in a uniform
and unambiguous fashion. The statutes in most states contain a schedule
that lists the number of weeks or dollar amounts of compensation benefits
to be paid for the physical loss or (in most jurisdictions) the loss of
use of specified parts of the body. In addition to listing the upper and
lower extremities (the arm, leg, hand, foot, fingers, and toes), states
commonly schedule benefits for the enucleation of an eye and for the
loss of hearing and vision. Disfigurement is also specifically mention
ed in some statutes, usually without specific guidance as to how it is
to be rated. We define a scheduled injury as any injury that is specifically
enumerated in the workers' compensation statute.
Injuries to the trunk, internal organs, nervous system, and other body
systems are not usually included in the lists of injuries found in the
statutes, and we define these injuries as nonscheduled. (In some states,
they are referred to as "unscheduled" injuries.)
The distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled injuries can be
related to the possible consequences of an injury or disease illustrated
in chart 1.2 and discussed in chapter 1. The worker who suffers the
physical loss of a part of the body included in the schedule is evaluated
in terms of the seriousness of his or her impairment. Thus in a state
that equates the loss of an arm with 250 weeks of benefits, a worker
who loses half of an arm by amputation will be entitled to 125 weeks
of benefits. An injury that leads to the loss of use of a body part found
in the schedule is evaluated in terms of the extent of functional limita
tions that result. Thus in a state that equates the loss of a hand with
100 weeks of benefits, a worker with an injury that causes a 50 percent
99
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loss of use of a hand will receive 50 weeks of benefits. Most states pay
scheduled benefits if the worker experiences either a physical loss or
a loss of use of the body part found in the schedule, but there are some
states that confine scheduled benefits to amputations as opposed to loss
of use.
There are three general approaches to nonscheduled injuries that can
also be related to the conceptual framework found in chapter 1. (Most
states use only one of these approaches, although, as we will discuss
in subsequent chapters, there are exceptions.) The first approach to
nonscheduled injuries evaluates them in terms of the resulting im
pairments or functional limitations. For example, a worker may ex
perience structural damage to a vertebra and the spinal column, which
are injuries usually not found on the schedule. The impairment itself
may be evaluated (the disc is herniated) or the consequent functional
limitations may be assessed (the worker is restricted in his ability to
lift, stoop, or make certain motions that he was able to make before
the injury). This first approach usually produces a rating in percentage
terms that relates the worker's condition to that of a whole man (or
to a "totally disabled" person). Thus in a state that equates a whole
man to 500 weeks, a worker with an impairment rating of 25 percent
would receive 125 weeks of benefits. The states that use the impair
ment approach to nonscheduled benefits are our category I states, and
are examined in chapter 6.
The second approach to nonscheduled injuries evaluates them in terms
of the loss of earning capacity. In states that use this approach (category
II states, discussed in chapter 7), an assessment of the seriousness of
the worker's medical condition, in light of such factors as the worker's
prior education, work experience, and personal characteristics, is used
to yield a rating in percentage terms of the loss of earning capacity.
Thus in a state that defines a total loss of earning capacity as equivalent
to 600 weeks of benefits, a worker with a 33 1/3 percent loss of earn
ing capacity would receive 200 weeks of benefits.
The third approach to nonscheduled benefits is the wage-loss approach,
which requires the worker to demonstrate that he has experienced an
actual loss of earnings because of the work-related injury or disease.
The states using the wage-loss approach (category III states) are ex
amined in chapters 8 and 9.
The typical workers' compensation statute, then, distinguishes be
tween scheduled injuries, which are listed in the statute and evaluated
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according to the resulting impairments and functional limitations, and
nonscheduled injuries, which are evaluated in terms of impairment, loss
of earning capacity, or actual wage loss. A few jurisdictions are atypical.
In California, for example, the statute does not contain a list of injuries
with corresponding benefits; i.e., there is no statutory schedule.
However, the California workers' compensation agency issues a set of
guidelines for evaluating injuries that encompasses all types of injuries,
without the typical scheduled-nonscheduled distinction found in the
statutes of other jurisdictions. The California guidelines are also
unique because, depending on the injury, the basis for the rating can
be impairment, functional limitations, or loss of earning capacity.
Although California does not neatly fit into our taxonomy, we will ex
amine the California treatment of those injuries that are normally schedul
ed in this chapter, and then reexamine California as an example of the
category II approach to nonscheduled injuries in chapter 7.
Nevada, too, defies our classification scheme. As in California,
Nevada's statute includes no list of injuries. Rather, all injuries are
evaluated by use of the American Medical Association's Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. In terms of the conceptual ap
proach provided in chapter 1, the Guides evaluate injuries in terms of
the resulting impairments and functional limitations. We treat Nevada
in this chapter for those injuries that are typically scheduled; in the next
chapter, Nevada is viewed as exemplifying the category I approach to
nonscheduled injuries.
A final matter requiring discussion before we turn to an intensive
examination of scheduled injuries is the question of whether a given
injury can be compensated under more than one approach. In most states
the schedule is "exclusive," that is, an injury that qualifies for scheduled
benefits cannot qualify for any other type of permanent disability benefit.
(An injured worker may qualify for temporary disability benefits dur
ing the healing period that are paid in addition to the scheduled benefits,
and still meet our definition of "exclusive" benefits.) In some states,
however, a worker who qualifies for scheduled benefits may also qualify
for some other type of permanent disability benefits; such scheduled
benefits are "nonexclusive." One state with nonexclusive benefits is
New York, where workers with scheduled awards based on loss of at
least 50 percent of the arm, hand, leg, or foot can qualify for a type
of wage-loss benefit if they are still experiencing losses of earnings due
to the injury when the scheduled benefits expire. Another example is
Florida, where the limited scheduled benefits included in the 1979 law
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can be paid in addition to wage-loss benefits for the same injury (assum
ing the worker is experiencing an actual loss of earnings).

History of the Schedule
Arthur Larson (1986, sec. 57.14), in tracing the history of the schedule
in workers' compensation, identifies the fundamental rule of liability:
normally a fixed amount of compensation is paid for a particular type
and severity of injury, regardless of actual wage loss. Larson recognizes
that the rule cuts both ways. A worker may receive a scheduled benefit
in the absence of any permanent wage loss. Conversely, he may suffer
a continuing wage loss in excess of the time specified on the schedule.
Larson notes that this rule was never universal and has been giving way
to both judicial and legislative assaults. Despite these exceptions, the
fundamental rule of liability is so pervasive that a review of its historical
origins is warranted.
Ancient Precedents

A generation ago, Babylonian law, which was codified in the reign
of Hammurabi, was rediscovered for the modern world. Hammurabi's
code represented some amelioration of more primitive customs, because
it partially substituted compensation for retaliation. Also, the principle
oftalion, a punishment identical to the offense, however brutal it might
have been, at least precluded retaliations that exceeded the severity of
the original offense. The code of Hammurabi includes both specified
money payments for particular injuries and more direct "eye for an
eye, tooth for a tooth" penalties, with the choice dependent upon the
relative social ranks of the aggressors and the victims. 1
In Hittite law, penalties, fines, and punishments were reduced, and
the previous talionic and corporal penalties replaced by compensation.
Punishment of the offenders became almost secondary to reparation for
the damage done (Neufeld 1951, p. 99).
In the Hebrew Bible, although the law of retaliation—the measure
for measure—is quoted, nonfatal physical injuries became a matter for
monetary compensation to the injured party. The general rule was that
these ought to be equitable and, as far as possible, equivalent. The rules
allowed compensation for a good deal more than wage loss (Falk 1964,
pp. 83-84) and can be considered the predecessor of tort law and
nonscheduled injury awards as much as the forerunner of the schedules.
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A clear illustration of how compensation replaced retaliation is found
in Exodus (21.18-19):
And if men contend, and one smite the other with a stone,
or with his fists, and he die not, but keep his bed; if he rise
again and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote
him be quit; only he shall pay for the loss of his time and
shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.
The commentaries explain that compensation is awarded on five
grounds: for damage, for pain, for healing, for loss of time, and for
insult. Insult apparently refers to payments made when the harm was
intentionally inflicted. The liability for healing extended to payment of
medical costs; the commentaries are quite specific as to when liability
ceases, and under what conditions the case may be "reopened," to use
the modern phrase. 2
Payment for damages was assessed in a way that is not possible in
the absence of a slave market. The instructions were to consider the
injured person as if he were a slave to be sold in the market, to ap
praise his price before the injury, and to contrast that price with what
he would be worth with the impairment. Obviously, in a perfect market
the difference would be the present value of the future net product of
the whole slave, as contrasted with that of the impaired one. With the
examples at hand (a slave market), these capitalized values could be
observed, rather than estimated by probabilistic functions dependent
upon imperfect knowledge of future earning streams.
Another of the five grounds was liability for loss of time. The rabbis
recognized that the injured man had already been paid for the value
of his foot or leg, and consequently the amount paid for loss of time
was estimated at a minimum wage—"as if he were a watchman over
a cucumber field," neither an onerous nor a dangerous occupation. The
duration is not clear from the commentaries. Was it payment for the
healing period or "temporary total disability" in modern terms? Or
was it an extended wage-loss benefit after payment of compensation
for the impairment? A footnote to the commentaries implies it was the
latter, and that wages of the simplest task were chosen since the in
jured often may have been fit for no other kind of work. It goes on
to say that "in actual practice the court must take into consideration
what services he will be fit to give after he has been completely cured.''
The ambiguity remains since the same footnote also states that com
pensation for lost time must be paid even in the absence of bodily injury.
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Since the scheme was general, and not one of "liability without fault,"
the last of the five grounds was for "pain." The amounts awarded
depended upon the amounts a person "would be willing to accept to
suffer so much"—a startlingly modern formulation.
People in similar stages of civilization develop similar concepts to
deal with such matters, but how these concepts survive, and through
what transmutations, is difficult to trace. Certain developments cannot
be traced on a straight upward line; retrogression and advance both take
place, and it is not easy to distinguish between them. It is claimed that
the Egyptian Bedouin, until quite recently, had a set of fixed payments
for assaults and wounds, dealing respectively with loss of limbs, broken
bones, wounds on the face, and wounds elsewhere on the body. A
hereditary assessor determined the amount payable in each case in order
to avoid talion or some sort of revenge (Driver and Miles 1960, pp.
408-9).
By the time the Anglo-Saxon world begins to leave its record, money
reparations as a substitute for clan vengeance seem to be the rule. A
definite schedule of tariffs established the official money worth of all
persons, gauged principally by their rank (Malone 1970, p. 2). Thus
the biblical notion specifying a definite amount for a specific injury,
independent of rank, was lost sight of as status distinctions came into
play.
Disfigurements, which are included in some modern schedules, were
also included in the earliest laws. Malone (1970, p. 2) quotes the laws
of Ethelbert to illustrate his point that the amount of tariff to be paid
was determined to a large extent by the public shame that attended the
wound: "If the bruise be black in part not covered by the clothes, let
bot be made with thirty scaetts. If it be covered by the clothes, let bot
be made for each with twenty scaetts." Such pronouncements sound
much like current provisions of state compensation statutes, which
specify dollar amounts due for highly visible scars but often leave less
obvious scars uncompensated.
Malone cites the reference by Pound (1914, p. 198) to a pronounce
ment of the Welsh king, Howell the Good, that a scar on the face is
worth six-score "pints," while the permanent loss of both joints of the
thumb (an injury that would virtually disable the hand) brought only
seventy-six "pints" and a half-penny. Thus even in the earliest times
there was no ready social consensus as to the relative value of the con
sequences of one injury versus those of another.
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We can find no organic connection between these ancient and primitive
valuations and modern-day compensation schedules. The practice of
levying fixed sums to compensate victims for specific injuries apparently
disappeared, perhaps because of the lack of flexibility, or perhaps
because the sums became unrealistically large and paid no account to
the offender's ability to pay (Pollock and Maitland 1895, Vol. II, pp.
459-60).
The development of the criminal law substituted a more sophisticated
method of social control, and in civil suits money damages were awarded
when harm was inflicted, at first in accordance with strict liability and
later according to negligence principles. Thus in the late nineteenth cen
tury, courts proudly declared that the law does not attempt to fix any
precise rules for measuring damages, but "from the necessity of the
case leaves their assessment to the good sense and the unbiased judg
ment of the jury." 3 "There can be no fixed measurement of compen
sation," wrote the Supreme Court in a late nineteenth century railroad
case, "for . . . the permanent injury to health and body." 4
Of course, it was the very dissatisfaction with these jury awards and
the uncertainty attendant upon the tort law standards that helped per
suade legislatures to adopt the first compensation statutes. The aim was
to eliminate negligence concepts and substitute the concept of liability
without fault. Liability was to be limited and the search was for definite
rules to govern the determination of compensation benefits.
European Experience and Early State Laws

American state workers' compensation laws were influenced heavi
ly by European experience. Germany's workers' compensation statute
in 1884 was followed by Austria's in 1887. Sixteen other European na
tions, as well as South Australia, Queensland, and the Cape of Good
Hope, had followed suit (between 1894 and 1907) before the first
American act appeared (Larson 1986, sec. 57.13).
By 1913, the Bureau of Labor Statistics could report that no subject
of labor legislation had gained such general acceptance throughout the
world in so brief a period. Forty-one foreign countries, including all
European countries except Turkey, had introduced some form of
workers' compensation for industrial accidents. In the United States,
the U.S. Congress passed a law in 1908 granting certain of its employees
the right to receive compensation for injuries sustained in the course
of employment. New York, Wisconsin, and Minnesota appointed com-
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missions to formulate laws in 1909. Legislation was passed in Mon
tana in 1909 and in Maryland and New York in 1910, but each of these
laws was later declared unconstitutional. In 1911, Wisconsin became
the first state to pass a state workers' compensation law that survived
constitutional tests.
As Larson makes clear, most of these statutes did not contain schedules
(1986, sec. 57.13). The New York law, for example, was modeled on
the 1897 British act, which had a wage-loss provision for all perma
nent injuries. New Jersey's 1911 law is the first that contained a schedule
from the beginning. New Jersey was the first state to adopt what Reede
terms a flat rate disability schedule—"the only completely original ele
ment in American compensation scales." According to Reede (1947,
pp. 117-18), the idea for the schedule was derived from the prevailing
practice in private accidental and health insurance of paying specified
sums for accidental dismemberment.
Dodd (1936, p. 617) maintains that the amounts specified for various
types of impairments were influenced by jury verdicts in liability cases,
schedules in accident policies, and legislative compromise between op
posing interests.
Larson notes that schedules for compensation appeared in the United
States well before the first state workers' compensation statutes: the
first schedules were probably those of individual insurance policies,
which began to appear in the second half of the nineteenth century. 5
Larson claims that Belgium's Industrial Accident schedule was closely
associated with comparable compensation for war wounds, as was
France's original schedule. It is his opinion that these historical fragments
are of no use at all in explaining the origin of the fundamental rule of
liability used for workers' compensation scheduled injuries—namely,
the complete independence from actual wage loss within a program that
justified benefits because of the existence of lost earnings (work disabili
ty, in our terminology). The schedules, especially the more limited
schedules (such as Pennsylvania's early law, which was limited to ma
jor members), Larson notes, were tied in with the wage-loss rationale
by the conclusive presumption of wage loss from major impairment.
He contends that it was a realistic presumption, more obvious in earlier
times than now because of the absence then of laws prohibiting employ
ment discrimination. "The presumption that a one-armed or a one-legged
worker would suffer eventual actual wage loss, then, was no fiction,
nor was it a facade behind which to distribute payments for physical
impairment" (Larson 1986, sec. 57.14).
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New Jersey's example inspired the adoption of schedules in many
other state workers' compensation laws. In 1912, Michigan, Rhode
Island, and Maryland passed original statutes containing limited
schedules; and a number of states whose original statutes had no
schedules added them within a few years (Reede 1947, pp. 117-18).
Ten jurisdictions had no schedules in their original acts: Arizona, Califor
nia, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Ohio, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. By 1940, every state with a com
pensation law had a schedule of one sort or another. 6
Of the 48 states in the union in 1940, only Arkansas and Mississippi
were without workers' compensation laws. Of the remaining 46 states,
20 had exclusive schedules, which Reede defines as schedules under
which payments represent the entire compensation with no attempt to
differentiate the healing period, the permanent impairment, or any subse
quent loss of earning capacity; and 22 states had schedules that Reede
labels "additional," which show the number of weekly installments
for permanent impairments to be paid in addition to compensation for
total disability during the healing period. Maine, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island also had schedules of one kind or another, but Reede
categorizes them apart from the other 42 states with workers'
compensation.
Why did states follow New Jersey's lead? Reede (1947, p. 117) argues
that the move was influenced, in part, by doubts about the effect of
alternative plans on the worker's "will to recover" and, in part, by
the difficulty of relating earning capacity at the wage level prevailing
after the injury to earning capacity at the level prevailing at the time
of injury.
California did not place a schedule in its statute, but authorized the
workers' compensation administrator to issue a comprehensive schedule
that measured disabilities as a percentage of the compensation award
ed for total and permanent disability. The California schedule was bor
rowed from a Russian schedule, which listed 136 disabilities rated in
terms of the percent of permanent total injury. 7
The California schedule provided a standard rating for a wide range
of injuries, and then adjusted that standard rating according to the oc
cupation and age of the worker. In terms of our typology, California
was basing its final award on some estimated measure of disability, since
presumably the only justification for adjusting the standard rating ac
cording to age and occupation was that the same impairment or func-
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tional limitation would have different economic consequences depend
ing upon the age and occupation of the worker affected.
What is most significant for our purpose is that no state followed
California's lead. It was New Jersey's schedule that served as the model
for the other states. New Jersey's schedule differs from California's
in the limited number of entries and in the absence of explicit adjustments
for age and occupation. In the New Jersey schedule, each of the entries
(the arm, the leg, and so on) is valued at a particular number of weeks.
In the California schedule, all injuries are assessed at a proportion of
the single figure allocated for total disability. That difference should
not be too significant, in that it is always possible to translate the assessed
number of weeks for a particular part of the body into a fixed propor
tion of the number of weeks allocated for total disability, and yet those
schedules that do base all entries on a common denominator tend to
be much more comprehensive. Again, the Russian schedule, from which
the California schedule was borrowed, had over a hundred entries, in
contrast to New Jersey's limited schedule. It is also apparent that when
one begins to list more than the extremities and the eyes, it becomes
necessary to evaluate loss of use. If internal injuries or injuries to the
back are listed, it is clear that the initial assessment is based not on
impairment, that is, a loss of the particular limb or the eye, but rather
on a functional loss or limitation.
In addition to this basic difference in schedules among the states, there
is today a difference as to whether the amounts awarded are wage-related.
The statutes in all states but Massachusetts, Minnesota, Washington,
and Oregon make awards by first fixing a number of weeks for a par
ticular impairment or functional limitation, then multiplying that number
by a weekly compensation benefit that is a specified percentage of the
worker's preinjury wage, subject to a minimum and maximum weekly
amount. In Washington, losses are valued as specified dollar sums, rang
ing in 1986 from $2,760 for the loss of a lesser toe to $36,000 for the
loss of an arm or a leg. In Oregon, losses are valued in terms of degrees,
with each degree of scheduled injury calling for $125 in compensation
benefits. Thus the loss of an arm is valued at 192 degrees, or $24,000. 8
The scheduled benefits in the few "deviant" states, such as
Washington and Oregon, are obviously based on the philosophy that
an arm is an arm, and worth the same amount to a lawyer or truck driver,
a rich man or poor man. Larson (1986, sec. 57.17) maintains that such
an assessment method is the only logical one if the reason for payments
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is physical impairment. In the typical state, the loss of an arm is valued
at a larger sum for a high-wage worker than for a low-wage worker.
Presumably the reason for this method is that the sums are paid not
to compensate for physical loss in and of itself (although that is the opera
tional basis for benefits), but because, on the average, the low-wage
worker will suffer a smaller future wage loss due to the impairment
than will the high-wage worker with the identical impairment.
Many of the other differences in the schedules will be discussed as
we make comparisons across states. It will be seen that state schedules
differ in the specificity of their entries, and they also differ in the ex
clusivity of their awards. The latter difference among states has per
sisted to the present day. Most states pay benefits during the period
of temporary disability, and in addition pay the scheduled benefits. In
four states, the compensation for temporary disability is deducted in
its entirety from the allowance for scheduled injury, and in four other
states there are restrictions on the number of weeks of temporary disabili
ty benefits that can be subtracted from the duration of the scheduled
awards. 9 Also, in a few states, it is possible to collect benefits after
the scheduled number of weeks are paid, whereas in most states the
payment of the scheduled number of weeks constitutes the full and com
plete payment, and is not supplemented in the absence of a change in
the worker's medical condition.
Consistency of the Schedules
Durations

In the literature on workers' compensation, perhaps nothing is more
frequently remarked than the extreme variations across states in dura
tions or amounts of benefits for the same loss. In terms of number of
weeks, for example, table 5.1 shows the range for the arm is from 225
weeks in Ohio to 500 weeks in Wisconsin. Comparable differences in
durations for other parts of the body are also shown in the table.
Internal Consistency

Granted that the durations of benefits for any specified loss differ
widely among states, we can also ask whether there is internal con
sistency within the states.
In table 5.2, we have set the duration of benefits for the arm in each
state equal to 100. Other entries in a state's schedule are expressed as
a proportion of the duration for the arm in that state. For example, in
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Table 5.2
of the Loss of an Arm, January 1, 1986
Percentage
a
as
Payments
Scheduled Compensation
Scheduled compensation payments as a percentage of the loss of an arm
State

Arm

Hand

Thumb

First
finger

Leg

Foot

Great
toe

Other
toe

Sight
one eye

Hearing Hearing
one ear both ears

California

100

73.8

12.9

5.7

109.5

57.2

7.2

1.4

35.7

10.7

73.8

District of Columbia

100

78.2

24.0

14.7

89.7

65.7

9.6

5.1

51.3

16.7

64.1

89.1

32.0

16.4

63.6

41.6

7.3

1.8

34.5

5.5

54.5
58.3

Florida

100

Michigan

100

79.9

24.2

14.1

79.9

60.2

12.3

4.1

60.2

Nevada
New Jersey

100

90.0

36.7

23.3

66.7

46.7

13.3

3.3

40.0

10.0

100

74.2

22.7

15.2

95.5

69.7

12.1

4.5

68.2

18.2

60.6

14.7

92.3

65.7

12.2

5.1

51.3

19.2

48.1

13.3

4.4

55.6

11.1

55.6

New York

100

78.2

24.0

Ohio

100

77.8

26.7

15.6

88.9

66.7

Pennsylvania

100

81.7

14.4

12.2

100.0

61.0

9.8

3.9

67.1

14.6

63.4

Wisconsin

100

80.0

25.0

12.0

100.0

50.0

16.7

5.0

50.0

11.0

66.0

Average

80.3

25.3

14.4

88.6

58.5

11.4

3.9

51.4

13.0

60.5

Standard deviation

5.46

6.17

4.37

14.68

9.45

2.93

1.32

11.96

4.47

7.48

0.068

0.244

0.304

0.166

0.162

0.258

0.343

0.233

0.344

0.124

Coefficient of variation

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, State Workers' Compensation Laws (January 1986), table 9; U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws (1986), chart VII; statutes for various jurisdictions.
Nevada: Percentages are based on ratings from the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
Florida: Percentages are based on adjusted ratings from the AMA Guides.
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New Jersey the duration of benefit payments for the loss of an arm is
330 weeks, and for the loss of the great toe, 40 weeks (table 5.1). When
the arm is set equal to 100, then the great toe's "relative value" is 12.1
(table 5.2).
Since the hand is part of the arm and the fingers part of the hand,
we expect fairly close correspondence among the relative values of these
parts of the upper extremity, when calculated using the arm as the base.
In general, the relative values show only moderate variation among
states. For the hand, they range from a low of 73.8 in California to
a high of 90 in Nevada, which derives its values from the AM A Guides.
The average value of the hand relative to the arm is 80.3, and the stan
dard deviation is 5.46. The coefficient of variation (the standard devia
tion divided by the average) is only .068.
If we were to set the leg equal to 100, instead of the arm, we would
find a similar correspondence in relative values for the foot and the toes.
Larger deviations occur in the comparisons between the two major
members—the arm and the leg. California is the only state that sets a
longer duration for the leg than for the arm. In two of the states, the
durations are equal; and in the remaining seven jurisdictions, the dura
tion for the leg is less than that for the arm. Florida assesses the leg
at the lowest relative rate, assigning it only 63.6 percent of the dura
tion allocated for the arm. Nevada also places a low value on the leg
relative to the arm.
The Florida and Nevada low evaluations of the relative worth of a
leg result from the states' use of the AM A Guides as the basis for rating
permanent impairments. Henry Kessler, one of the formulators of the
AM A Guides, argued that although injuries to the leg will, in general,
cause a longer period of disability and absence from work than com
parable injuries to the arm, the long-range prognosis for vocational
rehabilitation is more favorable for leg injuries. "The activities of the
leg are relatively simple and therefore more easily restored or
duplicated" (Kessler 1970, p. 109). As Kessler sees it, the human leg
has two major tasks: to support the trunk and upper body, and to achieve
ambulation. The arm primarily acts as an auxiliary of the hand, which
has the prehensile ability indispensable to carrying out basic vocational
functions. Kessler's views as to the importance of the hand are also
reflected in its relative valuation of 90 percent of the arm in the AMA
Guides.
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The relative valuations are influenced by basic differences in
philosophy and judgment as to the importance of the extremities. Even
this short discussion is suggestive of the difficulty of pricing any part
of the body in an entirely objective, scientific way.
Specificity and Comprehensiveness
Subdivisions of Parts of the Body Listed. The typical schedule, which
gives only maximum values for the complete loss of the extremity, does
not define precisely any part of the body. This leaves the sometimes
challenging task of determining ratings for partial loss of the member.
Is the loss of a tip of the finger before the distal joint equivalent to the
loss of one-third of the finger or one-half of the finger? Or is the loss
of any part of the finger to be considered as the loss of the entire finger?
Both the degree of specificity of schedules and accompanying
guidelines issued by the worker's compensation agency vary from state
to state. Although most states are content with a bare listing in the
schedule, with minimum detail, Wisconsin has 20 separate schedule
listings covering the loss of the thumb, fingers, or parts of these digits.
Four separate listings differentiate portions of the index finger alone.
The loss of the finger at the distal joint in Wisconsin is valued as 25
percent of the finger; by comparison, in New York, it is taken as 50
percent of the finger. The loss of the first two phalanges in Wisconsin
is defined as 60 percent of the finger; in New York it is viewed as the
equivalent of the entire finger. The same range of values for partial
loss occurs with the hand and the arm, or the foot and the leg.
More Than One Extremity Affected. Some schedules are explicit as
to benefits due when more than one member is affected. In New York,
if more than one part of the body is affected, compensation is to be
awarded for each, and these awards are to run consecutively. It is
recognized, however, that adding together the scheduled values may
exceed the value for the next highest specified loss in the schedule. Thus,
in New York, the loss of two or more fingers is proportioned to the
loss of the hand, but the total duration may not exceed that which is
scheduled for the loss of an entire hand.
In Wisconsin, if two fingers on the same hand are lost, the award
for the first equal or lesser valued finger is increased by 100 percent;
if three fingers are lost, the award for the second and third equal or
lesser valued finger is increased by 150 percent. The same type of ad
justment is provided in the case of toes, although at only a 20 percent
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rate, an amount that applies in all other cases that are not specifically
mentioned in the multiple injury variation portions.
There is very nearly a perfect split of opinion among the states as
to the relation of the combined value of the fingers to the value of the
whole hand. Fratello (1955, Exhibit Dl) compared the schedules of 39
states. In 19 of them, the sum of the values for the five individual fingers
is less than the value of the hand; in 2 it is the same; and in the remain
ing 18 it is greater.
Combinations of impairments are also difficult to evaluate when
unrelated parts of the body are involved. Most state schedules do not
specify the durations for such combinations. Texas is an exception: it
specifically schedules the loss of an eye and leg, the loss of an eye and
hand, and so on. Some statutes presume permanent total disability in
the event of multiple major losses. Michigan, for example, defines as
total permanent disability the loss of any of the two members or faculties
among eyes, legs, or arms.
Comparing Benefits Across States
Percentage of Wages and Weekly Maximums
Thus far, our discussion largely has been in terms of duration of
benefits for various specified losses. Obviously, a person who loses
an arm must be concerned not only with the duration of benefits, but
with the amounts he receives. Table 5.3 shows the maximum weekly
rates paid for permanent partial as well as the maximum rates for tem
porary total disability in 10 jurisdictions.
As seen in table 5.3, the District of Columbia, Michigan, and Penn
sylvania pay the same maximum rate for temporary disability as they
do for permanent partial. The other states have different maximums
for permanent partial and temporary total. Thus in Wisconsin, the max
imum for temporary total is set at 100 percent of the state's average
weekly wage ($329), whereas the maximum weekly rate for perma
nent partial disability is $112 as of January 1986.
New Jersey's weekly benefits for permanent partial disability are
governed by the duration of benefits. Thus minor awards are compen
sated according to a rate as low as 20 percent of the state's average
weekly wage, while major awards (421-600 weeks) are paid on the basis
of 75 percent of the state's average wage, as is the case for temporary
total and permanent total disabilities.

vo

00

R1
1—
>>

S.

03
S

o

%

j-

«

4>

_

"•3

£

c ^ C
o
c

(A

o> _O
"« t_ E «
>• <2 a •o
Ol

en
£

C

t2

E c

S. ^0

o

CM

E

u

J

</>

CM <M
o n
o
c
cs
1

£•

*^

^2

cu
Ol

et

1

S
_>>

•s S

1
1

E

eg
e
eg C 'S

1 ^
O. u

en

| -S cw ?
5 EM
_o (9
E c U C

E
'S

c
3 jQ
c»
O

^

03
>-s

Jg

1
°x
1

S

4)

•£*

•5

S

I*
<

e

03
CM
O
1/5
t/5
O

J

f*J
o
If) CM
<U 2

3 c
« CU

H
*0

01

PQ
"«

"1

^

|
'1

g

3

I.

r

c#u
e
V

•«-»

C

S

03

I.

£

•o
—
JS

1

&
•w

S

OO
0
r-

vo"

Tt-

—
—
—i
(N

O
0
m

r-"

—•

fT

r*ON
O

in

r-~"
o-i

^O

TJ-"
m
"™

ON

oo"
m

ON
vo
"*
oo
tN
o
in
\O
ro

^^

cs
in
^-

(N
in

o
o

OO

>O

(N

^"

O

<n

r*-

ON

£

•£
U

c

& §
g L^
53 "-C
0. ^

TJ

oo"

«3

2
S
oo

ed

3

ra
S
c

•2
o
2
§
1c

"Ba
.0
2i
§
03

_o
a

'5
Is

c«

<

a
O.

ca

CQ

i*

o
'ti
"3

ca
u

o: 3
D "a,
O cjT
oo

W

^

E ca

<L>

o ^o
c

2

S E

'C
U 12

o.

C

ca
"O
•^

5
r~
—
c

0

e

3
j-

^

8.
VO

^
<_

c

0

3
0

ca
^
3

ca

'><

E
<u
'53

Z

>

•O

c
«
QQ

iH

JO

1
s

O

ON
<n

U,

1

o

8
i/5 T3 u.
«
c > o
u
z "f
o" "c

ca
•o

>-.

Scheduled Benefits

•—i
(N
vo

m

fN

ON

o

rn

ro

o

r-

in

r-

—

rn

in
to
vo
in

vO

oo

oo

O

OJ
CS
^*
—

O

cO
'—'
^t"

O

oo
SO
^

O

\O
OO
vo

O

• —•
ON
oo
CN

ON

8—

Q

—

8 °tN
~—

o
r~
TJm

co
O
m

fN
oo
—i

co
^H
•*

o
in
—

in
fS
ts

06
o
<s

CN
—
m

ON
r—

co
f)
m

m
rm

O"-i
—
\o

8888888

ON
VO
(N

5 -

O

o

CN
fN
—

in

—
(N

—

q R 8 8^88888
Tt

2

.S

cs

CO

2
c
|
—

^t

C^J

vo
CO

°

o

C^i

^*

oo

?N

*

r«">

CO

r^

CO

—>

f*^

«

.2
j:
O

IS

o

•-•

>"
^
u
Z

u
Q

k«

"
5
<u
Z

&o
0

U
'o

«

.2? -S
•S >
S u
S Z

3

—

m

^

<N

<N

.2
^-

1 .y -o
•^

u 5 E

115

116 Scheduled Benefits

Neither the weekly rate nor the duration, considered alone, reveals
the total amount of benefits. That quantity is the number of weeks times
the weekly amounts.
Dollar Amounts
How do these states compare in dollar benefits? Table 5.3 shows the
maximum amount paid for what normally is the gravest scheduled loss,
the loss of an arm at the shoulder. The last columns of table 5.3 show
the present values of the maximum weekly benefits paid for the dura
tions shown.
It is difficult to compare Nevada and Florida with the other states
because of their different methods of calculating benefits. Nevada pays
six-tenths of 1 percent of a worker's wage up to the maximum amount
allowable ($2,159.33 a month as of July 1, 1985) for each 1 percent
of disability. The loss of an arm is rated at 60 percent and would pay,
at most, $777.36 per month (.006 x 60 x $2,159.33), or $179.39 per
week. The worker is entitled to receive such a sum until his 70th birth
day, or for at least five years. In our calculations, we assume a 39-yearold worker. Nevada is the most generous of the jurisdictions, although
the amounts shown depend, of course, on our choice of the age of the
worker. Florida, like Nevada, uses the AMA Guides to rate the injuries,
and pays $250 per 1 percent of impairment up to 10 percent and $500
for each percent above the 10 percent level.
The differences among the states are extreme, regardless of whether
the maximum scheduled amount column or the present value column
is used as the basis of comparison. One of the most generous jurisdic
tions on a present-value basis is the District of Columbia; its duration
(312 weeks) is below the median among the nine jurisdictions with dura
tion data, but it has the most generous weekly maximum. The present
value of D.C.'s benefits discounted at 6 percent is $113,111. Wiscon
sin pays for 500 weeks, but with a considerably lower maximum weekly
benefit than in D.C., and the resulting maximum scheduled amount is
less than one-half of D.C.'s. Present value comparisons are probably
more meaningful than comparisons of maximum amount, since they
take into account not only the weekly benefit but the time over which
it is received. We assume that none of the benefits paid are in a lump
sum. The present value of Pennsylvania's amount discounted at 6 per
cent is $113,352, almost three times the amounts paid in New York,
Ohio, and Wisconsin. It is here that one sees the importance of the ex
clusivity or nonexclusivity of the schedule. Pennsylvania pays only for
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scheduled benefits. New York's relatively low sum may be augmented
if actual wage loss follows the scheduled number of weeks. In New
Jersey the awards are also exclusive in the sense of not being influenc
ed by possible continuing wage loss, but there always is the possibility
of a nonscheduled award—for psychiatric considerations, for example—
and such matters are not susceptible to exact measurement. Florida's
scheduled benefits are also nonexclusive, since a worker may also be
eligible for wage-loss benefits.
Utility of the Scheduled Method of Assessing
Permanent Partial Disability
The schedule is a list that details the number of weeks to be paid for
the loss or loss of use of a specified limb or other part of the body.
It is essentially a relative value scale, which places a value on the ma
jor members, the arm and the leg, and lesser values on the parts of each
of these major concerns. Provision is also usually made for loss of vi
sion, loss of hearing, enucleation of the eye, and sometimes
disfigurement.
In antiquity, such schedules as existed served the useful function of
substituting a finite amount of money damages for retaliation. Even in
ancient times, the amounts to be paid were rated on the basis of several
factors, and not necessarily confined to the impairment or functional
limitation that arose as a result of the injury. With the growth of the
common law and negligence principles, the schedules gave way to an
assessment of the consequences of the injury by a jury on an individual
basis. Schedules were retained, however, in personal accident policies.
Acting on these examples, and on the examples of European countries,
when U.S. compensation laws were passed in the first and second
decades of this century, all of the states—even those that began without
schedules—soon adopted some sort of schedule in their workers' com
pensation programs.
California followed the example of Russia in issuing a comprehen
sive schedule with all entries based on a common denominator. The
number of weeks of benefits to be paid was adjusted according to the
age and occupation of the worker. New Jersey adopted a more limited
schedule with relatively few entries, each with a specified number of
weeks. New Jersey's law provided very little guidance to the parties
as to how such schedules were to be used. Most states followed New
Jersey's lead rather than California's. There are two exceptions: in re-
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cent times, Nevada adopted the AM A Guides to the Evaluation of Per
manent Impairment, which go far beyond specifying the names of limbs
and the number of weeks to be paid; and Florida, in contrast, all but
eliminated its schedules when it adopted a wage-loss method of com
pensating for permanent partial injuries (see chapter 9).
States are not uniform in their assessment of the relative value of the
limbs specified. The value of an arm varies across the states, as does
the value of a leg. The value of the minor members in relationship to
the corresponding major members is, however, fairly uniform.
The amounts paid for scheduled impairments vary greatly among
states, not only because of differences in the number of weeks of com
pensation, but also because of differences in the amounts to be paid
per week as measured by the maximums in the states.
The general function of any schedule, be it an advertising rate
schedule, a freight rate schedule, or a workers' compensation schedule,
is to provide information on amounts to be paid. In principle, a schedule
will promote certainty to the extent that it is detailed, complete (con
taining as many entries as are likely to be needed), and joined with ex
plicit guidance as to its proper use. Such details and guidance can be
communicated via statutory provisions, rules and regulations, advice
from the administrators, or possibly simply by a practice widely known
among practitioners.
In workers' compensation, how the schedule is used is the most im
portant question, and that question can be approached only with con
siderations such as those discussed in chapter 4, dealing with procedures.
It would be naive to expect that a limited schedule, in and of itself,
without rules or guidance as to its use, could provide a great deal of
information—or increase significantly the level of certainty as to the
benefit amounts due for a particular contingency. Even in the complete
loss cases, the amputations, certainty is not guaranteed unless the loss
is one exactly specified by a scheduled entry. Given the great number
of possibilities as to where an amputation can take place, it is not likely
that many amputations will be exactly as specified by a scheduled entry.
The more frequent consequence of an injury is not an amputation,
but some degree of loss of use of a limb that remains physically pre
sent. Given the variety of functions of every limb, it is obvious that
determining the extent of functional limitation is a complex task. The
hand not only has functions specific to it, such as its use as a mallet
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or pointer in Kessler's terms (1970, p. 20), but it also acts as a sensory
organ with which the brain monitors resistance, texture, temperature,
weight, and so forth.
Although an injury to the hand requires a fairly sophisticated assess
ment to determine the resulting functional limitation, the most the typical
schedule does is to provide the maximum number of weeks for the total
loss of the member to be used as a benchmark. In that respect, a schedule
can limit the range of values that can be paid for the consequence of
an injury to a member, and hence can limit the range of values over
which the parties can quarrel—but only in the special case of an injury
whose consequences are confined to one member only and that do not
extend to the so-called nonscheduled area by reason of some effect to
the worker as a whole.
The problem is complicated further in that the physician may be called
upon not only to assess the worker's physical condition, but also to judge
to what extent the condition is due to the work-related injury. If the
physician decides that a particular functional limitation of the arm is
the result of the work injury aggravating a pre-existing impairment of
the arm, then the physician may be required to assess the relative con
tributions of the prior impairment and the new work injury to the resulting
functional limitation. Unless given specific guidance by a very com
prehensive schedule, rules and regulations, guidelines issued by the agen
cy, or some well-understood rules that have grown up as a matter of
practice, different physicians are liable to arrive at very different
judgments.
The rules for measuring functional limitation, no matter how they
are derived, may or may not call upon the examiner to estimate the
impact of a functional limitation in terms of future wage earnings. If
they do, the estimates move to a consideration of "disability" factors,
as we will see in the consideration of the nonscheduled injuries. In the
California schedule, the guides for the assessment of back injuries call
upon the rater to make a judgment as to the kind of work the injured
worker should be capable of performing. In these cases, the assessment
of disability factors is open and explicit. The same is true of some of
the entries and rules in Wisconsin's guides. In Ohio, the loss of two
or more digits of the hand may call for compensation in an amount greater
than scheduled if it can be shown that the injury would cause more than
the normal handicap because of the nature of the claimant's work.
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How can the method of determining the amount of payments due in
scheduled injuries be evaluated? If the purpose of the schedule is to
provide information and increase the level of certainty with which deci
sions about permanent partial disabilities can be made, an appropriate
question is whether using the schedule improves the reliability of rating.
Can several raters, using the schedule, look at the same consequences
of an injury and come up with the same number of weeks? If so, the
schedule can be said to increase certainty, and presumably could have
the eventual effect of eliminating litigation over the injuries it covers.
If this is the objective, it is obvious that a comprehensive schedule
is necessary, and that there must be agreement as to how the schedule
is to be used.
The American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Per
manent Impairment is an example of a comprehensive schedule that
covers all body systems. The users are instructed to evaluate impair
ment or functional limitations only, without regard to the other conse
quences of the injury. Theoretically, it should be possible for physi
cians to use the method of measurement called for in the Guides with
a high degree of correspondence among their ratings. At the same time,
we ought to recognize that since it deals only with measurement of im
pairment and functional limitations, its desirable contributions to ob
jectivity may be purchased at the expense of ignoring some of the con
sequences of the injury. The Guides contain no adjustment for the age
and occupation of the worker, or any other proxy that measures work
disability in specific cases. Neither is any attempt made to measure sub
jective pain, except to the extent that the physician evaluates the ability
of the person to make a particular movement and infers the degree of
pain associated with that movement.
Other bases for compensation benefits may be appropriate in addi
tion to impairment and functional ratings. We examine that policy issue
in part IV of this study.
NOTES
1. Driver and Miles (1960, pp. 406-11). Some of the differences between the Babylonian and
Mosaic Laws are discussed in Hertz (1975, pp. 403-6).
Hertz maintains that the church's Father Augustine was one of the first to declare that taliation
was the law of justice, not of hatred, in that it was one eye, not two, for an eye; one tooth, not
ten, for a tooth; and one life, not a whole family's lives, for a life. He quotes authorities on inter-

Scheduled Benefits 121
national law to sustain his position that the rule enjoined, on the one hand, that a fair and equitable
relation must exist between the crime and the punishment, and, on the other hand, that all citizens
are equal before the law and their injuries were to be valued according to the same standards.
In the Mosaic law, monetary commutation became the rule except in capital cases, and it is Hertz's
contention that in the code of Hammurabi, the money compensation prevailed in the cases of in
jury only to the slaves. Hertz points out that the two systems are independent codifications of
ancient Semitic common law, and the resemblances are probably due to the common usages of
the Semitic ancestors of both Babylonians and Hebrews.
2. "If [the wound] healed up and then reopened, and healed again and opened up once more,
he is liable [for all expenses] to cure him, but once it is healed up thoroughly he is no longer
liable to heal him." The quotations and the information about the commentaries are from Blackman
(1983, Vol. IV, pp. 62-64). The more traditional citation would simply be Mishnayoth, Baba
Kamma, Chap. 8 (Hachovel), Mishna 2.
3. Aldrich v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 513 (1863).
4. Illinois Central Railroad v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, 105 (1866). Both cases are cited in Dodd (1936,
p. 617).
5. Larson, citing Geerts, Kornblich, and Urmson (1977, p. 110).
6. Nevada and Massachusetts, according to Reede (1947), adopted schedules in 1911. The schedule
in Massachusetts was much less detailed than Nevada's, and not altogether on the basis of the
New Jersey schedule. In 1912, Michigan followed New Jersey; and Rhode Island followed the
Massachusetts plan, which allowed subsequent compensation for demonstrated loss of earnings.
The new laws adopted in 1913, with the exception of the West Virginia law, included schedules,
six of them modeled after New Jersey and one of them modeled after Massachusetts. During the
same year, amendments in Illinois and Ohio added schedules similar to that of New Jersey, so
that by the end of 1913, 14 laws contained partial disability schedules while 6 used exclusively
the system of rating loss of earning capacity. The latter system was used in the remaining states
for nonlisted injuries (Reede 1947, p. 118).
On January 1, 1915, 17 states used schedules of compensation for specific injuries. Nine states
made these payments to the exclusion of any other payment for injury (Connecticut, Iowa, Loui
siana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin). These states made
no distinction between the temporary total benefit paid during the healing period and the amounts
that they would receive under the schedule.
Five of the laws, effective on January 1, 1915, provided scheduled payments for injuries in
addition to payments for temporary total disability during the healing period: Illinois, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. Three of the states, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Texas,
allowed subsequent compensation for demonstrated loss of earning capacity. What is interesting
in these states, however, is that there is still an overall limitation. Under the Massachusetts law,
a person could receive temporary total disability during the healing period, then a short period
of scheduled payments, approximately 50 weeks, and then compensation for subsequent loss of
earning capacity. The limitation on payments under all of the provisions in Massachusetts was
for 500 weeks, a specified sum of $3000.
Reede then takes up the revisions between 1915 and 1940. Amendments to Texas and West
Virginia provided a flat rate schedule exclusive of any kind of compensation. Twelve of the new
laws adopted such a schedule, and four adopted a schedule allowing additional payments during
the healing period. The schedule system was more firmly established, with 22 states employing
the system exclusively, and 11 compensating total disability as well. Only five states had altogether
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avoided the flat rate schedule: Arizona, New Hampshire, California, Washington, and Wyom
ing. California is an exception, only because its schedule was not contained in the statute. In 1937,
the last state with no schedule of any kind, New Hampshire, adopted a flat rate schedule of specific
injuries.
7. Discussion of "Report of Committee on Statistics and Compensation Insurance Costs" of the
International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions (1923, p. 87).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics published its Bulletin 126, Workmen's Compensation Laws in
the United States and Foreign Countries, in 1914. It gave a fairly detailed description of the various
foreign schedules and discussed their advantages and disadvantages.
8. U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1986, Chart VII).
9. U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1986, Chart VII).

Chapter 6
Nonscheduled Benefits in Impairment
(Category I) States
Categorization of the States for Nonscheduled Injuries
We divide states into three categories according to the method used
to evaluate nonscheduled injuries. In category I are those jurisdictions
in which the physical impairments or functional limitations that are con
sequences of the work-related injury are rated as a percentage of total
disability; in category II, those that assess consequences on the basis
of the loss of wage-earning capacity; in category III, those in which
actual wage loss is a necessary condition for benefits. We use these
categories with the caution that distinctions are by no means clear-cut.
We will note differences among jurisdictions within the same category
and commonalities among states in different categories.
We include New Jersey and Nevada in category I. Ohio provides
workers a choice of methods for assessing permanent consequences of
injury. One of these choices is to base the assessment on an evaluation
of impairments or functional limitations, and we discuss Ohio's method
of assessing impairment in this chapter.
Nevada assesses all cases—without distinction between scheduled and
nonscheduled injuries—on the basis of the American Medical Associa
tion's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. New Jersey
and Ohio use schedules for those injuries that are listed and use the
total number of weeks for complete disability as the referent for all cases
not listed. The role of factors other than impairment in assessing the
benefit amounts, and the amount of guidance given the raters, differ
greatly among these states, and we comment on these differences below.
Despite our categorization, Ohio and New Jersey do not assess sole
ly on the basis of impairment or functional limitation. Both states im
plicitly take into account the consequences of the impairment for a
worker's future role in the labor market. (Nevada is a less clear-cut
case.) In some states, little formal guidance is given the evaluators of
nonscheduled injuries, and so the internist or other specialist may evaluate
the consequences of a given heart condition quite differently for a lawyer
123
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and a truck driver, for a young man and an old man, and so on. We
provide examples from our field work reports of how these adjustments
are made without any particular basis in statutory or administrative rules.
Why then denominate these jurisdictions as ones that assess on the
basis of impairments or functional limitations? In part, because in these
states a physician is called upon to assess the physical condition of the
claimant. The physician's evaluation is based primarily, even if not ex
clusively, on the extent of the physical or mental damage and on his
estimate of the worker's residual capacity.
If the methods used in category I are contrasted with the methods
used in category III, the wage-loss states of Florida, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and New York, and the alternative method in Ohio, several
distinctions become apparent. However "disability" factors are taken
into account in the assessment of the permanent consequences of the
injury in New Jersey or Nevada, it is clear that workers in these category
I states need not experience an actual wage loss in order to receive a
permanent and partial disability award. In category I jurisdictions, the
rater need never address the question of whether the injury under ex
amination puts the worker at a disadvantage in the labor market. The
rater instead evaluates the worker's condition against the standard of
a normal unimpaired man. His concepts of normality may not be based
strictly on medical factors, such as prescribed in the AM A Guides, and
may be conditioned by factors such as age, occupation, experience, and
training. Nonetheless, the rating is essentially centered on the worker's
physical or mental condition. We classify the rating methods in Florida,
Pennsylvania, and New York, and one of the methods in Ohio, as wageloss methods because they endorse compensation in nonscheduled cases
only in the event of actual wage loss assessed on a retrospective basis
(at least that is the theoretical prerequisite for benefits in those jurisdic
tions). In Michigan, as we shall see, compromise enters into the han
dling of a great many cases, and the exact basis for settlement is not
always clear. But compromises are not the rule in the other jurisdic
tions, and in those states the distinction between scheduled injuries (rated
strictly on medical factors) and nonscheduled injuries (requiring actual
wage loss) is quite clear.
California, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia are left in an
intermediate category II group, between actual wage loss on the one
hand and impairment on the other, and are designated as states that assess
on the basis of loss of wage-earning capacity. For convenience, we in-
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elude California in this category even while recognizing that Califor
nia is different. In California the standard rating is based on impair
ment factors, but is then adjusted by age and occupational factors. Taking
age and occupation into account is one method of assessing wage-earning
capacity.
In all three categories of states, the rater must use medical judgment
to determine if at least some permanent consequences stem from the
worker's injury. If not, the worker is not entitled to permanent disability
benefits. Beyond that threshold determination, the three categories of
states diverge as outlined above.
We will now proceed to examine the impairment and functional limita
tion criteria used to evaluate partial disability in New Jersey, Nevada,
and Ohio.
New Jersey
Introduction
New Jersey is one of the pioneering states in the field of workers'
compensation. l It was one of the first states to enact any type of workers'
compensation law, and it was the first to adopt a schedule (see chapter
5). New Jersey also pioneered in that its statute was elective, a method
designed to overcome the perceived constitutional obstacles to a com
pulsory law in 1911. New Jersey's original act did not provide for com
pulsory insurance. Insuring one's liability was altogether optional for
employers. Rubinow denotes this type of insurance and liability ar
rangements as the "New Jersey plan" (Rubinow 1916, p. 183).
In recent decades New Jersey has been well known for its "perma
nent partial problem." The problem, it is safe to say, is hardly a new
one. The Somers used 1951 data to show that the proportion of com
pensation cases in the permanent partial category was higher in New
Jersey than in the industrially important states of Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Moreover, New Jersey had the lowest
average award per case (Somers and Somers 1954, pp. 74-79). By 1956,
72 percent of all closed compensated cases involved permanent partial
disability, and they accounted for 89 percent of the compensation benefits
awarded. Employer groups in New Jersey complained about the everincreasing number of permanent partial cases "where there is no ap
parent disability and little or no loss of time or wages" (Berkowitz 1960,
p. 69). In 1957, a commission set up to study laws affecting industrial
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development noted, in what was to become an oft-repeated refrain dur
ing the years, that the major problem in workers' compensation was
the payment of many claims for permanent partial disability in amounts
up to $800 where there was no apparent disability and little or no loss
of time or wages, and where the claim often rested on subjective com
plaints (Berkowitz 1960, p. 68).
A New Jersey study commission reported in 1973 that New Jersey
was paying an enormous number of relatively small awards in perma
nent partial cases, which, in the aggregate, consumed a very substan
tial portion of workmen's compensation resources. (The charges are
corroborated by the data in tables 3.8 and 3.16.) Many of these awards
were for injuries that did not involve permanent disability under any
of the theories familiar to the Commission (New Jersey Study Com
mission 1973, p. 23).
The Commission recommended substantial changes in New Jersey's
law, including an increase in the rates paid for permanent partial, award
of benefits on the basis of the extent of permanent impairment as
established in the AMA Guides, and payment of continuing wage-loss
benefits in cases where wage loss occurs and impairment at the initial
evaluation step is rated at 20 percent or higher. No legislation resulted
from the Commission's report, and it was not until 1979 that forces
coalesced to bring about changes in New Jersey's statute to address the
permanent partial problem. What came to be perceived as an excessive
number of minor permanent partial disability awards in New Jersey
stemmed from the courts' interpretation of the statutory language. New
Jersey lists a limited number of injuries in its schedule, with 23 dif
ferent entries. The statute (N.J.S.A. 34:15-12[22]), provides:
In all lesser or other cases involving permanent loss, or where
the usefulness of a member of any physical function is per
manently impaired, the duration of compensation shall bear
such relation to specific periods of time stated in the above
schedule as the disabilities bear to those produced by the in
juries named in the schedule. In cases in which the disabili
ty is determined as a percentage of total and permanent
disability, the duration of the compensation shall be a cor
responding portion of 600 weeks.
From the earliest days of the law, claimants were not required to show
any present or anticipated future wage loss in order to be eligible to
receive compensation for the consequences of an injury. In the case
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that enunciated that concept, Brubage v. Lee, 87 N.J.L. 36 (1915), compensable disability was defined as "any loss of physical function which
detracts from the former efficiency of the body or its member in the
ordinary pursuits of life." The definition was refined further in Her
cules Powder v. Morris Co. Court, 93 N.J.L. 93 (1919), when it was
established that permanent impairment of the physical entity is compensable in the absence of any showing of functional impairment.
Similarly, in Kiczko v. Bay Us, 20 N.J.Misc. 323 (1942), it was held
that compensation was dependent not on loss of efficiency, but on
whether there had been a loss of any portion of the scheduled member.
In keeping with that concept, compensation, whether for scheduled or
for nonscheduled injuries, has been awarded for impairment to the
worker as a "physiological unit"; for "structural change"; for "fault
akin to a traumatic injury"; for "loss of (personal) anatomy"; and for
"physical loss and not industrial capacity" (Lefelt 1975, p. 597).
The term "ordinary pursuits of life" seems to have almost limitless
applications. The category includes recreation, procreation, avocation,
and many other activities. There does seem to be some restriction on
the broad concept in Barbato v. Alsan Masonry and Concrete, Inc.,
64 N.J.L. 514 (1974), in which disability was defined as "loss ensu
ing from personal injury which detracts from the former efficiency of
the workman's body or its members in the ordinary pursuits of life,
in relation to the field of service to which he is suited." However, the
implications of that qualification upon disability determinations have
not yet been felt (Lefelt 1975, p. 598). The decision has been used to
justify a permanent total award on the basis of unemployability. We
discuss the changes brought about by the 1979 amendments below.
Changes in New Jersey's Law
The 1973 Study Commission raised several procedural issues about
the operation of the law. The Commission observed that at every stage
of the workers' compensation proceedings, factors were at work to en
sure that virtually no claim relating to the existence or the extent of
disability would be denied. The volume of cases and the controversies
had led to delays in payments for medical services and for temporary
disability. They noted the limited role of the Division of Workmen's
Compensation and what they perceived to be an absence of reasonably
precise standards defining disability. We document later the Commis
sion's observations that disability evaluation techniques were developed
by the physicians, who alone had custody of this knowledge. Their
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testimony, according to the Study Commission, was governed not only
by medical considerations but by considerations of other factors, such
as age, sex, education, and economic and social environments, which
are much less precise and which only the physicians knew how to in
clude in their testimony.
The 1973 Commission reviewed files of 74 workers' compensation
permanent partial cases selected at random and observed that the disabili
ty evaluations of both the respondents' and the petitioners' doctors were
frequently based on pure guesswork and self-serving declarations with
little physiological or other logical rationale.
Amendments of the law did not come until 1979. (The 1978 data in
tables 3.8 and 3.16 show that minor permanent partial cases still
dominated the New Jersey program one year prior to the amendments.)
Senate Bill S. 802, introduced on February 9, 1978, was originally
drafted by representatives of the business community. In an effort to
solicit the support of organized labor, a series of amendments was ham
mered out and the final version was adopted by the legislature on
November 13, 1979, and signed by the governor on January 10, 1980,
as P.L. 1979, Chapter 283 (Napier 1981).
One objective of the new law was to eliminate the payment of benefits
for minor permanent partial disabilities and to direct the money to more
seriously disabled workers. It sought to accomplish this objective, not
by any radical change in the philosophy by which awards were given,
but by revising the statutory definitions of permanent partial disabilities.
The amendments stated (at N.J.S.A. 34:15-36):
"Disability permanent in quality and partial in character"
means a permanent impairment caused by a compensable ac
cident or compensable occupational disease, based upon
demonstrable objective medical evidence, which restricts the
function of the body or its members or organs; included in
the criteria which shall be considered shall be whether there
has been a lessening to a material degree of an employee's
working ability. Subject to the above provisions, nothing in
this definition shall be construed to preclude benefits to a
worker who returns to work following a compensable acci
dent even if there be no reduction in earnings. Injuries such
as minor lacerations, minor contusions, minor sprains, and
scars which do not constitute significant permanent disfigure
ment, and occupational disease of a minor nature such as
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mild dermatitis and mild bronchitis shall not constitute per
manent disability within the meaning of this definition.
This statutory definition preserves the essence of the impairment
theory, so New Jersey still belongs as a category I state. However, the
loss-of-earning-capacity approach is also used in the new law, which
moves New Jersey closer to the border between our category I and
category II. In addition to reformulating the basis for benefits, the new
statute requires "demonstrable objective medical evidence." As a result,
cases that formerly were compensated as permanent partial impairments
of a minor nature are presumably excluded under this statute.
Also changed were the criteria for compensable heart attacks. Awards
based on compensable heart attacks had increased from 367 in 1975
to 526 in 1979, and in response the criteria were made more restrictive
(Napier 1981, p. 4). The claimant must prove that injury or death was
produced by the work effort or strain in excess of the wear and tear
of the claimant's daily living (N.J.S.A. 34:15-8.3). The previous
criterion was that whenever the required exertion was too great for the
person undertaking the work, whatever the degree of the exertion or
the condition of the workplace, the heart attack was compensable. 2
Also, under the new law, New Jersey has moved to a type of appor
tionment statute. Pre-existing disabilities due to the deterioration of a
tissue, organ, or part of the body through the natural aging process are
not to be compensated and are to be deducted from the overall disabili
ty (N.J.S.A. 34:15-31(b)).
As a quid pro quo for the tightening of these criteria for permanent
partial disability benefits, the compensation rates were substantially in
creased. Prior to the amendments, the New Jersey maximum weekly
benefit was $40 a week for permanent partial disability awards. Under
the new law, the weekly maximums for permanent partial disability in
crease with the severity of the disability. Thus, the maximum weekly
compensation available for the first 90 weeks of allowable compensa
tion is set at 20 percent of the statewide average weekly wage. For those
awards that range from 421 to 600 weeks (the maximum number of
weeks), the maximum weekly benefit is 75 percent of the state average
weekly wage. Thus as the duration of the permanent partial disability
benefits increases, whether by reason of a scheduled or an unschedul
ed award, the maximum weekly compensation goes up. The same
nominal percentage of lost earnings is paid for temporary total disability
as for permanent partial and permanent total disability, namely 70 per-
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cent of the worker's preinjury wage. For temporary and permanent total
disability, the maximum weekly benefit is 75 percent of the state average
weekly wage, regardless of the duration of the disability.
In a separate piece of legislation, Senate Bill S. 3362, the legislature
for the first time enacted an occupational hearing loss statute. It adopted
criteria for the extent of the noise hazard necessary to produce a sen
sory neuro-hearing loss, and provided a formula for the calculation of
the level of hearing impairments intended to cut back on many of the
claims held compensable before the new law. (In years prior to 1980,
an average of 1,500 awards per year were made for occupational hear
ing loss.) Standards were included for audiometric testing, and preex
isting hearing impairments were deducted from the overall impairment
in assessing compensable disability.
Perhaps the 1979 amendments are significant as much for what they
did not do as for what they did. Although benefit levels were increased
and disability definitions were changed, there was no fundamental change
in the philosophy about which consequences of injuries justify com
pensation. Nor was additional guidance provided to the parties as to
how to evaluate permanent partial disability. Nothing in the new statutes
necessarily changes the procedures in the old law (which are discussed
below).
In contrast, the 1973 Commission, which delved deeply into the per
manent partial problem, recommended a four-step procedure for
evaluating and awarding benefits for injuries and diseases with perma
nent consequences. The first step was the payment of temporary total
benefits during the healing period. The second was a waiting period—
which exists in the current law—of six months after maximum healing
has been reached before permanent partial benefits could be paid. The
third step was the award of benefits based on the extent of permanent
impairments as established by the AMA Guides in multiples of 1 per
cent. The Commission recognized that such changes logically required
the elimination of the schedule in the law, and they recommended its
abolition except in cases of absolute incapacity limited to paraplegia,
total loss of bilateral vision, and total loss of use of both hands, both
feet, both arms, or any two thereof. These conditions led to a conclusive
presumption of permanent total disability, and benefits would be payable
for life without regard to the possibility of rehabilitation or actual
earnings.
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The fourth step was a wage-loss benefit. If impairment at the initial
evaluation step were 20 percent or higher, the Commission recommended
that the worker be considered for additional benefits after the expira
tion of the period during which he received his impairment benefits.
These would be conditioned upon the showing of actual loss of wages
suffered by the worker. The hearing officer would be directed to deter
mine causation, that is, whether the wage loss was caused by the im
pairment in relation to such factors as rehabilitation success, age, oc
cupational training or work experience, attitude, formal education, and
capacity for competing in the open labor market. Employee wages earned
before the injury would be contrasted to the wages earned after the in
jury, giving consideration to changes in wage rates and labor condi
tions. These benefits would be paid for the duration of the wage loss.
The purpose of these recommendations was to encourage rehabilita
tion or return to some form of work, and to encourage employers to
rehire injured workers.
The concern in the 1979 amendments seems to have been narrower,
with an attempt to substitute statutory language for decisions that had
evolved over the years. The apparent goals of the amendments were
to reduce the numbers and costs of permanent partial disability cases,
and in particular the dominance of minor permanent partial awards.
The available evidence suggests that these goals were only partially
achieved. Between 1978 and 1982 (the latest year with available data
as of 1986), the number of all permanent disability cases as a share
of all cases dropped in New Jersey (table 3.9), and this is true for the
three types of permanent disability cases: permanent total, major per
manent partial, and minor permanent partial (tables 3.6 to 3.8).
Nonetheless, as of 1982, the New Jersey shares of all cases accounted
for by minor permanent partial cases (table 3.8) and by all permanent
disability cases (table 3.9) were more than 200 percent of the national
average shares.
The average costs of all New Jersey permanent disability cases in
creased between 1978 and 1982 relative to the U.S. averages (table 3.13),
and this was also true for each of the three types of permanent disabili
ty cases (tables 3.10 to 3.12). Nonetheless, because of the numerical
dominance of minor permanent partial cases in New Jersey, as of 1982
the average cost of all permanent disability cases in the state was only
about 57 percent of the national average (table 3.13).

132 Nonscheduled Benefits in Category I States

A significant measure of the developments in New Jersey since 1978
is the share of all cash benefits accounted for by permanent disability
benefits, a statistic that reflects the declining importance of New Jersey
permanent disability cases as well as the increasing average costs of
those cases. The data show that the share of all costs represented by
permanent disability cases in New Jersey was relatively stable between
1978 and 1982, increasing from 110 to 113 percent of the national
average (table 3.17). It is surprising, in light of the intended purpose
of the 1979 New Jersey legislation, that the increasing overall share
of costs was primarily due to the increased importance of minor per
manent partial disability cases between 1978 and 1982. By 1982, these
minor cases accounted for 49 percent of all cash benefits in New Jersey,
more than twice the importance of such cases nationally (table 3.16).
The increasing share of all cash benefits accounted for by permanent
disability benefits between 1978 and 1982 would have been expected
to increase the employers' costs of workers' compensation in New Jersey
between 1978 and 1984 according to our analysis in chapter 3. The data
in table 3.18, however, indicate that New Jersey insurance costs drop
ped from about 20 percent above the national average in 1978 to about
10 percent below in 1984. We do not have a full explanation of the
contrary movements in New Jersey between shares of costs accounted
for by permanent disability benefits and the employers' costs of workers'
compensation. Burton and Krueger (1986, pp. 179-97) examined cost
developments in New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut between 1972
and 1983 and argued that one explanation of the developments was the
movement of maximum weekly benefits for total disability. New Jersey's
maximum for total disability compared to the state's average weekly
wage has lagged behind the maximum in other jurisdictions in the last
decade. As of 1986, for example, the New Jersey weekly maximum
for temporary total disability benefits was $284, which represented 79
percent of the state's average weekly wage—a record exceeded by 34
other jurisdictions (U.S. Dept. of Labor, State Compliance, 1987).
The reductions in the New Jersey employers' costs of workers' com
pensation insurance between 1978 and 1984 thus appear to be in spite
of, rather than because of, the attempted reforms of permanent partial
disability benefits in 1979. The legislation does appear to have reduc
ed somewhat the numerical importance of permanent partial cases, but
not the significance of such cases in terms of share of costs. The lesson
may be that meaningful changes in the New Jersey approach to perma-
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nent partial disability benefits may require reforms as fundamental as
those endorsed by the 1973 Study Commission.
Procedure for Permanent Partial Cases

Few changes were made at the procedural level in the 1979 law. What
follows is a review of the procedures that prevailed at the time of our
field investigation.
Administratively, New Jersey classified itself as a direct payment state,
one in which compensation is initiated and paid by employers and car
riers, who notify the Division of Workers' Compensation as to when
and how much compensation is being paid. In the law (N.J.S.A.
34:15-50), the system is referred to as an agreement system, although
in practice no signed agreement between the employee and the employer
(carrier) is necessary before compensation is paid. The so-called direct
or voluntary payments are important for cases involving temporary
disability benefits only, since permanent partial cases usually end up
at a more advanced stage in the procedure.
An employee, his employer, the carrier, or the Division itself may
request an informal hearing at a regional office before a hearing of
ficer. Serious disability cases and questions of liability go directly to
a formal hearing, but all minor permanent partial cases, if contested,
must go through the informal process. The worker may or may not be
represented by an attorney at the informal stage. The hearing official
may propose a settlement based upon the medical evidence. If the sug
gestion is accepted by both parties, the case ends. If the suggestion is
not accepted, or if none is made—perhaps because there is serious ques
tion of liability—the parties are notified of their rights and the burden
for initiating a formal hearing rests on the employee.
The number of cases heard by the judge in one session varies. In a
session in which minor permanent partial awards are made for fingers
and minor injuries to the hand resulting in disability ratings of less than
5 percent, it is not unusual to process 25 cases in a morning session.
In these cases, the outcome depends not only on the physician's find
ings, but also on an informal bargaining process between the carrier's
representative and the petitioner's lawyer, with the hearing officer closely
involved, making suggestions based on his observation of the claimant
and the condition of his fingers or hands.
If the informal process does not result in an agreement, a formal hear
ing is initiated by the filing of the claim petition with the Division. If
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it appears that the issues are simple, possibly with only a narrow dif
ference between the parties as to the extent and nature of the perma
nent partial disability, the claim may be scheduled for an accelerated
award proceeding in which a binding decision is made by the judge based
upon his review of the medical reports submitted. The matter may,
however, go before a pretrial conference in which an attempt is made
to list the legal, medical, and factual issues to be tried, the witnesses
to be used at the time of trial, and so on.
Before the 1979 amendments, there was no provision in the New Jersey
statute for compromise and release settlements. In practice, at the pretrial
conference the judge would try to reach a compromise agreement ac
ceptable to both sides. With the parties' agreement, the judge would
issue an order in accordance with the settlement as an outcome of for
mal proceedings. It became a formal award, but such a compromise
did not operate as a release. If the petitioner's physical condition changed,
he could come in for review or modification of the award, so long as
he did so within the statute of limitations.
The 1979 amendments specifically provided for compromise and
release settlements for the first time. Under the new law, the judge of
compensation, with the consent of the parties, after considering the
testimony of the petitioner and other witnesses together with any stipula
tions of the parties, and after determining that it is fair and just under
all the circumstances, may enter "an order approving settlement." That
order has the force and effect of a conclusive dismissal of the claim
petition. It is a complete surrender of any rights to compensation or
other benefits arising out of such claim, both for the employee and for
the employee's dependents, under the statute.
The petitioner has to be represented by an attorney and it has to be
shown that the issue involves questions of jurisdiction, liability, causal
relationship, or dependency of the petitioner. Any payment made under
these procedures is to be recognized as a payment of workers' com
pensation benefits for insurance rating purposes only, and not as an ad
mission of liability for workers' compensation benefits (N.J.S.A.
34:15-20).
Determining the Disability Rating

Settlement Procedures. In informal hearings, the percentage of disabili
ty is usually the percentage suggested by the hearing officer to the par
ties. In pretrial conferences in which a settlement is reached, a com-
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promise figure, usually between the percentages stated by the respec
tive parties' doctors, is worked out among the attorneys and the hear
ing officer. In a formal trial, however, the percentage of disability must
be decided by the judge, based upon the evidence before him derived,
for the most part, from the testimony of physicians. The skill and ex
perience of the physicians, and the skill and experience of the attorneys
in eliciting the appropriate answers from the physicians, become crucially
important in such a process. At the formal trial there will be at least
two reports, one from each of the parties' physicians, and, in addition,
each of these physicians may testify. In a complicated case, more than
one specialist (for example, a neurologist as well as an orthopedic
specialist) may testify, each of them evaluating the percentage of
disability.
It is important to note that the physician will almost always include
a percentage rating in his report. This need not be a pure impairment
rating, because he may also include his evaluation of the importance
of nonmedical factors such as a patient's age and occupational status.
Under the old law he could also note and evaluate subjective complaints.
The 1979 amendments changed this, since "demonstrable objective
medical evidence" is necessary to sustain a finding of "disability per
manent in quality and partial in character" (N.J.S.A. 34:15-36).
Each of the physicians testifying at the formal hearing is retained by
one of the parties. It would cause great shock if the petitioner's physi
cian came in with a percentage rating of disability that was less than
that of the respondent's. Such an event is rendered highly unlikely by
the discovery procedures at the pretrial conference, which give each
side a fairly good idea of the other's position.
It has been argued that judges of compensation have abdicated the
responsibility for the evaluation of disability to the physicians. The ac
cusation is not entirely fair, since final responsibility rests with the judges.
Yet the physician's role is important, and for the most part, the physi
cians exercise discretion without any agency guidance as to how to
evaluate the consequences of injuries. New Jersey does not provide what
we have termed in the procedures chapter "evaluation" guidance as
to the normal accepted ratings or the range of ratings for particular types
of impairments, functional limitations, or even disabilities. As a result,
the physicians have developed evaluation techniques governed not on
ly by medical considerations, but by other considerations with which
only they, as a corps of experts, are familiar.
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A Physician's View. Saul B. Lieb, a physician experienced in workers'
compensation matters, notes that the question of the amount of disability
in nonscheduled cases does not lend itself to any easy practical guides.
In the case of lost members of the body, there are statutory provisions
in terms of weeks of compensation. "Otherwise the law is silent, assum
ing that the judge of compensation will make an award guided by ex
pert medical testimony" (Lieb 1975, p. 62). In his view, the expert's
estimates of disability are guided by:
functional and anatomical impairment as determined by
a medical examination; examiner's personality; petitioner's
or respondent's viewpoint; prognosis (medical outlook for
the future); social adaptability; impact on economic future;
and examiner's experience as to awards in prior cases. (Lieb
1975, p. 65)
These criteria allow for idiosyncratic factors and economic or "disabili
ty" factors in terms of our typology. Lieb also recognizes that the ex
amining physician's knowledge of what awards have been made in
similar cases will necessarily have an impact on his estimate. In Lieb's
view, the expert is one who knows how much has been awarded in
similar cases.
Lieb recognizes that the legal merits of the case have a great deal
to do with the eventual disability rating. Where there is a serious legal
question about notice, or the facts of exposure, or the authenticity of
an alleged accidental occurrence, the case may be disposed of with a
markedly diminished disability rating (Lieb 1975, p. 71). We are
presented here with a traditional type of problem in estimating benefit
amounts. A 10 percent rating may be awarded, not so much because
a man has an impairment of 10 percent of total, but because there is
only a 10 percent chance that he has any disability, or only 1 chance
in 10 that the impairment is the result of an occupational exposure or
trauma.
An instance of how the system of rating operated in New Jersey before
the 1979 amendments, and one that illustrates the shortcomings that
provoked demands for change, is the way disability ratings were given
for fractures. The theories discussed up to now dealt with physical im
pairment, such as loss of limb; functional limitations, defined as restric
tions of motion or ability to make particular movements; and work
disability, which is the effect that functional limitations can have on
a worker's job chances. Where does a completely healed fracture that
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leaves no impairment, functional limitation, or apparent disability fit?
Saul Lieb contends that fractures have been a tremendous part of the
injuries seen in workers' compensation; note that the reference is to
an "injury," not to any permanent impairment. A fracture of the wrist
(Colic's fracture) has been evaluated at 25 to 35 percent of a hand; a
simple fracture of the finger has been evaluated at 25 to 35 percent of
the finger (Lieb 1975, p. 83). The 1979 amendments were designed
to change the old practices. They explicitly stated that injuries such as
minor lacerations, minor contusions, and minor sprains do not constitute
permanent disability (N.J.S.A. 34:15-36). Under the new law, it has
become more difficult to collect awards in the absence of a showing
of a permanent impairment that restricts function and affects an
employee's working ability.
Lieb concludes his presentation with an admonition to lawyers that
the only way for the lawyer to become familiar with compensation prac
tice is to apply himself, keeping up with the latest developments,
refreshing his knowledge by constant reading and study in textbooks
concerning anatomy, physiology, and pathology. He advises lawyers
to be guided by the judges of compensation, who have developed a great
deal of knowledge concerning the medical status of compensation cases.
Field interviews with lawyers and experts for both sides yield the
same conclusion—most judges of compensation do become expert in
rating. They are not products of any formal training program; their ex
pertise is derived from a layman's exposure to physicians' reports over
the years. From the treating physician's reports, the judge gets an idea
of the type of injury sustained and the range within which the disability
rating will fall. The judge is informed by the petitioner about complaints,
and his evaluation of these complaints may well influence where, in
the range, the decision will be. Such complaints may well involve the
claimant's evaluation of his poor employment prospects. The judge may
evaluate such information in light of the petitioner's age, occupation,
and possibly even the effects of the injury on the nonwork activities
of the claimant. But no criteria for weighting these complaints are set
down. The judge decides a percentage based on his opinion of the medical
evidence and his evaluation of the importance and severity of the com
plaints. Interviews with the staff of the division indicate that they would
not be surprised if two judges gave different percentage awards for the
same case, but they would expect the differences to be rather small.
Of course, such a system works, but inevitably at the expense of exten
sive litigation.
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New Jersey's 1979 amendments are the product of a compromise.
It is significant that those amendments did not adopt a theory of perma
nent partial disability any different from the traditional one in that state.
The path to improvement taken by the 1979 law was to redefine, or
define for the first time, the concept of impairments. To be sure, these
were not the only changes. Benefits were liberalized substantially, and
in return not only was the definition of permanent disability tightened,
but employers were allowed credits for preexisting disabilities to
employees in the determination of awards for permanent partial and
permanent total disability claims. Rules dealing with compensation for
heart attacks changed. The basic change was the statutory definition
of a permanent disability requiring a demonstration of objective medical
evidence and a diminution of the claimant's work ability. The medical
evidence, according to the explanatory note attached to the bill, is
understood to mean evidence exceeding the subjective statement of the
petitioner.
Still other changes, which ought not to be ignored, were made. The
amendments limit the base upon which the attorney's fees are to be paid.
Fees are assessed only at the amount awarded beyond an employer's
offer, provided that offer is made within designated time frames. But
nothing in the new law strengthens administrative procedures. Nothing
in the amendments provides for evaluation or monitoring in the sense
we have talked about.
The long-run effects of these changes on the equity, efficiency, and
adequacy of the New Jersey statute cannot be evaluated yet. The initial
impact does not seem too promising, as indicated by our discussion of
the changes between 1978 and 1982 in the distribution of the benefit
dollars. Surely, one of the primary objectives of the 1979 amendments
was to move a larger part of the compensation dollar from the minor
permanent partial awards, where no wage loss was suffered, to those
workers with more serious injuries, and the evidence indicates that this
objective has not been met.

Nevada
Nevada's Changing Organizational Structure
Until 1982, the Nevada Industrial Commission (NIC) operated the
exclusive state fund and administered the workers' compensation act.
There were three commissioners. One was selected from lists submit
ted to the governor by the AFL-CIO, one was appointed from lists sub-
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mitted by employer groups, and the third was the chairman, who was
required to have at least five years of actuarial experience and a master's
degree in business administration or its equivalent. The chairman at
the time of our field visits (1975-76), John Reiser, concentrated on the
administrative aspects of the system, and hearings were conducted by
the two other members.
The NIC acted as both the state workers' compensation agency and
the state fund administrator. It determined insurance classifications and
rates, made investments, directed the rehabilitation program, and ad
ministered the safety program and the State Inspector of Mines offices.
It supervised the initial adjudication of claims and also functioned as
the appellate board for the first level of appeal beyond the claims depart
ment. A separate appeals officer (not an NIC employee, but with ftmctions and duties provided for under the workers' compensation statute,
NRS 616.542) heard appeals from decisions of the NIC.
A complaint about the operations of the NIC was that the same com
missioners were supervising the insurance function, administering
claims, and adjudicating disputes. The 1981 legislation changed the
organization so as to separate these functions and, for the first time,
allow for self-insurance for qualified employers.
Effective July 1, 1982, the Nevada Industrial Commission was replac
ed by a new organization, the State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS),
with a seven-member board of directors and a general manager
designated as operating chief. The insurance regulation responsibilities
rest with a newly formed Division of Insurance Regulation under the
Department of Industrial Relations headed by a director and with a sevenperson advisory board.
The Department of Industrial Relations also includes the Division of
Mines Inspection and the Division of Occupational Safety and Health.
The Department of Industrial Relations is responsible for regulation of
all aspects of workers' compensation insurance, such as the certifica
tion of self-insurers and the establishment of rates, as well as for oc
cupational safety and health. The appeals function remains with the hear
ings and appeals officers in the Department of Administration.
The SIIS's board of directors has three representatives of policyholders, three representatives of organized labor, and one public
member. The SIIS is the exclusive fund insurer in the state, covering
all employers except those who are qualified as self-insurers. Within

140 Nonscheduled Benefits in Category I States

the SIIS, the division of regional operations is responsible for most field
services and has the most direct contacts with claimants and policyholders. SIIS also includes the benefits services department with its
medical advisors and benefit delivery sections in which the disability
prevention teams and counseling specialists are housed. The Rehabilita
tion Center at Las Vegas is a separate division of SIIS.
Changing Methods of Evaluating Permanent Partial Disabilities
Nevada is an interesting state to examine because of the changes
through time in the criteria for permanent partial disability benefits.
Four periods of development can be distinguished: the years before 1972;
1972-73; the period from the 1973 amendments to the organizational
changes of 1981; and from 1981 forward. Certain of the organizational
changes did not become effective until July 1, 1982.
Before 1972, Nevada's statute contained a fairly comprehensive
schedule. Scheduled awards, or, in terms of the Nevada law, awards
for "specified injuries" (NRS 616.590), were listed in terms of number
of months of benefits. Amputations of the arm at the shoulder, for ex
ample, called for an award of 60 months of benefits, payable at the
rate of 50 percent of the worker's average monthly wage subject to a
minimum and a maximum.
The second section of this statute provided that if the specific injuries
result in a residual physical disability to parts of the body
other than the members affected, the commission may con
sider and award additional compensation taking into con
sideration, among other things:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Any previous disability;
The occupation of the injured employee;
The nature of the physical injury;
The age of the employee, and
Such other factors as may be compatible with the
injury incurred.

Thus, if an award were made solely on the basis of the schedule, the
number of weeks awarded would be as specified in the statute and nothing
additional would be paid for the permanent partial disability. A leg was
valued at 50 months and entitled the worker to 50 percent of his wages
(subject to the maximum) for 50 months. But if it were found that there
were "residual physical disability to parts of the body other than the
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members affected" the commission could take these other factors into
account and make an award on the "body" basis.
In cases of permanent partial disability not specified in the schedule,
that is, nonscheduled injuries, the NIC was directed by the statute to
determine the percentage of disability and each percent was to be paid
one month at 50 percent of the worker's wage, subject to a maximum
slightly lower than that allowed for scheduled awards. In determining
the percentage of disability, the commission was to consider among other
things the exact list of "other factors" as specified in the scheduled
section.
During this period, the NIC made some use of the AM A Guides to
determine the extent of impairment, but there were no rules, directives,
or guides for the application of the other factors, nor for when the
specified or nonspecified ratings were to be made. In seeking objec
tivity, Nevada in 1972 turned to the example of its neighboring state
and adopted a modified form of California's schedule to be used in place
of the rater's subjective evaluation of the "other factors." The system
was to be used only if it resulted in an increase in the award to the worker.
These changes proved to be unsatisfactory, and following a number
of studies, the law was amended with changes that became effective
July 1, 1973. Under the new law (NRS 616.605), disability and im
pairment of the whole man were declared to be equivalent terms. The
law then went on to state:
The percentage of disability shall be determined by the
physician designated by the Commission, or board of physi
cians, in accordance with the current American Medical
Association publication, Guides to the Evaluation of Perma
nent Impairment.
Further, "No factors other than the degree of physical impairment of
the whole man shall be considered in calculating the entitlement to per
manent partial disability compensation." These provisions from the 1973
amendments continue substantially unchanged in the law that became
effective July 1, 1982.
The 1973 statute provided that each 1 percent of impairment of the
whole man was to be compensated by a monthly payment of one-half
of 1 percent of the claimant's average monthly wage prior to injury.
Effective July 1, 1981, that was changed to six-tenths of 1 percent.
Liability for payments is to begin on the day of injury, or the day after
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the last payment of temporary disability compensation, whichever is
later. Payments are to continue on a monthly basis for a minimum of
five years or until the 70th birthday of the claimant, whichever is later.
Compensation benefits are usually paid on a monthly basis, but may
be paid annually to claimants who are receiving benefits of less than
$100 a month. Claimants may receive up to $10,000, or one-quarter
of the present value of their award, whichever is greater, in a lump sum.
Under the Nevada law, the maximum weekly wage used to calculate
permanent partial benefits is 150 percent of the state's average weekly
wage. The maximum monthly wage as of July 1985 was $2,159.33.
Six-tenths of 1 percent of $2,159.33 is $12.96. Assuming that a worker
entitled to the maximum monthly benefit had a 10 percent permanent
partial award, he would be entitled to $129.56 per month. The same
high-wage worker with a 60 percent award would receive $777.36 per
month.
The monthly dollar amount of these awards for a 65-year-old worker
and a 35-year-old worker with the same rating and earning the same
wage would be exactly the same. However, the 65-year-old worker
would receive these payments for 5 years, until age 70, whereas the
35-year-old worker would receive them for 35 years. The theory ob
viously is that wage-earning capacity has been impaired and compen
sation should be paid for the span over which wages would have been
earned. Thus, the duration is for the rest of the worker's normal work
ing life, which is presumed to end when he attains the age of 70.
Since Nevada's benefits are so crucially dependent on age, they are
difficult to compare with those in other states. Obviously, the younger
the worker, the greater the total amount received. The present value
of the 60 percent award for the 35-year-old worker at maximum wages
would be $136,433 discounted at 6 percent; for the 65-year-old worker,
it would be $40,296. The latter's benefits would be received over five
years, the minimum duration no matter what the age of the worker.
Lump-Sum Payments

When Nevada's law was amended in 1973, lump-sum payments were
permitted only under specific conditions. If the total rating was 12 per
cent or less, a lump-sum payment was made on demand of the worker.
For cases in which ratings totalled 13 percent or more, lump sums were
to be allowed only "upon demonstration of a need which is substan
tiated by a comprehensive evaluation of possible rehabilitation." Ef-
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fective July 1, 1979, a provision was added that up to one-quarter of
a rating of 13 percent or more could be paid in a lump sum on demand.
The practice has been to pay a lump sum, regardless of the percent rating,
any time the value of the lump sum, which is a discounted figure that
takes into account mortality rates, exceeds the total amount that would
be due in installments. This occurs when the claimant's age is 56 years,
8 months or older.
When the law was again amended in 1981, the lump-sum provisions
were further liberalized. Claimants injured after July 1, 1981, may
receive up to $10,000 or one-quarter of the present value of their award
(whichever is greater) as a lump sum without limitations on the percent
age rating.
Permanent Total Disability Awards

Nevada uses a different and more usual method for calculating benefits
for workers whose disability is adjudged as permanent total. The law
(NRS 616.575) provides that certain specified injuries, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, are deemed to be total and permanent: for ex
ample, the loss of sight of both eyes, the loss of two major limbs, an
injury to the spine resulting in complete paralysis, and an injury to the
skull resulting in incurable imbecility or insanity. The enumeration is
not meant to be inclusive, and all other cases are to be determined in
accordance with the facts presented. The permanent total benefit is
calculated at two-thirds of the worker's preinjury wage, subject to a
maximum weekly benefit of $332.46 as of January 1986 (U.S. Dept.
of Labor, State Laws, 1986). This amount is payable for life, although
the employee is required to file a report on any of his earnings on an
annual basis, and presumably they would be deducted.
Hearing Procedure

Just as the law has changed to provide different methods of paying
benefits, so has it changed in regard to hearing procedures. Before 1973,
the NIC examined claims, decided on the benefits to be paid, and heard
appeals of decisions of its own claims examiners. In 1973, the law added
an appeals officer from the Department of Administration to hear ap
peals from Commission decision. In 1978, claimants could seek the ser
vices of the office of the State Industrial Insurance System attorney,
and in 1979 the NIC was no longer authorized to hold any hearings
on claims.
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Under the law effective in 1982, claims examiners of SIIS investigate
claims and, if there is no dispute, pay claims and close cases without
any outside interference. Should a dispute arise, a hearing may be re
quested before a hearing officer of the Department of Administration,
who will conduct a formal hearing at which the claimant may be
represented by an attorney. From there, appeals may be made to the
appeals officer (who is also from the Department of Administration),
and thereafter to the court system.
Rehabilitation
At the time of our field visits in 1975 and 1976, there was great en
thusiasm among the commissioner, staff, and representatives of interest
groups about rehabilitation. It was seen as an NIC function that was
just as important as the payment of benefits.
The chairman of the Commission at that time, John Reiser, was the
most enthusiastic advocate of rehabilitation, and spoke of negotiations
with employers to promote the possibility of rehabilitation for serious
ly injured workers. He argued that the claims person or the rehabilita
tion counselor could point out to the employer the reserves for medical
and cash benefits that would have to be established and would even
tually be reflected in the employer's insurance costs if workers were
adjudged to be permanently and totally disabled, and could contrast these
sums with the lesser sums involved in a rehabilitation program, which
would be successful if employers agreed to take seriously injured workers
back.
There can be no quarrel with the idea that return to the job is a primary
goal of a workers' compensation program, but it is also true that
rehabilitation programs are invariably beset by practical difficulties.
These difficulties are apparent in Nevada, where experience has tempered
initial enthusiasm. It has been difficult to select eligible candidates for
rehabilitation, to decide on a program, to set limits on rehabilitation
expenditures, and to motivate employees and employers.
The statutory provisions relating to rehabilitation have not changed
in substance since 1973. NRS 616.222 provides:
To aid in getting the injured workman back to work, to
assist in lessening or removing any resulting handicap, the
insurer may order counseling, training, or rehabilitation ser
vices for the injured worker regardless of the date on which
such workman first became entitled to compensation.
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Before services can be ordered, the worker and his physician must be
consulted, and if the services involve a change in vocation, the con
sultation must include the employer and a rehabilitation counselor. Com
pensation benefits may be withheld if a worker rejects counseling, train
ing, or other rehabilitation services offered by the insurer.
NRS 616.223 provides authority for cooperative agreements between
SIIS and the rehabilitation division of the Department of Human
Resources as well as other public and private entities. To avoid reliance
on other agencies, SIIS employed rehabilitation counselors and nurses.
In 1976, it completed the building of a rehabilitation center in Las Vegas
with accommodations for 250 outpatients daily. The rehabilitation center
is one of the four operating divisions of the SIIS.
The changes in the regulations tell a part of the story of the changes
in rehabilitation practices. In its original form, under regulation 13 of
the NIC, rehabilitation was defined to encompass a very broad range
of services, from guidance to transportation allowances. Regulation
14.1020 charged the Commission with establishing "a program of
rehabilitation for each industrially injured worker in need of and capable
of benefiting from such service."
Although some latitude is still in place, later regulations sought ways
to limit services, perhaps recognizing that "need" is insufficient guidance
in light of the finiteness of resources allocated for rehabilitation. Regula
tion 14.004 states that rehabilitation means "assisting in the return of
an injured worker to gainful employment, at a justifiable cost, within
a reasonable time after he is injured or contracts an occupational disease"
(emphasis added).
Section 14.015, dealing with eligibility for rehabilitation services,
stipulates that in order to receive services a worker must be physically
unable to return to his former job, and that if he is released by his physi
cian without any job restrictions he is not eligible for services. Neither
is he eligible solely on the grounds that the job he performed before
his injury is no longer available.
Section 14.045 lists in order of priority the options for returning the
disabled worker to gainful employment. The first is to place him in the
job he held before injury; the second, to place him with the former
employer in a job that accommodates his limitations; and third, to place
him with another employer in a job that utilizes his existing skills. Last
on the list is assisting in initiating self-employment or other means of
employment. Only if these are not possible will training be considered.
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In general, the regulations require the counselors to approach formal
training and educational programs with caution. Rehabilitation services
are to cease when the employer offers a job whose demands do not ex
ceed any limitations defined by a treating or examining physician.
The thrust of the regulations is to provide services that will return
the worker to a job and not necessarily to develop his fullest potential.
The counselor is to provide a written rehabilitation plan to be explain
ed to the worker, and a copy is to be sent to the worker's previous
employer. The plan is to include a budget together with a justification
for the expenses.
The rehabilitation programs are administered by a staff of rehabilita
tion counselors stationed in Las Vegas and in the northern part of the
state. Ideally, each counselor works with a nurse employed by the SIIS
and with a claims examiner. This three-person team functions as a socalled disability prevention team.
If the worker receives compensation for more than 42 days, the file
is examined by the team to determine if services are needed. If necessary,
the nurse or counselor confers with the attending physician or the claim
ant. If the medical advisor deems it beneficial, the claimant might be
sent to the Las Vegas center for evaluation. If a case is accepted for
rehabilitation, the individual written rehabilitation plan will be worked
out by the counselor and approved by the supervisor.
The Lessons from Nevada

Nevada's example is interesting for three reasons. First and foremost,
it clearly illustrates some of the difficulties likely to be encountered in
trying to operationalize criteria for permanent partial disability benefits.
Before 1972, Nevada drew the conventional distinction between schedul
ed and nonscheduled injuries. Scheduled injuries were rated strictly on
an impairment basis. Nonscheduled injuries (and scheduled injuries that
affected other parts of the body) were evaluated essentially on the basis
of the loss of earning capacity, with the rating depending on factors
that included the worker's age and occupation. The determination of
the extent of loss of earning capacity was done on a case-by-case basis,
which produced controversies and inefficiencies. From the next phase
in Nevada, a brief one (1972-73), one innovation has survived: the
distinction between scheduled injuries (those specifically enumerated
in the statute) and nonscheduled injuries was dropped. Another innova
tion from that period, namely the use of a formula approach a la Califor-
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nia to evaluate all injuries in terms of the extent of loss of earning capaci
ty, was soon abandoned. (The California model is discussed at length
in the next chapter.)
The approach used in Nevada since 1973 to pay permanent partial
disability benefits is unique among jurisdictions we have examined. There
is no distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled injuries. Rather,
all injuries are rated on the basis of the extent of impairment or func
tional limitations as spelled out in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment. These ratings are then turned into weekly
benefit amounts by a formula. (The 1973 formula was slightly modified
in 1981.) The ratings and the weekly benefit amounts pay no attention
to disability factors, such as age, education, or occupation. Only two
aspects of the Nevada scheme make it something other than a "pure"
impairment approach: the weekly benefits are related to the worker's
preinjury wage, and the benefits terminate when the worker reaches
age 70.
Because these permanent partial benefits are paid for the "working
lifetime," it is possible to see their purpose as being to compensate for
loss of earning capacity: a presumably permanent loss calls for com
pensation to be paid on a regular basis throughout the injured person's
entire working life. But such a goal gives way before the practicalities
of administration and the desires of the parties. The worker anxious
for immediate benefits, the attorney eager for his fee, and the ad
ministrator who wants to minimize his record keeping—all combine to
press for lump sums. The 1981 amendments made these easier to ob
tain, so that today, for some workers, such as those who receive a lump
sum and then die before age 70, the relationship between their benefits
and the extent of their work disability is muted. The lump-sum prac
tice moves Nevada closer to a "pure" impairment approach for per
manent partial disability benefits, and away from an approach that com
pensates work disability.
The second interesting aspect of the Nevada experience is the state's
changing rehabilitation program. The enthusiasm with which rehabilita
tion was embraced as a panacea has gradually dimmed with the recogni
tion that rehabilitation, in common with many other purposes, is sub
ject to economic constraints. Not all injured workers can benefit from
rehabilitation, and the SIIS, like others concerned with these problems,
faces the task of choosing those who can be motivated to complete pro
grams devised in light of cost-effective priorities.
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One reason why a more free-wheeling system of rehabilitation—with
claims persons bargaining with, cajoling, and threatening employers
to take back workers—is not possible leads to the third interesting aspect
of Nevada's experience. In 1973, the NIC was the exclusive insurer,
the insurance rate fixer, the initial determiner of benefits, and the ap
pellant level. These functions, in the interest of due process and equi
ty, have been separated. This diffusion of authority since 1973 has made
it more difficult in Nevada to mount a whole-hearted campaign to pur
sue any goal, including the promotion of rehabilitation.
Perhaps when all is said and done, the importance of Nevada lies
in its unique method of assessing permanent partial disability. The state
should continue to be monitored to determine if an objective AMA
Guides type of evaluation can, despite the obstacles and difficulties outlin
ed above, succeed in providing an efficient and equitable method of
awarding permanent partial benefits.

Ohio3
Introduction
Ohio is an exclusive-fund state with a large number of self-insured
employers. The Ohio Industrial Commission—a three-member panel
appointed by the governor, with one member representing employees,
another employers, and the third, the public—supervises the district hear
ing officers, the Regional Boards of Review, and the so-called "C-92
Section," which handles applications for percentage ratings of perma
nent disability. Most administrative functions are the responsibility of
a separate unit, the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, which is head
ed by an administrator. The Bureau is responsible for claims and
disbursements from the state fund and supervision of claims from the
self-insured sector. It maintains claims records and rates employers for
premium purposes for policies issued by the state fund.
The time span of our research encompasses two periods of major
upheaval in the Ohio Workers' Compensation Program. The first
culminated in action by the governor and the legislature in 1976 that
largely affected administrative structure and procedure. The second
resulted in wholesale statutory changes in 1986 that, inter alia, chang
ed the type of benefits available to workers with permanent partial
disabilities. As discussed below, the significance of the 1986 benefit
changes is not yet clear, and for that reason we concentrate on the benefit
scheme in effect before the latest set of changes.
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Organizational Change
Our field work in Ohio was conducted in 1975 and 1976 at a time
when the administration of the law was under investigation and scan
dals were threatening the stability of the workers' compensation pro
gram. One lengthy study, the Report of the Joint Select Committee on
Workmen's Compensation, recommended several basic reforms of the
program. One of these was redirection of the role of the medical prac
titioner toward objective evaluation of impairment and sound medical
treatment. The report criticized the administration of the act and the
absence of published policies and operating guidelines.
At the time of our field work, responsibility for the rather complex
administration of the Ohio law was divided between the Commission
and the Bureau. In the evaluation of permanent partial disability the
medical unit played a crucial role, and we noted that the Bureau's and
the Commission's shared control of that unit caused some tension. We
also commented that beyond the great confusion induced by the apparent
ly complex organization and the investigations, the process of deter
mining the disability ratings was not guided by any well-known rules,
regulations, or standards. "The agency's physicians make determina
tions in a manner that is apparently understood by them and some of
the examining physicians, but that understanding is not widely
disseminated. There are no extensive statistical data published as to the
results and very little information as to the consistency of the awards
that are made" (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman 1979, p. 234).
Because of allegations of abuse and fraud, the chairman of the Ohio
Industrial Commission was removed by the governor in 1976. This ac
tion was followed by over 200 indictments and many subsequent con
victions. A legislative investigation culminated in the passage of S.B.
545, which mandated specific management reforms at the Bureau and
the Commission. These have since been carried out.
Overlapping responsibilities of the Bureau and the Commission were
eliminated. The Bureau is the administrative body and the Industrial
Commission is the adjudicative and policy-making body. Each agency
has control over its own personnel, physical space, and budget. The
reforms were designed to strengthen the political independence of the
Bureau personnel and the commissioners. The Bureau's administrator,
who formerly served at the pleasure of the governor, was given a fixed
six-year term. The Industrial Commission members were limited to two
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terms in office. Employees of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation
were placed under the classified civil service system.
Rules, procedures, and decisions of both the Bureau and the Com
mission were formalized and opened for public review and comment.
Managerial improvements such as the introduction of electronic data
processing and systematized rules and operating procedures were made.
We note some of these changes below, and will discuss the evaluation
guidance now given physicians to aid them in assessing the percentage
of permanent partial impairments.
Procedures
For employers insured under the state fund, the Bureau of Workers'
Compensation makes the initial determination on all uncontested claims.
The Bureau, which also monitors self-insurers, has a central office in
Columbus, and 16 district offices. The central office's claims section
maintains the claims file and sets hearings for contested claims.
There are five Regional Boards of Review (O.R.C. 4123.14), each
composed of three members: a representative of employers, a represen
tative of employees, and a chairman who must be admitted to the prac
tice of law in Ohio. The regional boards are under the jurisdiction of
the Industrial Commission and are to follow uniform rules of procedure
established by the Commission. The Industrial Commission determines
appeals from the regional boards, and also determines applications for
permanent partial awards.
If a claim is contested, the hearing on the matter is conducted by the
district hearing officer, who is an employee of the Industrial Commis
sion. Appeals from the orders of the district hearing officer may be
taken by either party, and if the employee was unrepresented at the hear
ing, the administrator may appeal to the Commission. The Commis
sion then assigns an appeal to a Regional Board of Review, which holds
an informal hearing. New evidence, not presented to the District Hear
ing Officer, is allowed; the administrator is represented at the hearing.
Regional boards are given 60 days to decide the case or demonstrate
reasonable grounds for delay to the Commission. Any dissatisfied par
ty, or the administrator, can file an appeal with the Industrial Commis
sion, which is given sole discretion to decide whether to accept the ap
peal. Most cases are accepted. When the appeal is not accepted, the
regional board's order becomes a final order and may be appealed direct
ly to the Court of Common Pleas (O.R.C. 4123.51a).
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In addition to the appeals function, the Industrial Commission has
original jurisdiction over settlements, permanent total cases, and safe
ty violation awards. Staff hearing officers may hear such matters of
original jurisdiction with an appeal of right directly to the Industrial
Commission.
Types of Permanent Partial Disability Benefits4
There were three types of benefits available to workers with perma
nent partial disabilities in Ohio prior to the 1986 statutory amendments.
The new law eliminated one type of benefit and created another, which
"appears to be a substitute for the [type of benefit] the bill eliminates." 5
Scheduled permanent partial benefits were retained by the 1986 amend
ments with some modifications. Previously these were provided by Sec.
4123.57 division C. The "old" benefits were for durations that depended
on the nature and severity of injury (such as 60 weeks for a loss of a
thumb), with the weekly benefit set at 66 2/3 percent of the worker's
preinjury wage, subject to maximum and minimum weekly benefit
amounts of 50 percent and 25 percent of the state's average weekly wage.
These "old" scheduled benefits were in effect as of January 1986 and
thus are the Ohio entries in the tables in chapter 5. The "new" Ohio
scheduled benefits are moved to division B of Sec. 4123.57 and the
maximum and minimum weekly benefit amounts are 100 percent and
40 percent of the state's average weekly wage. The durations of the
scheduled benefits were not changed.
A second type of benefit was also retained by the 1986 amendments
with some modifications. Previously these were provided by division
B of Sec. 4123.57, and were sometimes referred to as "paragraph B
awards." Under the new law, the benefits are moved to division A;
in order to reduce confusion, we will refer to them as "C-92 awards"
or "permanent partial awards," which are terms commonly used in
Ohio. Previously the weekly benefit was 66 2/3 percent of the worker's
preinjury wage subject to a maximum weekly benefit of 33 1/3 percent
of the state's average weekly wage. The duration was a percentage of
200 weeks, with the percentage determined by the extent of the worker's
disability. None of these provisions were changed by the 1986 law,
although, as discussed below, the relationship between permanent par
tial awards and other types of benefits was modified. The permanent
partial (or C-92) awards are essentially based on the extent of the
worker's permanent impairment or functional limitations, and are the
primary concern of the balance of this chapter.
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The third type of benefit has changed as a result of the 1986 amend
ments. The old law provided in division A of Sec. 4123.57 a type of
wage-loss benefit that the employee would choose instead of the C-92
or permanent partial awards; these benefits were commonly referred
to as "temporary partial" disability benefits, although that term was
not in the statute. The 1986 amendments eliminated these temporary
partial disability benefits and added a new type of wage-loss benefit
in division B of Sec. 4123.56. The new wage-loss benefits are not an
alternative to a C-92 or permanent partial award; rather, the worker
cannot receive a permanent partial award until 40 weeks after the ter
mination of the new wage-loss benefit. Because both the old and new
version of the third type of benefit are types of wage-loss benefits, we
defer extended discussion until chapter 8.
Permanent Partial or C-92 Awards. Division A (previously division
B) of Sec. 4123.57 provides that the Commission "shall determine the
percentage of the employee's permanent disability . . . based upon that
condition of the employee resulting from the injury or occupational
disease and causing permanent impairment evidenced by medical or
clinical findings reasonably demonstrable." Note that the Commission
is to fix the disability percentage based upon the impairment that results
from the condition, which in turn is the result of the injury. Although
the terms are not used exactly as we have developed and defined them
in chapter 1, they are quite similar, as will be seen from the evaluation
guidance provided to physicians by the Commission.
The provision that established the "permanent partial award" (old
division B) came into the law in 1941 in response to dissatisfaction with
the "temporary partial" awards (old division A). Apparently, it became
difficult to disassociate wage losses due to the conditions of the labor
market from those due to the employee's medical condition. The com
plaint was that workers abused the provision. Employers sought some
alternative, and employee groups were willing to accept percentage
awards based on physical impairment because they eliminated the re
quirement to file periodic wage statements and undergo periodic medical
examinations. In time, the impairment method became the prevailing
method of assessing permanent partial disability in Ohio.
Applicants may file for permanent partial awards 40 weeks after last
payment of temporary total benefits or 40 weeks after date of injury,
whichever is later. 6 The claims are filed on Form C-92, hence the com
mon name for these awards.
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When a C-92 application is filed, the claimant is examined by an In
dustrial Commission physician, whose report becomes part of the file.
The rules provide that the employer may have the claimant examined
at the employer's expense. Self-insurers are likely to do this, and in
such cases three physician reports may be presented at the hearing—
the report from the physician of the Industrial Commission and reports
from physicians retained by the employee and the employer.
The C-92 unit processes the claim. When there is substantial disparity
(defined as 15 percent or more) among physicians' reports, a party may
request a deposition from the physician. This is done at the expense
of the requesting party, under the supervision of an attorney designated
by the Industrial Commission's legal director.
If there is agreement on the percentage of permanent partial disabili
ty it is possible to waive a hearing, although this is not usual. Hearings
are conducted by a district hearing officer in the various District Of
fices. The hearing is informal, and the only issue is the percentage of
impairment. Physicians usually do not appear, but the hearing officer
listens to arguments based on the medical evidence in the record. If
there is substantial disparity among ratings, the hearing officer may refer
the claimant to a specialist for examination. No payment is made until
there is a final order.
The determination of permanent partial disability is exclusively within
the Commissioner's jurisdiction. The Commission's decision may not
be appealed to court (O.R.C. 4123.5la). It can be challenged only by
a party filing a writ of mandamus, which requires the Commission to
perform its legal duty to make or not make the percentage award. The
Commission's decision will be upheld by the Court if there is some
evidence to support the decision. 7
Permanent Total Disability

Ohio's statute (O.R.C. 4123.58) provides for a scheduled type of per
manent and total disability for "loss or loss of use of both hands or
both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof."
The award is to be paid in addition to any scheduled award for perma
nent partial disability. The statute does not otherwise define permanent
and total disability, but provides that in cases of permanent and total
disability, benefits based on 66 2/3 percent of preinjury wages, subject
to the maximum of 100 percent of the state's average weekly wage,
are payable for life. As of January 1986, the maximum was $365 per
week.
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"Nonscheduled" permanent total claims (those not involving the
specified losses of body parts, such as both hands) are evaluated only
after 200 weeks of temporary total compensation have been paid. The
evaluation process is similar to that followed for permanent partial
awards, with a great deal of reliance on medical findings. The final
decision rests with the Industrial Commission, which must decide if
the impairment has caused the worker to be unfit for sustained
remunerative employment.
Providing Evaluation Guidance
At the time of our field work investigations, we observed that physi
cians who evaluated physical impairments in order to aid the hearing
officers in fixing the physical disability rating were provided with little
or no evaluation guidance. The 1976 reforms specifically provided that
the Industrial Commission's medical section was to "issue a manual
of Commission policy so as to increase consistency of medical reports"
(O.R.C. 4121.38). The Ohio Medical Examination Manual (1981)
defines terms commonly used in determining impairment ratings, ex
amines the role of the examining physician in workers' compensation
law, and, in general, provides guidance to the physician in the evalua
tion of permanent partial impairments.
The manual makes clear that the examining physician will be asked
to perform two types of examination. In one, the physician is asked
whether a particular condition is related to an identifiable occupational
injury or occupational exposure. For the second type of examination,
the physician is asked to state the percentage of impairment caused by
the allowed injury or disease.
The Ohio Medical Examination Manual (1981, pp. 1-2) points out
that the terms disability and impairment are not synonymous:
"Impairment" is a medical term measuring the amount of
the claimant's anatomical and/or mental loss of function as
a result of the allowed injury/occupational disease. The ex
amining physician evaluates impairment.
"Disability" is a legal term indicating the effect that the
medical impairment has on the claimant's ability to work.
Disability is determined by the Industrial Commission and
its hearing officer.

Nonscheduled Benefits in Category I States 155

The Commission's definition of impairment combines our concepts of
impairment and functional limitations, but its definition of disability
is similar to ours in emphasizing the ability to work. The Commission
stresses that disability is a legal concept and not a medical concept.
Physicians are told that they may choose any established guide, such
as the AMA Guides (1984) or McBride's Disability Evaluation (1942),
to decide on the percentage of impairment. They are asked to indicate
which guide was used.
The opinion is to be expressed both as a degree and as a percentage
of the entire body. The degree ranges from minimal (which is equivalent
to 0-10 percent) through low, low moderate, high moderate, high, and
maximum (which is rated at 85-100 percent).
The manual also discusses the physician's role in evaluating schedule
losses. If there is an amputation, the loss is to be stated in definite
anatomical terms and specifically noted as a scheduled loss. The physi
cian is also asked to determine, however, if the claimant has a perma
nent partial impairment over and above the scheduled loss. The exam
ple cited in the Ohio Medical Examination Manual (1981, p. 8) is that
of a claimant who has totally lost the vision in one eye due to an injury:
"That would be a scheduled loss. If he/she suffers from a constant 'tear
ing' of that eye, he/she may have permanent partial impairment over
and above the scheduled loss."
The issuance of such a medical rating manual shows a commendable
willingness to assume the responsibility for providing evaluation
guidance. Of course, no approach will satisfy everyone. The Ohio AFLCIO's Workers' Compensation Manual (Jaffy and Smith 1981), for ex
ample, remains critical of the physician's rating of impairment, noting
that different doctors use different approaches to evaluate disability and
that doctors who do a great deal of disability evaluation are the ones
familiar with the methods used. But the range of disagreement is pro
bably lessened given the changes in Ohio's law.
Summary
There is little doubt that Ohio's permanent partial awards (C-92
awards) belong squarely in our category I. But despite the clear direc
tives to physicians to this effect and supporting legal opinion, 8 some
important ambiguity remains. An unanswered question is whether the
district hearing officers are to take into account the "other factors"
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that, combined with the impairment, may result in the disability.
Presumably they may, although no guidelines are offered. Interesting
ly enough, the AFL-CIO's Manual instructs the union representative
that if there is some dispute over the amount of the award, it will be
helpful to have the injured worker present at the C-92 hearing. The
representative is advised that the hearing officer will ask whether the
claimant is working regularly and whether he is earning the same amount
as before, or less, or more (Jaffy and Smith 1981, p. 82). This ques
tion pertains to the extent of dissability,not just the extent of impair
ment. On the other hand, it is significant that the union representatives
are advised to seek a medical specialist's examination in the event of
a dispute; they are not advised to hire vocational experts.
Perhaps the Ohio handling of permanent partial awards only proves
that impairment evaluation is an oblique way to operationalize a desire
to compensate for actual or putative wage loss, and that even if the pro
cess begins by measuring the extent of the physical impairment, fac
tors relevant for determining the extent of disability slip into the evalua
tion process.
Procedurally, Ohio does not go as far as California, which has a
separate rating bureau, but it combines aspects of a rating bureau with
aspects of New York's hearing system. Although a hearing can be waiv
ed, almost all C-92 cases come before a hearing officer. If there is no
medical dispute, the hearing may be perfunctory. The advantage of such
a procedure is that, combined with the examination by the Industrial
Commission's doctor, it could bring about uniformity in evaluation,
with a consequent improvement in equity. The banning of appeals con
cerning the extent of disability shows promise of promoting efficien
cy. What is necessary to make such a system truly equitable and effi
cient is detailed evaluation guidance. The physician's manual
disseminated following the 1976 amendments is a step in the right direc
tion. More detailed evaluation guidance should allow Ohio to improve
further the efficiency of the program.
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NOTES
1. New Jersey's law was approved April 4, 1911, to become effective on July 4, 1911. Three
states enacted laws before New Jersey—Kansas and Washington on March 14, 1911, and Nevada
on March 23, 1911—but of these laws, only Nevada's became effective before New Jersey's,
since it went into effect on July 1 of that year. Nevada's act, however, applied only to specific
employments, and it was superseded by another act in 1913. To complicate matters further, Wiscon
sin, which passed its act after New Jersey, put its statute into effect immediately upon adoption.
New Jersey's law is, at any rate, the oldest statute from point of enactment that has remained
in effect (Berkowitz 1960, p. 3).
2. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Company, 36 N.J. 487 (1962).
3. We are indebted to Richard J. Levine, attorney to the administrator, for providing information
and useful insights.
4. The material in this subsection is based in part on material from Young (1984), sections 7.4.1
and 7.11-7.7.17.
5. The passage is from an analysis of S.B. 307 prepared by the Ohio Legislative Service Com
mission staff. The lack of certainty about the role of the new benefit suggests that a clear understand
ing of the new Ohio benefit scheme must await time and court interpretations.
6. Under the 1986 amendments, there is also a minimum of 40 weeks between the last payment
of the Section 4123.56 wage-loss benefits and eligibility for permanent partial awards under Sec
tion 4123.57 division A.
7. State, ex rel. Manley v. Industrial Commission, 66 Ohio St. 2d 40, 417 NE 2d 1375 (1981).
8. "Permanent partial awards differ from most other types of compensation in that they are not
a substitute for wages or an award for impairment of earnings capacity. Like scheduled loss-ofmember awards this award is designed as a 'general damage' type of compensation, aiming to
compensate a worker for loss of physical or mental function" (Nackley 1985, sec. 14:5).

Chapter 7
Nonscheduled Benefits in Loss
of Wage-Earning
Capacity (Category II) States
In this chapter we consider California, the District of Columbia, and
Wisconsin, jurisdictions in which the basis for nonscheduled perma
nent partial awards is the loss of wage-earning capacity. These jurisdic
tions differ considerably in their approaches. California is particularly
notable because it does not make the conventional distinction between
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries (a feature that was examined in
chapter 5).

California
Types and Levels of Benefits
Cash benefits in California fall into the classifications of temporary
total, temporary partial, permanent partial, permanent total, and death
benefits. In addition, medical care and rehabilitation services are pro
vided. For our purposes, the temporary and permanent disability benefits
are most relevant.
(a) Temporary disability benefits. Temporary disability benefits are
paid during the recovery period following an injury or onset of a disease.
Benefits do not begin in California until four days after the employee
leaves work, although the waiting period is eliminated if the employee
is hospitalized. Benefits for the waiting period are paid retroactively
if the period of disability is at least 22 days. A worker eligible for tem
porary total disability benefits normally receives two-thirds of his preinjury average earnings, subject to minimum and maximum benefit rates
that were $112 and $224 per week as of January 1986. This maximum
was only 62 percent of the state's average weekly wage; only six other
states had maximum weekly benefits that were as low relative to their
average weekly wages (U.S. Dept. of Labor, State Laws Compared,
Forthcoming 1987).
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(b) Permanent partial disability benefits. A worker who experiences
a permanent impairment as a result of a work-related injury or disease
is eligible for permanent disability benefits. An impairment is considered
permanent when it persists after the worker has reached maximum im
provement, or when his condition has been stationary for a reasonable
period of time. Permanent disability benefits are paid in addition to tem
porary benefits.
In determining the percentages of permanent disability, Labor Code
Section 4660 provides that "account shall be taken of the nature of the
physical injury or disfigurement, the occupation of the injured employee,
and his age at the time of such injury, consideration being given to the
diminished ability of such injured employee to compete in an open labor
market." The section also provides that a schedule shall be adopted
for determining the extent of permanent disabilities, and that the schedule
shall be prima facie evidence of the percentage of disability.
The schedule is used to evaluate the extent of the injury, providing
what roughly amounts to an impairment rating, and then to modify the
rating by the worker's age and occupation. These factors are introduc
ed to reflect the varying impact of a particular injury on the future ability
to compete in the open labor market among workers who differ in age
and occupation. As will be discussed later, there is more to the deter
mination of the extent of permanent disability in California than a
mechanical application of the schedule. The complexities result from
the presence of discretion in the application of the schedule; the fact
that the disability rating is only prima facie evidence, which can
sometimes be successfully challenged; and the ability of the parties to
avoid the use of the schedule in the determination of permanent disability
benefits.
A worker with a permanent disability rating between 1 and 99.75
percent is eligible for permanent partial disability benefits. The worker
receives progressively more weeks of benefits as the size of the rating
increases, according to a formula in Labor Code Section 4658, shown
in table 7.1.
The cumulative number of weeks increases with the severity of the
disability, as shown in table 7.2. The benefits are based on two-thirds
of the worker's wage, subject to a weekly minimum and maximum that
were $70 and $140 in January 1986.
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Table 7.1
Duration of Permanent Partial Benefits in California
Number of weeks of benefits
for each 1 percent
of disability in range

Percentage range
of disability rating
Under 10
10-19.75
20-29.75
30-39.75
50-69.75
70-99.75

Table 7.2
Cumulative Duration of Permanent Partial Benefits in California

Percentage
of permanent
disability
incurred

Cumulative
number of
benefit
weeks

Percentage
of permanent
disability
incurred

Cumulative
number of
benefit
weeks

5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50

15.00
30.25
50.25
70.50
95.50
120.75
150.75
180.75
210.75
241.00

55
60
65
70

276.00
311.00
346.00
381.25
421.25
461.25
501.25
541.25
581.25

75
80
85
90
95
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Workers whose disabilities rate 70-99 percent receive a life pension
at the end of the permanent partial benefit period. The pension is com
puted at 1.5 percent of average weekly earnings for each percent of
rating above 60 percent. Thus a worker with an 99 percent rating would
receive 39 x 1.5 or 58.5 percent of his wage, subject to a weekly max
imum of $64.21 in January 1986. (The maximum of $64.21 could only
be received by a worker with a 99 percent rating. Workers with lower
ratings receive lower benefits.)
(c) Permanent total disability. Total permanent disability benefits are
to be paid for life. The loss of both eyes, or the sight thereof, the loss
of use of both hands, an injury resulting in "practically total paralysis,"
and an injury to the brain resulting in incurable imbecility or insanity
are conclusively presumed to be total in character. All other cases are
to be determined individually. As shown in table 3.6, permanent total
cases are relatively uncommon in California compared to other states.
Permanent and total disability benefits are based on two-thirds of the
worker's wage with a maximum as of January 1986 of $224 per week,
the same as in the case of temporary total disabilities.
The Delivery System for Workers' Compensation
The California workers' compensation program is a direct-payment
system, which means that a worker eligible for the benefits can receive
the benefits without prior approval by the state workers' compensation
agency.
Although the obligation to provide workers' compensation benefits
is on the employer, most employers secure this obligation by purchas
ing insurance from a carrier that assumes much of the employer's ad
ministrative responsibility. In California, insurance can be purchased
from the State Compensation Insurance Fund (the largest state fund in
the country) or from private insurance carriers. Employers can selfinsure if they obtain a certificate of self-insurance, and many of the
state's largest employers have qualified. Public agencies are also per
mitted to administer their own workers' compensation programs.
Administrative Organizations. The primary responsibility for ad
ministering the California workers' compensation program lies with the
Division of Industrial Accidents, which includes the Workers' Com
pensation Appeals Board. The Department of Industrial Relations, in
which the Division of Industrial Accidents is included, also houses the
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Division of Labor Statistics and Research, which is responsible for the
collection and analysis of the employers' and doctors' first reports of
work injuries. The administrative director of the Division of Industrial
Accidents and the members (commissioners) of the Workers' Compen
sation Appeals Board are appointed by the governor and are subject
to senate confirmation. The director serves at the pleasure of the gover
nor, and the members of the Appeals Board have four-year terms.
The director of the Division of Industrial Accidents appoints all per
sonnel in the division except the seven members of the Appeals Board.
Among the most important appointments are the workers' compensa
tion judges, who make the initial decisions in contested claims. There
are 125 workers' compensation judges staffing 21 offices of the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Administration Pro
files, 1985).
The director also appoints the chief of the Disability Evaluation
Bureau, the medical director, the chief of the Rehabilitation Bureau,
and the chief of the Information & Assistance (I & A) Bureau. The
Disability Evaluation Bureau employs disability evaluation specialists
throughout the state who serve the offices of the Workers' Compensa
tion Appeals Board. These disability evaluation specialists prepare formal
permanent disability ratings in litigated cases and also, when requested
by the employer or carrier and the injured employee, informal con
sultative evaluations. The I & A Bureau has responsibility for the Benefit
Notice Program, which prepares a statistical analysis of such matters
as promptness of payment of workers' compensation benefits. The
Medical Bureau provides medical examinations of injured employees—
either by staff physicians or by "independent medical examiners"—at
the request of the judges and commissioners of the Workers' Compen
sation Appeals Board.
The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is part of the Division
of Industrial Accidents, but is independent of the administrative direc
tor of the Division in its judicial functions. The initial hearings in disputed
cases are held in the 21 district offices of the Board. The appellate level
of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board is located in San Fran
cisco. The Appeals Board consists of seven members, known as com
missioners, of whom five must be attorneys. One member of the Ap
peals Board is appointed chairman by the governor.
Administrative Procedures. A worker who suffers a work-related in
jury is supposed to serve written notice on the employer within 30 days

164 Nonscheduled Benefits in Category II States

after the occurrence of the injury in order to maintain a claim for com
pensation (Labor Code Section 5400). However, a formal notice is not
required from the employee when the employer has knowledge of the
injury. In the normal case, the employer, or a foreman, or some other
person in authority will be aware that the employee has been injured
or has claimed an injury, and therefore the employee's obligation to
provide written notice is not applicable (Swezey 1985, sec. 4.5).
The 30-day period for a notice has been held to start running only
when the employee knows, or should know, that he has suffered an
injury of industrial origin. In occupational disease and cumulative in
jury claims, the "date of injury" is that on which disability is first suf
fered and the employee had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have had knowledge, that the disability was work-related
(Swezey 1985, sec. 4.3).
Although an employer is not required to provide notice to state agen
cies of minor injuries to his employees, any injury that requires medical
services other than ordinary first aid treatment or causes absence from
work for a full day or beyond the shift of the day of the injury must
be reported to the Division of Labor Statistics and Research. The first
reports do not, however, become part of the records of litigated workers'
compensation cases.
Physicians are also required to report instances of initial treatment—
both medical-only and time-loss cases—to the insurer or self-insured
employer. A copy of each report is then sent to the Division of Labor
Statistics and Research.
In cases of work injuries that result in more than three days of lost
time or that require hospitalization, the employer is required to submit
a notice of commencement of benefits, or a notice explaining why
benefits have not been paid, to the Division of Industrial Accidents under
the Benefit Notice Program.
In the vast majority of cases involving a work injury that results in
more than three days of lost time, requires hospitalization, or results
in death, the employer accepts liability for cash benefits. The employer
must file a First Notice of Work Injury with the Division of Labor
Statistics and Research, and a notice of commencement (and subsequently
a notice of termination) of benefits with the Benefit Notice Program
in the Division of Industrial Accidents.
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In disputed cases, a party files with the Board an application for ad
judication, an original compromise and release agreement, or a stipula
tion with request for award. Each requires action by a workers' com
pensation judge.
Litigation normally is initiated with the filing of the application, usually
by a worker or his representative, with the appropriate office of the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. In the application, the party
seeks a judicial determination of his rights under the law. The applica
tion is often filed before the case is ready to go to hearing. For exam
ple, an application may be filed for a worker who is severely injured
shortly after the date of injury, requesting permanent disability benefits.
(Often—in some years in more than 50 percent of the filings—the
worker's application is the employer/insurer's first notice of injury. 1 )
The determination of the extent of the disability cannot be made,
however, until the injury is permanent and stationary, and therefore
a hearing would be premature. An application for adjudication is not
moved toward a hearing stage unless a form is also filed indicating that
the case is ready to proceed to the hearing. A case may proceed to a
hearing immediately after filing because a "declaration of readiness
to proceed" is filed with the application, or the application may first
be put on an inactive status and then moved to the hearing stage after
a declaration of readiness.
After the parties are ready to proceed to a hearing, the Appeals Board
usually holds some sort of pretrial conference to determine whether in
fact a dispute exists, and, if so, whether the parties are ready to try
the dispute or are willing to resolve it by voluntary agreement. If the
parties do not resolve the issue voluntarily, the matter is set for a hear
ing before a workers' compensation judge. Although hearings do not
adhere to all of the technical rules of evidence used in the court system,
they nonetheless are formal and all parties are usually represented by
attorneys. 2 The hearings usually rely on written medical reports, although
the parties have a right to present medical evidence during the hearing
and to cross-examine doctors who have filed written reports. Follow
ing the hearing, if the extent of permanent disability is an issue in the
case, the workers' compensation judge may obtain a formal rating from
the Disability Evaluation Bureau. The judge also may refer the case
to an independent medical examiner (IME) or to an agreed medical ex
aminer (AME), selected by the parties and approved by the judge; this
examiner provides additional medical evidence to assist the judge in
resolving conflicting evidence. The judge, after the hearing and after
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receipt of any additional medical evidence, issues a decision. Unless
it is appealed by one of the parties, this decision is the final step in
the case.
Formal cases that begin with an application for adjudication and result
in a hearing and decision by a workers' compensation judge represent
the clearest example of litigation. There are, however, other types of
formal cases considered litigated because they involve a workers' com
pensation judge. For example, the parties may file an original com
promise and release, which represents a complete agreement between
the parties on all issues. The compromise and release, which releases
the employer from any further liability in exchange for the benefits pro
vided in the settlement, is normally approved by the workers' compen
sation judge without a hearing.
Another type of formal case, also counted as a litigated case, is one
with stipulated findings and award. When an application has been filed
and the parties feel that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the issues,
a stipulated statement of facts may be filed, signed by all parties in in
terest, giving consent to the immediate issuance of an award. The Board
then makes its findings and award based on the stipulation, or sets the
matter for a hearing to take testimony, or conducts a further investiga
tion into the matter (Swezey 1985, sec. 5.41). Ordinarily, stipulations
are used when the parties agree on all or most facts, but disagree on
the amount of permanent disability award, or prefer to avoid a con
tested hearing for reasons of economy or convenience.
Any party to a workers' compensation case may appeal the decision
of a workers' compensation judge to the Workers' Compensation Ap
peals Board by filing a petition for reconsideration within 20 days of
the issuance of award. When a party files a petition for reconsidera
tion, the workers' compensation judge who issued the decision has 15
days in which to prepare a report and make a recommendation on the
petition (Swezey 1985, sec. 10.37). After the judge has prepared the
report, the file is forwarded to the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board, where it is assigned on an automatic-rotation basis to three
members of the Appeals Board for consideration. The Appeals Board
has 30 days from the date of the filing of the petition to act, although
one 30-day extension is permitted. The three members of the Appeals
Board may grant reconsideration and receive additional evidence, or
grant reconsideration and issue an immediate decision based on the
evidence in the case file, or deny reconsideration. The majority of peti-
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tions for reconsideration are denied at this stage. In addition, sometimes
the Appeals Board grants reconsideration of a case but then upholds
the decision made by the workers' compensation judge.
After the decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the
parties have 45 days to file a petition for review with an appropriate
appellate court. These petitions for review have numbered about 600
annually in recent years, although there was a drop to 522 in 1985. 3
The court of appeals may grant the petition and set the matter for oral
argument, which was done in 61 cases in 1985, or deny the petition
without opinion. If the petition is granted, the awards are sometimes
annulled.
The final step in the appellate procedure involves a petition for a hear
ing by the California Supreme Court, of which there were 153 in 1986.
Petitions must be filed within 10 days after the opinion of the court of
appeal becomes final, and are likely to be unsuccessful: only nine were
granted in 1985.
Procedures for Permanent Disability Benefits—Voluntary Cases. Until
the late 1960s, an employer could decide the appropriate amount of per
manent partial disability benefits on the basis of medical evidence in
its files, and the Division of Industrial Accidents (DIA) did not have
to approve the amount of the payments or otherwise become involved
in the case. This procedure was known as self-rating. The current pro
cedure for voluntary cases requires that the Disability Evaluation Bureau
of the Division of Industrial Accidents prepare an informal rating for
every case. After the worker's injury becomes permanent and stationary,
the employer sends him a Form 200, which asks the employee to describe
the effect of the injury on his work. This form is returned to the
employer, who submits it along with Form 201 (the employer or car
rier request for an informal rating) and all medical evidence in the
employer's file to the Disability Evaluation Bureau.
A disability evaluation specialist in the Bureau examines the forms
and medical records and, if these are adequate, prepares a description
of the disability and a rating of the extent of disability. If either party
is dissatisfied with the rating, the Evaluation Bureau will reconsider
the rating on request, or suggest that an application be filed for a hear
ing (Swezey 1985, sec. 16.43). If the informal rating is acceptable to
both parties, the payment of compensation due under the rating is made
directly to the employee.
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Informal ratings are primarily used for minor injuries. Cases with
serious injuries that began with informal ratings typically are later con
verted into litigated (or formal) cases. Even in informal cases, however,
an attorney may be involved, and when this occurs, the informal rating
is sent to a judge to "endorse" a reasonable attorney's fee (Swezey
1985, sec. 16.45).
Procedures for Permanent Disability Benefits—Litigated Cases. A
litigated case begins with the filing of an application for adjudication
(Form 1) by the claimant, which states the basis for the benefits claim
ed and the nature of the disagreement. When the claimant is ready to
move forward on the case, a Declaration of Readiness to Proceed (Form
9) is filed. 4 A party can request a hearing on one of three calendars:
conference pretrial, rating pretrial, or regular. The presiding workers'
compensation judge in the Appeals Board office having jurisdiction over
the case decides whether the case is ready to be placed on a calendar
and, if so, on which calendar (Swezey 1985, sees. 6.17, 6.25).
The conference calendar is used for cases that the presiding workers'
compensation judge does not believe should be directly sent to a hear
ing. In cases that are in a preliminary stage, the judge uses the con
ference to define the issue, to get an exchange of medical reports, or
otherwise to move the case along. In cases in which the judge feels a
resolution of the issues is imminent, the conference is used to try to
reach an agreement. If that effort is unsuccessful, the case is sent to
a regular hearing.
The rating pretrial calendar is often used when the extent of perma
nent disability is the primary issue. A disability evaluation specialist
in the Disability Evaluation Bureau reviews the medical records and
estimates the extent of disability. The rating (or often ratings, since the
medical records obtained by both the employee and employer are rated)
is prepared in advance by the disability evaluation specialist (Swezey
1985, sec. 6.6).
A number of outcomes of a conference pretrial hearing or a rating
pretrial hearing are possible. The parties may reach a complete agree
ment and sign a compromise and release agreement (subject to the judge's
approval), or they may reach a partial agreement and submit stipulated
findings and a request for award to the judge for his resolution of re
maining issues. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the case pro
ceeds to regular hearing. A regular hearing may either follow a pretrial
hearing or be the first hearing in the case. In either event the case is
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assigned to a workers' compensation judge, who assumes the roles of
finder of fact and decider of legal issues.
The judge prepares a full description of the disability, basing the
description on the medical evidence in the record and on the worker's
testimony at the hearing. The judge's description of the disability is
sent to the Disability Evaluation Bureau. A disability evaluation specialist
prepares a rating of the disability and computes the number of weeks
of disability payments, the weekly rate of compensation, and the total
sum of payments due (Swezey 1985, sees. 16.50-16.55).
The disability evaluation specialist is required to make a recommen
dation solely on the information provided by the judge. The specialist
can neither consider factors that are not included in the instructions nor
disregard factors that are included. The recommendation is based on
the specialist's independent judgment, the rating schedule, and published
guidelines developed by the Evaluation Bureau (Swezey 1985, sec.
16.54).
The report of the disability evaluation specialist is evidence but not
a conclusive finding of fact; therefore, it is not binding on the judge.
The judge, however, will rarely disregard the percentage of disability
recommended by the specialist. If the judge feels the rating is inap
propriate, he may revise his instructions and ask the disability evalua
tion specialist to prepare a new rating for the case.
The specialist's report is returned to the judge and served on the par
ties. Any corrections or appeals of the rating must be pursued within
seven days. If any party is dissatisfied with the recommended rating,
several remedies are available.
When the dissatisfaction with the recommended rating stems from
the judge's description of the factors of permanent disability in the in
structions to the Evaluation Bureau, the dissatisfied party may do one
of two things. He may write to the judge indicating his specific
disagreements with the description and requesting that the matter be
referred again to the disability evaluation specialist with amended in
struction; or he may file a motion to strike the recommended rating,
again indicating his specific disagreements with the judge's instructions.
If the judge does not amend the instructions or approve the motion to
strike, after a decision is issued in the case, it can be appealed by the
dissatisfied party.

170 Nonscheduled Benefits in Category II States

If the party is satisfied that the judge has properly described the fac
tors of permanent disability, but dissatisfied with the percentage disability
as calculated by the disability evaluation specialist, he then files a re
quest to cross-examine the specialist and to submit rebuttal evidence.
A party has a right to this cross-examination, but the subject matter
of the cross-examination is carefully prescribed. The disability evalua
tion specialist may only be cross-examined about the procedure used
to rate the factors included in the judge's description, and cannot be
asked whether the judge's description is appropriate on the basis of the
information in the medical records.
After receiving the rating from the Disability Evaluation Bureau and
disposing of any objections to the rating, the judge issues findings and
award. The written decision specifies the award and includes the reasons
for the decision. This is the final determination of the case, unless one
or both parties files a petition for reconsideration within 20 days, in
which case the appellate procedure previously described becomes
applicable.
Other Dispositions. The previous subsection discussed formal cases
(cases in which a regular hearing is held). This section discusses two
other types of dispositions that require involvement by a judge: stipulated
findings and awards and compromise and release agreements. Use of
a stipulated findings and award or a compromise and release agreement,
either as the initial filing or as the resolution of a case that originated
with an application for adjudication, accounts for the great bulk of the
California formal cases.
The compromise and release agreement is used when the parties are
in agreement about the disposition of the case. The parties complete
a form that indicates the salient facts and the agreed settlement of the
case. The form is submitted to the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board for approval. A judge reviews the proposed settlement and nor
mally approves the parties' agreement. When the claimant is represented
by an attorney (as is almost always the pattern in compromise and release
cases), the judge is particularly likely to accept an agreement between
the parties. Occasionally, the judge will use the Disability Evaluation
Bureau to rate the permanent disability on the basis of medical evidence
in the file. 5
The consequences of a compromise and release agreement are twofold:
The claimant receives his benefits in a lump sum, and the employer
is released from any future liability for medical care and compensation
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for the work-related injury or disease. There are exceptions to that rule,
but they are limited. Occasionally, the lump sum paid by the employer
to terminate his liability is not immediately paid to the employee, but
placed in a trust that pays the amount to the employee over an extended
period. Also, occasionally a case is appealed or reopened after the com
promise and release agreement is approved. The possibilities for reopen
ing or appeal are for the most part limited, however, to situations in
volving fraud, duress, or mistakes of law or fact (Swezey 1985, sees.
13.52, 13.55). 6 As a practical matter, a compromise and release agree
ment reached by the parties is very likely to be found acceptable by
the judge, and once it is approved by a judge it is very unlikely to be
disturbed thereafter.
The stipulated findings and award is commonly used by the parties
in one of two situations. The parties may be in complete agreement
on the facts and issues, but may not want to terminate the possibility
of future benefits. Thus, they may agree to the amount of temporary
total and permanent disability benefits to be paid, and, in addition to
stipulating those amounts, provide that future medical benefits will be
paid as appropriate. The stipulated findings and award is also used when
the parties agree on most issues and do not believe a regular hearing
is necessary to resolve the remaining issues. For example, the parties
may themselves resolve all issues except the extent of permanent disabili
ty, and agree that the judge should refer that issue to the Disability
Evaluation Bureau for a rating. The judge will then issue a decision
on the permanent disability issue based on the disability evaluation
specialist's report.
The consequences of the stipulated findings and award are somewhat
different from those of the compromise and release agreement. As with
the compromise and release, the employee may receive his benefits in
a lump sum or periodic payments. Unlike the compromise and release
agreement, however, the stipulated findings and award does not preclude
future benefits for the case. This is obviously the result in a stipulated
findings and award that provides for future medical benefits. Less ob
vious, however, is that the stipulated findings and award (as well as
the findings and award issued in a litigated case) is subject to reopen
ing for additional cash benefits if the injury results in new and further
disability within five years of the original injury.
Criteria for Permanent Disability Benefits in California
The California criteria are complex and their history is tangled; they
are only summarized here. 7
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The California approach to determining the extent of disability is
unique among American workers' compensation jurisdictions. For one
thing, the California workers' compensation statute does not include
a traditional schedule. Instead, the statute gives the administrative director
of the Division of Industrial Accidents the authority to adopt a schedule
for the determination of the percentage of permanent disabilities. The
California schedule is also unusual because it considers factors other
than the nature of the injury in determining the degree of disability.
These factors, the procedure for adopting the schedule, and the
significance of the schedule are included in statutory language that has
been virtually unchanged since 1917, when the original statute effec
tive in 1914 was amended to require consideration of the worker's
diminished ability to compete in an open labor market when determin
ing the percentage of permanent disability. 8
Section 4660. (a) In determining the percentages of per
manent disability, account shall be taken of the nature of the
physical injury or disfigurement, the occupation of the in
jured employee, and his age at the time of such injury, con
sideration being given to the diminished ability of such in
jured employee to compete in an open labor market.
(b) The administrative director may prepare, adopt, and
from time to time amend, a schedule for the determination
of the percentage of permanent disabilities in accordance with
this section. Such schedule shall be available for public in
spection, and without formal introduction in evidence shall
be prima facie evidence of the percentage of permanent
disability to be attributed to each injury covered by the
schedule.
The 1914 California schedule used a hypothetical "standard man"
as a reference point for the occupational and age adjustments made to
the standard rating of the injury. The standard occupation was a ditch
digger. For the standard age, the 1910 census in California was used.
After certain actuarial adjustments were made, the average worker was
found to be 39 years old. Thus the standard man used in the 1914
schedule was a 39-year-old ditch digger (laborer).
The 1914 schedule contained 52 occupational classifications. The stan
dard rating was increased or decreased depending on whether the physical
demands for each occupation were relatively greater or less than those
for the standard man for the part of the body involved. Similarly, if
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a worker were over 39, the disability rating was increased, and if under
39, the rating was decreased. Thus the 1914 schedule determined for
each case a permanent disability rating based on the nature of the
worker's injury, the particular occupation, and age at the time of injury.
The basic approach adopted in the 1914 schedule has remained largely
intact to the present day. Minor amendments were made before World
War n. 9 After World War n, because of concern that the schedule might
have become outdated, an extensive review of the California perma
nent disability rating system and of alternative rating procedures was
conducted and a report was submitted to the Industrial Accident Com
mission (the predecessor of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board)
in 1947. The 1950 revision that resulted did not disturb the basic con
cepts found in the 1914 schedule. The standard man, on whom the oc
cupational adjustments are based, had been a laborer in the original
schedule, but this specific occupation was abandoned in favor of a stan
dard man who was in a generalized occupation, with average physical
demands on all parts of the body. The age of 39 was retained for the
standard man, as was the original plan of increasing the rating for older
workers and decreasing it for younger workers, and there were some
revisions in the standard ratings for injuries "in the light of analysis
and Mr. Haggard's [superintendent of the Permanent Disability Rating
Bureau] experience" (Welch 1964, p. 18).
The 1950 schedule is still in use. There have been some amendments,
but the 1986 schedule is still essentially the 1950 schedule, which, in
turn, is an obvious descendant of the 1914 schedule.
The current edition of the schedule, published by the administrative
director in 1978, is 82 pages long. It is supplemented by a rule of the
director (Sec. 9725) that the objective factors of disability be rated by
methods described in a standard text (discussed below). The schedule
also incorporates "work capacity guidelines" for the evaluation of
troublesome injuries (such as back, heart, and pulmonary cases). Use
of these various materials allows every injury and disease to be rated.
Each injury is given a standard rating based on the medical factors.
For example, the loss of one leg at or above the ankle but below the
knee receives a standard disability rating of 50 percent. 10 If the worker
is a carpenter, his rating is increased to 62 percent because the schedule
is based on the assumption that an amputation of the leg of a carpenter
is more disabling than the same loss for an average worker. Standard
ratings are increased for workers over 39 and decreased for workers
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under 39 on the assumption that older workers require more time to
adjust to handicaps, or, if necessary, to find new employment. If the
carpenter is 45 years old when injured, his rating is increased to 64
percent. The standard rating, modified by the occupational and age ad
justments, is used to determine the amount of permanent disability
benefits the carpenter receives.
Determination of the standard rating is often more difficult than the
carpenter example suggests, in part because there are three sets of stan
dards or criteria used to rate permanent disabilities in California: ob
jective factors, subjective factors, and work-capacity guidelines (Swezey
1985, sees. 16.21-16.24).
Objective Factors. The measurement of objective factors is govern
ed by Section 9725 of the Rules issued by the administrative director
of the Division of Industrial Accidents.
Section 9725. Method of Measurement. The method of
measuring physical elements of a disability should follow the
Report of the Joint Committee of the California Medical
Association and Industrial Accident Commission, as contain
ed in Evaluation of Industrial Disability edited by Packard
Thurber, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, New
York, 1960.
The Thurber volume resulted from an effort in 1940 to establish some
uniformity in the measurement of impairments. It had become obvious
by then that doctors were arriving at widely varying assessments of the
extent of impairment for similar or identical injuries, resulting in widely
varying standard disability ratings for identical or similar injuries.
A committee chaired by Dr. Packard Thurber, with representatives
from the California Medical Association, the Industrial Accident Com
mission, and other agencies, prepared the guidelines for evaluation. The
committee based its work on several principles: that the guidelines should
be brief and not unduly complicated; that the evaluation procedures
already used by the Industrial Accident Commission should be follow
ed as much as possible; and that the relevant concept for determining
restricted motion was the worker's remaining active (or functional) mo
tion, not his passive motion.
The Thurber volume differs from the AMA Guides to the Evalua
tion of Permanent Impairment in several ways. The Thurber volume
is confined to assessment of injuries to the musculoskeletal system,
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whereas the AM A Guides deal with all body systems, including the car
diovascular and digestive systems. For the musculoskeletal system, the
Thurber approach is roughly the same as the AM A approach; they both
concentrate on the objective manifestations of impairment, such as
restricted motion or ankylosis.
Subjective Factors. The California permanent disability rating stan
dards also consider subjective manifestations of impairment. These are
known in California as "subjective factors" (Swezey 1985, sec. 16.23)
and are explained in Section 9727 of the Rules issued by the ad
ministrative director of the Division of Industrial Accidents.
Section 9727. Subjective Disability. Subjective Disability
should be identified by:
1. A description of the activity which produces disability.
2. The duration of the disability.
3. The activities which are precluded and those which can
be performed with the disability.
4. The means necessary for relief.
The terms shown below are presumed to mean the following:
1. A severe pain would preclude the activity precipitating
the pain.
2. A moderate pain could be tolerated, but would cause
marked handicap in the performance of the activity
precipitating the pain.
3. A slight pain could be tolerated, but would cause some
handicap in the performance of the activity precipitating the
pain.
4. A minimal (mild) pain would constitute an annoyance,
but causing no handicap in the performance of the particular
activity, would be considered as nonratable permanent
disability.
The California Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities lists a
number of injuries evaluated on the basis of subjective factors. The range
of standard disability ratings for the injuries evaluated on this basis can
be considerable: several injuries receive 20 percent ratings for "slight"
disability and 100 percent for "severe" disability. Despite the language
of Section 9727, the schedule does not confine consideration of the sub
jective factors to pain, nor are the only ratable categories "slight,
moderate, and severe." Thus headaches receive a standard rating of
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5 percent if slight; a 15 percent rating if moderate; 60 percent if severe;
and 100 percent if pronounced. Neurosis adds the category "very
slight," which receives a standard rating of 10 percent. Epilepsy con
tains the category "slight to moderate," which receives a standard rating
of 50 percent. A "moderate" epilepsy receives a standard rating of
75 percent, and since a rating may be increased or decreased from the
scheduled ratings when the degree of impairment so warrants, an epilepsy
more serious than "slight to moderate" but less serious than "moderate"
might be rated as a 60 percent or 65 percent disability.
There appears to be a potential for inconsistent ratings of similar in
juries in this California schedule, especially when the disability evaluation
specialist must rely on descriptions in the reports from doctors (or the
instructions from the workers' compensation judges) that may not cor
respond, in an unambiguous fashion, to terms like "moderate" or
"slight." The potential for inconsistency was probably greater prior
to the development of the work-capacity guidelines described below.
These guidelines are at least partial substitutes for the "minimal-slightmoderate-severe" approach for several important types of injuries such
as back injuries.
Part of the impetus for the use of work-capacity guidelines in place
of the subjective disability approach was a 1953 report of the Califor
nia Senate Interim Committee. The report contains a section entitled
"Incredible Inconsistencies in Rating Specialists' Computations."
The claim by the rating specialists of the commission that
ratings are consistent, one with another, is pure fiction. Called
upon separately by us to rate a set of hypothetical cases, two
specialists arrived at amazingly different rates. The test cases
included twelve (12) disabilities of varying degrees of severi
ty, each case to be rated for four (4) different occupations
and all cases at age 39 years. For not one of these forty-eight
(48) cases did the specialists arrive at the same rating. . . .
For the forty-eight (48) cases, the average difference be
tween ratings is 12.05 percent; the average difference in pay
ment periods, 48 weeks; and in terms of cash benefits, the
average difference between cases (at $30 per week) is $1,440.
(1953, pp. 60-62)
The Senate Committee also selected 24 actual ratings from case files.
These 24 cases were resubmitted to the same rating specialist who made
the original computations. Three of the cases showed the same percent-
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age on rerating as indicated on the original rating, but six reratings were
higher than the original rating and eleven were lower. (The other four
cases showed ranges on the original rating or the rerating, and all four
cases involved some change between the original rating and the rerating.)
Although the Senate Committee did not confine its criticism to ratings
involving subjective disability, it was obviously concerned about the
subjective rating system, 11 and the committee's criticism was probably
an important factor in the development of the work-capacity guidelines.
The subjective factors can be considered examples of subjective
manifestations of impairment, as those terms were defined in chapter
1. They carry the California criteria for evaluating permanent disabili
ty beyond the factors considered by the AMA Guides or the factors
covered in the Thurber volume. There is, however, no published guide
to aid in the evaluation of the subjective factors other than the descrip
tions "severe," "moderate," "slight," and "minimal" contained in
Section 9727 of the rules. Thus the Permanent Disability Rating Bureau's
Fundamentals for Applying the California Schedule for Rating Perma
nent Disabilities (1967) contains rather detailed instructions for rating
objective factors, but for subjective factors contains only general
statements such as "if subjective factors were present, a percentage
would be added to the rating for objective factors. The amount to be
added would depend on the nature and effect of the subjective factors,
consideration being given to scheduled ratings." The only other
assistance to the rating of subjective factors is the verbatim reproduc
tion of Section 9727 of the Rules defining pain.
Work-Capacity Guidelines. "In the 1950s, work-capacity guidelines
were developed by the Rating Bureau to overcome a lack of uniformity
and consistency in ratings" (Swezey 1985, sec. 16.24). As an example
of the ratings problems the guidelines were designed to deal with, the
discussion from Welch is instructive. "Initially the schedule provided
only three ratings for the spine: slight (30%), moderate (50%), and
severe (100%). It did not define these levels, and obviously all spinal
disabilities could not be rated on only these three points. The guidelines
were evolved to permit more precise ratings on spinal disabilities, and
the definitions of work capacity were developed in relation to spinal
disabilities only" (Welch 1973, sec. 15.17). The work-capacity
guidelines since have been extended to other types of injuries, but their
origin as a method to rate spinal disabilities is evident.
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The Rating Bureau's work-capacity guidelines have eight levels, or
"plateaus," of disability. Four of the plateaus are described below:
(a) "Disability precluding very heavy lifting—contemplates the in
dividual has lost approximately one-quarter of his pre-injury capacity
for lifting." This receives a standard rating of 10 percent. A note to
this guideline elaborates: "A statement 'inability to lift 50 pounds' is
not meaningful. The total lifting effort, including weight, distance, en
durance, frequency, body position and similar factors should be con
sidered with reference to the particular individual."
(e) "Disability precluding heavy work—contemplates the individual
has lost approximately half of his pre-injury capacity for performing
such activities as bending, stooping, lifting, pushing, pulling and climb
ing or other activities involving comparable physical effort." This
receives a standard rating of 30 percent.
(g) "Disability resulting in limitation to semi-sedentary work—
contemplates the individual can do work approximately one half the
time in a sitting position, and approximately one half the time in a stand
ing or walking position, with a minimum of demands for physical ef
fort whether standing, walking or sitting." This receives a standard rating
of 60 percent.
(h) "Disability resulting in limitation to sedentary work—contemplates
that the individual can do work predominantly in a sitting position at
a bench, desk or table with a minimum of demands for physical effort
and with some degree of walking and standing being permitted." This
receives a standard rating of 70 percent.
The predecessors to these current guidelines were used informally
from the 1950s by the Disability Evaluation Bureau, first to rate spinal
injuries, later to rate a few additional categories of injuries. The
guidelines were formally incorporated into the Schedule for Rating Per
manent Disabilities for injuries occurring on and after January 1, 1970,
for chronic infections of the pulmonary tissues, heart disability, spinal
disabilities, and abdominal weakness. Following an appellate court deci
sion, the two most severe plateaus (g and h above) were added to the
schedule as a basis for evaluating injuries to the lower extremities that
occurred on or after January 1, 1973.
Several aspects of the work-capacity guidelines do not displace, but
only supplement or complement, the subjective rating factors in the
Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities. For example, the guideline
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for disability number 18 (neck, spine, or pelvis) provides alternative
methods to obtain a standard rating of 10 percent: either a work-capacity
rating of "disability precluding very heavy lifting" or a subjective fac
tor rating of "constant slight pain." Moreover, disability number 18.1
(impaired function of the neck, spine, or pelvis) has a standard rating
of 100 percent for a subjective factor rating of severe, "and this rating
can be given even though the maximum plateau in the work-capacity
guidelines is a 70 percent standard rating."
Second, aside from the use of the subjective factors as an alternative
to the work-capacity guidelines, the guidelines themselves can be ap
proached in two ways: in terms of the work restrictions named by the
plateau designations (e.g., disability precluding heavy work) or in terms
of the activities that the worker can still do after the injury or can no
longer do because of the injury ("contemplates the individual has lost
approximately half of his pre-injury capacity for performing such ac
tivities as bending, stooping, lifting, . . .").
Finally, what is being evaluated by the work-capacity guidelines? Us
ing the terminology of chapter 1, we consider the "objective factors"
in California to be objective manifestations of impairment. The workcapacity guidelines are not so easy to classify. Certain of the guidelines'
descriptions of the precluded activity correspond to functional limita
tions, that is, limitations in generalized (or nonwork-specific) activities
such as walking, climbing, and bending. However, most of the plateau
designations (for example, disability resulting in limitation to semisedentary work) and some of the guidelines' descriptions (for exam
ple, the descriptions of plateaus g and h quoted above) correspond to
work disability. Thus the quest for more consistency in evaluating in
juries as a result of the criticism of the use of subjective factors had
led to more categories (eight plateaus in place of the three levels of
subjective disability included in Section 9727 of the Rules) and the use
of criteria that consider the consequences of injury further downstream
in the injury-impairment-functional limitation-disability sequence shown
in chart 1.2.
Final Elaborations. A few additional elaborations on the rating of
permanent disabilities are needed. First, it should be stressed that "ob
jective factors," "subjective factors," and "work-capacity guidelines"
are not mutually exclusive categories. Rather it is quite common for
an injury to have rating factors from more than one category, such as
an injury to the wrist that causes restriction of motion and loss of grip.
(See Swezey 1985, sec. 16.30, for such an example.)
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Second, the discussion of the use of the schedule indicated some op
portunities for the exercise of discretion in the rating of injuries. To
a much more limited extent, a disability evaluation specialist has some
discretion in the choice of the occupation to be used in adjusting the
standard rating. This opportunity is more likely to arise if the worker
has an occupation that does not fall on the list of occupations included
in the Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities. The specialist can
then turn for guidance to the "Outline of Occupational Groupings,"
a 16-page document published by the Division of Industrial Accidents
but not a part of the schedule.
Preliminary Observations on the Criteria for Permanent
Disability Benefits in California
Several observations can be made about the criteria for permanent
disability benefits in California. One is that it has been some time since
the schedule has been carefully reviewed to determine if it provides
a meaningful guide to the evaluation of permanent disabilities. The last
thorough review took place in the 1940s, and culminated in a schedule
that celebrated its 35th anniversary in 1985. The schedule has had some
revisions since 1950, including changes in the occupational adjustments
in the 1960s and the introduction of the work-capacity guidelines in
the 1970s. Nonetheless, the basic approach and most age and occupa
tional adjustments have not been careftilly scrutinized recently. 12 In light
of such significant labor force developments in the last 30 plus years
as the reduction in retirement age, the increasing participation of women
in the labor force, and the shift from blue-collar to white-collar jobs,
many of the age and occupational adjustment factors may be obsolete.
Indeed, the starting point for the age and occupational adjustments—a
39-year-old worker with average physical demands on all parts of the
body—may no longer be appropriate.
Another observation is that the California rating system for perma
nent disabilities is complex and difficult to learn. The same injury may
be rated on more than one factor (for example, an injury to the wrist
may have objective and subjective factors). Moreover, a worker may
have multiple injuries, and there are rules for combining the ratings
of injuries to the same extremities (see Swezey 1985, sec. 16.34) and
of injuries to different parts of the body (see Swezey 1985, sec. 16.35).
The rules are designed to avoid "pyramiding"—straight addition of the
ratings for multiple injuries to an extremity, which could result in a
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permanent disability rating in excess of the rating for the amputation
of the member even when the extremity maintains substantial function.
There are also special rules to deal with overlapping. "One disabili
ty is said to 'overlap' another when it does not reduce the employee's
ability to compete in an open labor market beyond the limitation that
resulted from the other disability. If the disabilities do not completely
overlap, then additional compensation is payable to the extent that the
second disability further restricts his ability to compete" (Swezey 1985,
sec. 16.40).
Another set of rules is used for apportionment. Apportionment is
used when a worker with a preexisting disability experiences a workrelated injury or disease; California permanent disability benefits are
paid only for the increased extent of disability due to the new injury
or disease. (See Swezey 1985, sees. 16.38-16.39.)
Given these complexities, it is no surprise that considerable time and
effort must be invested in order to learn the rating system. Disability
evaluation specialists in the Disability Evaluation Bureau are given six
months of training and need still more time to master the intricacies
of the system. Representatives of all the interest groups interviewed
in California for this project (including workers' compensation judges,
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board commissioners, plaintiffs'
attorneys, defense attorneys, and employers) expressed doubts about
whether the other parties in the system really understood the intricacies
of the rating system. Most admitted they themselves did not under
stand all the details of the system. 13
Another observation on the California criteria for rating of perma
nent disabilities is that the rating procedure is not mechanical, but leaves
considerable room for the exercise of discretion with no objective criteria.
The greatest potential for discretionary handling is in deciding what
factors are to be rated. For example, in a case with conflicting medical
evidence and testimony about the extent of an injury to the spine, some
one must decide whether the evidence supports a conclusion that the
pain is "constant slight to moderate" or "constant moderate." That
decision is worth 20 percentage points on a standard rating and (depend
ing on the worker's age and occupation) about 120 weeks of benefits.
The work-capacity guidelines, introduced to overcome a lack of con
sistency in rating such injuries, may provide some assistance to the person
who must evaluate the conflicting evidence. Still, the difference
between standard ratings of 30 percent and 50 percent reduces to a deci-
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sion whether the injury results in limitations to "light work" or to "semisedentary work." The workers' compensation judge, faced with a typical
file in a soft tissue back injury case, replete with conflict
ing and ambiguous medical evidence and with a record of a hearing
with testimony that is less than totally persuasive, not only can exer
cise his discretion to decide whether the disability is to be described
by factors that rate at 30 percent or 50 percent (or even a higher or
lower figure), he must exercise that discretion. 14
Although the exercise of discretion is most obvious in the decision
about which factors are to be rated, other kinds of discretion are also
possible in applying the schedule. The rules for rating multiple injuries,
or subjective factors, for example, are not mechanical. Moreover, most
injuries are not precisely on the schedule, and the disability evaluation
specialist must exercise his discretion in rating these injuries or
diseases. 15
Another observation concerns the difference between the California
schedule and the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evalua
tion of Permanent Impairment. The AMA Guides are concerned primari
ly with objective manifestations of impairment, but the California
schedule considers subjective manifestations of impairment (the "sub
jective factors") and ftmctional limitations and work disabilities (the
"work-capacity guidelines"). In this sense, the California criteria for
rating permanent disabilities are much more extensive than those of the
AMA Guides. However, the AMA Guides are at least as broad, if not
broader, in terms of the number of body systems covered. The objec
tive factors in California are largely confined to the musculoskeletal
system; coverage of body systems other than the musculoskeletal system
is often cursory or incomplete, compared to the AMA Guides. 16 The
Guides, for example, devote chapters to the digestive system and the
reproductive and urinary systems; those systems are not even covered
by the California schedule. In practice, injuries or diseases that affect
these body systems may be compensable in California as nonscheduled
disabilities. But the Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities by itself
is a limited guide to the evaluation of permanent impairment compared
with the AMA version.
The Lessons from California
California provides a unique answer to the question of what criteria
should be used to provide permanent partial disability benefits. The con
ventional distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled injuries has
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never been used in California. Instead, all injuries are evaluated by use
of a comprehensive schedule that purports to measure the loss of earn
ing capacity by a formula, that incorporates information on the nature
and severity of the injury plus the worker's age and occupation.
The use of a formula approach to determine the extent of loss of ear
ning capacity might be expected to reduce the extent of litigation and
to keep costs of permanent disability benefits under control. The lower
costs should result because there appears to be less room to exercise
discretion and bend the rules in a way to help an especially deserving
worker when the benefits are calculated using an "objective" formula.
The control of permanent disability benefit costs seems especially like
ly in California, since the maximum weekly permanent partial disabili
ty benefit was only $70 from 1972 to 1982, was $130 until the end of
1983, and then reached its current level of $140 in January 1984. Not
only might permanent disability benefits be expected to be relatively
inexpensive, but the cost of the entire program could be expected to
be low because of the generally meager cash benefits. The maximum
weekly benefit of $224 for total disability that has been in effect since
1984 represents only 62 percent of the state's average weekly wage.
The record in California largely contradicts these expectations. Almost
all permanent partial disability cases involve litigation, in the sense of
lawyers being used to help determine the amount of benefits. The legal
assistance does not come cheap: a survey of carriers indicated that the
total cost of litigating a claim in California was $3521 per case in 1984,
which amounted to 43 percent of the $8137 average payment in disputed
cases that year. These litigation expenses included attorneys' fees for
both parties, the cost of forensic medical reports or testimony, and related
costs, such as depositions. The study provided a "rough estimate" that
"litigation in California's no-fault workers' compensation system is—
conservatively—a $600 million-plus annual industry." 17 Although not
all of these cases involve permanent partial disabilities, such claims are
the most common since 59 percent of the litigated cases involved the
application of the work capacity guidelines to back, heart, and psychiatric
injuries.
Another dashed expectation is that California has contained the costs
of permanent partial cases. Despite a relatively low share of all costs
accounted for by permanent total cases (table 3.14), the high costs of
permanent partial cases in 1982 made the California share of all costs
accounted for by permanent disability cases the highest among the eight
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states with comparable data that we are intensively examining (table
3.17 and graph 3.1). California has been edged from this top position
among the eight jurisdictions only once since 1958 (table 3.17).
Moreover, as of 1982, all permanent disability cases (including per
manent total, major permanent partial, and minor permanent partial)
accounted for 82.11 percent of all cash benefits in California, a figure
exceeded only in Rhode Island (84.21); below this odd couple were
43 jurisdictions (table 3.5).
The expectation of low costs of workers' compensation for employers
is also contradicted by the data. From 1958 to 1984, the costs of workers'
compensation insurance in California have consistently been above the
national average; in the latter year, California ranked first among the
10 jurisdictions we are examining, with insurance costs more than 40
percent above the national average (table 3.18).
With all this litigation, a high share of benefits going to permanent
disability cases, and substantial workers' compensation insurance costs,
one would at least expect the benefits to be adequate and equitable for
workers who are permanently disabled. However, this expectation is
also contradicted by the results from our "wage-loss study" and by
a recent study by the California Workers' Compensation Institute,
discussed in chapters 10 and 11, respectively.
What explains these results, such as the extensive litigation and the
high cost of permanent partial disability benefits in California? One factor
may be the litigious environment that characterizes the state, especial
ly the Los Angeles area: workers' compensation is only one example
of the pervasive reliance on the law suit to solve disputes. This tenden
cy is reinforced by the passive nature of the workers' compensation
agency. As noted by Tebb (1986, p. 46), traditionally most of the agency
resources have been devoted to providing the parties a forum to resolve
their disputes, rather than administering a system that has as its raison
d'etre the prevention of disputes. The total budget of the agency is on
ly $37 million (table 4.1), only about 6 percent of the estimated $600
million cost for litigation. Moreover, most of the budget pays for the
administrative law judge teams located throughout the state (Tebb 1986,
p. 46), rather than the record keeping, monitoring, and evaluation func
tions central to an active workers' compensation agency. California is
the very model of myopic efficiency described in chapter 2.
Still another explanation of California's record is that the "objec
tive" formula used to determine the amount of permanent partial disabili-
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ty benefits is not all that objective. As this chapter has documented,
there is considerable room for the exercise of discretion in application
of the schedule. Where money is at stake in the exercise of discretion,
there shall ye find lawyers.
The procedures and criteria for permanent disability benefits are not
the only factors that explain the high costs of workers' compensation
insurance in California. Vocational rehabilitation expenses increased
228 percent over the most recent five-year period with available data,
and exceeded $115 million in 1983. 18 Medical benefits were estimated
to account for 28.8 percent of net premiums in 1986, and their cost
"has increased significantly and steadily since 1970" (California Study
Committee Staff Report [hereafter CSCS Report}, 1986, pp. 20-21).
But even though these other factors are significant, permanent disabili
ty benefits are a major source of concern in California and have been
a central part of recent reform efforts.
The most recent significant change in the California workers' com
pensation program occurred in 1982, when the maximum weekly benefit
for permanent partial disability was increased from $70 to $140. This
change and others were estimated to increase costs to employers by near
ly $1 billion and may represent "the largest benefit increase in the history
of workers' compensation" (Tebb 1986, p. 47). Nonetheless, with minor
exceptions, "the 1982 amendments did little to make the California com
pensation program more equitable, effective, or efficient" (Tebb 1986,
p. 45). The central features of the 1982 amendments were a buttress
ing of the exclusive remedy doctrine to protect employers from tort suits;
in exchange, benefits were increased, with 90 percent of the new benefit
dollars allocated to permanent partial disability, "leaving maximum
weekly benefits for total disability, both temporary and permanent,
woefully inadequate. . . . The 1982 benefit increases magnify the
maldistribution of California workers' compensation benefits" (Tebb
1986, p. 47).
The concern over maldistribution of benefits and the high costs of
the program led the Division of Industrial Accidents in early 1985 to
propose a wage-replacement approach in place of the present criteria
for permanent partial disability benefits (13 CWCR 57, April 1985).
By September of 1985, the wage-replacement approach (nee the wageloss approach discussed in chapters 8 and 9) was incorporated into a
proposal sponsored by the Californians for Compensation Reforms
(CCR), a coalition of employers and carriers. But there were outspoken
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objections to the CCR proposal, and the bill died in an assembly com
mittee in January 1986 (14 CWCR 1, Feb. 1986).
The next month (February 1986), a significant examination of workers'
compensation was issued as a staff report by the Joint Study Commit
tee on Workers' Compensation (CSCS Report 1986). 19 The report ex
amined the cost of workers' compensation in California, as well as the
extent of litigation, the history of permanent disability benefits, and the
current criteria and procedures for permanent disability benefits. The
present approach was criticized in many respects, and issues and recom
mendations for reform were presented using the framework included
in chapter 10 of this study. 20 Compensation for both work disability
and nonwork disability ("personal loss") was endorsed in principle,
which led to a recommendation for a dual system of permanent benefits.
Operationally, the Report (p. 78) recommended that "work disability
should be compensated directly by providing benefits when there are
actual wage losses," while the separate benefit for the other consequences
"should be based on the nature and extent of the permanent impair
ment or limitations."
The CSCS Report was criticized by some, including the California
Applicants' Attorneys Association (14 CWCR 167, July 1986), but served
as an input to a bill introduced by State Senator Bill Greene, chairman
of the Senate Committee on Industrial Relations in Summer 1986. The
Greene proposal (SB 1617) did not substitute wage-loss benefits for the
current permanent partial disability benefits, but provided a "supplemen
tal PD benefit" for seriously injured workers who experience actual
wage loss after their benefits expire (14 CWCR 143, June 1986). This
is a variant of the hybrid benefits found in New York (discussed in
chapter 8 and endorsed in chapter 12). SB 1617 died in the Senate Com
mittee on Industrial Relations in August 1986, but is expected to be
the basis for a new legislative proposal in 1987.

District of Columbia
The principal employer in the District of Columbia is, of course, the
federal government, whose employees are covered by the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act. Until 1982, the private sector employees
in the District were covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, a federal statute that remains in effect
for employees throughout the nation who are engaged in longshoring
and related activities, or who are working on the outer continental shelf
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or certain defense bases. The council of the District of Columbia, under
the home rule provisions granted to the District by Congress, passed
the "District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979" (Act
3-88) to replace the Longshoremen's Act for private sector employees
in the District and the District government's own employees. Although
the District of Columbia Act was passed on May 14, 1980, because
of court challenges it did not become effective until July 26, 1982.
We will examine some of the factors that led to the enactment of the
District's new law, and note some of the differences between it and
the Longshoremen's Act. We also provide a brief review of some of
the initial consequences of the new law.
The Dynamics of Change
Some of the factors that explain the emergence of the new law in
the District of Columbia are beyond the scope of this study—for exam
ple, the residents' increasing interest in self-governance and Congress's
increased willingness to cede some of its traditional control over the
capital. But some of the factors are internal to the workers' compensa
tion program itself, and deserve a brief examination.
One part of the story concerns the surging importance of permanent
disability benefits, and especially major permanent partial disability
benefits, after 1968. In that year, major permanent partial cases ac
counted for only 3.43 percent of all cases in the District, less than the
national average share of 4.38 percent. Then for 20 years, the jurisdic
tion's major permanent partial cases billowed, so that by 1978 they ac
counted for 13.75 percent of all cases in the District—a share that was
more than 21/2 times the national average share of 5.14 percent for
these cases. (All data from table 3.7.)
Superimposed on this explosion in the number of major permanent
partial disability cases was an equally dramatic change in benefit levels.
As previously noted, until 1982 the District of Columbia was covered
by the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
In 1972, as a result of an agreement among various parties in the
maritime industry, the benefits under the Longshoremen's Act were
substantially increased in exchange for limits on employers' liability
from suits outside the workers' compensation law. The private sector
employers in the District of Columbia were "beneficiaries" of the reform
agreement, even though the problem of suits outside the workers' com
pensation law did not involve them. As an example of the benefit in-
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creases that resulted from the 1972 legislative package, the maximum
weekly benefits for total and partial disability in the District of Colum
bia went from $70.00 in January 1972 to $167.00 a year later and to
$318.38 by 1976. Because the maximums automatically increase as
wages increase, the weekly maximums reached $426.40 by 1980.
The higher maximums translated into higher average costs for per
manent disability cases in the District. In 1968, before the increase in
maximums resulting from the 1972 legislation, major permanent par
tial cases cost an average $11,987, about 20 percent above the national
average. By 1973 the average for major cases was $17,242, some 30
percent above the national average. By 1978 the District average of
$38,266 for major permanent partial cases was 78 percent above the
national average (table 3.11). Because, as noted above, major perma
nent partial cases were becoming numerically more prevalent during
the 1968 to 1978 period in the District, the average costs for all perma
nent disability cases spiraled. In 1968, the average cost of all perma
nent disability cases in the District was $4,707, some 39 percent above
the national average; by 1973, the average of $10,711 in the District
was more than twice the national average of $4,599; by 1978, the District
average was more than three times the national average—$24,933 vs.
$8,178 (table 3.13).
Two consequences of these developments concerning the numbers
and average costs of permanent disability cases are worth noting. By
1978, permanent disability costs accounted for 81.73 percent of all cash
benefits in the District of Columbia, a figure exceeded only by Alaska.
Not only did permanent disability benefits account for a goodly share
of the pie, the pie had grown through time. One measure of the cost
of the workers' compensation program in the District of Columbia is
the percentage of payroll devoted to workers' compensation insurance
premiums by a representative sample of employers. In 1972 the
premiums for District of Columbia employers were 0.737 percent. By
1978, the U.S. average cost of workers' compensation insurance was
1.420 percent, but District of Columbia employers were paying 3.502
percent of payroll for premiums, the highest rate in the nation (table
3.18).
The pressures for change that arose from these developments led the
District of Columbia to enact its own workers' compensation law.
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Comparisons of the Old and New Laws
Maximum Benefit Levels. The Longshoremen's Act provides a max
imum weekly benefit rate fixed at 200 percent of the national average
weekly wage. As of 1980, the maximum amounted to $426.40 per week;
the 1986 maximum under the Longshoremen's Act is $595.24. The new
District of Columbia Act reduces that maximum to 100 percent of the
average weekly wage of insured employees in the District, which made
the maximum $431.70 in 1986. That maximum applies to all benefits
for disability and death, including permanent partial disability.
Scheduled Permanent Partial Benefits. Scheduled benefits under both
statutes are essentially the same. Both include a basic schedule listing
the extremities and sensory organs. For the most part the number of
weeks of benefits is the same under the two laws. The weekly benefit
is 66 2/3 percent of the worker's preinjury wage under both laws.
The new D.C. Act does tighten the hearing loss provisions. Employees
must wait for a period of at least six months after they leave the work
environment before loss of hearing can be tested if the claim results
from nontraumatic causes in that environment. The employee is not
prevented from filing for temporary partial benefits during that waiting
period, however.
In the disfigurement section, both the D.C. and Longshoremen's Acts
limit claims to $3,500 "for serious disfigurement of the face, neck or
other normally exposed bodily areas," but the Longshoremen's Act and
not the D.C. Act adds the modifying phrase "likely to handicap the
employee in securing or maintaining employment."
Nonscheduled Benefits. The Longshoremen's Act tracks the language
of New York State's statute almost exactly in nonscheduled benefits
denominated as "other cases" (Sec. 8[c][21] of the Longshoremen's
Act and Sec. 15[w] in the N.Y. Act):
In all other cases in this class of disability, the compensa
tion shall be sixty six and two-thirds per centum of the dif
ference between his average weekly wages and his wageearning capacity, thereafter in the same employment or other
wise, payable during the continuance of such partial disability,
but subject to reconsideration of the degree of such impair
ment by the [board] [deputy commissioner] or [its] [his] mo
tion or upon application of any party in interest.
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As the law was interpreted in the District under the Longshoremen's
Act, the test administered in nonscheduled permanent partial cases was
that of impairment of wage-earning capacity. In theory, the extent of
impairment of wage-earning capacity depended first on the physician's
evaluation of the impairment, and second on the worker's wage after
the injury as compared to his wage before. At the time of our field work,
however, we observed that the physicians were the primary evaluators
of impairment and that in many cases their ratings appeared to be the
only information considered in closing the case. The physicians operated
without any evaluation guidance from the deputy commissioner either
through published works or through any other means. Although the prac
tice at the informal level did not require evidence of actual wage loss,
the decisions at the appeal levels held that reemployment of a worker
at prior wages would preclude an award on the nonscheduled basis (Kendal v. Bethlehem [12 BRBS 150]) unless there was some reason to believe
that the wages actually received were not what he could earn in the
open labor market (Silverstein v. Service Printing Company, Inc. [2
BRBS 143]).
The new District Act charges the statutory provision for nonscheduled
cases, presumably eliminating any doubts about its meaning. It does
not use the term "earning capacity" but speaks instead of "wage loss."
D.C. Code 36-508 Section 9 (a)(22), still denominated as the "other
cases," provides:
In this class of disability the compensation shall be sixty-six
and two-thirds (66 2/3) percent of the employee's wage loss,
payable during the continuance of such disability. Wage loss
shall be the difference between the employee's average week
ly wage before becoming disabled and the employee's ac
tual wage after becoming disabled. If the employee volun
tarily limits his income or fails to accept employment com
mensurate with his abilities, then his wages after becoming
disabled shall be deemed to be the amount he would earn
if he did not voluntarily limit his income or did accept employ
ment commensurate with his abilities, [emphasis added]
Certainly, the intent of the statute is to provide an actual wage-loss
test, which inevitably must test whether the postinjury wages are those
a normally motivated worker might reasonably earn in the open com
petitive labor market. If this intent is carried out in practice, the District
of Columbia will have to be reclassified as a category III jurisdiction.
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Given the extensive schedule, it is likely that most permanent partial
cases will be decided on the scheduled basis. At the time of our field
study we could not locate any comprehensive statistics, but found a study
made by Popkin (1975) of a sample of 811 cases handled by Ad
ministrative Law Judges over a three-month period. Of these, 491 in
volved a permanent disability issue. Four hundred and thirty-two of
these, or 88 percent, were scheduled cases, and 45, or 9 percent, were
nonscheduled cases. The remaining 3 percent could not be classified.
Popkin concluded that most of the cases were decided on the scheduled
basis if it was at all possible because resolution of these cases did not
require proof of loss of wage-earning capacity. Since the new D.C. Act
contemplates a sterner test of wage loss for nonscheduled cases, it is
likely that the majority of cases will still be decided on the scheduled
basis. Under the old law, as will probably be the practice under the
new, the cases decided on the nonscheduled basis tended to be more
serious and hence more costly. Benefits under the nonscheduled category
can continue for life or for as long as the decrease in wage-earning
capacity or wage loss remains.
Temporary Partial Benefits. Temporary partial disability benefits are
paid when an injured worker returns to work before his medical condi
tion has fully stabilized, and his wages are lower than prior to the in
jury. The Longshoremen's Act uses the same language relating to wageearning capacity in its provision for temporary partial benefits as it does
in its provision for the nonscheduled cases. The new D.C. Act also has
a temporary partial benefit provision, which makes the same change
as for nonscheduled injuries and thus speaks of wage loss and not loss
of wage-earning capacity. Under both laws, the benefits are limited to
a period of five years.
Lump-Sum Payments. Our finding at the time of the field work in
vestigations was that lump-sum payments were not encouraged in the
District under the Longshoremen's Act. Official settlements acted as
a release under the Longshoremen's Act Sec. 8 (i)(A) if approved by
the deputy commissioner. Apparently informal settlements were reached
that did not come before the deputy commissioner, since the workers
merely withdrew their claims.
A provision of the new D.C. Code (36-508 Sec. 9[h]) makes it clear
that "such settlements are to be complete and final dispositions of a
case and once approved require no further action by the mayor."
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Permanent Total Disability. The Longshoremen's Act provided a
presumption of permanent and total disability in the event of the loss
of two major members. Also, "In all other cases permanent total disabili
ty shall be determined in accordance with the facts" (Sec. 8 [a]).
The new D.C. Act, in keeping with its attempt to foster a wage-loss
orientation, provides for the same presumptions in regard to the loss
of major members, but then goes on to state: "In all other cases per
manent total disability shall be determined only if, as a result of the
injury, the employee is unable to earn any wages in the same or other
employment" (Sec. 9 [a]).
Administration. Under the old act, the District of Columbia was one
of the geographical districts under the U.S. Department of Labor's unit
that administered the Longshoremen's Act; a deputy commissioner and
his or her assistant supervised the processing of claims. Claims examiners
monitored claims and conducted some of the informal conferences. Con
tested claims were heard by the deputy commissioner and decisions could
be appealed to an administrative law judge. Further appeals were to
the Benefits Review Board established under the Longshoremen's Act
and from there to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The new act is to be administered by the mayor, who is empowered
to make the necessary rules and regulations. The statute contemplates
a direct payment system (Sec. 16 [a]) with the first installment due 14
days after the employer has received notice of injury. Penalties are pro
vided in the event payment is not made promptly. The administrator
is empowered in all cases, controverted and noncontroverted, to in
vestigate, cause medical examinations to be made, hold hearings, and
take any further action to properly protect the rights of all parties (Sec.
A system of hearings within the agency is provided for (Sees. 21 and
26), as is a system for review (Sec. 23). Any party adversely affected
by a final decision may petition for a review of the decision by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Initial Impact of the New Law
The new law did not become effective until July 26, 1982, and so
little data are available to assess its impact. The 1982 data on the numbers
and costs of permanent disability cases contained in chapter 3 cover
a policy period that ran from February 1982 to January 1983, and so
include about half a year of experience under the new law. The 1982
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data show a drop from 1978 in the share of all costs accounted for by
major permanent partial cases (from 193 percent to 154 percent of the
national average share; table 3.15) and in the share of all costs accounted
for by all permanent disability cases (from 121 to 113 percent of the
national average share; table 3.16). The drop in the latter statistic moved
the District from first to third place among the eight jurisdictions with
comparable data that we are examining.
Even more dramatic evidence of the apparent impact of the new law
is reflected in the data on the employers' costs of workers' compensa
tion insurance shown in table 3.18. In 1978, District employers were
expending 3.502 percent of payroll on insurance, a figure that was 247
percent of the national average. By 1984, these employers were spend
ing 1.909 percent of payroll on insurance, only about 40 percent above
the national average.
To the extent the purpose of the new workers' compensation law in
the District of Columbia was to lower the employers' costs of the pro
gram, it must be judged a resounding success. The primary cause prob
ably was the lowering of the maximum weekly benefits compared to
the levels in the Longshoremen's Act; but the shift to new criteria for
nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits may also be a signifi
cant factor, since this would help explain the decline between 1978 and
1982 in the proportions of all cases accounted for by permanent partial
disability cases (tables 3.7 and 3.8).

Wisconsin
The Wisconsin workers' compensation law was enacted in 1911 and
was "the first law to become and remain effective." 21 The Wisconsin
program is not only the oldest, but it is generally regarded as one of
the best, particularly in terms of quality of administration. Nonetheless,
Wisconsin criteria and procedures for permanent disability benefits are
not without problems, as evidenced by the recent establishment of a
Study Commission to examine inter alia permanent partial disability.
Criteria for Permanent Disability Benefits

The original Wisconsin law of 1911 based compensation on the loss
of wages, but by the next year the Industrial Commission called for
a restructuring: 22
Compensation under the Wisconsin law is based on loss of
wage. Theoretically this is the correct principle, but in order
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to secure a simpler administration, it may be well to adopt
the New Jersey plan for certain definable injuries. For in
stance, the New Jersey law provides as compensation for the
loss of a great toe, 50 percent of the daily wage during thir
ty weeks; for the loss of an eye, 50 percent of the daily wage
during 100 weeks, and so on through a complete list of
definite injuries. This provision makes it easy for the
employee and employer definitely to ascertain the compen
sation without reference to the administering board. We sug
gest that both employers and employees consider this mat
ter with the view of possible amendment to our law.
The Wisconsin law was amended in 1913 to provide the approach
found in most states: first, a statutory schedule of injuries constituting
permanent partial disability; second, a provision for nonscheduled per
manent partial injuries; and third, a provision for permanent total disabili
ty. Although the statute has been amended since 1913, the three-way
division of permanent disabilities is still found in the current act.
The schedule (Sees. 102.52 to 102.56), with some 43 entries, is more
detailed than most. The list is lengthy because there are multiple en
tries for each of the fingers and toes, indicating the exact number of
weeks of compensation to be paid for a loss at the specified joints.
For the "loss of use cases," the statute (Sec. 102.55[3]) provides:
For all other injuries to the members of the body or its
faculties which are specified in this schedule resulting in per
manent disability, though the member be not actually severed
or the faculty totally lost, compensation shall bear such rela
tion to that named in this schedule as disabilities bear to the
disabilities named in this schedule.
For injuries that cannot be scheduled, the statute (Sec. 102.44[3]) pro
vides that "the aggregate number of weeks of indemnity shall bear such
relationship to 1000 weeks as the nature of the injury bears to one causing
permanent total disability." And for permanent total disability, the statute
provides:
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Total impairment for industrial use of both eyes, or the
loss of both arms at or near the shoulder or of both legs at
or near the hip, or of one arm at the shoulder and one leg
at the hip, constitutes permanent total disability. This
enumeration is not exclusive, but in other cases the depart
ment shall find the facts. (Sec. 102.44[2])
The potential durations and weekly benefit amounts vary considerably
among the three types of permanent disability benefits. As of 1986,
permanent total disability benefits were 66 2/3 percent of the worker's
preinjury wage, subject to a maximum weekly benefit of $329; the
benefits were payable for life. Scheduled permanent partial disability
benefits were 66 2/3 percent of the state's average weekly wage, sub
ject to a maximum weekly benefit of $112, which was the fifth lowest
in the country. Thus, even though the scheduled duration of 500 weeks
for loss of an arm was the longest in the country, the maximum amount
of benefits for loss of an arm in Wisconsin ($56,000) was less than in
six other jurisdictions in our 10-state study (table 5.3). The same disparity
between low weekly amount and long potential duration of benefits is
also found for Wisconsin nonscheduled permanent partial disability
benefits: the weekly benefit of 66 2/3 percent of preinjury wages was
subject to a maximum of $112, while the potential duration of 1000
weeks was exceeded only by nine jurisdictions in the U.S. 23
Basis for Nonscheduled Permanent Partial Awards. The statutory
language for nonscheduled permanent partial disability (quoted above)
is subject to various interpretations. Until the 1970s, the Workers' Com
pensation Division primarily relied on evaluations of impairment—the
medical consequences of the work injury—to determine the number of
weeks of benefits, even though decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court since 1947 had at least implicitly endorsed the notion that ratings
for nonscheduled permanent partial disability should be based on loss
of earning capacity. 24
The movement towards the loss of earning capacity approach received
substantial impetus from the court's 1968 holding in Kurschner v. ILHR
Department, 40 Wis. 2d 10. The court held that a nonscheduled injury
should be evaluated in comparison with permanent total disability for
industrial purposes. It based its reasoning on the statutory provision
for permanent total disability that speaks of "total impairment for in
dustrial use," and the provision for nonscheduled injuries under which
the number of weeks of benefits paid bears the same relationship to
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1,000 weeks "as the nature of the injury bears to one causing perma
nent total disability." Thus, nonscheduled permanent partial injuries,
the court concluded (at 18), "are to be compared medically with in
juries that would render a person permanently totally disabled for in
dustrial purposes . . . and not to injuries that would totally disable a
person functionally without regard to loss of earning capacity."
Despite this 1968 decision supporting the evaluation of loss of earn
ing capacity as the basis for nonscheduled permanent partial disability
awards, the operational basis for benefits remained the evaluation of
the extent of impairment or functional limitations. Only the terminology
was changed to bring practice into superficial conformity with the court's
edict. According to Neal, (1983 at p. 45),
Attorneys (and examiners) became careful to have the
physician express his percentage estimate (which almost
always remained a functional estimate) in acceptable terms,
such as "permanent disability for industrial purposes," "as
compared to permanent, total disability" and the like. Most
physicians went along with the game .... The use of the
"magic words" by physicians was routinely held sufficient
by the Supreme and Circuit Courts.
The de facto reliance on impairment as the basis for nonscheduled
permanent partial ratings despite the dejure adherence to disability (loss
of earning capacity) is the situation that existed when we conducted our
field work in 1975-76, and explains why we classified Wisconsin as
a category I (impairment) state in the NSFReport (Berkowitz, Burton,
and Vroman 1979). Subsequent court decisions and changes in agency
practices have now clearly moved Wisconsin into category II, among
jurisdictions that base nonscheduled benefits on loss of earning capacity.
A significant case in this transformation of Wisconsin was Balczewski
v. ILHR Department, 76 Wis. 2d 487 (1977). The claimant was found
to be 55 percent permanently disabled as a result of the work injury,
with the rating based on the physician's estimate of the extent of im
pairment (apparently phrased in the "correct" terms enumerated above
by Neal). A guidance counselor who was an expert in industrial employ
ment testified that the claimant was not qualified for any industrial
employment by reason of her condition, age, and lack of education.
The court invoked the "odd lot doctrine," which is a rule of evidence
that when a claimant has been injured in an industrial accident and can
not, because of her "injury, age, education and capacity," secure a
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job, there is aprimafacie case showing of permanent total disability,
and the burden of showing that jobs do exist for the claimant shifts to
the employer. The court concluded that the odd-lot doctrine was part
of Wisconsin law, but since it had not been recognized as part of the
law by the examiner, or the department on review, the case was remand
ed for further consideration.
The Balczewski decision was interpreted by many, according to Neal
(1983, p. 45), "as a signal that physicians were no longer competent
to estimate loss of wage earning capacity, whatever language was used
to express the estimate." In short, the Supreme Court was insisting that
the practice converge to the legal norms it had established.
Any doubts that the Supreme Court meant that loss of earning capacity
was the basis for all nonscheduled awards (and not just in the conver
sion of a serious nonscheduled rating into a permanent total award, as
in Balczewski) were removed with the decision in Pfister & Vogel Tan
ning Co. v. DILHR, 86 Wis. 2d 522 (1979). Two physicians had rated
the claimant at 5 percent disabled; another physician had reported the
permanent partial disability at about 15 percent; and the hearing ex
aminer found that the claimant had a 20 percent permanent disability.
However, the lower court that initially reviewed the agency's decision
found that none of these ratings had considered the economic loss of
earning capacity resulting from the injury. The Supreme Court was ada
mant in rejecting this agency approach in Pfister. The court (at p. 529)
distinguished functional or medical impairment from impairment with
regard to earning capacity, and concluded that it was the latter impair
ment that should be measured in assessing nonscheduled injury:
In Kurschner we held that the Industrial Commission erred
in adopting the finding of the examiner who determined per
manent partial disability by comparing the employee's in
juries to those of a hypothetical person totally disabled func
tionally and not to one totally disabled as to loss of earning
capacity. Workers' compensation disability is not the same
as functional disability. In a number of cases we have said
that a finding of permanent partial disability by the Industrial
Commission must be based on a consideration of both
factors—loss of bodily function and loss of earning capaci
ty. Consideration of both factors is necessary to implement
the objective of the Workers' Compensation Act, namely to
"compensate in some measure injured workmen for loss of
wage-earning power sustained in the industry."
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Three consequences of the court's clear mandate to use loss of earn
ing capacity rather than impairment ("loss of bodily function") war
rant attention. First, the law was amended in 1980 to require nonscheduled injuries to be rated solely on the basis of physical limitations without
regard to loss of earning capacity when the worker returns to work for
the same employer as at the time of injury at a wage loss of less than
15 percent (Sec. 102.44). A good faith offer of employment refused
by the worker without reasonable cause has the same effect as actual
reemployment. A case closed under this provision can be reopened if
within 12 years there is a termination of employment or wage loss of
15 percent or more. The result of this amendment is to give Wisconsin
a distinctive set of rules for determining the ratings for nonscheduled
injuries with permanent consequences: (1) a minimum rating is based
on the extent of impairment; (2) the minimum rating cannot be increased
or decreased if the worker has actual wage loss of less than 15 percent
of preinjury wages; and (3) if actual wage loss exceeds 15 percent, the
minimum rating can be increased (but not decreased) based on the ex
tent of loss of earning capacity.
The second consequence of the court's decision was a capitulation
by the workers' compensation agency (DILHR) to the view that
nonscheduled permanent partial disability cases (other than those just
discussed involving minimal actual wage loss) should be rated on the
basis of loss of earning capacity. By a rule (Ind. 80.34) effective Oc
tober 1982 all departmental determinations as to loss of earning capacity
for nonscheduled permanent partial disability and permanent total
disability are to:
take into account the effect of the injured employee's per
manent physical and mental limitations resulting from the
injury upon present and potential earnings in view of the
following factors: (a) Age; (b) Education; (c) Training; (d)
Previous work experience; (e) Previous earnings; (f) Pre
sent occupation and earnings; (g) Likelihood of future suitable
occupational change; (h) Efforts to obtain suitable employ
ment; (i) Willingness to make reasonable change in a
residence to secure suitable employment; (j) Success of and
willingness to participate in reasonable physical and voca
tional rehabilitation program; and (k) Other pertinent
evidence.
A third notable consequence of the shift from impairment to loss of
earning capacity as a basis for nonscheduled permanent partial disability
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is a change in the professions relied upon for ratings. In the period before
the Kurschner decision in 1968, physicians were dominant because
ratings were based on impairment. The initial impact of the Kurschner
decision, as previously discussed, was to change the language of the
reports (so terms such as "permanent disability for industrial purposes"
were used), but to continue to rely on physicians for the reports. But
the court's continuing insistence on loss of earning capacity as the basis
for ratings eventually forced a change, as discussed by Neal (1983, pp.
45-46):
Balczewski's rejection of the physician's estimate (apparently
phrased in the "correct" terms) . . . was perceived by many
as a signal that physicians were no longer competent to
estimate loss of wage earning capacity, whatever language
was used to express the estimate. And applicant's attorneys
soon learned that the vocational expert's opinion was much
more favorable to the client than the physician's.
The trend toward the use of vocational experts has since
grown steadily. . . .
What is the law and practice today? Most applicants' at
torneys use vocational experts because the estimates are
higher. Some also voice fear of malpractice suit if they do
not. The Labor and Industry Review Commission, in reac
tion to Pfister, has been remanding some awards where a
permanent disability finding is based on medical testimony
only.
Administration of the Wisconsin Program

Processing workers' compensation cases is a responsibility of the
Workers' Compensation Division of the Department of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations (DILHR). The administrator of the division
oversees the hearing examiners and, in general, actively administers
the act. Reviews of examiners' decisions are made by a commission
within the department.
The division is active in communicating with the parties and seeing
to it that procedures are followed and payments made in a timely fashion.
As discussed in chapter 4, Wisconsin provides evaluation guidance to
the parties so they know the amounts to be paid in permanent partial
disability cases.
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The active administrative stance of the administrator of the workers'
compensation system extends to legislative concerns. Workers' com
pensation legislation, by tradition and by statute (Sec. 102.14), originates
with an advisory council on workers' compensation, consisting of five
representatives from labor and five from industry, chaired by the ad
ministrator of the Workers' Compensation Division. Three represen
tatives of the insurance industry attend meetings of the council, but do
not have a vote. Once the legislative issues are thrashed out by the ad
visory council, the division takes the responsibility for putting the coun
cil's recommendations into final form. The tradition has been to sub
mit an agreed-upon bill to the legislature with the understanding that
the members of the advisory council will support the agreed-upon bill
and oppose all others.
Processing Permanent Partial Disability Cases

The active role of the administration in communicating with the par
ties and in providing guidance in the evaluation of permanent partial
disabilities is illustrated by the procedures involved in the processing
of cases.
Wisconsin is the epitome of the direct payment state. The employer
is required to file a first report of injury or disease (Form WC-12) and,
11 days after the accident or the beginning of disability, a supplemen
tal report (WC-13). The latter form indicates the amount of compensa
tion paid or the reason compensation was not paid. The same form is
used to let the division know of a final payment, and may be used in
case of a suspension of payments.
Insurance carriers and self-insured employers are expected to pay
claims promptly. The division's standard is that 80 percent of cases
be mailed or delivered within 14 days after injuries are reported. The
Workers' Compensation Division has monitored first payment perfor
mance since 1921, either by correspondence or by personal visits. The
division releases periodic reports detailing the promptness records of
individual carriers. In 1985, local government self-insurers, on the
average, met the standard, but 22.3 percent of payments from nongovern
mental self-insurers and 26.9 percent of payments from insurance car
riers were not made within the 14-day period (Gmeinder and Tatarsky
1986, p. 30). Insurers and self-insurers who do not meet the standard
are asked to explain why.
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The division requires a physician's report if the disability lasts more
than three weeks or if there is any permanent disability. The physician
is asked to estimate the amount of permanent disability resulting from
the injury. Such estimates are influenced by the guidelines established
by rule of the division. If there is some controversy about the extent
of disability, the carrier is expected to pay the minimal amount con
ceded without any order from the division. Failure to do so may sub
ject the carrier to a 10 percent penalty. There are, of course, cases in
which employers or carriers dispute liability completely; when they do
so, they are expected to notify the division.
In some states, such notification, or any dissatisfaction by the divi
sion with some action of the carrier, results in the case being scheduled
before a hearing officer. In Wisconsin, much is accomplished by cor
respondence between the division and the parties. For example, if com
pensation payments are not being made, the agency may send a form
letter to the carrier with the following message: "More than 30 days
have elapsed since compensation payment was due in this case. You
have had more than enough time to complete a necessary investigation,
unless unusual circumstances prevail" (Guide Letter #6). If the injured
worker complains about not receiving compensation, the agency sends
a letter to the worker informing him that the agency has notified the
employer's insurance carrier of the complaint and has requested an
explanation.
If the carrier does not respond, one of the administrative staff will
attempt to find out whether the cause of delay is a genuine dispute or
perhaps confused communications. If the problem, for example, is that
the doctor has not filed the necessary medical reports, the worker may
be asked to contact the doctor to urge him to send in the necessary report.
The division has made arrangements to invoke the aid of the Wiscon
sin Medical Society in securing these reports. In short, the division does
not hesitate to intervene actively by correspondence or by phone call
to one party or the other.
Of course, cases of serious dispute concerning liability or extent of
disability result in applications for hearings, but even at this stage the
employer is advised to pay the compensation that is admittedly due and
accrued.
The case may go directly to a hearing, or may be set down for a pretrial
conference to establish the issues in dispute, although before that stage
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is reached the administrative personnel of the agency will make sure
that the file is complete and that the physician's forms are in. The ad
ministrator may give a good deal of assistance to the claimant in filling
out forms, because it is not automatically assumed that the claimant
needs an attorney.
At the pretrial conference, the examiner attempts to get the parties
to agree about the issues, or, if that is not possible, to determine whether
a formal hearing is necessary. Some compromises are reached at this
stage, although these do not necessarily involve a release of the
employer's obligation for further medical care or even for future cash
benefits should the employee's condition worsen. The parties are
urged to stipulate to as many mutually accepted facts as possible at the
pretrial conference.
A 1980 amendment (Sec. 102.18 [l][c]) provided for a tie-breaking
procedure for cases in which two or more examiners have conducted
hearings and are unable to agree within a range of 5 percent of the highest
or lowest estimate of permanent partial disability. An additional ex
aminer may be appointed for findings of fact, and an order of award
may then be issued by a majority of the examiners. Also, these same
amendments provided that any award that falls within a range of 5 per
cent of the highest or lowest estimate of permanent partial disability
is presumed to be a reasonable award "provided it is not higher than
the highest or lower than the lowest estimate in evidence" (Sec. 102. 18
Evaluation Rules

Wisconsin has issued a series of rules to guide physicians who rate
the permanent consequences of injuries. Rule 80.32 covers "percent
ages of loss of use or losses of motion as compared with amputations
at the involved joints." It also includes injuries to the back. As the rule
states in paragraph 1:
The disabilities set forth in this section are the minimums
for the described conditions. However, findings of additional
disabling elements shall result in an estimate higher than the
minimum. The minimum also assumes that the member, the
back, etc., was previously without disability. Appropriate
reduction shall be made for any preexisting disability.
Note: An example would be where in addition to a describ
ed loss of motion, pain and circulatory disturbance further
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limits the use of an arm or a leg. The removal of a semilunar cartilage in a knee with less than a good result would
call for an estimate higher than 5 % loss of use of the leg
at the knee. The same principle would apply to laminectomies
or spinal fusions. The schedule of minimum disabilities con
tained in this section was adopted upon the advice of the or
thopedic advisory committee.
Thus the general guides provide for minimum ratings that may be
supplemented if there is a finding of additional disabling factors. Fur
ther, the physician has the discretion to determine whether pain or a
circulatory disturbance contributes to the restriction for practical pur
poses of the use of an extremity.
The guides provide fairly detailed instruction for rating amputation
of the upper and lower extremities and sensory loss to the digits, hands,
portions of the arms, and so on. Some (though less) guidance is pro
vided for rating back injuries and loss of hearing and vision.
The deputy administrator has prepared a guide for physicians and car
riers showing comparisons between evaluations of disability as expected
under Wisconsin's Workmen's Compensation Act and those listed in
the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Some
of the conditions listed are impairments by AMA standards, but would
not be compensable under Wisconsin's workers' compensation standards.
Not only are Wisconsin's statutory provisions relating to permanent
partial disabilities quite detailed, but the division has issued rules and
regulations supplementing the statute that provide further guidance to
the parties in making their evaluations. In addition, the administrators
provide guidance on an informal basis, so that the physician has some
way to translate his findings into percentage ratings acceptable to the
administrators. Finally, the administrator actively communicates the divi
sion's policies to the parties and is perfectly willing to instruct physi
cians as to whether they are meeting the guidelines.
Cases and Work Load

Wisconsin has been widely esteemed as a state that has succeeded
in keeping litigation within reasonable bounds. This remains largely
true, although litigation has increased, in part because the number of
cases has increased. In 1970, the state received 39,841 first reports of
accidents that were likely indemnity cases. By 1979, the number of cases
had increased to 82,352—more than doubling the number of reported
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cases in less than a decade. Then the case load dropped—to 54,579 cases
reported in 1983—and then partially rebounded—to 65,679 in 1985
(Gmeinder and Tatarsky 1986, p. 3).
Application for hearing is one measure of litigation. From 1970 to
1979, the number of applications almost doubled (from 2,069 to 3,822),
roughly matching the increase in first reports of injuries, so that the
"litigation rate" (number of applications per 100 first reports) hovered
around 5 in the 1970s. Then as the number of reported cases dropped
in the 1980s, the applications for hearing did not. In 1984 there were
4,989 applications for hearing out of 61,588 reported cases, for a 8.1
percent litigation rate. In 1985, applications exceeded 5000 for the first
time (at 5,133), but the number of reported cases increased to 65,679
and so the litigation rate dropped to 7.8 percent (Gmeinder and Tatarsky 1986, p. 31)—still high by Wisconsin's historical standards.
Other measures of litigation are the numbers of informal hearings
(pretrial conferences) and of formal hearings, and these also show in
creasing litigiousness in Wisconsin. To be sure, formal hearings have
not expanded—from 1,478 in 1970 to 1,093 in 1980 to 1,463 in 1985.
But pretrial conferences have spurted—from 1,360 to 3,019 to 4,255
in these same years (Gmeinder and Tatarsky 1986, p. 33).
One "solution" to disputed cases in most states is a compromise and
release agreement, in which the worker typically receives a lump-sum
settlement in exchange for a release of the employer's further liability.
Compromise agreements in Wisconsin are discouraged. Every com
promise may be reviewed and set aside or modified within one year
after the filing of the agreement. Also the act clearly specifies that a
stipulation of settlement is not a compromise agreement and it does not
bar future claims. The claimant, for example, may be entitled to future
medical benefits. As a result, compromise agreements are uncommon
in Wisconsin, with the 1,614 in 1985 accounting for only 3 percent of
the 52,088 cases initially closed that year.
Lessons from Wisconsin
The experience in Wisconsin illustrates the difficulties of meeting all
three criteria presented in chapter 2: adequacy, equity, and efficiency.
The tension between equity and efficiency is particularly evident.
Wisconsin's record on efficiency is outstanding using several measures
of performance. The employers' costs of workers' compensation in
surance in Wisconsin have been consistently below the national average
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since 1958, with a representative sample of employers paying only 62
percent of the national average in 1984 (table 3.18). Moreover, the record
has not been achieved by paying parsimonious benefits. Rather, among
the seven Great Lakes states with comparable data (all but Ohio),
Wisconsin in 1984 had the highest ratio of benefits received by workers
to insurance premiums paid by employers (Burton and Partridge 1985,
p. 62).
The Wisconsin workers' compensation agency also appears to be a
model of efficiency. The data in table 4.1 indicate that the size of the
budget and workforce in Wisconsin are relatively low compared to the
other jurisdictions we are intensively examining. If anything, the com
parisons are "stacked" against Wisconsin since its agency performs
the full set of administrative functions described in chapter 4, including
monitoring and evaluation, while some of the other states' agencies are
essentially passive, doing little more than adjudicating disputed claims.
The reasons for the efficiency in Wisconsin, as reflected in the
employers' costs of insurance and the agency operations, include several
factors previously discussed. The share of all cash benefits accounted
for by permanent disability cases is generally related to the employers'
costs of workers' compensation insurance (graph 3.2), and Wisconsin
has consistently kept its permanent disability benefits share at or below
the national average (table 3.17). The agency efficiency results in part
from its aggressive stance in promoting voluntary settlements and
avoiding litigation. Among 13 states with data available from the Na
tional Council on Compensation Insurance, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania
had the lowest percentage (2 percent) of cases where claimants were
represented by attorneys; the average for all 13 states was 8 percent
(NCCI Claims Characteristics, 1984, p. 3). The quality performance
of the Wisconsin agency also appears to reflect the general reputation
of Wisconsin as a "good government" state, in which government
employment is a career rather than a way-stop. The long-standing sup
port of the Wisconsin program by the Advisory Council is also a factor
that helps explain the quality of the agency.
The record of the Wisconsin workers' compensation program is not
unsullied, however. There is cause for concern about the adequacy of
the permanent partial disability benefits because of the low weekly max
imum. As documented in chapter 10, Wisconsin workers who were in
jured in 1968 and received permanent partial disability awards did receive
adequate benefits. However, between 1968 and 1986 the maximum for
permanent partial disability benefits increased 136 percent (from $47.50
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to $112), less than the 182 percent increase in average wages in the
state over the latest comparable period. 25 Wisconsin benefits for per
manently disabled workers may, therefore, no longer be adequate.
Even if Wisconsin is at least arguably satisfying the adequacy criterion
for permanent disability benefits, there is strong evidence that the benefits
are inequitable. The essence of equity is that workers with equal losses
of income due to work injuries receive equal benefits (horizonal equi
ty), while workers with different amounts of income losses receive
benefits proportional to their losses (vertical equity). The data in chapter
10 for Wisconsin workers injured in 1968 show numerous violations
of horizonal and vertical equity. Similar results were found by Ginnold (1979), who also studied workers injured in 1968. He found, for
example (p. 85), that workers with scheduled permanent partial ratings
averaging 13 percent were on average experiencing no earnings losses
in 1973, but by then the workers with nonscheduled ratings averaging
11 percent were experiencing 25 percent earnings losses.
A concern for equity in the Wisconsin workers' compensation pro
gram is reflected in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decisions about
the basis for nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits. The
court in effect recognized that if the purpose of workers' compensation
benefits is primarily to compensate workers for work disability—an
economic consequence of the injury—then an operational approach that
only examines the workers' impairments ("functional disabilities") is
unlikely to produce benefits that serve the primary purpose well. Follow
ing that reasoning, the court (in conjunction with the legislature) in a
quest for equity ruled that nonscheduled benefits should be based not
only on impairment but on a combination of impairment, loss of earn
ing capacity, and even a strain of actual wage loss.
The transformation of the basis for nonscheduled benefits can be con
sidered a trade-off of efficiency for equity. For whatever are the defects
of ratings based on impairment, they are relatively objective and thus
less prone to disagreement and litigation than ratings based on loss of
earning capacity. Surely even reasonable men and women would disagree
about the application of the factors enumerated in agency rule Ind. 80.34
(quoted earlier) that are used in determining the loss of earning capaci
ty.
The tension between equity and efficiency reflected in the transformed
basis for nonscheduled benefits is a tension present in the determina
tion of all permanent disability benefits in Wisconsin (and indeed in
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all states). How can equity be promoted without reducing efficiency?
The problem must be carefully stated, because as we have argued in
chapter 2, it is easy to achieve a myopic version of efficiency in which
the only concern is for low costs of the delivery system (and in par
ticular low costs of the state workers' compensation agency) without
regard to the quality of the program, as measured by the equity and
adequacy of benefits. A more appropriate version of equity—which we
have termed panoramic efficiency—is concerned simultaneously with
the costs of the delivery system and the quality of the program.
The proper view of efficiency will not consider a larger budget for
a state agency or even more litigation as necessarily inefficient if these
are necessary to achieve greater adequacy or equity of benefits. We
hasten to add, however, that the evidence from other states that will
be reviewed in chapter 11 provides no support for the notion that greater
litigation necessarily promotes equity or adequacy. And we particular
ly doubt that greater litigation resulting from the use of loss of earning
capacity as a basis for permanent disability benefits is likely to pro
mote adequacy or equity. We are therefore concerned that the recent
change in the basis for nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits
in Wisconsin has been accompanied by increased litigation. We realize
that other factors—including, perhaps, a trend towards greater tolerance
of litigation—may partly explain the increased litigation in Wisconsin.
We view the recent change of job title in the Wisconsin workers' com
pensation program from "hearing examiner" to "administrative law
judge" as a disturbing evidence of such a trend. But regardless of the
influence of these other factors, we believe that use of loss of earning
capacity as a basis for nonscheduled benefits will almost inevitably in
crease litigation, and we are skeptical of the view that improvements
in equity will result.
One of the challenges for the new Wisconsin Study Commission is
to figure out a better way to improve equity than by changing the basis
for permanent disability benefits to loss of earning capacity. One prob
lem with the recent developments in Wisconsin is that ratings for schedul
ed permanent partial disability benefits are still based strictly on an assess
ment of impairment. Thus, even if a case can be made that the transfor
mation of the basis for nonscheduled benefits has been beneficial, the
majority of workers in Wisconsin with permanent disabilities must still
rely on scheduled benefits that are demonstrably inequitable.
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NOTES
1. During the second quarter of 1986, 39 percent of all new original filings of applications for
adjudication contained the insurer's first notice of the injury, down from the 1977 record of 53
percent (California Workers' Compensation Institute Bulletin [hereafter CWCI Bulletin], No. 85-8,
Oct. 2, 1985 and CWCI Bulletin No. 86-7, Aug. 14, 1986).
2. In 90-95 percent of cases involving an application for adjudication, the worker is represented
by an attorney (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Administration Profiles, 1985, p. 29).
3. The data on the activity in the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court are from 14 California
Workers' Compensation Reporter (hereafter CWCR) 63, April 1986.
4. An employer, his carrier, or the Board can also initiate movement in a case by filing a Declaration
of Readiness to Proceed.
5. In some cases involving a request for approval of a compromise and release, the case has already
had an informal or formal disability rating prepared by the Disability Evaluation Bureau, and
that could be considered by the judge in determining the appropriateness of the proposed com
promise and release settlement.
6. The order of the judge approving a compromise and release agreement is subject to a petition
for reconsideration or a writ of review, and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board may on
its own motion reconsider a compromise and release agreement approved by a judge (Swezey
1985, sec. 13.52). The latter procedure is rarely used.
7. More extensive discussions can be found in the chapter "Permanent Disability Evaluation"
(Welch 1973), and in the June 4, 1964, "Presentation on Permanent Disability Ratings" to the
Workmen's Compensation Study Commission ("Moss Commission"), both by Eli P. Welch,
chief of the Permanent Disability Rating Bureau; and in the California Senate Interim Commit
tee's Report on Workmen's Compensation Benefits (Part I, 1953). These items were relied on
for much of the material in this chapter. Welch's "Permanent Disability Evaluation" chapter
is similar to chapter 16 in Swezey (1985).
8. The only other change in the language was made in 1966, when authority to prepare, adopt,
and amend the schedule was transferred from the Industrial Accident Commission (the predecessor
of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board) to the administrative director of the Division of
Industrial Accidents.
9. There were 14 amendments by 1939, according to Welch (1964, p. 16).
10. The example is from Swezey (1985, sec. 16.29).
11. "Actually, 'slight,' 'moderate,' and 'severe' have different meanings to different persons
involved in the judicial process of the commission. What may be 'slight,' 'moderate,' or 'severe'
as the case may be, to litigants and referees alike, may prove to be something different to the
rating specialist although presumably the latter also functions under the same legislative formula
and rules of evidence" (Senate Interim Committee 1953, p. 42).
12. A May 20, 1986 letter from Barry F. Carmody, acting administrative director of the Divi
sion of Industrial Accidents, to All Interested Parties indicated that the Division is renewing the
Schedule for Rating Permanent Disabilities in order to provide "more equitable permanent disability
determinations." A request was made for a list of occupations not currently in the schedule that
should be included.
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13. Nor do we.
14. To be sure, the workers' compensation judge can use an independent medical examiner or
an agreed medical examiner to assess the extent of injury, but ultimately the judge must decide
whether to accept the medical opinion from these sources, and that decision is an act of discretion.
15. These injuries or diseases are described in California as nonscheduled (see quotation below).
This use of the term "nonscheduled," however, differs from the term's use in most states, where
all cases that cannot be rated by reference to the list of injuries in the statute are considered
nonscheduled and are evaluated on the basis of a general standard. In California, the procedure
in "nonscheduled" cases is roughly comparable to the process used in most states to evaluate
loss of use cases for scheduled injuries. As described by Welch (1973, sec. 15.22), in California
"a disability rating (sometimes referred to as a judgment rating) is one for which the disability
is not precisely described in the schedule, or the occupation is not specifically listed. Most ratings
are nonscheduled. The schedule can be applied to nonscheduled disabilities in three ways: (1)
by comparison with the most similar scheduled disability, or (2) by analogy to a scheduled disability,
or (3) by comparison with the entire scheme of relative severity of disability."
16. The California schedule for mental deterioration, for example, consists of four levels—slight,
moderate, severe, and pronounced—with no description of what these levels involve. The AMA
Guides devote a chapter to mental illness.
17. CWCI Bulletin No. 85-6, July 10, 1985. The CWCI estimate of $600 million plus has been
challenged by the California Applicants' Attorneys Association (CAAA) in "Litigation Costs in
California's Workers' Compensation System," a three-page, undated memorandum. The CAAA
estimates the costs as only $243 million. This figure, however, excludes $110 million of applicants'
attorneys fees and $27 million for the costs of the WCAB because these "costs are not paid by
employers as a part of their workers' compensation costs." As we have defined costs of the delivery
system in chapter 2, however, these costs should be included, and doing so would make the total
costs of litigation some $380 million annually in California. Obviously the difference between
the CWCI estimate of $600 million and the $380 million figure is substantial, but even the lower
figure indicates that the cost of the litigation process in California is considerably greater than
the budget of the workers' compensation agency for its nonadjudicatory functions.
18. CWCI Bulletin No. 86-3, April 24, 1986.
19. The Study Committee was created in 1983 and directed to report by November 1984. "The
joint committee did not meet this deadline, the chairman retired from the Legislature, and the
committee was not extended" (CSCS Report, 1986, p. 1). Under these apparently beneficial con
ditions, the staff produced an excellent 279-page report.
20. The committee staff relied on an earlier version of portions of chapter 10 of this study published
by Burton and Vroman (1979).
21. National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, Compendium on Workers'
Compensation (1973, p. 18). The 1910 law in New York was held unconstitutional by the Court
of Appeals of New York, thus allowing Wisconsin its honor.
22. The passage is from the Bulletin of the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, Vol. 1, No.
3 (July 20, 1912), as quoted in Gmeinder (1983, p. 12).
23. Nine jurisdictions (Arizona, the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Hamp
shire, New York, Rhode Island, and South Dakota) pay nonscheduled permanent partial disabili
ty benefits for the duration of the disability without limits on the total amount of payments. Data
for this note and the text are from U.S. Dept. of Labor, State Laws (1986).
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24. In Northern States Power Co. v. Industrial Comm., 252 Wis. 70 (1947) at Note 2, p. 76,
the court stated that "since an award for permanent disability is to be made for all time . . .
it must be based upon some sort of prediction as to impairment of earning capacity."
25. The latest data for the average weekly wage of workers covered by the Wisconsin unemploy
ment insurance program are for 1984. In order to match the 18-year period over which benefits
are compared in the text, wage data from 1966 were used to estimate the 182 percent increase
in average weekly wages in the state (from $115.55 to $325.57). Wage data are from U.S. Dept.
of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Finan
cial Data, 1938-1976, as supplemented by a 1986 release from U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics.

Chapter 8
Nonscheduled Benefits in Wage-Loss
(Category III) States
We now consider nonscheduled permanent partial disability cases in
the wage-loss states in our sample. Prominent among these is Florida,
which is examined individually in chapter 9 because of its widely herald
ed 1979 wage-loss statute. But aspects of the wage-loss approach are
also present in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the states
discussed in this chapter.
Definition of the Wage-Loss Approach
The definition of a "pure" wage-loss approach that follows is
elaborate. Nonetheless, all of the dimensions of a wage-loss approach
represented by the five traits we name must be recognized in order to
accurately capture the differences among the states using the wage-loss
approach.
Trait One. The wage-loss approach applies to the period after the
date of maximum medical improvement (MMI), not to the period be
tween the date of injury and the date of MMI. (See graph 2.1 in chapter
2.) In our terminology, the period between the date of injury and the
date of MMI is the temporary disability period, and the period after
the date of MMI is the permanent disability period.
Most states do not use this precise terminology in distinguishing be
tween the temporary and permanent disability periods. Indeed, some
states do not explicitly distinguish between temporary disability and per
manent disability. Nonetheless, each state has to decide how to com
pensate workers after their medical conditions are stable whether they
explicitly recognize that date or not, and we examine whatever approach
each state uses to compensate workers after the healing period.
Trait Two. The wage-loss approach requires that as of the date of
MMI, there is some remaining impairment or functional limitation that
was caused by the work-related injury or disease. This requirement is
true for all three categories of nonscheduled permanent partial disability
211
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benefits, but needs emphasis here. It means that most workers' com
pensation cases cannot qualify for wage-loss benefits (or any type of
permanent disability benefits), since the medical problems are temporary.
Trait Three. After the date of MMI, the worker's postinjury poten
tial earnings are determined by projecting the preinjury wage into the
period of permanent disability with adjustments to reflect what would
have happened to the wage had the worker not been injured. These poten
tial earnings (line BC in graph 2.1) are compared to his actual earnings
(line FG) and the difference, which is defined as "true" wage loss due
to injury, serves as the basis for the wage-loss benefits. Two outcomes
are possible: (a) if the worker has no wage loss after the date of MMI,
then no permanent disability benefits are paid; however, (b) if the worker
does have wage loss after the date of MMI, then permanent disability
benefits are paid that are related to the amount of wage loss (for exam
ple, the benefits could be 66 2/3 percent of the "true" wage loss).
Trait Four. Even in a pure wage-loss approach, it is recognized that
some workers will voluntarily restrict the amount of their actual earn
ings after the date of MMI. It would be unfair to require the employer
to pay benefits because of the worker's voluntary limitation of work
activity. Therefore, even in a pure wage-loss approach the employer
has the right to establish that the worker's earning capacity after the
date of MMI is greater than the worker's actual earnings. This means
that the compensable wage loss is the lesser of: (a) the worker's poten
tial earnings minus the worker's actual earnings; or (b) the worker's
potential earnings minus the worker's earning capacity.
Bringing in the notion of earning capacity makes this sound like the
category II approach. But there is a crucial difference. In the category
II approach, only the difference between potential earnings and earn
ing capacity is considered in determining benefits; as a result, a worker
can receive permanent disability benefits even if there is no actual wage
loss so long as a decision is made that he has experienced a loss of earn
ing capacity. A worker in the same situation receives no benefits under
the wage-loss approach.
Trait Five. Under a pure wage-loss approach, a worker would be eligi
ble for wage-loss benefits any time between the date of MMI and the
worker's retirement age that the worker experiences true wage loss.
Further, this extended period would not be limited by statute (for ex
ample, by a maximum duration on permanent partial disability benefits
that could terminate benefits for some workers before their normal retire-
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ment age) or by agreements between the parties to limit the period of
eligibility (for example, by compromise and release agreements).
The preceding discussion of the wage-loss approach provides a "pure"
version that no state altogether meets, although each of the traits is met
(or at least approached) by one or more states. We are not suggesting
that "pure" is best. We offer the definition only because it provides
a model to which the laws in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New York, Ohio,
and Florida can be compared.
Following are some of the ways that state laws deviate from the pure
approach (these will be elaborated in subsequent sections).
1. The law does not measure "true" wage loss but "restricted" wage
loss, as those terms are defined in graph 2.1. "True" wage loss
requires that preinjury wages be escalated through time to simulate
what the worker would have earned had the injury never occur
red. In contrast, "restricted" wage loss takes the worker's wage
as of the date of injury and projects this wage into the postinjury
period without escalation. This deviation from the "pure" wageloss approach characterizes most states.
2. The law considers only wage loss above a certain minimum amount
to be compensable. Florida, for example, only compensates wage
loss in excess of 15 percent of potential earnings.
3. The law restricts the eligibility period for wage-loss benefits. For
example, the statute may terminate benefits for some workers
before their normal retirement age even though their wage loss
is continuing. Or the statute may require workers to establish their
eligibility for wage-loss benefits within a certain period after the
date of MMI.
4. The eligibility period may be restricted by private agreements beween the parties. A common example is the compromise and
release agreement (variously known as a redemption, washout,
or "C & R"), whereby the worker receives a lump-sum payment
and the employer is released from any further liability for the par
ticular injury. Under such an agreement, the worker is obviously
no longer eligible for wage-loss benefits even if actual wage loss
occurs after the date of the agreement; this violates trait five of
the "pure" wage-loss approach. Also, the lump-sum part of the
settlement means that some workers receive benefits even though
they experience no actual loss of earnings after the date of MMI—a
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violation of trait three. Moreover, since the size of the lump-sum
settlement is likely to reflect an estimate of future wage loss, the
agreement essentially converts a de jure wage loss approach
(category III) into a de facto loss of earning capacity approach
(category II).
5. Finally, a "pure" wage-loss approach pays benefits only because
of actual loss of earnings, not, for example, because of the mere
existence of an impairment or functional limitation. A state may
deviate from the pure wage-loss by awarding benefits above and
beyond wage-loss benefits for certain injuries, such as amputations.
With this catalogue of traits and deviations in mind, we now turn to
a review of the jurisdictions that have at least some elements of a wageloss approach in their workers' compensation statutes.

Pennsylvania
Types and Levels of Benefits

In Pennsylvania, a worker who is out of work due to the consequences
of an injury may receive what are termed "total disability" benefits
for the duration of his total disability. As in other states, these benefits
are calculated at two-thirds of the employee's preinjury weekly wage,
subject to the statutory maximum ($347.00 on January 1, 1986). There
is no stated number of weeks after which such total disability payments
automatically cease. The law simply provides that "nothing in this clause
should require payments of compensation after disability shall cease"
(Section 306). If disability continues for the worker's entire life, the
payments also continue. There is no distinction in Pennsylvania's law
between "temporary total" and "permanent total" benefits, except for
the statutory presumption that certain combinations of scheduled injuries
constitute total disability. The statute provides, "Unless the Board shall
otherwise determine, the loss of both hands or both arms or both feet
or both legs or both eyes shall constitute total disability" (Section 306[b]
[23]).
If, as a consequence of the injury, the worker suffers a permanent
impairment that is included on the schedule (say the loss of a hand),
he receives, as an exclusive remedy, 66 2/3 percent of his wage during
the stipulated period (335 weeks for one hand, for example) plus his
total disability payments during a healing period defined by law. (The
scheduled benefits are subject to a $347.00 per week maximum.) The
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law provides that he is to receive, in addition to his scheduled award,
payments during any period of disability "necessary and required as
a healing period." The healing period ends either when the claimant
returns to work without impairment in earnings or on the last day of
the period specified in the schedule, whichever comes first. Thus, for
the loss of a hand he would receive the benefits for 335 weeks as in
dicated, plus a maximum of 20 weeks for the healing period if he were
out of work for that long.
There are three restrictive aspects of the schedule in Pennsylvania
that are relevant for an understanding of the relationship between schedul
ed and nonscheduled cases. First, the schedule provides compensation
only for total, not for partial, loss of most body members included in
the list. In other states' schedules, by contrast, partial loss of the listed
body members results in awards that are proportional to the extent of
loss. (For example, in most states if the loss of the hand resulted in
an award of 335 weeks, then loss of two-thirds of a hand would result
in an award of 223 weeks. In Pennsylvania, partial loss of a hand is
only evaluated in terms of the scheduled awards for loss of the fingers.)
Second, the Pennsylvania schedule is largely confined to physical loss
of the listed body members, and loss of use is not compensable as in
most states' schedules. (Pennsylvania does allow loss of use to be com
pensated when there is a permanent loss of use of two or more body
members.) These two restrictive aspects of the Pennsylvania schedule
mean that a relatively large proportion of injuries with permanent con
sequences are not encompassed by the schedule and will receive per
manent disability benefits only if they qualify for nonscheduled perma
nent partial (or permanent total) disability benefits. The third restric
tive aspect of the Pennsylvania schedule is the limitation found in most
statutes, namely the exclusiveness of scheduled benefits in the sense
that an injury that qualifies for scheduled benefits cannot qualify for
any other type of permanent disability benefits.
In the nonscheduled cases, if, in the words of the law, the "disabili
ty [is] partial in character" (Section 306 a), the worker is entitled to
66 2/3 percent of the difference between his preinjury wages and his
"earning power" thereafter paid "during the period of his partial
disability . . . but for not more than 500 weeks" (Section 306 b). If
a period of total disability is followed by partial disability, the 500 weeks
maximum period of partial disability is not reduced. The nonscheduled
benefits were also subject to a $347.00-per-week maximum on January
1, 1986.
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The administrative problems in Pennsylvania for nonscheduled cases
revolve around determining when the period of total disability should
end, and in determining the employee's earning power. The statute of
fers no guidance as to the former, but does for the latter. First, earning
power "shall in no case be less than the weekly amount which the
employee receives after the injury." "Further, the combined compen
sation and wage received are to be no more than the amount received
by a fellow employee in employment similar to that in which the in
jured employee was engaged at the time of the injury" (Section 306 b).
The first condition—that of taking the actual wages as a floor to
establish earning power—came as a result of a 1939 amendment. Before
1939, earning power could be less than actual postinjury wages if the
worker could show that the reason for his higher wage was inflation,
promotion, or some other reason not connected with his permanent in
jury. Today, if a worker who earned $200 a week before his accident
returned after his period of total disability to a job that paid $110 a week,'
he would be entitled upon showing the necessary proof to a benefit of
$60, which is two-thirds of the difference between his wage before his
injury, $200, and his present wage of $110.
If his wage remained at $110, he would continue to receive the $60
a week benefit for the maximum duration of 500 weeks. If, however,
his wage gradually increaseed, his benefits would correspondingly
decrease and, once his earnings reached $200, cease. The termination
of benefits occurs regardless of the reason for the increase in wages.
As noted by a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, "It seems
paradoxical that, while statutory changes to benefit employees and to
account for inflationary forces have been repeatedly enacted by the
legislature since 1939, this post-injury disadvantage to partially disabl
ed employees has remained unchanged since 1939 and throughout most
inflationary times" (Barbieri 1975, pp. 46-47).
Obviously, for those employees who return to a job, the establish
ment of actual wages as an indicator of earning power, however un
fair, does simplify the administrative task of determining "earning
power." The problems become more complicated for an employee who
does not return to a job. The difficulty is in assessing whether his loss
of earnings results from his injury. Although his actual earnings are
zero, his earning power may be a good deal more. The employer or
the insurance carrier is likely to claim that his lack of a job has nothing
to do with the work-related injury.
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Procedures
In Pennsylvania, within 21 days after an insurance carrier is notified
of an injury, it must submit a form indicating acceptance or denial of
the claim. If the carrier accepts the claim, it is supposed to begin
payments of total disability benefits promptly. Any change in the status
of the claim, including a stoppage of payments because the employee
returned to work or because the carrier believes that he is capable of
returning to work, requires notice to the claimant and to the agency.
Once total disability benefits begin, they normally continue until the
employee recovers and is back to work. The carrier then files a final
receipt of compensation form that requires the signature of the employee.
If the employee refuses to sign, say on grounds that he continues to
be totally disabled, the carrier must then petition the agency to terminate
or modify the benefit payments.
If an employer's petition to stop or modify payments alleges either
that the employee has returned to work at the same or higher wages
or that he is fully recovered as attested to by a physician's affidavit,
the carrier may stop or modify the payments and await a final deter
mination by a referee. Provisions may be made for an expedited hear
ing to determine the issue. If the employee has not returned to work,
the burden of proof for establishing his employability at a certain wage
falls on the employer. As in those states where the criteria center around
impairment or measures of functional limitation, the controversy centers
around conflicting medical evidence and physicians' estimates of the
employee's ability to work. The referee is called upon to make a deci
sion based on the medical and lay testimony before him.
When the extent of impairment is not resolved but the employee is
not suffering any current wage loss, the referee can order a suspension
of benefits. The suspension in effect imposes a 500-week rather than
a three-year time limit within which the case can be reopened if actual
wage loss occurs. This is a common procedure in back cases.
Of course the parties may agree as to the nature and extent of the
impairment or functional limitation and disagree about the significance
of that condition for the employee's chances in the labor market. Con
flicting medical testimony is usually supplemented by employment ex
perts' testimony as to the availability of jobs within a reasonable distance
from the employee's home for workers with the claimant's impairment
and functional limitation. The referee must decide on the basis of the
evidence before him whether it is reasonable to conclude that the claim-
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ant could return to some job. In some instances, the hearing is adjourn
ed to give the claimant an opportunity to test the labor market, although
the referee's decision will not always turn on the actual results of that
job search. Of course, if the employee does get a job that pays as much
as his former wage, that eliminates his claim for wage-loss benefits.
In general, however, in Pennsylvania, if the claimant's physician testifies,
based on some reasonable evidence, that his patient is unable to return
to work, the employer's task of proving otherwise is a difficult and timeconsuming one.
Although statistics on litigation are difficult to interpret on a com
parative basis, they do suggest that Pennsylvania is not an overly litigious
state. There are 13 states with data on attorney representation available
from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (Claims
Characteristics 1984, p. 3). For all types of claims, 2 percent of all
claimants are represented by attorneys in Pennsylvania (a record
matched only by Wisconsin), well below the 13-state average of 8 per
cent. For permanent partial claims, Pennsylvania has the lowest percent
age of attorney representation—7 percent, compared to the 13-state
average of 23 percent.
Compromise and Release Settlements

In spite of a wage-loss statute under which claims remain open for
an indefinite period of time, Pennsylvania is not plagued with a rash
of compromise and release settlements.
The director of the Bureau and the attorney general have interpreted
Section 407 of the statute as constituting a complete bar to compromise
and release settlements. Section 407 states (in part):
the employer or insurer and employee or his dependents may
agree upon the compensation payable to the employee or his
dependents under this act, but any agreement . . . permit
ting a computation of a payment contrary to the provision
of this act, or varying the amount to be paid or the period
during which compensation shall be payable . . . shall be
wholly null and void. . .
A referee (Stander 1976) has pointed out that the "tortured syntax"
of the section makes possible interpretations other than the prevailing
one, which bars any compromise and release settlements. The rationale
for such settlements is eroded due to the provisions that allow reopenings in cases where settlements have been reached. In a 1975 case,
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General v. Roseman and Company, 343 A. 2d 683, the claimant was
awarded compensation beyond that stipulated in a prior settlement to
which he had agreed. The amount of the settlement was credited against
the compensation benefits the court found appropriate.
The formal ban on compromises has not eliminated all settlements.
They still can be implemented by agreeing to stipulations to dismiss
or withdraw pending petitions, which can be done without disclosing
any details of the settlement. The incentive for the carrier or employer
to enter into such settlements is dulled, however, by the knowledge that
such settlements are not accompanied by binding releases. The claim
ant can file a petition any time within the statute of limitations and reopen
the matter for adjudication and determination.
Experience with Permanent Disability Benefits in Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania's experiences with permanent total disability cases and
with permanent partial disability cases contrast sharply. Throughout
1958-82, the number of permanent total cases as a share of all cash
benefit cases was relatively high in Pennsylvania (table 3.6). In 1982,
for example, the state had 173 permanent total cases, a number exceeded
in only two other jurisdictions for which the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance collects data. 2 These cases accounted for 0.31 per
cent of all Pennsylvania cash benefit cases, which was 209 percent of
the national average share for permanent total cases that year (table 3.6).
Not only were these cases numerous, they were expensive. In 1982,
for example, the average cost of a permanent total case in Pennsylvania
was $180,187, which was 96 percent above the national average of
$92,055 for permanent total cases that year (table 3.10). Altogether,
Pennsylvania's 1982 permanent total cases cost $31.172 million, which
represented 11.27 percent of all cash benefits that year—the second
largest share of cash benefits accounted for by permanent total disability
cases among the 45 jurisdictions included in table 3.5.
Pennsylvania's experience with permanent partial disability benefits
is quite different. Although the average costs of both major and minor
permanent partial cases have been relatively high since 1973—as of 1982,
major cases had average costs of $78,575, which was 313 percent of
the national average (table 3.11), while minor permanent partial cases
averaged $9,176, some 185 percent of the U.S. average (table 3.12)—the
numbers of permanent partial cases in Pennsylvania have been relatively
low. In 1982, for example, major permanent partial cases accounted
for only 1.40 percent of all cash benefit cases in Pennsylvania, a share
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that was only 21 percent of the U.S. average share for such cases (table
3.7). Similarly, minor permanent partial cases accounted for only 9.86
percent of all cash benefit cases in Pennsylvania, which was 57 per
cent of the national average share for minor permanent partial cases
(table 3.8). The relatively low number of permanent partial cases more
than offset the high average costs of those cases, resulting in a total
cost that, as a share of all costs for cash benefits, was relatively low;
in 1982, the Pennsylvania share of all costs for major cases was only
52 percent of the national average share (table 3.15), while the state's
share of all costs for minor cases was only 82 percent of the national
average share (table 3.16).
The data just cited, which are from the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance, do not distinguish between scheduled and
nonscheduled permanent partial cases, and any conclusions drawn from
them must be somewhat speculative. It appears that the relatively restric
tive schedule in Pennsylvania, plus the requirement that nonscheduled
cases be paid only when there is actual wage loss, substantially limit
the number of cases that qualify for benefits, while those cases that do
qualify involve serious wage loss and thus the average costs are high.
In short, one possible outcome of a limited schedule plus a wage-loss
approach for nonscheduled benefits is to channel most of the perma
nent disability benefits to a relatively small number of workers, with
the overall cost of the permanent disability benefits in the state below
the costs in most jurisdictions. This is true in Pennsylvania even when
the relatively expensive permanent total disability benefits are added
to the costs of the major and minor permanent partial benefits: all three
types of permanent disability cases accounted for only 51.64 percent
of all cash benefits in the state in 1982, a share that was only 75 per
cent of the national average share for permanent disability cases that
year (table 3.17) and that was the lowest share among the eight jurisdic
tions with comparable data that we are intensely examining (graph 3.1).
Pennsylvania's record of a low share of all cash benefits accounted
for by permanent disability cases has persisted since 1958, compared
to the national average (table 3.17) and the rest of the eight states (graph
3.1). The cost of workers' compensation insurance in Pennsylvania has
also been consistently below the national average since 1958 (table 3.18).
Pennsylvania's experience thus supports the general relationship shown
in graph 3.2—employers' costs of workers' compensation insurance tend
to be lower in jurisdictions with a lower share of cash benefits accounted
for by permanent disability cases.
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Michigan
Workers' compensation in Michigan has experienced recurrent tur
moil and criticism for decades. A continuing complaint of employers
has been the high cost of workers' compensation in Michigan, a charge
that changed from ill-founded to accurate between 1958 and 1978 (table
3.18). Three separate study commissions were appointed in the 1960s
and 1970s with little success. Then a series of amendments were enacted
in 1980 and 1981 that made significant changes in the criteria and pro
cedures for permanent disability benefits. In January 1983 open com
petition for workers' compensation insurance rates became effective.
Despite these significant changes, which will be reviewed in this sec
tion, pressures for additional amendments did not completely dissipate.
Partly in response to these pressures, in 1983 Governor Blanchard ap
pointed Theodore J. St. Antoine as Special Counselor on Workers' Com
pensation. St. Antoine in his report (1984, p. 21) concluded that "it
is entirely too soon to seek further major amendments affecting the
substantive rights of employers or employees," but he did recommend
significant changes in administrative structure and procedure. Many of
St. Antoine's recommendations were included in 1985 legislation, which
is discussed below. The legislature only partially heeded St. Antoine's
advice to delay further amendments to the substantive criteria for
benefits: no changes were enacted in 1985 but crucial sections dealing
with wage-loss benefits are subject to a May 15, 1987, sunset provi
sion. Whether that date will be extended or substantive amendments
made before then is unclear as of early 1987, when this chapter was
completed.
Throughout these decades of strife, the wage-loss approach for workers
with permanent disabilities has been one focus of attention. The Michigan
approach was cited with favor by the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws (1972, p. 69), but subsequently was
described as "a sullied wage-loss approach at best" by the National
Commission's former chairman (Burton 1983, p. 26). Michigan's prob
lems with wage-loss benefits primarily relate to the fourth and fifth traits
of the approach provided earlier in this chapter: the ability of the
employer to establish that the worker's earning capacity is greater than
his actual earnings, and the use of redemptions (compromise and release
agreements) to terminate eligibility for benefits for subsequent wage
loss.
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Administrative Structure and Procedures
Michigan is a direct payment state. The employer is required to file
a report in all compensable cases. When the carrier begins payment,
it sends the Bureau a notice to that effect. The Bureau is the ad
ministrative body located within the Department of Labor. It is headed
by a director who is appointed by the governor with the advice and con
sent of the Senate for a period of three years.
The ' 'old'' administration. Many of the administrative features will
be affected by the 1985 amendments. There is a two-tier structure for
decisionmaking in contested cases. Initial hearings are conducted by
a hearing referee, who must be an attorney and who is almost always
referred to as an administrative law judge (ALJ). In recent years, there
have been about 30 ALJs, who are Civil Service personnel appointed
by the director of the Bureau.
Parties have the right to appeal the ALJ's decision to the Workers'
Compensation Appeal Board, which consists of 15 members, a majority
of whom are required to be attorneys-at-law. Five members are represen
tatives of employee interests, five of employer interests, and five of
the general public. The chairperson of the Board is designated by, and
serves at the pleasure of, the governor. Matters pending in review are
assigned to a panel of three members of the Board for disposition, with
each panel consisting of one representative from each of the interest
groups.
St. Antoine (1984, pp. 67-78) documented several problems with the
procedures. For the last two decades, the average time from applica
tion for a hearing to the actual hearing ranged from about a year to
15 months. Once the ALJ decisions were made, they routinely were
carried to the Appeal board—indeed, between 75 and 85 percent of all
ALJ awards were appealed in the last decade. This had caused the
Board's backlog "to mushroom from a mere 2,000 cases in 1976 to
almost 7,000 as of November 1984 . . . which is the equivalent of about
five or six years' output by the Appeals Board" (St. Antoine 1984, p.
68).
St. Antoine termed the delay "simply intolerable." One major ex
planation in his view was that the reviews by the Appeal Board were
de novo, with both determinations of fact and law subject to a "whole
fresh look." Even though the ALJs were affirmed in about 75 percent
of the cases, "the very notion of de novo review ... is an open invita-
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tion to disappointed litigants and their lawyers to retry the case from
scratch" (St. Antoine 1984, p. 69).
St. Antoine recommended that findings of facts by ALJs be conclusive
if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the
whole record. He also recommended that the selection procedure for
ALJs be modified by use of a bipartisan ALJ Qualifications Advisory
Committee. Further, he recommended that a new five- or possibly sevenmember Appeal Board be created to replace the old 15-member Board,
with members all to be lawyers screened by a Qualifications Advisory
Committee before appointment.
The ''new" administration. The essence of St. Antoine's recommen
dations were enacted by the legislature in 1985. The first level of deci
sions were to be by magistrates, of whom 30 may be appointed by the
governor with prior recommendation from the qualifications advisory
committee. A seven-member appellate commission was established,
again with all members to be lawyers screened before appointment by
the Qualifications Advisory Committee. Effective October 1, 1986, the
finding of fact made by a magistrate was to be considered conclusive
by the appellate commission "if supported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the whole record" (Sec. 861a[3]), thus ending
de novo reviews.
The 1985 legislation provided for the position of hearing referees to
be abolished as of March 31, 1987, with the initial magistrates to be
appointed no later than March 31, 1986, and there were overlapping
provisions for other aspects of the old and new administrative procedures.
One feature of the 1985 law challenged by the Civil Service Commis
sion and the ALJs was the switch to a system of magistrates appointed
by the governor. After a circuit court decision ruled against the provi
sion, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in March 1986. 3
Because of the delays caused by the legal challenge, the new magistrates
could not be appointed before late 1986. Thus the new administrative
process began with almost a year's backlog of cases by the time it became
operative.
Types and Levels of Benefits

Total Disability Benefits. Effective January 1, 1982, Michigan discard
ed 66 2/3 percent of preinjury wages as the basis for the weekly amount
of total disability benefits in favor of a formula that calculates benefits
as 80 percent of the employee's after-tax average weekly wage, sub-
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ject to a maximum of 90 percent of the state's average weekly wage.
The maximum weekly benefit in January 1986 was $375.00. "After
tax" wages are defined as gross weekly wages reduced by federal and
state income taxes and the Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax (social
security contribution), using the standard deductions and the exemp
tions calculated according to the number of the employee's dependents.
Michigan's act provides for permanent total disability when the worker
experiences a loss of two major members; or permanent and complete
paralysis of both legs or both arms or one leg and one arm; or incurable
insanity or imbecility; or permanent and total loss of industrial use of
both legs or both hands or both arms, or one leg and one arm. The
statute provides that the conclusive presumption of total and perma
nent disability shall not extend beyond 800 weeks from the date of in
jury, and "thereafter the question of permanent and total disability shall
be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at that
time" (Sec. 351).
Scheduled Benefits. Michigan has a schedule in its law that lists the
extremities normally covered, such as arms, hands, and fingers. The
law provides (Section 361) that the disability "shall be considered to
continue for the period specified" in this schedule and during that time
the employee is to be paid compensation at 80 percent of his after-tax
average weekly wages, subject to the minimum and maximum weekly
benefits ($104.05 and $375.00, respectively, as of January 1986).
The Michigan schedule is rather restrictive because it applies only
to physical loss of the listed body members, not loss of use, as in most
states' schedules. Also, the schedule provides compensation only for
total loss, not partial loss, of most body members included in the list.
These aspects of the Michigan schedule are at least as restrictive as the
corresponding provisions in the Pennsylvania schedule. (The Penn
sylvania law does compensate for loss of use when multiple body
members are involved.) Unlike the Pennsylvania schedule, however,
the Michigan schedule is not exclusive, because workers who experience
continuing wage loss after periods specified in the schedule are eligi
ble for further benefits based on the wage-loss approach.
Partial Disability Benefits. The Michigan statute (Sec. 361) does not
distinguish between temporary and permanent partial disability. In either
case, weekly benefits are 80 percent of the difference between the
worker's after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury and
the after-tax average weekly wage "which the employee is able to earn
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after the personal injury," subject to a maximum benefit that is 90 per
cent of the state's average weekly wage ($375.00 in January 1986).
The benefits are paid for the duration of the disability. The partial
disability benefits represent a form of wage-loss benefits potentially
payable for life.
The legal requirements for these wage-loss benefits are extraordinarily
complex and the impact of the 1980, 1981, and 1985 amendments is
unclear; we attempt a brief overview relying in large part on St. Antoine (1984, pp. 23-35).
The definition of the wage-loss approach provided earlier in this
chapter involved several requirements, including: (1) there must be some
remaining permanent impairment or functional limitation at the date
of MMI; (2) there must be actual wage loss after the date of MMI, which
is calculated by subtracting postinjury actual wages from postinjury
potential earnings; (3) wage-loss benefits are calculated by subtracting
postinjury earning capacity from postinjury potential earnings when
postinjury earning capacity exceeds postinjury actual wages.
Michigan has, in effect, added an additional requirement, namely:
(IB) the impairment or functional limitation must cause a disability,
which means a loss of earning capacity by the employee. Earning capaci
ty thus appears in two of the Michigan requirements: (IB), where the
employee must show that the injury caused some loss of earning capacity,
and (3), where the employer must show that earning capacity is greater
than postinjury actual wages.
Michigan requirement (IB) has a history that Arthur Larson has
described as "sheer freakishness." 4 The courts defined disability as
the loss of earning capacity in the work the employee was doing at the
time of injury. Moreover, a distinction was drawn between a skilled
worker—who was considered totally disabled if he could not resume
his former job—and an unskilled worker—who was considered only par
tially disabled so long as he could perform some job in the field of com
mon labor. The 1981 amendments added a definition of disability (Sec.
301 [4]), namely, "a limitation of an employee's wage earning capaci
ty in the employee's general field of employment resulting from a per
sonal injury or work related disease." The apparent intent was to remove
the distinction between skilled and unskilled workers and to generally
make it more difficult for a worker to establish that he is disabled. St.
Antoine (1984, p. 25) has expressed doubt, however, that the new 1981
definition of disability will have much impact.
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One reason for St. Antoine's skepticism about the practical impact
of the change in definition of disability is that once any degree of disabili
ty is established—however slight—the worker may qualify for full wageloss benefits (St. Antoine 1984, p. 26). To restate in terms of our
framework, a 1 percent or greater permanent impairment will fully satisfy
requirement (1) for wage-loss benefits; and, in Michigan, a 1 percent
or greater disability will fully satisfy requirement (IB).
The second requirement for wage-loss benefits—that actual wage loss
exists after subtracting actual postinjury earnings from postinjury poten
tial earnings—is encompassed in several sections of the Michigan statute
(St. Antoine 1984, p. 26).
Michigan's most noteworthy contribution to the quest for an opera
tional wage-loss approach involves the handling of requirement (3):
employers can reduce their liability for wage-loss benefits by
demonstrating that postinjury earnings capacity is greater than postin
jury actual wages. There are a number of elements to the Michigan
scheme. Since the 1981 amendments, if the employee refuses a bona
fide offer of reasonable employment without good and reasonable cause
(Sec. 301.[5][a]), the worker is not entitled to wage-loss benefits dur
ing the period of refusal. In effect, there is a conclusive presumption
that the refusal of a reasonable job means that postinjury earning capacity
is equal to postinjury potential earnings.
The most difficult aspect of requirement (3) involves the question:
if the worker is employed after the injury, do the earnings from that
job establish a postinjury earnings capacity that will continue to be us
ed to calculate wage-loss benefits if the worker subsequently loses his
job? A simple example may help: a worker earns $500 a week in 1986;
is injured in 1987 and has no earnings that year and receives benefits
based on $500 of earnings loss; returns to work at $300 per week in
1988 and receives wage-loss benefits based on the $200 of actual wage
loss; and then has no earnings in 1989. Question: are the wage-loss
benefits in 1989 based on $200 or $500 of earning loss?
The Michigan answer is: it depends! Prior to 1981, a distinction was
drawn between "favored work," which was essentially a temporary
position that made limited demands on the worker because of his in
jury, and "recognized regular employment." The former did not
establish a postinjury earning capacity, whereas the latter did. Unfor
tunately, this distinction was overlaid with a concern about why the
postinjury job was terminated—if the employee was responsible, he
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would be treated as having established a postinjury earning capacity;
otherwise, he would not (St. Antoine 1984, pp. 30-31).
The Legislature dealt with the issue of how postinjury earning capacity
is established in 1981. Sec. 301(5)(e) provides that if the postinjury
employment period is less than 100 weeks and the employee "loses
his or her job for whatever reason," then (in effect) postinjury earning
capacity is zero for the period subsequent to the job loss. As noted by
St. Antoine (1984, p. 33), this appears to be more favorable to the
employee than the law prior to 1981, since an employee who volun
tarily quits during the 100 weeks can take advantage of the provision.
St. Antoine recommended that the defect be remedied, which was not
accomplished in 1985. Sec. 301(5)(d) provides that if the postinjury
employment period is between 100 and 249 weeks and the employee
loses his job "through no fault of the employee" and the employee ex
hausts his unemployment benefit eligibility, then (in effect) postinjury
earning capacity, if any, will be determined by the worker's compen
sation magistrate or hearing referee. That postinjury earning capacity
apparently is "the normal and customary wages paid to those persons
performing the same or similar employment" as the injured worker was
performing in the postinjury period. Unfortunately, the language of Sec.
301(5)(d) is sufficiently confusing that other interpretations are possi
ble, but we agree with St. Antoine (1984 at p. 34) that this is the most
reasonable interpretation of the legislature's intent for those workers
with 100-249 weeks of postinjury employment. As for the worker with
250 or more weeks of postinjury employment who then becomes
unemployed for any reason, Sec. 301(5)(d) provides that "there is a
presumption of wage earning capacity established." This means the
magistrate or referee must find a postinjury earning capacity equal to
"the normal and customary wages paid to those persons performing
the same or similar employment" as the worker was performing after
the date of injury.
The 1981 amendments have not received extensive interpretations
and their ultimate significance is thus hard to assess. St. Antoine (1984,
p. 35) suggests that, compared to previous case law, they seem to make
disabled workers better off during the first two years on a postinjury
job, to make little difference for the next three years, and to treat in
jured workers with five years of postinjury employment no better than
other workers. He concluded that, while the statute could stand some
clarifying amendments, the underlying rationale for the 1981 amend
ments is sufficiently defensible to justify an extended trial period before
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additional significant changes are made in the wage-loss provisions of
the statute. Whether St. Antoine's advice will be heeded remains to be
seen. In any case, his trenchant analysis of the evolution of the wageloss approach in Michigan provides valuable guidance to those in other
jurisdictions. One possible "lesson" we draw is that the parameters
of the wage-loss approach may require detailed legislation rather than
reliance on the courts to flesh out the operational details. Although the
1981 amendments are not free of ambiguity, the effort to delineate in
a statute the meaning of postinjury earning capacity seems preferable
to relying on sporadic court pronouncements.
Retirees

The recent amendments also dealt with the problem of retirees.
Michigan was awarding a large portion of its compensation dollars to
individuals who voluntarily retired and then filed for benefits alleging
wage loss as a result of a prior injury or exposure.
The problem had its origin in 1956, when some of the United
Automobile Workers' agreements eliminated pension benefit offset
against workers' compensation. Under the newly negotiated provision,
the worker could receive both a workers' compensation benefit and his
full pension benefit. In 1960, court decisions liberalized the statute of
limitations for the notice required of a worker to an employer of a workrelated injury. Claimants and their attorneys, taking advantage of these
developments, began to file claims on behalf of retired workers alleg
ing wage loss due to some prior injury. These began as contested claims,
since no initial report of injury or notice of beginnings of payment had
been filed. The argument made to justify benefits was that the retired
worker could not find another job because of a work-related injury.
Many of the earlier cases were filed by foundry workers with im
pairments of the lungs, heart, or back. The incentives to file such claims
grew after 1965 amendments removed the duration limits for total
disability payments.
A single attorney could represent a large number of clients and
negotiate a bulk settlement with representatives of the automobile com
panies. Hundreds of these cases were redeemed in a type of class ac
tion. Employees received some predetermined amounts, and the
employers disposed of a number of claims in the least expensive way,
given the interpretation of the law.

Nonscheduled Benefits in Category III States 229

Some UAW representatives interviewed at the time of our 1976-77
field work indicated they were anxious to find some solution to the retiree
problem, since it held back reform of other aspects of the law. With
possibly some understandable exaggeration, they spoke of workers in
quiring about their pensions and workers' compensation benefits at one
and the same time; a workers' compensation settlement became a form
of retirement bonus.
One ingredient that complicated the problem in Michigan was the early
retirement plan in the automobile industry. Many retirees were in their
fifties and looked forward to another job, if only on some part-time
basis. If they could not find that job, for example because of a failure
to pass a physical examination due to a bad back or decreased lung
capacity, they had the basis for a workers' compensation claim on a
wage-loss basis. Because court interpretations had lessened the need
to show the occurrence of an accident, it was more difficult for the
employer to demonstrate that the pre-retirement job was not the prox
imate cause of the worker's condition. The worker's case was strengthen
ed because the employer could not demonstrate the employee's fitness
by offering him a job, since the labor contract had provisions that made
it difficult to rehire a retired and pensioned worker. Such a case was
ripe for redemption, and that was the path followed in Michigan.
The retiree problem is not inherent in the wage-loss approach but
grew out of conditions peculiar to Michigan. The ingredients were
(1) a low retirement age in the principal industry, (2) the relaxed re
quirement for showing the occurrence of an accident and liberal inter
pretations of the statute of limitations, and (3) the practice of redeem
ing wage-loss cases in order for the employer to avoid potential liabili
ty of an uncertain amount and duration.
The 1980 and 1981 amendments contained a frontal attack on the
retiree problem. Section 373 of the Act provides that an employee who
has terminated active employment and is receiving either a governmental
or a private pension paid by an employer from whom workers' com
pensation benefits are sought is presumed not to have suffered a loss
of earnings or earning capacity as a result of a compensable injury or
disease. The presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of
evidence that the employee is unable to perform work suited to his
qualifications because of the work-related disability.
The retirement problem came about because of liberal interpretations
of the notice of accident requirement. Under the recent amendments,
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notice of accident must be given within 90 days and claims for com
pensation must be made within two years of the date of injury or, in
the case of occupational disease, within two years of the time the
employee knows or should have known of the disability and its
work-relatedness.
A "coordination of benefits" provision, another recent amendment,
will also affect the amount of workers' compensation benefits received
by retirees. Effective March 31, 1982, benefits are reduced by the
amounts received from a private pension or disability insurance plan.
In addition, 50 percent of an old age insurance benefit from Social Securi
ty is to be deducted from the net workers' compensation benefits. If
an employee is eligible to receive such an old age retirement benefit
from Social Security at his normal retirement age, he is obligated to
apply for that benefit. A controversial Michigan Supreme Court deci
sion, Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., 422 Mich. 636, 375 N.W.2d
715 (1985), held that the coordination provision applies not only to
workers injured after March 31, 1982, but to workers injured before
that date. The decision was estimated to affect as many as 40,000
workers, in some instances completely eliminating their workers' com
pensation benefits, 5 and efforts to amend the law so as to remove the
retroactive application of the benefits coordination provision have been
mounted, without success as of early 1987.
The retirement problem will also be affected by Sections 301(2) and
401 (2), under which conditions of the aging process are deemed to
be compensable only if they are contributed to, aggravated by, or ac
celerated by the employment in a significant manner. These provisions
of the act should go a long way toward eliminating simultaneous receipt
of retirement pensions and workers' compensation benefits.
Redemptions
We include Michigan in this chapter devoted to jurisdictions that use
the wage-loss approach, and the National Commission Report (1972,
p. 69) so described the state. Whether this is an accurate characteriza
tion depends in large part on the importance attached to compliance
with trait five of a wage-loss approach (provided earlier in this chapter),
which requires an extended period of eligibility for the wage-loss
benefits.
The problem has been succinctly stated by St. Antoine (1984, p. 58):
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Under the Michigan "wage loss" theory, one might expect
that the standard award would require the payment of week
ly benefits during the period of an employee's disability and
continuing lack of work. In fact. . . more than half the total
dispositions in contested workers' compensation cases have
consisted for many years of compromises or so-called
"redemptions," usually in the form of lump-sum settlements.
Typically, a redemption terminates all further employer
liability for income maintenance, medical benefits, and voca
tional rehabilitation. The practical effect is to transform the
Michigan wage loss system, in many cases, into a modified
impairment rating system.
The problems with redemptions have long been recognized in
Michigan. During our field work for the NSF report (Berkowitz, Bur
ton, and Vroman 1979) almost a decade ago, criticism was received
from several quarters. The labor representatives we interviewed felt
that the law should be amended to limit redemptions because of the risks
for the worker who redeemed all future benefits. Concerns were ex
pressed that these redemptions could be very disadvantageous to the
worker in the long run, especially to workers who face the prospect
of continuing medical care expenses. Insurance representatives were
not happy with the high number of redemptions, but felt that in light
of the way the law was administered, it was financially prudent to close
out cases as rapidly and as inexpensively as possible.
The 1981 legislature stared down the problem. Section 836, to be
effective January 1, 1984, consisted of a single sentence: "For any peti
tion filed after the effective date of this section, entitlement to workers'
compensation benefits under this act shall not be redeemed."
The 1983 legislature blinked. Section 836 was repealed and redemp
tions were again authorized, subject, however, to a new and stricter
system for approval. Hearing referees are required to consider a varie
ty of factors, including the intended use of the proceeds, before ap
proving the agreement as being in the ' 'best interests of the injured
employee" (Sec. 836), and each party to the agreement must pay a $100
fee to the bureau (Sec. 835). Nonetheless, the discount rate used to com
mute the future payments to their present worth for determining the
amount of the lump-sum settlement is 12 percent—a rate unlikely to
severely dampen the employer or carrier interest in a redemption
settlement.
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The new procedures for redemptions became effective on January
1, 1984, and assessment of the effect is premature, although St. Antoine (1984, p. 58) reported that redemptions represented 54.4 percent
of dispositions in the first nine months of 1984—only marginally better
than in the previous five years. Nonetheless, St. Antoine concluded that
further stringent restrictions on redemptions were unfeasible at this time
because of the enormous backlog of cases. He was also encouraged by
the close scrutiny being given by ALJs to proposed agreements under
the new act. His ultimate advice (p. 59) bears repeating: "This whole
area has enough potential for abuse, however, that it calls for continu
ing surveillance."
Experience with Permanent Disability Benefits in Michigan
The costs of workers' compensation in Michigan have been of con
cern to employers and others in the state for decades. Indeed, one of
the authors of this study became involved in workers' compensation
research because of a fear expressed in the early 1960s that high workers'
compensation costs were affecting plant location decisions in Michigan.
His earlier study (Burton 1966, p. 73) concluded that "the actual
magnitude of the interstate differentials in employers' costs of workmen's
compensation should not influence plant location decisions." This con
clusion seemed particularly appropriate for Michigan at the time, because
Michigan's workers' compensation costs were not out of line with those
in other states. One measure of the cost of the workers' compensation
program is the percentage of payroll devoted to workers' compensa
tion premiums by a representative sample of employers. In 1965, the
premiums for Michigan employers were equivalent to 0.715 percent
of payroll, below the average cost of 0.791 percent of payroll in the
28 states for which comparable data are available (table 3.18).
This relatively sanguine situation for Michigan employers did not last,
however. By 1972, insurance premiums for workers' compensation
represented 0.914 percent of payroll in Michigan, which was 17 per
cent above the average (0.783) in the 28 jurisdictions. Costs continued
to escalate rapidly in Michigan, and by 1978 Michigan employers were
expending 1.890 percent of payroll on workers' compensation premiums,
compared to the 28-jurisdiction average of 1.460 percent. Thus by 1978
Michigan employers were spending 33 percent more on workers' com
pensation than comparable employers in the other jurisdictions.
The rapid increase in Michigan workers' compensation costs between
1972 and 1978 is particularly interesting because the benefit levels
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prescribed by the Michigan law lagged during this period. For exam
ple, in terms of the maximum weekly benefit for temporary total disabili
ty, as of 1972, when one state (Arizona) had a maximum that was at
least 100 percent of the state's average weekly wage, Michigan's max
imum for temporary total of $79.00 was 50 percent of the state's average
weekly wage. By 1978, Michigan's temporary total maximum had in
creased to $171.00, which was 64 percent of the state's average week
ly wage, but by then 24 jurisdictions had increased their maximums
for temporary total disability benefits to at least 100 percent of the state's
average weekly wage (U.S. Dept. of Labor, State Compliance, 1982).
The relatively slow increase in maximum benefits in Michigan during
this period is explained in part by the employers' reactions to the
escalating costs of the program, which in turn they related to "abuses"
of permanent disability benefits, such as the retiree problem.
The magnitude of Michigan workers' compensation costs during the
1970s do appear to be largely due to permanent disability benefits. Sur
prisingly, at one level it is hard to identify an adverse trend in Michigan's
experience with permanent disability benefits during this period. For
example, the share of all cash benefits accounted for by all types of
permanent disability benefits in Michigan was consistently below the
national average share for such cases from 1968 to 1978 (table 3.17).
Michigan's problems with permanent disability benefits become more
apparent as the data are disaggregated, however. The pattern over time
of permanent total disability benefits, for example, helps to explain why
Michigan had a deserved reputation as a problem state. Michigan was
the only state that failed to meet recommendation R3.11 of the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, which limited
permanent total disability benefits to those workers who did not retain
substantial earning capacity. By 1978, 0.45 percent of all Michigan cases
were permanent total cases, which was 331 percent of the national
average share and the highest share of the eight states intensively analyzed
in chapter 3. (See table 3.6.)
The problems with permanent partial disability benefits in Michigan
are less obvious than the permanent total problem. A few comparisons
with Pennsylvania will help to put the problem in relief. Because
Michigan has a restrictive schedule roughly comparable to that in Penn
sylvania, and both states have a statute that purports to base nonscheduled
benefits on a wage-loss approach, a comparable experience with per
manent partial cases in the two jurisdictions could be expected. In fact,

234 Nonscheduled Benefits in Category III States

there was a significant difference in 1978 in the share of all cash benefits
accounted for by permanent partial disability cases (major and minor)
in the two jurisdictions: 39.45 percent in Pennsylvania and 60.40 per
cent in Michigan (tables 3.15 and 3.16).
How is it that two states with similar statutory approaches to perma
nent disability benefits had such different experiences with the numbers
and costs of these benefits? The answer in large part appears to be that
whereas the theory and practice of wage-loss benefits are largely con
gruent in Pennsylvania, in Michigan the practice often deviates from
the theory. In theory, except for those few cases handled entirely by
paying scheduled benefits, permanent partial disability benefits in
Michigan were supposed to be paid only when the worker experiences
an actual loss of earnings because of the work injury, and those benefits
are supposed to continue for the duration of the wage loss and cease
when wage loss ends.
The practice in Michigan was captured by Hunt's study (1982) of
Michigan workers' compensation cases closed in 1978. Hunt found that
some cases were in fact handled as the theory dictates, with benefits
paid over an extended period, but many were not. The cases typically
were litigated and ended in redemptions, with the employer released
from further liability and the worker given a settlement with the amount
related, at least loosely, to the extent of loss of earning capacity. 6 The
redemption settlement was not conditioned upon the worker showing
an actual loss of wages due to the injury, with the most extreme exam
ple being the redemptions for retirees.
How significant are these interrelated phenomena of litigation and
redemption settlements? Hunt found (p. 183) that nearly three-fourths
of all Michigan claims were voluntarily paid by the insurers. Among
serious injury cases, however, litigation and redemption settlements are
the dominant approach. Overall, Hunt found (at p. 189) that "60per
cent of all the compensation paid over the lifetime of these closed cases
was paid in lump sums rather than weekly payments." Thus, even
though, as Hunt observes (p. 184), "in a theoretical context, the wageloss principle and lump-sum settlements are generally regarded as
mutually exclusive," the practice in Michigan clearly was dominated
by these lump-sum settlements. Moreover, Hunt estimated that from
25 to 35 percent of all litigated cases in Michigan were filed by retirees,
and that they received a minimum of 18 percent of all the indemnity
payments reported in the study.
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The litigation-redemption-lump-sum nexus took a particularly heavy
toll on the theory that permanent partial benefits in Michigan were paid
on a wage-loss basis. Whatever the theory, and however the statute reads,
the practice in Michigan had converted the permanent partial benefit
scheme into a perverse variant of a loss of wage-earning capacity
approach.
What needs to be stressed is that the fate of the wage-loss approach
in Michigan was not inevitable. Stretching the wage-loss concept to com
pensate retirees for earnings they never would have earned even if they
had never been injured is an aberration of the wage-loss approach, as
the Pennsylvania experience demonstrates.
The failings of the Michigan workers' compensation program as of
1978 precipitated a number of reforms described, in large part, earlier
in this section. There were multiple strategies and purposes, including
the tightening of the definition of disability in order to reduce the number
of total disability cases, the introduction of open competition for in
surance rates in order to reduce costs, and the elaboration of the criteria
for redemptions in order to discourage their use. These changes are
still working their way through the system in an interactive fashion and
it is too early to provide a definitive evaluation of their impact. Some
preliminary evidence is available, however.
One result that is particularly compelling is that the cost of workers'
compensation insurance fell sharply between 1978, when Michigan costs
were 33 percent above the U.S. average, and 1984, when costs were
6 percent below the U.S. average (table 3.18). Burton, Hunt, and
Krueger (1985, p. 135) attempted to disentangle the sources of the reduc
ed insurance costs between 1978 and 1984 and concluded that open com
petition reduced insurance rates by 30.2 percent and the 1983-84 benefit
changes resulting from the statutory changes in the preceding years
reduced rates an additional 6.2 percent. There were other developments,
such as higher medical benefits, that partially offset the impact of open
competition and the 1983-84 benefit changes. In combination, all these
factors produced a cumulative reduction of 31.8 percent in insurance
rates between 1978 and 1984. The estimated savings to Michigan
employers in 1983 and 1984 from open competition and the 1983-84
benefit changes were $502 million (Burton, Hunt, and Krueger 1985,
p. 137).
The data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance
(NCCI) analyzed in chapter 3 do not extend beyond 1982 policy year
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experience, and so the impact of the recent amendments is only par
tially reflected. The data in table 3.6 are suggestive of the potential im
pact: Michigan's share of all cases that were permanent total cases drop
ped from 331 percent of the national average in 1978 to 130 percent
in 1982. Supplemental data through 1983 injuries were provided by the
NCCI and analyzed by Burton and Partridge (1985, p. 46), who found
that permanent partial cases as a percentage of all claims had dropped
about 20-30 percent in 1982-83 compared to 1979-81.
The supplemental NCCI data also indicate that other facets of the
Michigan program are changing subsequent to the 1980-81 amendments.
The percentage of permanent partial cases closed by lump sums was
almost halved from 1979-81 to 1982-83,7 and the percentage of all per
manent partial claims accounted for by workers 50 years or older was
also down about 15 percent between the two periods (Burton and Par
tridge 1985, pp. 48-49). 8
Changes in workers' compensation criteria and procedures for per
manent disability benefits inevitably take time to have their full impact
on the program, especially when, as in Michigan, court interpretations
of key provisions are needed. To be sure, as St. Antoine concluded
(1984, p. 19), the preliminary data are consistent with the view that
the 1980 and 1981 amendments are having significant effects on several
aspects of the program. We believe the salutary effects include a reduc
tion in the use of redemption settlements and in the use of the program
by retirees, which move Michigan closer to a "true" wage-loss ap
proach. We can easily draw up a list of further changes that would hasten
the convergence of practice and theory of wage-loss in Michigan. But
given the magnitude of the recent amendments, we are persuaded by
St. Antoine's "one fundamental conclusion: It is entirely too soon to
seek further major amendments affecting the substantive rights of
employers or employees" (1984, p. 21).
New York
Administrative Structure and Procedure

Administrative Structure. The New York workers' compensation law
is administered by the Workers' Compensation Board, headed by a chair
man and consisting of 13 members. The members are appointed by the
governor for seven-year terms. The chairman is the administrative head
of the agency that processes claims and also the chairman of the Ap
peals Board.
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One of the principal divisions under the chairman's authority is the
Operations Division. Under the Operations Division are several units
including the Claims Bureau, the Judges Bureau, the Review Bureau,
the Medical Bureau, the Disability Benefits Bureau, the Health Pro
vider Practices Bureau, and the Rehabilitation Bureau. Altogether, the
Board has a staff of 1,627, which is the highest in terms of absolute
members and, among states without exclusive state funds, the highest
per million covered workers of the jurisdictions we are intensively ex
amining (table 4.1).
The Claims Bureau processes and monitors the claims for workers'
compensation: at the appropriate stage, the Bureau schedules the cases
for hearings before the administrative law judges.
There are 28 hearing rooms, or parts, in New York City and an equal
number of workers' compensation law judges staffing these parts, under
direction of a supervisor. The six district offices outside of New York
City have their own law judges, who conduct hearings at about 70
designated hearings points throughout their respective districts. Each
district office has a small staff whose primary responsibility is to set
up the calendar for the hearings in that district. They also have their
own claims examiners, medical examiners, rehabilitation counselors,
and statistical clerks.
The Board is authorized to hear cases on review in panels of three,
which are formed on a rotating basis. Unlike the law judges, the Board
panels hold their hearings only in the seven district offices.
The Office of the General Counsel occupies a strategic place in the
work of the Board. It enforces the insurance provisions of the act, in
cluding supervision of all cancellations and renewals; it administers the
Uninsured Employers' Fund and obtains and collects judgments from
defaulting employers. It drafts legislative proposals and helps to steer
them through the legislature, following clearance with the governor's
office. It has the responsibility of assuring that the law judge and Board
decisions are in conformity with the law; of preparing digests of the
law and its amendments, and of Board decisions and administrative rul
ings; and of answering inquiries about the act and conducting
investigations.
The Review Bureau has the responsibility to get cases ready for Board
review, when an appeal has been filed from a law judge's decision.
This involves screening cases for reviewability, digesting and summariz-
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ing the facts and issues in the cases, and preparing the Board panel
members for the review. This may include preparation of a memoran
dum for the Board members that analyzes the significant points in the
case, the evidence on both sides, and the summarizer's opinion on the
case.
The Basic Procedure: Indexing and Hearings. All work-related in
juries and diseases resulting in a loss of time beyond the working day
or shift on which the accident occurred that require medical treatment
beyond ordinary first aid must be reported to the Workers' Compensa
tion Board, which reviews the reports and indexes all cases appearing
to involve more than seven days' lost time or the likelihood of perma
nent disability. All cases that have been indexed can be closed only after
a hearing before a law judge. The claims examiner with responsibility
for monitoring a case that has been indexed must schedule a case for
hearing at some appropriate time, depending on the seriousness of the
injury, controversion of the case, termination or reduction of benefits,
or other factors. This mandatory hearing is unique to the New York
workers' compensation program, and helps explain the size of the staff.
The Motion Calendar. When the examiner determines that no award
of scheduled or other permanent disability benefits will be made or re
quired, the case may be set for the "motion calendar." The parties are
notified of the hearing but are not necessarily expected to appear. A
law judge conducts the hearings on the motion calendar and automatically
closes a case unless the claimant requests a regular hearing. If no par
ties appear, the case may be closed without a substantive review.
The motion calendar provides a procedure to permit the case to be
closed by a law judge in fulfillment of the statutory requirement; it also
allows a claimant to request a regular hearing when his claim has been
set for the motion calendar. Only 18 percent of all cases closed are ac
tually processed on the motion calendar (New York Temporary Com
mission 1986, p. 63). Efforts are being made to have more claims pro
cessed on the motion calendar, in order to enable the law judges to devote
more of their time to the more difficult cases.
The Trial Calendar. The trial calendar includes cases requiring an
immediate hearing either because the case is being controverted or
because benefits have been terminated by the carrier; such cases are
put on a "preference calendar" and usually set for hearing within six
weeks. More routine cases, such as those in which all bills and benefits
have been paid but which involve some permanent impairment, are set

Nonscheduled Benefits in Category III States 239

for a hearing usually six months or one year after the date of injury,
depending on the severity of the injury.
When a case is called at a regular hearing, the law judge checks to
see that all necessary information required for the case is in the case
folder and that all the participants who should be present are actually
available. If all is not ready, the case may be adjourned, with notices
being sent to the parties to tell them what they should do before the
next hearing.
An important part of the procedure in permanent disability cases is
an examination by a board doctor for a Final Adjustment. At this time
the claimant is given a finding of disability.
The judge develops the record by having the witnesses for both sides
testify. After all evidence is submitted by both sides, the judge usually
makes an award or states his decision immediately. Notice of the deci
sion is sent to all parties by the Board, since the decisions of the judges
are considered official actions of the Board.
If a particular case is not yet ready for a Final Adjustment (for ex
ample, if the claimant is still temporarily disabled), the judge may make
a temporary reduced earnings (TRE) award, if appropriate, and abey
the case for another few months. The abeyance will continue until the
case is ready for final adjustment.
Board Action on Lump-Sum Adjustments. A decision to close a case
by making a "lump-sum adjustment" must be made by a member of
the Board (prior to October 1984, approval of a three-member panel
was required). The Review Bureau has a special unit called the LumpSum Unit that reviews applications for lump-sum adjustments. After
reviewing the case, an examiner in this unit may make a recommenda
tion and pass the case on to the Board office that schedules Board
hearings.
Reopenings. Generally, reopening a case that has once been closed
requires evidence of a change in the medical condition of the claimant.
A case can be opened only upon the signature of a Board member. Then
the case is scheduled for hearing before a law judge, under generally
the same procedure as for a new case.
Upon reopening a case, the Board may make such modifications or
changes in its previous findings or awards as it considers to be in the
interest of justice. The modifications may be made on a change in con-
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dition or proof of an erroneous wage rate, or on a showing of a mistake
in facts, errors of law, or newly discovered evidence.
The provisions relating to reopening of cases and continuing jurisdic
tion of the Board are given a broad, liberal interpretation. This relative
liberality, as compared with most other United States jurisdictions, is
made possible by the presence of a Special Fund for Reopened Cases
which relieves carriers and self-insurers of liability in certain "stale"
cases. To be reopened under this section, the claim must have been
originally closed on its merits, but there does not necessarily have to
be a change in condition. Even the "reopened case fund" is relieved
of possible liability after a lapse of 18 years from the date of the original
injury and eight years since the last payment of compensation for the
injury. When a claim is disallowed after a hearing on the merits, or
the case is closed without award (after notice and opportunity to be
heard), the carrier is relieved of all liability after a lapse of seven years
from the date of injury or death, but the claimant may still be compen
sated from the reopened case fund if the claim is filed within the time
limitations mentioned above.
A defender of the fund for reopened cases, to protect the fund from
unwarranted claims, is appointed by the chairman of the Board, who
has to approve payments out of the fund.
Appeals to the Board. Any party to a hearing may appeal a decision
or award of a law judge by making written application to the Board
within 30 days after the notice of decision or award has been filed. Ad
ministrative review of the decision is made by a three-member panel
of the Board. The panel has the authority to weigh the evidence in the
record of the case and make its determination based on the facts as well
as the law. If the panel deems it necessary, it may send the case back
to the law judge for further development, that is, for the purpose of
getting more testimony. Panel decisions may be appealed to the full
Board, which must hear the case if one panel member has dissented.
Appeals to the Courts. From the Board a further appeal may be made
within 30 days to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, third
department. An appeal to the courts from a Board decision can be made
only on questions of law, not on questions of fact. The final step in
the appellate process is an appeal to the Court of Appeals, within 30
days of the decision of the appellate division.
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During the time the case is on appeal to the courts, any benefits award
ed by the Board must be paid to the claimant. If the award is reversed,
the claimant does not need to return the money he or she may have
received up to that time; instead, the carrier is reimbursed from the
Board's budget.
Representation at Hearings. Either party to a claim before a workers'
compensation law judge or before the Board may be represented by
an attorney admitted to practice in the state or by a layman licensed
by the Board. (Carriers or self-insurers may be represented by their
own regular employees even though they are not licensed.)
According to statistics on compensated cases closed in 1982, 9 only
19 percent of the cases involved legal fees, and the average fee was
$445. The total amount of legal fees ($10.5 million) amounted to 3.0
percent of the total compensation awarded in the cases where the claim
ant had legal representation, or 2.0 percent of compensation awarded
in all cases. The legal fee allowed "generally varies inversely with the
amount of compensation. For the 3,455 cases in which the compensa
tion award was under $1,000, legal fees amounted to 12 percent of the
awards, but for the 5,917 cases in which the award was $10,000 or
over, legal fees amounted to only 2 percent of the awards."

The Relationship between Temporary Total Disability Benefits
and Scheduled Permanent Partial Awards
If the injury is a scheduled one, the doctor at the hearing will state
a specified percentage of partial loss. The percentage rating is used in
conjunction with the statutory schedule to determine the nominal dura
tion of the permanent partial disability benefits. Thus a 100 percent loss
of a leg results in a nominal duration of 288 weeks; a 50 percent loss
of a leg produces a nominal duration of 144 weeks, etc. In New York,
the period of temporary total benefits is deducted from the nominal dura
tion of the scheduled award, subject to certain limits on the deduction
as determined by the prescribed healing periods. These limits, as pro
vided in the statute, range from a low of eight weeks for the loss of
a toe (other than the great toe) or for the loss of the third or fourth finger,
to a high of 40 weeks for the loss of a leg (Sec. 15, subd. 4-a).
If a worker lost a leg and was out on temporary total benefits for
exactly the 40 weeks prescribed in the healing period, he would be paid
for 40 weeks at the temporary total rate, which was a maximum of $300
a week in 1986. That 40 weeks would be deducted from the 288 weeks
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of benefits allowed by the schedule, and the worker would receive 248
weeks at the permanent partial rate, which was a maximum of $150
a week in 1986. If, however, the worker were out for 48 weeks, the
additional eight weeks of "protracted temporary total" would not be
subtracted from the scheduled award. The worker would receive 48
weeks of temporary total benefits and 248 weeks (288-40) of perma
nent partial benefits.
When the number of weeks the worker is out on temporary total (or
the specified healing period, if that is less than the actual period of tem
porary disability) is greater than the scheduled award, he receives no
permanent partial benefits. (This is known as disability exceeds schedule,
or DBS.) For example, a worker with a 30 week healing period and
a nominal scheduled award of 28.8 weeks for the loss of 10 percent
of the leg will actually receive no permanent partial benefits. Of 30,118
scheduled permanent partial cases closed in 1983, there were 1,694 DES
cases in which the injured worker received no permanent disability
benefits. 10
New York's method of relating temporary total disability benefits to
permanent partial scheduled benefits is unique among U.S. jurisdic
tions (Burton, Larson, and Moran 1980, p. 258). One purported ad
vantage is that the provision provides an incentive to return to work
as soon as possible, since each extra week of healing period benefits
reduces the scheduled award by a week. The incentive argument is under
mined, however, since the temporary total weekly benefit rate is higher
than the permanent partial rate, and consequently the worker receives
more benefits in total with an additional week off work. The incentive
argument does nonetheless have some merit when the New York pro
vision is compared with the approach used in most jurisdictions, where
a worker who extends the duration of his healing period by one week
receives an additional week of temporary total benefits and no reduc
tion in his permanent partial award.
One disadvantage of the approach is the confusing relationship be
tween temporary disability benefits and scheduled awards. The statute
provides in Sec. 15, subd. 4-a:
In any case resulting in loss or partial loss of use of arm,
leg, hand, foot, ear, eye, thumb, finger or toe, where the
temporary total disability does not extend beyond the periods
above mentioned for such injury, compensation shall be
limited to the schedule contained in subdivision three.
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It seems unlikely that a worker would understand this language to mean
that the longer the period of temporary total disability benefits, the
smaller the scheduled award. Even if this provision were clarified and
workers were fully appraised of its impact, there would remain other
disadvantages. One is that the provision has administrative complex
ities. Workers with temporary partial disability benefits must have these
benefits translated into an equivalent duration of temporary total benefits
in order to determine how many weeks to subtract from the scheduled
award, and this multistep process invites errors and confusion.
The most compelling argument against the healing period provision
is the effect of the provision on workers with extended and brief heal
ing periods. Workers with the longest healing periods experience the
most drastic reductions in their permanent disability benefits, which
makes sense only if it is assumed that the workers generally have con
trol over the duration of their healing periods.
The Relative Importance of Scheduled and Nonscheduled Awards
In 1982, 121,028 cases were closed with $526 million in cash benefits.
Over 40 percent of these were permanent partial disability cases. Of
these permanent partial disability cases, 89.6 percent (or 36.4 percent
of all cases) were scheduled cases, but the 10.4 percent of the perma
nent partial disability cases (or 4.2 percent of all cases) that were
nonscheduled accounted for 52.4 percent of all compensation award
ed. 11 Thus by far most cases in the permanent partial disability category
are decided on a scheduled rather than on a nonscheduled basis, and
the nonscheduled cases are obviously much more expensive.
The numerical dominance in New York of scheduled permanent partial
cases compared to nonscheduled cases is due in large part to the ex
pansive nature of the schedule. The New York schedule applies to par
tial as well as total losses of the body members included in the schedule,
not just to total losses as in Michigan and Pennsylvania. Also, unlike
the schedules in the other two states, the New York schedules apply
to losses of use as well as physical losses of the scheduled members.
Only if the injury cannot be scheduled does it fall under Sec. 15, subd.
3-(w), the so-called "other cases" category, which deals with
nonscheduled permanent partial cases and involves consideration of wage
loss. These nonscheduled cases typically involve injuries to the back
or other parts of the trunk.
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Nonscheduled Benefits: the Legal Requirements
Benefits for nonscheduled permanent partial disabilities in New York
State are 66 2/3 percent of the difference between the wages earned
before the injury and the wages the worker is earning, or is able to earn,
after the injury. The benefits are subject to a maximum of $150 a week
and a minimum of $30 a week (or actual wages, if less). Most state
laws limit the total amount of the award or the number of weeks of
payment for nonscheduled benefits. New York's law is one of the few
that provide for the payment of such benefits for the full period of
disability; however, the Board has the authority to modify the degree
of disability upon a showing of change in condition or earning capacity.
The statutory criteria for nonscheduled permanent partial benefits war
rant elaboration. The law bases benefits on the difference between the
claimant's average weekly wages before the injury and the "wageearning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable
during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to recon
sideration of the degree of such impairment by the board" (Sec. 15,
subd. 3-[w]; emphasis supplied). The statute also provides that the wageearning capacity of the claimant in such cases shall be determined by
his actual earnings, if any. If, however, the employee has no actual
earnings, the Board has the authority to fix the wage-earning capacity
"having due regard to the nature of his injury and his physical impair
ment." The capacity cannot be determined to be in excess of 75 per
cent of the worker's preinjury earnings (Sec. 15, subd. 5-a).
Application of these statutory criteria results in three types of
nonscheduled permanent partial disability cases: cases in which benefits
are paid because of continuing wage loss; nonscheduled lump-sum ad
justments, which can be approved by the Board in cases where contin
uance of disability and of future earning capacity cannot be made with
reasonable certainty; and cases in which there is no present loss of earn
ings and payments consequently may never begin or may be discon
tinued (upon notice to the Board and a hearing).
Continuing Compensation Payments (CCP) Cases. In order for a
worker to receive nonscheduled benefits, there must be affirmative
answers to three questions. First, are the worker's actual earnings in
the period after the medical condition is stabilized less than the worker's
earnings before the date of injury? If the answer is no, then no benefits
can be paid. In short, unlike in the case of scheduled awards, there can
be no compensation for nonscheduled awards in New York except upon
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a showing of actual wage loss. Second, if there is a wage loss, can this
be attributed at least in part to the permanent consequences of the workrelated injury? If the answer is no, then no benefits can be paid. If the
answer is yes, then normally the nonscheduled benefits are a specified
portion (66 2/3 percent) of the actual wage loss. If the worker has no
actual earnings in the period after the medical condition is stabilized,
however, a third question must be asked, namely, does the worker have
any wage-earning capacity? If the answer is no, the worker qualifies
for permanent total, not permanent partial, disability benefits. If the
answer is yes, then the nonscheduled benefits are a specified portion
of the difference between the worker's preinjury wages and the postinjury earning capacity determined by the Board. The second and third
questions deserve further elaboration.
Second, can the wage loss be attributed to the injury? In some situa
tions, there is a question as to whether the claimant's reduction of earn
ings is attributable to a compensable injury or to other factors, such
as economic conditions or voluntary withdrawal from the labor force.
(1) Retirement. In a number of cases, claimants have gone into retire
ment after beginning to receive permanent disability benefits. In
Yamonaco v. Union Carbide Corp., 42 A.D. 2d 1014, 348 N.Y.S. 2d
196 (1973), and other cases the court has outlined the standards to be
used: if reduced earnings are due solely to voluntary withdrawal from
the labor market, old age, economic conditions, or other factors un
connected with the disability, no compensation is payable. If there is
substantial proof that the claimant's disability is at least a contributing
factor to the reduced earnings, however, an award is warranted.
In Mazziotto v. Brookfield Construction, 40 A.D. 2d 704, 338 N.Y.S.
2d 1001 (1972), the claimant received benefits for three separate ac
cidents. He went into retirement as a result of a union rule regarding
work over age 65. The Appellate Division overruled the Board and
denied benefits because the claimant failed to show efforts to seek work.
In Hyars v. Wells Fuel Oil Co., 46 A.D. 2d 704, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 94
(1974), the claimant elected retirement but was awarded benefits bas
ed upon a showing that he was limited to light, sedentary work as a
result of a nonscheduled injury. Evidence that a claimant had sought
and received part-time employment was sufficient to sustain a claim
in another retirement case: Mulpagano v. Crucible Steel, 53 A.D. 2d
930, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 193 (1976). In Hartman v. W. H. Dunne Com
pany, 50 A.D. 2d 643, 374 N.Y.S. 2d 166 (1975), the claimant had
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sustained a compensable back injury in 1948, and had received benefits
until 1972. After her retirement in 1973, the claimant attempted to find
work but was unsuccessful. Thereupon the Board made an award, which
the Appellate Division upheld.
(2) Return to School. The Yamonaco standard of voluntary withdrawal
also applies here. In Larke v. Bell Aerosystems, 50 A.D. 2d 649, 374
N.Y.S. 2d 455 (1975), the claimant sustained a compensable back in
jury, looked for employment, and then returned to school full-time. With
one justice dissenting, the court affirmed the Board's decision in fin
ding that reduced earnings were due in part to disc protrusion. Similar
ly, in Dooley v. NYS Bronx Children's Hospital, 56 A.D. 2d 680, 391
N.Y.S. 2d 526 (1977), inability to perform prior duties as a registered
nurse and subsequent enrollment in school as a full-time student were
found not to constitute voluntary retirement.
(3) Rehabilitation and the effect of economic conditions. What if a
claimant is trained for a new occupation under a rehabilitation program
and then laid off? In Boyle v. G. J. Gatti, 40 A.D. 2d 1063, 339 N.Y.S.
2d 65 (1972), the claimant suffered a compensable permanent partial
disability back injury as a mason in 1960. He received rehabilitation
as an engineering administrator, and was laid off in 1970. Here the court
would only allow the claim if it could be shown that the back injury
was a limiting factor in the claimant's search for employment. The matter
was remitted to the Board. Similarly, in Topfv. American Character
Doll and Toy Co., 62 A.D. 2d 1111, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 451 (1976), the
claimant sustained an injury in 1961, was rehabilitated as an accoun
tant, and was laid off in 1974. Here the court found that economic con
ditions were the sole cause of the layoff and denied benefits.
(4) Other factors. In another case involving a change of occupation,
a telephone installer suffered a compensable back injury and took a desk
job. Three years later, his earnings were reduced as a result of a strike,
and the Board made an award. The court regarded as "speculative"
the Board's finding that the disability was a limiting factor for employ
ment purposes, and reversed the Board's ruling. (Colletti v. New York
Telephone Company, 48 A.D. 2d 491, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 212 [1975].)
Finally, one need not retire or return to school to be able to collect
benefits. In Miller v. Pan American World Airways, 46 A.D. 2d 718,
360 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1974), the claimant, a stewardess, sustained a per
manent partial disability and subsequently married and had children.
On appeal by the employer, the Appellate Division found that the wage
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loss was not solely related to factors other than the disability, and af
firmed the award.
These various cases suggest that the general answer to the second
question is: so long as the permanent consequences of the work-related
injury are at least a partial cause of the wage loss, nonscheduled benefits
can be paid. When, however, there are no earnings after the medical
condition has stabilized, then the third question must be asked.
The third question is: does the worker have any wage-earning capacity?
If so, then benefits are based on the difference between preinjury ac
tual earnings and postinjury earning capacity. For example, if a worker
earned $200 a week before he was injured and (despite his lack of ac
tual earnings) he is considered by the Board to maintain 75 percent of
his earning capacity, then his nonscheduled permanent partial benefits
are $33.33 per week (66 2/3 percent of $50.00).
Determining the earning capacity of a worker with no actual earn
ings is a formidable challenge. A tremendous share of the responsibili
ty falls on the Board's doctors, who conduct the examination at the time
of the final adjustment. They usually limit their evaluations of disabili
ty in the nonscheduled cases to mild, moderate, or marked (basically
equivalent to 25, 50 or 75 percent of total disability, respectively). The
doctor makes his report on a Form C-210 and may be called to testify
on his report if either party requests it. That medical report is then con
sidered by a law judge, who determines the extent of loss of earning
capacity. The ultimate responsibility for determining the extent of
disability rests with the judge rather than the doctor, subject, of course,
to possible Board and court review. This is because the payment of
benefits is contingent upon a showing that the physical impairment sus
tained is responsible for a reduction in wage-earning capacity, and the
doctor's opinion is supposed to be directed toward medical aspects on
ly. The statutes specifically indicate that the nature of an injury and
the impairments resulting from it can be taken into account in deter
mining the extent of loss of wage-earning capacity.
In general, the Board appears to defer to medical findings in deter
mining the extent of earning capacity, and in turn the courts generally
defer to the determinations made by the Board. For example, in Smith
v. GAP Corporation, 44 A.D. 2d 864, 355 N. Y.S. 2d 484 (1974), the
Appellate Division affirmed a Workers' Compensation Board finding
of a 25 percent nonscheduled, permanent partial disability, which was
based on an orthopedist's testimony that the claimant could only per-
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form light work. "The sole question presented in this appeal is whether
there was substantial evidence to support the board's determination,
and we find that there was." The test is whether the Board has "substan
tial evidence to support its determination." Sansome v. Maislin Transport
Ltd., 72 A.D. 2d 644, 421 N.Y.S. 2d 137 (1979). When the evidence
is not deemed to be sufficient, the court can remand the matter for fur
ther evidence.
Another case shows the extent of deference to medical testimony by
the Board and the courts. In Walsh v. New York Telephone, 55 A.D.
2d 765, 389 N.Y.S. 2d 463 (1976), the claimant sustained nonscheduled injuries to her back and leg as a result of a fall. The Board in this
case based its award on the testimony of a neurological specialist, who
accepted the claimant's description of her continuing pain. The Appellate
Division affirmed.
On the other hand, the court does not always affirm the Board. In
Grossman v. Posture Line Shops, Inc. et al., 28 A.D. 2d 1149, 284
N.Y.S. 2d 242 (1967), the court reversed, stating that "[T]here is lacking
any qualified opinion testimony as to the exact cause of the claimant's
neurological condition . . . The board's determination ... is unsup
ported by substantial evidence."
Nonscheduled Adjustments (Lump-Sum Settlements). Nonscheduled
adjustments through the payment of a lump sum may be approved by
a Board member upon a showing that several conditions have been met.
Some of these conditions are statutory and some are the result of rules
or practice.
Lump-sum settlements, or nonscheduled adjustments, in New York
State cannot be easily compared to the so-called "compromise and
release agreements," which form a substantial part of the claims-closing
process in many other states. One difference is that in the other states
permitting redemption of the employer's liability by a compromise, the
agreement may involve not only extent of disability but other matters,
such as the issue of compensability itself. Under the New York provi
sion adjustments are permitted only if both the carrier and employee
agree to a settlement, and then only under certain carefully defined con
ditions. At least three conditions must be met before a lump-sum ad
justment is allowed: the right to compensation has been established and
compensation has been paid for at least 13 weeks, the case involves
a nonscheduled permanent partial disability, and the continuance of
disability and of future earning capacity is uncertain. In addition, there
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must be no outstanding payments or bills for either cash benefits or
medical treatment; the general rule is that there must have been no
medical treatment required within the past three months. Other rules
of thumb concern the claimant's working status, his purpose in wishing
to settle the case, and his psychological condition. Generally there is
a medical report indicating that the settlement would be of "therapeutic"
value to the claimant, presumably because he would no longer worry
about the case and would be encouraged to return to gainful employ
ment. The Board normally will not approve a settlement for a claimant
who is not working unless he has voluntarily withdrawn himself from
the labor market.
Another thing that distinguishes the New York lump-sum adjustment
system is that the claimant has the opportunity to later reopen the case
upon a showing of change in medical condition. For this reason the
procedure is not as appealing to carriers or employers as are compromise
and release agreements, which operate as an absolute release of the claim
ant's right to further benefits.
No Present Loss of Earnings. As indicated previously, no compen
sation is payable for nonscheduled permanent partial disability unless
actual wage loss can be shown. The injured worker will of course receive
necessary medical treatment and payment of cash benefits for temporary
total or temporary partial disability. If the medical evidence shows that
there is a permanent residual impairment even in the absence of wage
loss, the judge will indicate a classification of "permanent partial disabili
ty" with no present loss of earnings, and close the case without prej
udice; it can later be reopened if the claimant's condition or status
changes.
The Relative Importance of the Three Types
of Nonscheduled Awards
Although data on the prevalence of the three types of nonscheduled
awards are not routinely published by the Workers' Compensation Board,
information on several years is presented in table 8.1. In 1970, cases
with continuing compensation payments (CCP) and cases with lumpsum payments each accounted for about 44 percent of nonscheduled
awards, while nonscheduled cases closed without permanent disability
benefits because of no present loss of earnings accounted for about 12
percent of nonscheduled awards. By 1982, the CCP cases dominated,
accounting for 60 percent of all cases, while lump-sum awards were
made in 31 percent of the cases, and cases closed without nonschedul-

Table 8.1
Numbers of Cases and Costs of Compensation for Three Types
of Nonscheduled Permanent Partial Disability Cases, as a Percentage
of All Nonscheduled Permanent Partial Disability Cases, Selected Years, 1970-82
No present loss of earnings

Lump sum

o
Nonscheduled

Payments to continue

Year

Number of
cases

Amount of
compensation

Number of
cases

Amount of
compensation

Number of
cases

Amount of
compensation

1970
1973
1977
1980
1982

44.9
35.4
26.1
28.9
31.3

25.0
19.4
12.8
14.9
17.4

11.8
13.7
8.5
8.3
8.6

2.4
2.6
1.3
1.2
1.4

43.4
50.9
65.4
62.8
60.1
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85.9
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81.2
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SOURCE: Special tabulation provided by Research and Statistical Department, State of New York Workers' Compensation Board.
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ed benefits because of no present loss of earnings accounted for about
9 percent of the cases. The predominant place that the payments-tocontinue awards had achieved by 1982 is even more strikingly shown
in the table by a breakdown of the amount of compensation awarded
by the three categories of award.
The data showing that cases closed with payments to continue are
the dominant type of nonscheduled permanent partial disability case must
be used v/ith caution. In a recent study of cases involving 1972 injuries
that resulted in nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits, Bur
ton, Partridge, and Thomason (1986, pp. 65-66) found that 29.7 per
cent were originally closed with lump-sum settlements (a statistic com
parable to the figures in table 8.1); however, many cases originally closed
with no present loss of earnings or with payment to continue were reopen
ed and reclosed with lump-sum settlements, so 51.1 percent of the 1972
injury cases had been ultimately resolved with lump-sum settlements
by 1983. Unfortunately, comparable data for other years are unavailable,
but the results strongly suggest that the use of lump sums to terminate
eligibility for the New York wage-loss benefits is much more prevalent
than data published by the Board suggest.
Major Member Continuing Disability Benefits

New York, in 1970, added Sec. 15, subd. 3-(v), calling for addi
tional payments beyond the period specified in the schedule in a case
where there is 50 percent or more loss or loss of use of certain major
members (arm, leg, hand, or foot) and where there is actual wage loss
at the end of the scheduled period of benefits, provided the impairment
of earning capacity is due solely to such physical loss and provided the
worker participates in a Board-approved rehabilitation program. The
injured worker must make application for such continuing disability
payments and the benefits are subject to an offset of 50 percent of social
security disability benefits.
There are relatively few cases involving 50 percent or more loss or
loss of use of a major member. Of 30,118 cases involving scheduled
injuries that were closed in 1983, only 227 (or 0.75 percent) met the
criteria for Sec. 15(3)(v) benefits. 12 Moreover, a special analysis of
claims involving such loss resulting from injuries occurring in 1972
showed that, at least partly owing to the restrictions written into the
law, very few 50 percent major member losses have actually qualified
for continuing disability benefits under this provision (Burton, Larson,
and Moran 1980, pp. 139-40 and chapter 11).
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Permanent Total Benefits
Benefits: Weekly Amounts and Duration. Benefits for permanent total
disability in New York are now payable at two-thirds of the employee's
average weekly wage, subject to a maximum weekly rate of $300 and
a minimum of $20, or actual wages, if less, for life or the duration of
the disability. If the injured worker, though classified as permanently
and totally disabled, is able to work for some wages, the compensation
payable may be partially offset by the worker's actual earnings, so that
compensation plus the earnings shall not exceed the wage base on which
the maximum weekly benefit is computed under the law in effect at
the time of such earnings. No deduction from the compensation payable
takes place, however, if the permanent total disability was due to the
loss or loss of use of both eyes; or both hands, arms, legs, or feet; or
of any two thereof. There are two categories of permanent total
disabilities: the scheduled type, covering these impairments mentioned
in the previous sentence, and the non-presumptive type, which is assessed
in accordance with the facts. The scheduled cases are presumed to be
permanent and total "in the absence of conclusive proof to the contrary.''
Experience with Permanent Disability Benefits. Permanent total
disability cases have been relatively rare in New York, never account
ing for as much as 0.1 percent of all cases with cash benefits during
the 1958 to 1982 period (table 3.6). As of 1982, the share of all cases
represented by permanent total cases was only 34 percent of the na
tional average share for such cases (table 3.6). Nor have these cases
been particularly expensive. In 1982, for example, the average perma
nent total case in New York involved $60,789 of cash benefits, only
66 percent of the national average figure of $92,055 (table 3.10). As
a result, cash benefits for permanent total cases accounted for slightly
less than 1 percent of all cash benefits in New York in 1982, about
one-fourth of the national average share of costs accounted for by such
cases (table 3.14).
Permanent partial disability cases are also relatively inexpensive in
New York compared to other jurisdictions, although the facts concern
ing them are somewhat more complex. The schedule is relatively com
prehensive in New York, especially in comparison with Pennsylvania
and Michigan, and thus a relatively large number of permanent partial
cases are compensated in New York. As of 1982, permanent partial
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cases (major and minor) accounted for 27.81 percent of all New York
cases, above the average of 22.05 percent for the eight states inten
sively examined in chapter 3 (see tables 3.7 and 3.8). Among the eight
states, only in California (29.9 percent), with its comprehensive schedule,
and New Jersey (45.18 percent), with its aberrant legal doctrines, did
permanent partial cases represent a higher percentage of all cases than
in New York.
Although permanent partial cases were relatively common in New
York, their costs were relatively low as of 1982. In 1958, the average
cost of major permanent partial disability cases in New York was $8,897,
which was 129 percent of the national average for that year. However,
by 1982, the New York average of $19,730 was only 78 percent of
the national average ($25,139) (table 3.11). Similarly, the average cost
in New York for minor permanent partial cases was $1,044 in 1958,
or 80 percent of the national average, whereas in 1982 it was $2,619,
or only 53 percent of the national average of $4,953 (table 3.12).
The total costs of permanent partial cases in New York were also
relatively low. Reflecting the below average cost per case, in 1982 the
major permanent partial cases accounted for 36.71 percent of all cash
benefits in New York, which was only 86 percent of the average share
for such cases nationally (table 3.15). Although minor permanent par
tial cases were relatively common in New York, because of their low
average cost their total cost in 1978 was 18.26 percent of all cash
benefits, only 82 percent of the national average share for minor per
manent partial cases (table 3.16).
If the total costs of all types of permanent disability cases (perma
nent total, major permanent partial, and minor permanent partial) are
considered, New York devotes a relatively low share of all cash benefits
to such cases. As of 1982, 55.95 percent of all cash benefits were spent
on permanent disability cases in New York; among the eight jurisdic
tions intensively examined in chapter 3, only Pennsylvania, with its
restrictive schedule, had a lower percentage (51.64; see table 3.17).
Indeed, among the 45 jurisdictions for which data are presented in table
3.5, only Arizona (40.59 percent), Indiana (55.81 percent), Missouri
(50.25 percent), and Pennsylvania (51.64 percent) devoted lower per
centages of their cash benefits to permanent disability benefits than did
New York (55.95 percent).
The rather tranquil picture of permanent disability benefits in New
York conveyed by those data may, however, be somewhat misleading
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in terms of the dynamics of permanent partial disability benefits in New
York. One reason is that the data in chapter 3, which are based on in
formation from the National Council on Compensation Insurance, have
a serious deficiency for purposes of analyzing the New York experience.
The NCCI data separate permanent partial cases into major and minor
categories depending on the seriousness of the injury. In New York,
however, the more significant distinction is between scheduled and
nonscheduled injuries, and unfortunately benefits for both types of in
juries are included in both the major and minor permanent partial
categories of the NCCI.
As discussed earlier, in New York, scheduled injuries are rated
primarily on the basis of impairment and functional limitations, whereas
nonscheduled injuries are rated on the basis of loss of wage-earning
capacity, which is operationalized through measurement of actual wage
loss. The worker must actually be out of work or earning less than his
preinjury wages before he is judged to have lost wage-earning capacity.
The result is that there is a sharp distinction in New York between
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries. It is not simply a matter of schedul
ed injuries being assessed on the basis of the number of weeks listed
for a particular extremity and nonscheduled being based on the number
of weeks that represents the "whole person," as in our category n states
analyzed in chapter 7. It is not a difference in base, it is a difference
in concept.
One data source that does distinguish between the scheduled and
nonscheduled benefits in New York is the information published by the
State of New York Workers' Compensation Board on compensated cases
closed. In particular, there is an annual publication showing, inter alia,
the number and costs of cases closed in the year. Table 8.2 provides
data for selected years between 1960 and 1983, the most recent data
available. Scheduled cases have accounted for about 35 percent of all
cases throughout the period, whereas their share of all costs has declined
from about 35 percent to about 25 percent. Nonscheduled cases have
represented about 2.5 to 4.5 percent of all cases, whereas their share
of all costs has increased from about 32 percent to over 50 percent;
virtually all of the increased costs occurred during the 1970s. In short,
this disaggregation of data reveals that scheduled awards have declin
ed in importance while nonscheduled awards have grown in importance.
Of particular interest here is the rapid escalation in the numbers and
costs of nonscheduled permanent partial benefits during the 1970s. Bur-
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ton (1983) has examined this issue in a separate study. He made a
statistical analysis of the determinants of the number and costs of
workers' compensation cases in New York from 1959 to 1979, and us
ed the results to help explain developments in the 1970s in nonscheduled permanent partial benefits. The number of nonscheduled cases per
thousand employees was up 54.6 percent during the 1970s; the average
cost of the cases (in constant dollars) was up 23.5 percent; the total
costs (in constant dollars) of nonscheduled cases per thousand employees
was up 91.0 percent. Burton found that over half of the increases dur
ing the 1970s in these three measures of nonscheduled permanent par
tial benefits was associated with increases in the unemployment rate.
He also found that there was no statistically significant relationship be
tween labor market conditions and the number of costs of scheduled
permanent partial disability benefits in New York from 1959 to 1979.
The difference between scheduled and nonscheduled benefits in their
sensitivity to labor market conditions was consistent with Burton's ex
pectations for New York, since the scheduled benefits are paid regardless
of wage loss, while a precondition for the nonscheduled benefits is ac
tual losses of earnings. In a labor market as slack as New York's in
the 1970s, when the unemployment rate almost doubled (from 2.5 to
4.9 percent), it is reasonable to expect that more injured workers with
nonscheduled injuries will experience actual wage loss and thus qualify
for benefits.
Table 8.2
Number of Cases and Cost of Compensation
for Scheduled and Nonscheduled Permanent Partial Disability,
as a Percentage of All Cases, Selected Years, 1960-83
Scheduled awards

Nonscheduled awards

Year

Number of
cases

Amount of
compensation

Number of
cases

Amount of
compensation

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1983

34.1
38.9
37.9
37.3
35.6
34.8

35.0
34.8
35.7
30.0
24.0
23.0

3.0
2.6
2.6
3.1
3.8
4.4

32.2
34.8
34.5
44.7
50.9
52.1

SOURCE: Compensated Cases Closed, Workers' Compensation Board, State of New York, for
years shown. The figures for 1983 are preliminary.
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In light of the rapidly increasing costs of nonscheduled benefits dur
ing the 1970s, it is somewhat surprising that the overall costs of workers'
compensation did not increase particularly fast in New York in that
decade. In 1972, insurance premiums for workers' compensation
represented 0.864 percent of payroll in New York, which was 10.3 per
cent above the average figure of 0.783 percent in the 28 jurisdictions
(table 3.18). By 1978, New York employers were expending 1.770 per
cent of payroll on workers' compensation, which was 24.6 percent above
the U.S. average of 1.420 percent. Thus over the 1972 to 1978 period
for which data are available, New York's costs increased only somewhat
more rapidly than costs elsewhere, despite the escalating cost of the
nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits. Moreover, by 1984
insurance rates in New York had been sharply reduced, and New York
employers were spending about 21 percent less on workers' compen
sation than were employers elsewhere, on average (table 3.18).
Several factors help explain these favorable insurance cost
developments in New York during a period when the costs of
nonscheduled permanent partial cases rapidly escalated. One is the
relatively slow pace of benefit increases. In 1972, for example, the max
imum weekly benefit for temporary total disability benefits was $95.00
in New York, which was 63 percent of the state's average weekly wage,
and New York ranked well above the median for the 52 jurisdictions
for which data are available. By January 1986, the maximum was
$300.00, which represented 80 percent of the state's average weekly
wage. However, as of that date, 32 of 52 jurisdictions had maximums
for temporary total disability that were at least 100 percent of the state's
average weekly wage, and only 16 jurisdictions had maximums that
were lower relative to their average weekly wages than the 80 percent
figure for New York (U.S. Dept. of Labor, State Compliance, 1987).
Permanent partial disability benefits have also declined relatively in
New York during the last decade. As of 1972, the maximum for per
manent partial was $80.00 per week, which was 53 percent of the state's
average weekly wage. The maximum in January 1986 was $150.00,
which represented only 40 percent of the state's average weekly wage.
The relatively slow increase in maximum weekly benefits helps explain
how overall workers' compensation costs in New York have increased
rather slowly despite the surge in nonscheduled benefits (Burton and
Krueger 1986).
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New York is not usually thought of as a wage-loss state, and yet with
the exception that preinjury earnings are not escalated through time as
a basis for calculating wage loss, the New York nonscheduled benefits
are probably the most pristine version of a "pure" wage-loss approach
found in the country. The reason is that the New York wage-loss benefits,
unlike those of Pennsylvania and Florida, for example, can be paid for
as long as wage loss continues. Compromise and release agreements
and other devices to limit the potential duration of wage-loss benefits
are a threat to the wage-loss approach in New York, however, although
the problem is not as severe as in Michigan.
The reason that New York wage-loss benefits are less conspicuous
than those of the other jurisdictions is that the New York schedule en
compasses a high proportion of all injuries with permanent consequences,
leaving only a relatively few nonscheduled cases. Approximately 90
percent of permanent partial cases are rated on the basis of the schedule,
leaving only 10 percent to be compensated on the nonscheduled wageloss basis. In contrast, the scope of injuries covered by the Pennsylvania
schedule is quite limited, leaving most cases to be handled by the wageloss approach, and the 1979 Florida statute makes wage-loss benefits
potentially available to all workers with permanent disabilities (including
those workers who also receive scheduled or 'impairment' benefits).
In Michigan, the schedule is used extensively, but workers who suffer
continuing wage loss may qualify for wage-loss benefits as well as
scheduled awards.
The wage-loss benefits in New York, although inconspicuous, pro
vide valuable lessons. They demonstrate that wage-loss benefits can be
expensive, particularly in a slack labor market. The legal decisions from
New York also provide valuable guidance on issues that are inherent
in a wage-loss approach, as will be evident in the next chapter when
we review the legal controversies concerning the Florida wage-loss
provision.
The Temporary State Commission
An extensive examination of the New York workers' compensation
program was completed in 1986 by the Temporary State Commission
on Workers' Compensation and Disability Benefits. Although the Final
Report considered a variety of topics, ranging from rehabilitation to
third-party suits for employer contribution, considerable attention was
devoted to "eleven issues relating to the adequacy and equity of disability
benefits" (New York Temporary Commission 1986, p. 29).
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One issue concerned the statutory maximum for partial disability,
which at $150 per week is only half of the maximum for total disabili
ty; the Commission recommended that the maximum for partial disability
should be increased so that in no more than three years there would
be a single maximum for total and partial disability. Another issue in
volved the subtraction of temporary total benefits from the scheduled
awards, which the Commission would eliminate. Lump-sum settlements
were examined, and the Commission (at p. 46) raised the "troublesome
possibility that lump sums in some, and perhaps many, cases are the
product of desperation" by claimants. The Cornrnmission (at pp. 165-66)
"concluded that additional limitations and safeguards on lump sum set
tlements are warranted," such as prohibitions on any lump-sum settle
ment that impairs the claimant's right to medical benefits.
The most fundamental reform proposed by the Temporary Commis
sion would eliminate the current provisions for permanent total, schedul
ed permanent partial, and nonscheduled permanent partial benefits. In
stead, all workers with injuries that had permanent consequences would
receive benefits in three stages. During a worker's healing period, the
worker would receive temporary disability benefits as under the cur
rent law. When the worker reaches maximum medical improvement,
he would be rated using a comprehensive rating system to evaluate the
extent of impairment, such as the American Medical Association Guides
(1984). If the worker had an impairment rating above a minimum
threshold, he would receive presumed disability benefits, with the dura
tion determined by the size of the impairment rating. The presumed
disability benefits would be paid regardless of the worker's labor market
experience. At the expiration of the presumed disability benefits (or
six months after the date of maximum medical improvement, whichever
is later) a worker with an impairment rating above a continuing disability
threshold could qualify for continuing disability benefits if he were then
experiencing actual wage-loss due to the work injury.
This hybrid system of benefits was unanimously endorsed in princi
ple by all members of the broad-based Temporary Commission, although
specific aspects, such as the exact benefit formula for the continuing
disability benefits, were left for the legislature to decide. A bill incor
porating the Commission's restructuring of permanent disability benefits
is expected to be introduced in 1987. The proposed reform is consis
tent with our views of desirable reform, as discussed in chapter 12.
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Ohio
Several types of benefits have been or are payable to Ohio workers
with nonscheduled permanent partial disabilities. One type, known as
permanent partial or C-92 award, relates the amount of benefits to the
seriousness of the worker's permanent impairment. This choice was
discussed in chapter 6, which also provided information on the struc
ture and procedures used to provide permanent disability benefits in
Ohio. Until 1986, the worker also had the choice of a form of wageloss benefit instead of the permanent partial (C-92) award. The 1986
amendments removed the choice and made a form of wage-loss benefits
a prerequisite to the granting of the C-92 award. We review first the
pre-1986 optional form of wage-loss benefits and then briefly summarize
the new provision.
The "Old" Wage-Loss Benefit

The alternative approach to compensating permanent partial disabilities
was included in paragraph (A) of Section 4123.57:
In case of injury or occupational disease resulting in partial
disability other than [the scheduled benefits], the employee
shall receive per week sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of
the impairment of his earning capacity . . . during the conti
nuance thereof. . . .
These benefits were subject to a weekly maximum of 100 percent
of the state's average weekly wage and a maximum aggregate amount
of $17,000. It is not immediately obvious that the paragraph (A) benefits
belonged in our category III approach to nonscheduled permanent par
tial disability benefits, that is, the wage-loss approach. One reason is
that paragraph (A) did not confine itself to permanent disability, as op
posed to temporary disability. Indeed, the paragraph (A) awards were
commonly referred to in Ohio as "temporary partial" awards, even
though the statute contains no such terminology. Despite this usage in
Ohio, we consider the paragraph (A) awards in at least some cases as
benefits paid for permanent partial disabilities. As we understand the
Ohio provision, workers could qualify for paragraph (A) awards even
if they had reached maximum medical rehabilitation, and for these
workers, the benefits could be classified as permanent partial disability
benefits.
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The language of paragraph (A) also seems to be inconsistent with
our characterization of the approach as wage-loss, since it refers to "the
impairment of his earning capacity." This sounds like our category II
approach (chapter 7). Using the definition of wage-loss approach
elaborated early in this chapter, however, we believe our classification
of the paragraph (A) benefits is correct. Specifically, trait four indicated
that in a wage-loss approach, the definition of compensable wage loss
is "the lesser of: (a) the worker's potential earnings minus the worker's
actual earnings; or (b) the worker's potential earnings minus the worker's
earning capacity."
The application of paragraph (A), as described by Young (1971), the
former administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Workmen's Compensation,
appears generally to follow this definition. Potential earnings for
paragraph (A) awards are calculated as "the average weekly wage for
the year prior to the injury" (p. 126). No provision is made for escala
tion of the wages after the date of injury, which is one of the deviations
from the pure wage-loss approach in Ohio. As to earning capacity,
Young (1971, p. 135) indicates the term "is not defined in the statutes.
It involves all of the factors relative to the ability to earn. The wages
actually lost are evidence of impairment in earning capacity although
such an impairment can exist without any actual loss in wages. Industrial
Commission v. Royer, 122 Ohio St. 271, 171 NE 337 (1930)." This
passage suggests that loss of earning capacity by itself will result in
benefits. However, Young (at p. 136) then provides examples that clarify
the use of the earning capacity measurement in Ohio.
One example involves a worker who had a $100 average weekly wage
before he was injured, which by the Ohio approach means the postinjury potential earnings are $100. As a result of the injury, the worker
"suffered a twenty-five percent physical disability," which means the
worker retains 75 percent of his earning capacity. This means the
worker's potential earnings minus the worker's earning capacity is $25.
The worker does not automatically get benefits based on the loss of
earning capacity, however, as he would in a category II state, because
benefits are based in part on actual earnings. If the worker actually earns
$70 after the injury and the wage loss is due to the injury, then the
benefits under paragraph (A) are two-thirds of the actual wage loss of
$30, or $20. Young then adds (p. 136) that the "twenty dollars per
week . . . would be within the twenty-five dollar maximum that had
been set and, therefore, payable to the employee." Clearly, in this ex
ample the benefits paid are less than the amount suggested by the loss
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of earning capacity, because the compensable portion of the actual wage
loss was a smaller amount.
Young also provides an example in which the potential earnings were
$100 and the loss of earning capacity was 10 percent. This means the
worker's potential earnings minus the worker's earning capacity is $10.
If this worker then has actual earnings of $70 after the injury, two-thirds
of the actual wage loss is $20, but the worker only receives a benefit
of $10 since the loss of earning capacity is less than the compensable
portion of the actual wage loss.
The "New" Wage-Loss Benefit

Despite the apparent lack of utilization of and enthusiasm for the op
tional wage-loss benefits, the 1986 legislature added a mandatory form
of wage-loss benefit that replaces the former paragraph A benefits. Sec.
4123.56 (B) now provides that when an employee
suffers a wage loss as a result of returning to employment
other than his former position of employment or as a result
of being unable to find employment consistent with [his]
physical capabilities, he shall receive compensation at sixtysix and two-thirds [sic] of his weekly wage loss not to ex
ceed the statewide average weekly wage for a period not to
exceed two hundred weeks.
The wage-loss approach to permanent partial disability benefits found
in paragraph (A) of Section 4123.57 was the only choice available to
workers until 1941. At that time, according to Young (pp. 144-45),
the approach was "advantageous to an injured employee" because of
the adverse economic conditions. Presumably, Young means that because
of the high unemployment of the era, many workers experienced ac
tual wage loss and therefore received benefits under the provision. The
paragraph (B) option was then added with the "fundamental purpose
... to encourage injured workers to return to work." The feature of
the impairment benefits under paragraph (B) that would encourage such
efforts to find jobs is that the benefits "could be received even though
the employee had returned to work and was earning wages." Also, under
the paragraph (B) approach, the worker was relieved of the burden of
periodic wage reports and periodic physical examinations.
In addition to these factors identified by Young as to why the paragraph
(B) benefits might be preferred, another feature attractive to workers
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was that benefits of a known amount could be received with certainty,
whereas the paragraph (A) awards depended on uncertain subsequent
evaluations of actual wage loss and of loss of earning capacity. For riskaverse workers, the wage-loss benefits would be unattractive because
of the risk they entail, even if they have the theoretical advantage of
providing a better match between lost earnings and benefits paid.
Whatever the reasons—and we may have overlooked some—paragraph
(B) benefits were much more attractive to workers than were the wageloss benefits under paragraph (A). Young reports (p. 145) that the
paragraph (B) benefits accounted for 19 percent of the benefits paid
by the State Insurance Fund, compared to only 3 percent for the
paragraph (A) wage-loss benefits.
The 1986 amendments also provide that the permanent partial (C-92)
award or scheduled permanent partial benefits cannot be paid until at
least 40 weeks after the termination of temporary total disability or wageloss benefits under Sec. 4123.56 (B). This obviously can lead to a gap
in the benefits provided to workers with permanent disabilities. The
Ohio benefits scheme is also questionable because the wage-loss benefits
precede the benefits based on the extent of impairment. We argue in
chapter 12 that the preferable order is presumed disability benefits follow
ed by wage-loss benefits. As experience develops under the Ohio pro
vision, we will be able to assess the consequences of a policy that is
the inverse of our best judgment of how benefits should be structured.

NOTES
1. If he returned to work at the $200 wage and if he could show an impairment as a result of
his injury, he could still receive an award, but payments could be suspended until actual earnings
loss occurred. Benedict v. Fox, 192 Pa. Super. 197,159 A.2d 756,758 (1960), cited by Larson
(1986), Sec. 57.12.
2. National Council on Compensation Insurance, "Countrywide Workers' Compensation Ex
perience Including Certain Competitive State Funds—1st Report Basis," Exhibit dated June 1986.
On an ultimate report basis, Pennsylvania had 496 permanent total cases in 1982, the largest number
of any jurisdiction. As explained in chapter 3, we concentrate on the first report data in order
to provide historical comparability.
3. Civil Service Commission v. Dept. of Labor, 424 Mich. 571, -N.W.2d- (1986).

4. As cited by St. Antoine (1984. p. 23).
5. Detroit Free Press, 5 Jan. 1986, p. 1.
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6. Although, as Hunt notes, the conclusions involving the determinants of the size of the lumpsum payments "must be regarded as somewhat tentative," the evidence does show a "positive
relationship between the size of the lump-sum and previous repeated spells of disability, a record
of hospitalization, or a claim of a back injury." (Hunt 1982, p. 191.) These are the kinds of
factors that affect estimates of the extent of loss of earnings capacity in states that use that approach.
7. These NCCI data showing a decline in lump-sum settlements are not entirely consistent with
the data presented by St. Antoine (1984, p. 58), which shows only a modest decline in redemp
tions as a percentage of dispositions from 63.8 percent in 1981 to 54.4 percent in the first nine
months of 1984.
8. Additional data showing a decline in the percentage of claims filed by retirees are provided
by St.Antoine (1984, pp. 60-62).
9. All data on 1982 legal fees are from New York Workers' Compensation Board (1984), pp.
13-14 and tables 1 and 16.
10. The 30,118 scheduled permanent partial cases closed in 1983 were analyzed by Burton and
Thomason (1986), Appendix I. Not all scheduled cases closed that year were included in the study;
two reasons are (1) only 1979-1982 injuries were included because maximum benefits for total
and partial disability did not change in this interval, and (2) certain cases involving 1979-1982
injuries were excluded because of apparent errors on the data tape provided by the Workers' Com
pensation Board.
11. The data are from New York Workers' Compensation Board (1984), table 2. Board data are
based on information collected at the time of initial closing of the cases, which includes estimates
of the present value of future benefits for those cases in which benefits were still being paid as
of the date of closing.
12. The data are from Burton and Thomason (1986), discussed supra note 10.
13. The unemployment rate is the insured unemployment rate lagged two years for reasons ex
plained in Burton (1983).

Chapter 9
The Transformation of Florida
to a Wage-Loss State
Florida's population in 1980 was 9,747,197, the seventh largest among
the states. That population had grown by more than 2.9 million during
the 1970s, a figure surpassed only by California and Texas.
As the population grew in Florida during the 1970s, so did the
workforce and the size of the workers' compensation program. There
were about two million workers covered in 1970; by the end of the
decade, the number had grown to over three million. 1 More important
than the change in the size of the program was the significant change
in the approach to compensating permanent partial disability benefits
that resulted from legislation enacted in 1979. At that time, Florida aban
doned an unusual, if not unique, approach that allowed the worker to
have his nonscheduled permanent partial injury evaluated on the basis
of the extent of impairment (our category I approach) or on the basis
of the loss of earning capacity (our category II approach). The 1979
law, probably the most widely discussed reform in workers' compen
sation in the last decade, essentially dropped the distinction between
scheduled and nonscheduled permanent partial injuries, and establish
ed the wage-loss approach as the primary basis for compensating per
manent disabilities.
The first section examines the approach used before the 1979 reforms. 2
Such a review is important because the unique choice of criteria ap
proach for nonscheduled benefits needs to be documented for the edifica
tion of policy makers who may some day reinvent the approach. The
pre-1979 situation also needs to be examined in order to understand
the forces that led to the enactment of the wage-loss approach. In addi
tion, the pre-1979 legislation provided the benefits paid to the workers
examined in the study of Florida workers reviewed in part III of this
volume. Even though the Florida law has been drastically changed since
1979, its essence—the determination of the amount of permanent par
tial disability benefits on an ex ante basis—is still the approach used
in most jurisdictions, and therefore an understanding of how the prior
265
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Florida law operated provides information relevant for reform efforts
nationally.
The second section will examine the nature of the 1979 reforms,
together with several changes made in 1978 that are also reflected in
the current statutory scheme in Florida. The third section reviews data
on the experience with the wage-loss approach, and the last section pro
vides some evaluation of the 1979 reforms.

Florida Before Wage-Loss
Statutory Criteria for Permanent Partial Disability Benefits
Before 1979, permanent partial disability was covered by paragraph
(3) of Section 440.15 of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law.
The weekly amount was 60 percent of the worker's average weekly
wage prior to the date of injury. For scheduled injuries, the durations
specified in the statute ranged from 200 weeks for the loss of an arm
to 15 weeks for the loss of the fourth finger, plus additional provisions
for loss of hearing, loss of vision, and disfigurement. The schedule was
typical, covering most body extremities and providing for total or par
tial loss and for total or partial loss of use. It was also typical in that
not much guidance was provided to the parties as to how the schedule
was to be applied.
The determination of the duration of nonscheduled permanent par
tial benefits was provided for in a relatively brief paragraph, as follows: 3
In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation
shall be 60 percent of the injured employee's average week
ly wage for such number of weeks as the injured employee's
percentage of disability is of 350 weeks; provided, however,
that for purposes of this paragraph "disability" means either
physical impairment or diminution of wage earning capaci
ty, whichever is greater.
The statute provided no guidance as to how physical impairment or
diminution of wage-earning capacity was to be determined.
The statute in effect in Florida before 1979 thus relied on the normal
distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled benefits, with the dura
tions for both types of permanent partial disability benefits determined
on an ex ante basis. That is, as soon as the medical condition was stable
(when the date of "maximum medical improvement" was reached),
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the permanent consequences of the worker's injury were evaluated and
the rating was used to determine the duration of the permanent partial
disability benefits.
Criteria for Nonscheduled Permanent Partial Disability Benefits4

The statute, as quoted above, offered the worker with a nonscheduled injury the choice of having the permanent consequences rated in terms
of the physical impairment or in terms of the diminution of wage-earning
capacity. In general, workers preferred to use the loss of wage-earning
capacity approach because usually there were some factors pertaining
to age, education, and so forth that could be relied on to increase the
rating beyond that based strictly on the evaluation of the worker's
physical impairment.
Neither the statute nor the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation had
published guidelines or instructions for measuring diminution of wageearning capacity. As a result, the Florida courts spelled out the factors
to be considered in determining the extent of loss of earning capacity.
In Walker v. Electronic Products & Engineering Company, 248 So. 2d
161,163 (Fla. 1971), for example, the Florida Supreme Court listed
eight factors, including: inability to obtain work of a type which claim
ant can perform; wages actually earned after injury (a factor entitled
to great weight); and "ability to compete in the open labor market the
remainder of his life, including the burden of pain, or the inability to
perform the required labor."
This list makes clear that actual wage loss was a factor in determin
ing the extent of loss of earning capacity. There is, however, a crucial
difference between this approach and an actual wage loss approach.
In an actual wage-loss approach, if the worker earns more after the date
of maximum medical improvement than before the date of injury, then
the employer has no liability for permanent partial disability benefits, 5
whereas in a loss of earning capacity approach, the fact that there is
no actual loss of earnings will not necessarily preclude a finding of a
loss of earning capacity. Thus, in Woodward v. Dade County Board
of Public Instruction, 278 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1973), the court reinstated
the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims for an award of 20 percent
of loss of earning capacity even though the worker had returned to the
same employer and was earning the same wages as before the injury.
In this case, the physical impairment had been rated at only 5 percent
of the whole man, and the worker's other characteristics had been used
to justify the 20 percent loss of earning capacity judgment.
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The Woodward case is a good illustration of how workers with
nonscheduled injuries often benefited from having their cases rated on
the basis of diminution of wage-earning capacity rather than on the ex
tent of physical impairment. There were, however, a few obstacles to
the use of loss of earning capacity as a basis for compensation: 6 the
claimant had to make a good faith job search, 7 and determination of
loss of earning capacity was constrained by several requirements (the
loss of earning capacity rating had to be based on facts existing at the
time of the award, not on predictions about the claimant's future loss
of earning capacity because of the delayed effects of the injury; 8 and
the deputy commissioner could not take judicial notice of employment
opportunities in the area when assessing the loss of earning capacity
rating, but must rely on evidence in the record). 9 But in most cases,
compensation was greater than it would have been if it had been based
strictly on physical impairment. The reason is that most cases were han
dled by lawyers who tried to circumvent the agency and the courts by
concluding compromise and release settlements (known as "washouts"
in Florida). In practice, the rule of thumb, according to plaintiffs' lawyers
interviewed during our field work under the pre-1979 law, was that
the percentage rating for loss of wage-earning capacity was about
double the physical impairment rating.
At the time of our field work, there was widespread unhappiness
in Florida with the high incidence of washouts, and a sense that workers
with serious injuries were being undercompensated and those with minor
injuries overcompensated. Legislation enacted in July 1978 provided
that the number of weeks of benefits to be multiplied by the percentage
of disability was to increase with the severity of the injury according
to a new formula: a rating of 1 to 10 percent was multiplied by 175
weeks; a rating of 11 to 50 percent, by 350 weeks; and a rating of 50
to 99 percent, by 525 weeks. This provision very likely did have the
effect of redirecting benefits away from minor injuries and toward ma
jor injuries, but the approach still relied on the evaluation of physical
impairment and diminution of earning capacity. That is, it remained
an ex ante approach to benefits. Moreover, because of poor draftsman
ship, the amendment produced anomalies: a worker with a 10 percent
rating received 17.5 weeks of benefits, while a worker with an 11 per
cent rating received benefits for 38.5 weeks.
Procedure for Permanent Partial Disability Benefits

Before the 1979 reform legislation, the administrative posture in
Florida was essentially one of allowing the employee to pursue his own
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interest. In practice, this usually meant retaining an attorney and filing
a claim. Almost all permanent partial disabilities other than those
delineated by the schedule involved the filing of a claim.
Florida had not issued any manual or other guide to assist the parties
in evaluating cases. Each case that was contested depended on an in
dividual determination based upon the presentation of the respective
attorneys, as well as, sometimes, the respective bargaining power of
the parties. Most cases involving permanent partial benefits were
litigated, and a high percentage ended up in compromise and release
settlements. One insurance claims examiner stated he did not offer to
pay anything voluntarily in cases where a physician's evaluation of 5
percent permanent partial disability was made. His rationale was that
if he agreed to 5 percent, the attorney would file a claim for 15 percent
and the judge would compromise on 10 percent. On the other hand,
if he offered nothing, the compromise figure might be 5 percent of per
manent partial plus an attorney's fee. The probability of litigation was
so high in these cases that carriers found it to their advantage to pro
crastinate and compromise only after litigation was well advanced. Car
riers who paid some amount on the basis of physical impairment
recognized that a higher rating would result when loss of wage-earning
capacity was assessed.
The absence of an active workers' compensation agency and the
vagueness of the criteria for evaluating nonscheduled cases resulted in
considerable litigation. The number of awards issued by the judges of
industrial claims increased from 14,076 in 1970 to 20,153 in 1974 to
25,381 in 1978. The time involved in processing a case from claim fil
ing to judge's decision increased from 170 days in 1970 to 201 days
in 1974. Most orders issued by judges were washouts. Of the 25,381
orders issued in 1978, 17,058 (or 67 percent) were in this category.
This compares with 9,237 washouts out of 14,076 orders in 1970. 10
Attorneys' fees were an important part of this litigious system. In
1972, for 9,720 awards by judges, the total attorneys' fees awarded
were $8 million. In 1978, attorneys' fees were awarded in 15,883 cases
and totaled $19.7 million.' l Before amendments effective July 1, 1978,
these fees were paid entirely by the employer or carrier and did not
come out of the employee's portion of the award. 12
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Experience with Permanent Disability Benefits through 1978
Costs for major permanent partial disability cases were high. The
average cost per case was only moderate (see table 3.11), but the number
of such cases as a proportion of all cases paying cash benefits more
than tripled between 1958 and 1978, when the numerical share was 131
percent of the national average (table 3.7). In terms of the share of dollars
expended on cash benefits, major permanent partial disability benefits
in Florida were 23 percent above the national average share by 1978
(table 3.15). The effect of the resulting high total cost for major per
manent partial cases was to dominate the below-average costs (as a
percentage of all cash benefits) of permanent total and minor perma
nent partial cases, so that the cost of all Florida permanent disability
cases as a percentage of all cash benefits was 106 percent of the na
tional average in 1978.
The economic pressures that led to the 1979 reforms in Florida in
volved more than the increasing frequency and total costs of perma
nent disability benefits as a share of all cash benefits. Not only had the
permanent disability slice of the pie grown, but the entire pastry had
swollen. One reason was the substantial increase in benefit levels dur
ing the 1970s. The maximum weekly benefit for total and partial disabili
ty was $56 as late as 1972 (46 percent of the state's average weekly
wage), but then the maximums increased annually through 1978, at which
time the maximum weekly benefit was $126, or 74 percent of the state's
average weekly wage. 13 Total expenditures on workers' compensation
in Florida, including cash benefits and medical expenses, went from
$75 million in 1970 to $257 million in 1978. 14 The higher cost was
due in part to the increased number of workers covered by the Florida
workers' compensation program, but even the cost per employee in
creased rapidly during the 1970s. One figure that illustrates the high
cost of the workers' compensation program as of 1978 is the average
insurance premium for workers' compensation paid by a representative
sample of employers. Florida employers were expending 2.641 per
cent of payroll on workers' compensation insurance in 1978, a figure
well above the 28-jurisdiction average of 1.420 percent (table 3.18).
Indeed, among 47 states with comparable data for 1978, Florida's
percentage was exceeded only by the District of Columbia and Oregon
(Hunt, Krueger, and Burton 1985).
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The objective evidence thus indicates that Florida was facing a real
problem with workers' compensation costs as of 1978, and that the prob
lem was partly associated with the increasing numbers and costs of per
manent partial disability cases. Particularly suspect were the nonscheduled permanent partial disability cases. As previously discussed, a choice
of criteria could be used to determine benefits in these cases, which
generally resulted in the duration being determined on the basis of the
ill-defined diminution of earning capacity. The nonscheduled perma
nent partial disability provision was generating litigation and widespread
reliance on washouts to resolve cases. The problems of administration
were confounded by a relatively passive workers' compensation agen
cy, which did little to assist workers or to reduce litigation by anticipating
and solving problems. The system was perceived not only as expen
sive, litigious, and poorly administered, but as arbitrary in its treat
ment of workers—especially those with permanent partial disabilities
for which the benefits awarded seemed to depend as much on the loca
tion in the state, the lawyer, and the judge of industrial claims as on
the merits of the case.
By 1978, pressures for reform, or at least drastic change, were building
in Florida. Some changes were made that year, such as a new formula
for translating percentage ratings in nonscheduled permanent partial
disability cases into weeks of benefits. But the critical enactment in 1978
was a sunset provision, declaring that the workers' compensation law
would expire in 1979. This sunset provision was a strategic ploy designed
to force a major overhaul of the workers' compensation program in 1979.
The Florida Wage-Loss Approach to Permanent
Partial Disability Benefits
The wage-loss approach to permanent partial disability benefits adopted
in Florida in 1979 has been described as a "bold experiment" that "has
attracted national attention." 15 The factors that led to the enactment
of the law, the features of the 1979 legislation and subsequent amend
ments, and the cases interpreting the law are provided in this section. 16
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The Economics and Politics of Change
The story of the forces and maneuvering that culminated in the enact
ment of the 1979 legislation is much too complex to recount in this
chapter. Fortunately, there is an excellent study of the reform process,
The Circle Solution, written by Jim Mintner, which was sponsored by
the Florida Association of Insurance Agents and published in 1982. 17
Although not devoid of hyperbole and although clearly sympathetic to
the wage-loss approach, the book is surprisingly frank and accurate,
at least about those matters with which we are personally familiar.
As outlined in the previous section, workers' compensation costs had
rapidly increased in Florida, to the point that its system was the third
most expensive in the country. Moreover, the criteria for nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits were ambiguous, the state
workers' compensation agency was passive, and litigation and reliance
on washouts to resolve cases were increasing. Other factors that made
Florida a likely target for reform were the prominence of the state—
large and rapidly growing—and the political environment. Unlike some
other jurisdictions in which high cost had emerged as a problem, such
as Michigan, the District of Columbia, and Oregon, Florida had a
relatively conservative legislature. One reason was the low proportion
of workers who were union members—the 11.7 percent of the
nonagricultural labor force organized in 1978 ranked Florida 46th among
the 50 jurisdictions in this respect (Gifford 1982, p. 68). Thus workers'
compensation in Florida was an inviting target for reform efforts: per
nicious, prominent, and pliable.
Although some reform of permanent partial disability in Florida was
almost inevitable, the adoption of the wage-loss approach was not. That
element in the reform picture was, to a large degree, a legacy of the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws.
Although it did not explicitly endorse the wage-loss approach and made
no pretense of having invented it, the National Commission in its Report
(1972, p. 69) suggested that:
Consideration should be given to the use of two types of
benefits:
permanent partial impairment benefits, paid to a worker
solely because of a work-related impairment
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permanent partial disability benefits, paid to a worker
because he has both a work-related impairment and a resul
tant disability.
In addition to this tacit support for a wage-loss approach contained
in the Report, the idea was examined in a Supplemental Study for the
National Commission that was written by the commission's chief
counsel. He criticized permanent partial disability benefits paid on the
basis of impairment or loss of wage-earning capacity, and composed
a paean to a wage-loss system (Lewis 1973).
The direct link between the National Commission and the Florida
wage-loss approach was John Lewis, who, coincidentally, was both the
general counsel of the National Commission and a Florida attorney who
became the chairman of the Florida Workers' Compensation Advisory
Committee. As the movement toward reform began in Florida in 1977,
Lewis introduced the idea of the wage-loss approach at meetings of the
committee. Then at a subcommittee meeting in January 1978, the
preliminary results of the NSF study were presented by Wayne Vroman
and a tentative proposal for reform of permanent partial disability benefits
in Florida was provided by John Burton. The NSF study results are
essentially those presented in part III of this volume, which document
the serious problems of inequities and excessive litigation for Florida
permanent partial disability cases under the law described in the previous
section. The proposal for reform suggested inter alia that comprehen
sive guidelines be issued to rate impairments in all cases and that a dual
benefit system be established. One part of the system was impairment
benefits, to be paid to each worker with a permanent impairment rating
of 1 percent or more. The other part was pure wage-loss benefits, paid
according to what was termed the "80/80 plan." The wage-loss benefits
were 80 percent of estimated wage loss, which in turn was defined as
80 percent of adjusted preinjury wages minus the actual wages after
the date of maximum medical improvement.
The general ideas for the wage-loss approach discussed at the January
1978 meeting were then translated into draft legislation by John Lewis.
The Lewis draft used the "80/80" formula for computing the wageloss benefits and provided that any worker with a permanent impair
ment of at least 1 percent would receive a permanent impairment benefit,
with the dollar amounts for the permanent impairment benefits being
$100 for each percent rating from 1 to 10 percent, and higher amounts
for more serious injuries.
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As the wage-loss concept was thus being translated into a specific
statutory proposal, the pressures for change were building. An impor
tant factor at this stage was the Florida Association of Insurance Agents
(FAIA), which had been actively involved in an unsuccessful effort to
amend the Florida workers' compensation law in 1977. To increase the
influence of the insurance industry in subsequent legislative sessions,
the FAIA and several national insurance companies had formed The
Last Manifesto, a "multi-million dollar program" to reform the "state's
Workers' Compensation mess."
In early April 1978, Lewis took his draft legislation to an FAIA
meeting and explained the general idea of the wage-loss approach and
the specific version of the concept included in his bill. Reactions were
mixed at the meeting. A more serious obstacle arose when the National
Council on Compensation Insurance prepared a cost estimate that in
dicated the bill at best would lead to a slight rate reduction. Regardless
of the merits of the wage-loss bill, the likelihood that costs would not
significantly drop made enactment of the Lewis bill unrealistic because
of the resistance of the business community (Mintner 1982, p. 17).
The FAIA leadership, although unhappy with the specific variant of
wage loss in the Lewis bill because of its costs, nonetheless was per
suaded that the concept was sound. The FAIA then redrafted the Lewis
bill to scale back the benefits and began to promote the idea. The wageloss bill was not enacted in 1978 because of the short time available
to educate the legislators and to muster support from all elements of
the insurance industry. Furthermore, the Florida trial lawyers were a
formidable opponent to the adoption of the wage-loss concept. So the
1978 session produced, instead, some limited changes in the workers'
compensation statute and the enactment of a sunset provision that was
designed, according to Senator MacKay, its sponsor, "to hold a gun
to the Legislature's head" in 1979 (Mintner 1982, p. 21).
The wage-loss concept was further promoted and refined between
the 1978 and 1979 legislative sessions. A drafting committee of The
Last Manifesto rewrote the bill, and Fred Karl, general counsel of the
FAIA, and other FAIA staff members met with various groups within
Florida promoting the wage-loss approach.
By November 1978, Associated Industries of Florida also provided
tentative support for a kind of wage loss. But the Associated Industries
leadership also were unwilling to support the Lewis version of the wageloss bill because of the expense involved. Consequently, Mary Ann

The Transformation of Florida 275

Stiles, the association's workers' compensation expert, started her own
research on closed cases at the Bureau of Workers' Compensation in
order to provide a basis for her own variant of wage loss.
The FAIA/Last Manifesto version of wage loss suffered a serious
blow in January 1979 when the National Council on Compensation In
surance actuary appeared before the Florida legislature and presented
figures suggesting that the "rate savings were minimal to nonexistent,
while benefits might actually decrease" (Mintner 1982, p. 49). But even
though the specific version of wage loss promoted by the FAIA was
thus side-tracked next to the original Lewis proposal, nonetheless the
general concept soon picked up more steam.
The impetus was provided by a Workmen's Compensation Conference
on Wage Loss held January 16, 1979, that was sponsored by the FAIA.
The conference, at which (according to The Circle Solution) "all the
right buzz words were used," was held in the chambers of the Florida
House of Representatives, and played to an audience of legislators, in
terest group representatives, and the media. Speakers included the new
governor, Bob Graham, the insurance commissioner, who endorsed
wage loss as a "bold, but brilliant" concept, the House speaker, the
Senate president, and the chief executives of three of the Manifesto com
panies. John Lewis and John Burton also spoke.
The next day the Joint Legislative Committee on Workmen's Com
pensation voted 4-2 to endorse the general concept of wage loss.
Moreover, the specific version of wage loss favored by the FAIA ap
parently was favored by the Joint Committee. By February, however,
the FAIA proposal began to be dismantled by the Joint Committee. "At
the urging of Associated Industries' Jon Shebel, the Joint Committee
trimmed back impairments benefits to cover only amputation, blinding
or disfigurement. Attorneys' fees would be paid 100% by the claimant,
another of Shebel's proposals" (Mintner 1982, p. 70). As a result of
the conflicting pressures,
in early March, the Joint Committee adopted a comprehen
sive and massive wage-loss bill that promised to cut rates
by 21%. It contained many fundamental changes in the way
Comp would be administered, and there were amendments
to the agents' original bill that made them and the companies
unhappy. Still it was very close to their original proposal,
and was "wage-loss at its finest," they maintained. (Mint
ner 1982, p. 73)
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Then the bombshell was dropped. On March 14, the AFL-CIO and
Associated Industries of Florida announced they were supporting a new
workers' compensation reform package. One reason the AFL-CIO was
willing to join this coalition is that the bill supported by the Joint Com
mittee (which had its best chance for enactment in the Senate) would
have almost entirely favored business by reducing benefits. Dan Miller,
the AFL-CIO president, was convinced that some form of wage loss
was going to pass, and he wanted to salvage something for labor (Mintner
1982, p. 75). What the Associated Industries got from the coalition was
support of the AFL-CIO for a package that included a substantial cur
tailment of lawyers' role in the system. Shebel, president of Associated
Industries, felt that the lawyers' chances of defeating reform would be
weakened if labor's normal support for plaintiffs' attorneys could be
neutralized.
The steps between the March announcement of the AFL-CIO and
Associated Industries coalition and the eventual enactment of the
workers' compensation statute in April are complicated, but the essence
is that most of the provisions those parties sought were included in the
statute. The statute made substantial changes in the structure of the
workers' compensation delivery system, in the role of lawyers, and in
the criteria for permanent partial disability benefits. It adopted a dual
benefit system for permanent partial disability, with impairment benefits
for certain types of injuries and wage-loss benefits for workers with
actual wage loss after the date of MMI.
The dual benefit system can be traced back at least to the Lewis bill
first proposed in 1978. The agents had modified the proposal, limiting
the amount of benefits. The bill as enacted contained impairment benefits
considerably more restricted than those in the Lewis bill, and a wageloss formula that was considerably more generous than the Lewis ver
sion. This obviously was acceptable to labor and management, since
they negotiated the provision, and it was accepted with some reserva
tions by the Florida Association of Insurance Agents. An advisory com
mittee appointed by the governor to evaluate the 1979 legislation,
however, unanimously recommended that the law not be signed. (The
chairman of the advisors, John Burton, was particularly concerned about
the paltry impairment benefits and the unduly generous wage-loss for
mula.) Governor Graham ignored his advisors and signed the bill into
law on May 11, 1979.
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This abbreviated recounting of the enactment of the 1979 Florida
legislation suggests several useful lessons. One is that enactment of wageloss legislation—or any major overhaul of workers' compensation, for
that matter—is likely to require a crisis environment. In the case of
Florida, the crisis was the rapid escalation of the costs to employers
of workers' compensation. The second lesson is that the process of
reform is unpredictable and even erratic. The Lewis proposal for a dual
benefits system in early 1978 had modest impairment and wage-loss
benefits; the ultimate legislation had much more restrictive impairment
benefits coupled with more generous wage-loss benefits. The path beween the starting and ending versions of the dual benefits system reflects
political influences that at times were almost random. Indeed, FAIA,
the organization that devoted the most resources over the 1977-79 period
to the enactment of the wage-loss concept, almost lost control of the
reform process at the end. The third lesson is that the reform outcome
in a particular state is very much tied to the political power of the key
interest groups in that state. In most states, organized labor and claimants'
attorneys are natural allies in the struggle against the introduction of
wage-loss benefits, and they usually are strong enough to prevail. In
Florida, organized labor is relatively weak, and when it became ap
parent that the labor-lawyer alliance could not defeat wage loss, the
AFL-CIO leadership threw in with management in order to salvage
something for labor. As Dan Miller, the Florida AFL-CIO president,
has observed, the 1979 wage-loss bill and the accompanying increase
in maximum weekly benefits were of particular value to high-skilled
workers in hazardous occupations, and it is among those types of workers
that AFL-CIO strength is centered in Florida. 18 Thus the AFL-CIO sup
port for wage loss in Florida was the product of special circumstances
not found in many states.
The forces that led to the enactment of wage-loss legislation in Florida
are unlikely to be duplicated in many other jurisdictions. Whether the
outcome deserves to be emulated in any case will be further examined
in the final pages of this chapter.
Key Features of the 1979 Florida Workers' Compensation Reform

The 1979 legislation eliminated the previous approach to permanent
partial disability benefits, which distinguished between scheduled and
nonscheduled injuries and for the latter type offered the worker the choice
of basing ratings on physical impairment or loss of earning capacity.
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The new law established a dual benefit system with impairment benefits
and wage-loss benefits.
Impairment Benefits. These benefits are provided in Section
440.15(3)(a). They are paid to workers with certain types of perma
nent impairments (amputations, loss of 80 percent or more of vision,
or serious head or facial disfigurements) but are not paid to workers
with other types of permanent impairments (such as total or partial loss
of use of a body member). This is a restrictive schedule, since it ex
cludes most permanent partial injuries which involve loss of use rather
than amputation. The only change since 1979 in the injuries qualifying
for impairment benefits is that in 1982 the law was amended to make
clear that 80 percent of loss of vision in either eye qualifies for benefits.
The amounts of impairment benefits in the 1979 legislation were $50
for each percent of permanent impairment for ratings of 1 to 50 per
cent, and $100 for each percent over 50 percent. Thus a worker with
a 60 percent impairment rating received $3,500 under the 1979 law.
These amounts were increased, effective May 1, 1982, to $250 for each
percent of permanent impairment for 1 to 10 percent ratings, and $500
for each percent over 10 percent. Thus a worker with a 60 percent im
pairment rating since that date receives $27,500. These impairment
benefits can be paid in a lump sum as of the date of MMI.
Determination of the extent of the permanent impairment is govern
ed by Section 440.15(3)(a)(3), which provides, in part, that
the division shall establish and use a schedule. . .based on
generally accepted medical standards for determining impair
ment and may incorporate all or part of any one or more
generally accepted schedules used for such purpose . . . pend
ing the adoption, by rule, or a permanent schedule, Guides
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ... by the
American Medical Association, shall be the temporary
schedule. . . .
Wage-loss Benefits. Workers with permanent impairments are also
eligible for wage-loss benefits as of the date of MMI if they suffer at
least a 15 percent loss of earnings. Benefits are 95 percent of the earn
ings losses in excess of the 15 percent threshold. The maximum wageloss benefit is the lesser of (a) 66 2/3 percent of the worker's preinjury
wage, or (b) 100 percent of the state's average weekly wage. The max
imum weekly benefit was $195 in 1979 and $318 as of January 1986.
For wage-loss benefits that extend more than 25 months beyond the
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date of MMI, there is (in effect) a 5 percent per year escalation in poten
tial earnings used to calculate wage loss. 19
There are several important limitations on workers' eligibility for
wage-loss benefits. One is that workers lose their eligibility for the
benefits if they do not experience at least three consecutive months of
compensable wage loss in each two-year period after the date of MMI.
Other limitations concern the potential duration for wage-loss benefits
once they commence. The 1979 statute provided that the maximum dura
tion for the wage-loss benefit was 525 weeks (those injuries that occur
red on or before July 1, 1980, had a maximum duration of 350 weeks)
or age 65, whichever occurred first. The law was amended effective
July 1, 1980, to provide that the benefits stop at age 65 only when the
worker becomes eligible for Social Security Old Age Benefits. For
workers age 62 who were actually receiving Social Security Old Age
Benefits, the wage-loss benefits were reduced by the amount of the Old
Age benefits, not to exceed 50 percent of those wage-loss benefits. In
1983, the provision was further amended to eliminate the termination
of wage-loss benefits at age 65 if the worker is eligible for Old Age
benefits. Effective June 30, 1983, Section 440.15(3)(b)(4) provided that
when the worker is eligible for Old Age benefits (normally age 62),
the wage-loss benefit is not terminated but the amount is reduced so
that the sum of the Old Age and wage-loss benefits is equal to the amount
of wage-loss benefits that would otherwise be payable. The 1983 legisla
tion also provides that any month when no wage-loss benefit is paid
because the Old Age benefit is greater than the wage-loss benefit
nominally due counts toward the three consecutive months in each twoyear period during which benefits must be payable in order for eligibility
for wage-loss to continue.
The aspect of the wage-loss benefits that has provoked the most con
tention is the definition of earnings losses. Section 440.15(3)(b)(l) pro
vides, in part, that wage-loss benefits "shall be based on actual wageloss" and "shall be equal to 95 percent of the difference between 85
percent of the employee's average monthly wage [before the injury]
and the salary, wages, and other remuneration the employee is able
to earn after reaching maximum medical improvement as compared on
a monthly basis" (emphasis added). As to what is meant by "able to
earn," Section 440.15(3)(b)(2) of the 1979 statute provided:
The amount determined to be the salary, wages, and other
remunerations the employee is able to earn after reaching
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the date of maximum medical improvement shall in no case
be less than the sum actually being earned by the employee,
including earnings from sheltered employment. In the event
the employee voluntarily limits his or her income or fails
to accept employment commensurate with his or her abilities,
the salary, wages, and other remuneration the employee is
able to earn after the date of maximum medical improve
ment shall be deemed to be the amount which would have
been earned if the employee did not limit his or her income
or accepted appropriate employment ... the burden shall
be on the employee to establish that any wage loss claimed
is the result of the compensable injury.
This seemingly innocuous language has led to a series of significant
decisions that will be reviewed at some length below. The decisions
in turn have provoked a 1983 amendment to Section 440.15(3)(b)(2)
that will be discussed in conjunction with those cases. As with these
original statutory provisions, the amendment has generated controver
sy as to the legislative intent.
Other Benefits. In addition to the changes involving permanent par
tial disability benefits, there were also significant changes in the other
types of benefits. For example, the nominal replacement rate for tem
porary total disability and permanent total disability benefits was in
creased from 60 percent of the worker's preinjury wage to 66 2/3 per
cent. In addition, the maximum for all types of benefits was increased
from 66 2/3 percent of the state average weekly wage ($130 prior to
July 1, 1979) to the lesser of (a) 100 percent of the state average week
ly wage ($196 as of July 1, 1979, and $318 as of January 1, 1986) or
(b) 66 2/3 percent of the worker's preinjury wage.
Administration. The 1979 legislation also included significant changes
in the administrative structure and procedures of the workers' compen
sation program. The previous law had provided that disputed claims
were first heard by judges of industrial claims, with appeals going to
the Industrial Relations Commission and then by petition for writ of
certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court. The 1979 law abolished the
IRC and changed the nomenclature of the judges to deputy commis
sioners. Appeals from the deputy commissioners now go to the First
District Court of Appeal (part of the regular court system in Florida)
and then to the Florida Supreme Court by petition for writ of certiorari.
In short, there is no longer an appellate level within the workers' com-
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pensation program that deals exclusively or primarily with workers'
compensation cases.
The 1979 legislation also elevated the Bureau of Workmen's Com
pensation to the Division of Workers' Compensation and gave it greater
authority and responsibility for administration. Section 440.44 provides
that the Division is to "assume an active and forceful role in its ad
ministration of this act so as to ensure that the system operates effi
ciently and with maximum benefit to both employers and employees."
The law attempts to ensure that injured workers are fully and promptly
informed of the proper procedures and their legal rights. For example,
injured workers are to be mailed information on the program, and those
suffering injuries that might permanently disable them are to be con
tacted personally. Moreover, the Division is to become more actively
involved in controverted claims, including the issuing of advisory opi
nions as to the benefits payable in each case.
Attorneys' fees were also affected by the 1979 law. Before July 1,
1978, attorneys' fees for claimants were entirely paid by the employer
or carrier; in 1978, the worker was required to pay 25 percent of his
own attorney's fee. The 1979 law requires the claimant (with several
exceptions) to pay 100 percent of his own attorney's fee. All attorneys'
fees have to be approved as reasonable by the deputy commissioner
based on criteria included in the statute, such as the amount of time
expended by the attorney. The statute was amended in 1980 to provide
that in determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the deputy commissioner
shall consider only those benefits the attorney is responsible for secur
ing. In other words, those benefits voluntarily paid by the employer
or carrier are not to be considered in determining the claimant's at
torney's fee.
The widespread utilization of washouts (compromise and release
agreements) to terminate cases was also affected by the 1979 statute.
Section 440.20(12)(a) states that "it is in the best interests of the in
jured worker that he receive disability or wage-loss payments on a
periodic basis." Washouts of future medical benefits are strictly pro
hibited. Settlements involving cash benefits are absolutely prohibited
until six months after the date of MMI, and thereafter are permitted
only in special circumstances, such as when the claimant can demonstrate
that a lump-sum payment will definitely aid in the rehabilitation pro
cess or is otherwise clearly in the workers' best interest and that lumpsum payment will avoid undue expense or undue hardship to any party.
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The 1983 legislation provides a limited exception to the general pro
hibition on washouts found in Section 440.20(12)(a). The new law allows
washouts when the employer or carrier denies that a compensable in
jury occurs and the deputy commissioner "finds a justifiable controversy
as to legal or medical compensability of the claimed injury or the alleged
accident." Lump sums are not permitted under this exception if the
employer or carrier initially accepts the case as compensable or pro
vides any benefits.
These are by no means the only changes in the Florida Workers' Com
pensation program included in the 1979 statute and the subsequent
amendments. Our focus for the balance of this section is primarily on
those matters pertaining to permanent partial disability benefits. But
it should be obvious that an overall assessment of the 1979 legislation
in terms of its desirability to labor, management, carriers, workers,
and the public is complicated because of the many aspects of the pro
gram that were affected.
Constitutionality of the 1979 Legislation

The Florida Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
permanent partial benefits provisions of the 1979 legislation in Acton
v. Fort Lauderdale Hospital, 440 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1983). Acton in
jured his knee at work and received medical care and temporary total
disability benefits for five months, at which time he returned to work.
Acton received a 25 percent permanent disability rating for the knee
injury, which would have qualified him for permanent partial disabili
ty benefits under the Florida law in effect before the 1979 amendments.
Under the new law, however, the deputy commissioner found that the
injury did not qualify Acton for permanent impairment benefits, which
are limited to amputations, 80 percent or more vision loss, or serious
head or facial disfigurement, nor was Acton entitled to wage-loss benefits
because he was earning more after the injury than before. Acton un
successfully argued that the 1979 legislation violated constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and access to the courts.
While the courts in Acton and other cases have endorsed the con
stitutionality of the basic scheme for permanent disability benefits in
the 1979 legislation, they have not hesitated to scrutinize and arguably
even modify the statutory criteria for wage-loss benefits.
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Wage-Loss Benefits: The Legal Requirements
It may be true that "wage-loss in concept is disarmingly simple"
(Mintner 1982, p. 9). Nonetheless, in practice, wage-loss in Florida
has complicated elements. This subsection examines some of the legal
issues that have emerged as courts have interpreted the statute. We
simplify the analysis by ignoring many of the issues that arise in a case
in which a worker has filed a claim for wage-loss benefits, such as
whether the worker experienced an injury arising out of and in the course
of employment. We focus on three sets of requirements that must be
met by a worker in order to qualify for wage-loss benefits: the perma
nent impairment requirements; the "objective" wage-loss requirements;
and the "legally sufficient" wage-loss requirements. These three
categories of requirements are our construct, designed to help in analyz
ing the Florida law. Within these three sets of requirements are subissues
that may or may not be critical in a particular case.
The Permanent Impairment Requirements. First, has maximum
medical improvement been reached? If the answer is no, then the worker
is only potentially eligible for temporary total disability or temporary
partial disability benefits, since the impairment is not yet permanent.
Second, does the worker have a permanent impairment using an ac
ceptable rating system? The worker need not have a permanent impair
ment falling into one of the three categories that are prerequisites for
permanent impairment benefits. But the worker must have a perma
nent impairment with a rating of at least 1 percent using an appropriate
rating system before potentially qualifying for wage-loss benefits.
The statute designates the AMA Guides as the temporary schedule
to be used in determining the existence and degree of permanent im
pairment. Initial interpretations of the 1979 statute suggested that workers
would find it difficult to demonstrate they had permanent impairments
not encompassed by the AMA Guides. Thus in Rhaney v. Dobbs House,
Inc., 415 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the claimant's allegation
that she had a 5 to 10 percent impairment of the hand was denied by
the deputy commissioner because under the AMA Guides there was
no permanent impairment. The District Court of Appeals rejected a
challenge to the exclusive reliance on the AMA Guides because there
was "no evidence that claimant is not permanently impaired under the
AMA Guide [sic] but is permanently impaired under some other stan
dard." The reference to "some other standard" suggested that exclusive
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reliance on the AM A Guides might not suffice. The example offered
by the Court, however—loss of an arm or a leg demonstrable to the
deputy by his own observation—is encompassed by the AMA Guides
and provided little solace to those hoping to avoid exclusive reliance
on the Guides. The high-water mark for use of the AMA Guides as
an exclusive rating system probably was Mathis v. Kelley Construction
Co., 417 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Mathis had a knee injury
that caused an excessive range of motion: the knee was unstable and
would buckle unexpectedly. The AMA Guides rate only restrictions
in motion of the knee, not excessive motion, and as a result Mathis
was found to have no ratable permanent impairment and was denied
wage-loss benefits.
The halcyon days were short lived for the doctrine denying wageloss benefits unless the worker had a permanent impairment ratable by
the AMA Guides. The Court was forced to deal with facts demonstrating
the limits of the AMA Guides in Trindade v. Abbey Road Beef 'N Booze,
443 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), decided en bane with all 12 judges
concurring. Trindade experienced a knee injury that caused his knee
to buckle on occasion, for which his physician recommended a knee
cage to limit motion. The surgeon could not rate the injury using the
AMA Guides because they dealt only with loss of range of motion in
rating knees, while Trindade's knee had instability due to excessive range
of motion. The physician rated the knee using the American Academy
of Orthopedic Surgery Manual and found a 5 to 10 percent permanent
impairment. The Court noted that its own efforts to give the AMA Guides
exclusive effect in order to facilitate the goal of uniformity in deter
mining the existence and extent of permanent impairment were under
taken in anticipation of the Division adopting a more comprehensive
schedule. But four years had passed since the legislature imposed on
the Division the duty of establishing a comprehensive guide and man
dated the use of the AMA Guides as a temporary schedule. Meanwhile,
the Court had found it increasingly difficult to justify the exclusion of
certain injuries with permanent consequences because they did not meet
the rating criteria in the AMA Guides. Moreover, the Division during
the course of this case had indicated that "it not only has been unable
to produce a comprehensive schedule as mandated by the statute: It ex
presses doubt that a suitable schedule can be prepared, and it is an
ticipated that no such schedule will be forthcoming." The Court con
cluded that exclusive reliance on the AMA Guides under these cir
cumstances would be inappropriate and indeed would be unconstitu-
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tional as a violation of due process because of the arbitrary distinction
between covered and excluded impairments. The Court therefore held
that for purposes of determining eligibility for wage loss
benefits ... the existence and degree of permanent impair
ment resulting from injury shall be determined pursuant to
the [AMA] Guides, unless such permanent impairment can
not reasonably be determined under the criteria utilized in
the Guides, in which event such permanent impairment may
be established under other generally accepted medical criteria
for determining impairment.
The Division's immediate reaction to the December 1983 Trindade
decision was to adopt by rule the Manual for Evaluation of Permanent
Physical Impairment of the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons
for use in evaluating those conditions of the hip, knee, shoulder, and
elbow not covered by the AMA Guides. In October 1984, the Division
adopted by rule the 2nd edition of the AMA Guides to replace the 1971
edition that had been previously used.
The use of the Manual of the American Academy of Orthopedic
Surgeons for certain conditions not encompassed in the AMA Guides
is defensible. More problematical are the recent rulings concerning the
use of subjective complaints as a basis for permanent impairment ratings.
In Maggard v. Simpson Motors, 451 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984),
the Court affirmed a denial of wage-loss benefits when the impairment
rating was based solely on subjective complaints. But because of a con
cern over lack of uniformity among the three-judge panels in the First
District Court of Appeals, an en bane review was held in Martin County
School Board v. McDaniel, 465 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The
worker experienced a back injury and during the healing period there
were objective findings, such as muscle spasm. The worker was given
medication, used a prescribed back brace, and his activity was restricted.
After the date of maximum medical improvement there was no objec
tive evidence of a permanent impairment. The treating physician made
a permanent impairment rating of 5 percent that did not rely on the rating
criteria in the Orthopedic Surgeons' Manual for Evaluation of Perma
nent Partial Impairment but was made "in reference" to the methods
in the Manual and his experience as an orthopedic surgeon who had
treated many bad backs. The deputy commissioner found there was a
permanent impairment, and the eight-member majority of the Court af
firmed. The opinion noted that the doctor had monitored the claimant's
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chronic complaints of pain and stiffness over an extended period of two
years and also noted that the program of medication and activity restric
tion were themselves responsible for the absence of objective signs after
the date of MMI. The majority opinion distinguished the case from Maggard, where the permanent impairment rating was based on bare
unverified subjective complaints. The four-judge dissent objected to the
finding of permanent impairment because there was no objective evidence
after the date of MMI, thus rendering "meaningless the standard of
'other generally accepted medical criteria for determining impairment'
which we approved in Trindade."
While the McDaniel case involved a physician who at least made an
oblique use of the Orthopedic Surgeons' Manual, a subsequent case
abandoned even this extent of reliance on a published guide. In United
General Construction v. Cason, 479 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985),
the permanent impairment rating was based primarily on a physician's
"personal judgment of the claimant's history of subjective complaints
of pain and specifically excluded consideration of the recognized medical
reference guides." The award of wage-loss benefits by the deputy com
mission was affirmed by the Court, which noted that "the physician's
opinion was particularly compelling due to the length of time spent in
evaluating and monitoring the pattern of subjective symptoms." These
recent decisions can only be viewed as a threat to the effort to restrict
the eligibility for wage-loss benefits to those workers with readily
verifiable permanent impairments.
The "Objective" Wage-Loss Requirements. First, are the actual earn
ings after the date of maximum medical improvement less than the earn
ings before the date of injury? If not, then the worker is not eligible
for wage-loss benefits for the months in question. Two additional
qualifications are necessary. First, for injuries occurring since July 1,
1980, the actual earnings in months that are more than two years after
the date of MMI are discounted by a factor of 5 percent per year before
they are compared to preinjury earnings. Second, the actual earnings
in the month for which wage-loss benefits are claimed must be at least
15 percent below preinjury earnings before the worker qualifies for the
benefits because of the threshold built into the statute.
Second, did the actual wage loss start soon and sustain sufficiently?
The statute requires the actual wage loss to begin within two years from
the date of MMI or the right to wage-loss benefits lapses. In addition,
wage-loss benefits must be payable for at least three consecutive months
during each 24-month period after the date of MMI.
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Third, did the actual wage loss last too long or occur too late in life?
For injuries that occurred after July 1, 1980, the maximum duration
on wage-loss benefits is 525 weeks. Thus a worker with a permanent
impairment who qualifies for wage-loss benefits at age 25 can in no
case receive these benefits after age 35. Also, as a result of a 1980
amendment (further changed in 1983), wage-loss benefits terminated
at age 65 if the worker was eligible for Old Age benefits from the Social
Security program. The age 65 cutoff was challenged in Sasso v. RAM
Property Management, 452 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed,
469 U.S. 1030 (1984). Sasso was age 78 at the time of his injury, and
consequently the carrier denied wage-loss benefits. The Florida Supreme
Court found that the age 65 cutoff provision did not violate constitu
tional guarantees of equal protection and access to the courts. The age
65 cutoff provision also was alleged to violate the Federal Age
Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), but the Florida
Supreme Court held that the Florida law was not unconstitutional under
the Federal Supremacy clause in O 'Neil v. Department of Transporta
tion, 468 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1985), cert, denied, __ U.S. __, 106
S.Ct. 174 (1985). A similar allegation that the Florida statute violated
the Federal Supremacy clause because it conflicted with the Social Securi
ty Act was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in Acosta v. Kraco,
Inc., 471 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1985), cert, denied, __ U.S. __, 106
S.Ct. 576 (1985). As discussed in the previous subsections, the ter
mination of wage-loss benefits at age 65 for workers qualifying for Social
Security Old Age benefits was eliminated in 1983, and in its place an
offset provision was added that reduces wage-loss benefits for workers
who are eligible for Old Age benefits.
The ' 'Legally Sufficient'' Wage-Loss Requirements. The two sets of
requirements for wage-loss benefits described above only provide the
background for the most interesting legal developments concerning wageloss benefits. The portions of the statute that have given rise to the con
troversies are Section 440.15(3)(b)(l) and (2) (quoted earlier in this
chapter).
At least five separate requirements have been used in one or another
of the Florida cases that have decided whether a wage loss was "legal
ly sufficient" to satisfy Section 440.15(3)(b). The five tests (with alter
native versions of the fifth) are:
(i)

There must be an interruption of employment because of the
permanent impairment.

288 The Transformation of Florida

(ii) There must be an adequate job search.
(iii) There must be no refusal of suitable work.
(iv) There must be no voluntary limitation of income.
(va) Even if tests (i)-(iv) are satisfied, the wage loss must be due
solely to the worker's physical inability to perform work, and
other factors, such as slack economic conditions, must play no
part in the loss of wages. 20
(vb) The wage loss must be due at least in part to the physical con
sequences of the injury. Even if economic conditions also play
a part in causing loss of earnings, the worker is not disqualified
if tests (i)-(iv) are satisfied.
The law in Florida has evolved since 1979 concerning the use of these
five tests because of both court cases and the 1983 amendments to the
law.
Probably the test that has been involved in most cases concerns whether
the job search was adequate. The Florida courts have provided some
guidance on the requirement. The employee is excused from conduc
ting a good-faith job search if the employer or carrier has failed to notify
the claimant of the search requirement, DeFrees v. Colt and Dumont/HIT
Sales, 483 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Similarly, in a case in
volving temporary total disability benefits but that is relevant for wageloss benefits, a worker cannot be denied benefits because of a failure
to search for work if "he neither knew nor should have known that
he was medically released to work," Davis v. Phillips & Jordan, 483
So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). A job search is not adequate when
the claimant misrepresented his medical limitations by telling prospec
tive employers he was medically limited to working only four hours
per day when his physician had imposed no such limit, Snowdon v. Sam
bo's, No. BG-442, slip op. (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). There are numerous
similar cases interpreting the adequate job search requirement.
Nonetheless, "it is impossible to find a single, definitive statement of
what constitutes an 'adequate' job search," Flesche v. Interstate
Warehouse, 411 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). 21
The fourth requirement for wage-loss benefits—no voluntary limita
tion of income—was involved in Topeka Inn Management v. Pate, 414
So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Pate was injured on August 2, 1979,
while working as a waitress. Her back injury was rated as 5 percent

The Transformation of Florida 289

permanent impairment with a date of MMI of February 18, 1980. From
April to August 1980, she worked as a full-time secretary at the minimum
wage, which was less than the wage she had earned as a waitress. From
August to October 1980 she quit work to take care of her husband, who
had suffered a heart attack. From October 1980 to January 1981, she
worked full time as a nurse's aid, again at the minimum wage. The
court agreed with the deputy commissioner that Pate was entitled to
wage-loss benefits during the periods she was working as a secretary
or as a nurse's aid, with the benefits replacing a portion of the difference
between her pre-injury wage and her actual earnings. But what of the
period in which she quit work?
The court opined:
Strictly speaking, her wage loss during this period of time
was not solely due to her compensable injury. That fact,
however, does not preclude her entitlement to wage-loss
benefits . . . Section 440.15(3)(b)(2) provides:
. . . In the event the employee voluntarily limits his or her
income or fails to accept employment commensurate with his
or her abilities, the salary, wages, and other remuneration
the employee is able to earn after the date of maximum
medical improvement shall be deemed to be the amount which
would have been earned if the employee did not limit his or
her income or accepted appropriate employment. . . . [em
phasis supplied in original]
Considering the statute as a whole and applying it to these
facts, we conclude that, by accepting employment as both
a secretary and a nurse's aide, claimant has demonstrated
the "salary, wages, and other remuneration (she) is able to
earn after the date of maximum medical improvement."
Therefore, the wage loss attributable to her injury for these
months when she was caring for her ill husband is the dif
ference between her former salary as a waitress and the
prevailing minimum wage.
The relationship between the requirements of adequate job search (test
ii) and no voluntary limitation of income (test iv) was involved in Anderson v. S& S Diversified, Inc., 477 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
The deputy commissioner used the deemed earnings provision to
diminish the wage-loss award for the six months when the job search
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was "sporadic and ineffective." For an additional two months, the depu
ty denied any wage-loss benefits because of the lack of any job search.
The District Court of Appeals affirmed the use of the deemed earnings
provision for the six-months interval, but reversed the deputy's deci
sion for the two-months period, holding that the deemed-earnings ap
proach "applied equally to inadequate and absent search." In short,
an adequate job search is not "a condition precedent to any considera
tion of the merits of a wage loss claim," but is only one factor to be
used in determining the extent of wage-earning capacity.
Although the job search and voluntary limitation of income tests can
in part be analyzed in isolation from the other tests that compose the
"legally sufficient" requirements, the most interesting developments
concern the combinations of the tests, which can be traced in a series
of cases.
LeHigh Corp. v. Byrd, 397 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in
volved a claim for temporary total disability benefits, but was cited in
subsequent permanent partial disability cases. The claimant was injured
in December 1979 and paid temporary total disability benefits. He return
ed to work for two weeks and then was discharged on February 23,
1980. Between then and June 27, 1980, there were two periods when
Byrd was medically able to work but was unemployed. The deputy com
missioner awarded temporary total disability benefits for these two
periods. The District Court reversed and laid down these requirements
for temporary total disability benefits:
. . . the claimant must show that his work search was suc
cessful, but that he was unable to perform the work. Alter
natively, he would have to show that his work search was
unsuccessful due to his disability (rather than unavailability
of work). . . . The claimant in this case has completely fail
ed to establish any of the preceding elements, [citations
omitted]
The District Court decision makes clear that Boyd did not make a
conscientious job search during most of the time when temporary total
disability benefits were controverted, and denying the benefits for these
periods is consistent with earlier cases. By June 15, however, Byrd had
made a conscientious search (according to the court), and yet he was
denied temporary total disability benefits for June 15 to June 27 (when
he started a new job) because, according to the court (at p. 1204), "the
claimant did not establish that the work search was unsuccessful due
to the disability."
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The LeHigh test for temporary total disability benefits was adopted
for wage-loss benefits under the permanent partial disability sections
of the 1979 statute in Lake County Commissioners v. Walburn, 409 So.
2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Walburn was injured in November 1979
and reached maximum medical improvement on July 23, 1980. Be
tween July 23 and October 1, 1980, Walburn had no earnings even
though he made extensive job searches (averaging two or three inquiries
per week with the State Employment Office, for example). The deputy
commissioner awarded wage-loss benefits for this period, but the District
Court reversed, holding that:
Section 440.15(3)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (1979). . . places the burden
on the employee to establish that any wage loss benefit claim
ed is a result of the compensable injury. As claimant is
qualified by training and experience for a number of jobs,
including surveying, accounting and construction, the
evidence is totally insufficient to prove that his work search
was unsuccessful due to his disability (rather than because
work was unavailable) and that he was entitled to wage loss
benefits.
Judge Ervin dissented on the issue of Walburn's eligibility for wageloss benefits, arguing that "The majority's interpretation of Section
440.15(3)(b)2, forcing a claimant to prove that his work search was
unsuccessful due to his disability, rather than because of unavailability
of work could place a well-nigh impossible burden on an injured claim
ant. . . ."
The decisions in LeHigh and Walburn represent a stringent view of
the tests that must be satisfied before wage-loss benefits are paid. The
cases form a backdrop for the landmark decision in Regency Inn v.
Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The claimant was in
jured in August 1979, only days after the legislation enacted that year
took affect. She reached maximum medical improvement on August
4, 1980, and had a 5 percent permanent impairment due to the 1979
injury. Johnson remained unemployed after the date of MMI and filed
for wage-loss benefits. Her claim for benefits for the period August
4, 1980 to December 10, 1980, was denied by the deputy commissioner
because of the absence of a job search; this period was not an issue
in the appeal. Thereafter, Johnson made an extensive job search that
the deputy commissioner found was in good faith, but she was unsuc
cessful in obtaining employment. The deputy commissioner also found
that the employer had not made Johnson a job offer for the period of
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wage loss after December 10, 1980. 22 The deputy commissioner
therefore awarded her 100 percent wage-loss benefits for December
10, 1980, to April 10, 1981, and the employer filed an appeal concern
ing this period. The appeal was initially decided by a three-judge panel
of the First District Court of Appeal, which upheld the award of wageloss benefits for the December 1980 to April 1981 period. The court
concluded that the Lehigh rule is inapplicable for the purpose of wageloss benefits, and specifically endorsed the reasoning and authority set
forth in the dissenting opinion in Lake County Commissioners v.
Walburn. The court noted that the language pertaining to permanent
total benefits was different from the language pertaining to wage-loss
benefits. Specifically, for permanent total disability the statute provides:
"the burden shall be upon the employee to establish that he
is not able uninterruptedly to. . .work due to physical limita
tions," and no compensation of that character shall be payable
'if the employee. . .is physically capable of. . .gainful
employment." Section 440.15(l)(b), Florida statutes.
In contrast, the court notes, "For wage loss the statute provides simply
for general causal relation by covering any such loss which 'is the result
of the. . .injury.' "
The three-judge panel concluded that the difference in statutory
language for permanent total and wage-loss benefits made the LeHigh
rule inapplicable for the latter type of benefits.
The decisions in Walburn and Regency obviously conflict, reflecting
in part the different composition of the three-judge panels from the First
District Court that rendered these decisions. To resolve the conflict be
tween the cases, the Regency case was reheard en bane, and the First
District Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the original decision in
Regency. The per curium opinion reflects the diversity of arguments
presented to the court.
One argument that was significant concerned the final sentence of
Section 440.15(3)(b)2, which reads: "Whenever a wage-loss benefit
as set forth in subparagraph 1. may be payable, the burden shall be
on the employee to establish that any wage loss claimed is the result
of the compensable injury." The employer/carrier argued that this
sentence placed the burden of proof on the employee to show a causal
relationship between the wage loss and the injury, and that this burden
could not be satisfied merely by proving "economic dislocation" or
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"job disruption" by reason of the compensable injury, as had been con
cluded by the panel that originally decided the case. The full court then
restated the burden of proof provision to:
require the employee to go forward with evidence showing
a change in employment status due to the injury, and an ade
quate and good faith attempt to secure employment commen
surate with his abilities so as to establish, prima facie, an
economic loss and to show that he or she has not voluntarily
limited his or her income or failed to accept employment com
mensurate with his or her abilities. Once this evidence has
been presented by the employee, the burden of proving that
the employee has refused work or voluntarily limited his or
her income is on the employer.
But what if an employee who could meet the four elements of the
burden of proof requirement, which corresponds to the first four tests
for "legally sufficient wage loss" that were previously enumerated,
still could not find a job, at least in part because suitable jobs were
unavailable? The en bane opinion (at p. 879) could not have been more
clear:
We hold that the unavailability of jobs due to economic
conditions does not preclude recovery of wage loss benefits,
and, accordingly, it is not necessary for a wage loss claim
ant to present evidence that his refusal for employment was
not due to unavailability of jobs resulting from economic con
ditions. Any other decision on this issue would convert wage
loss hearings under the act into seminars on economics, re
quiring the gathering and presentation of complex informa
tion beyond the ken of all but the most schooled in the field
of economics, and certainly beyond the resources and abili
ty of the average worker to present or defend against. The
sheer impracticability of burdening wage loss claim procedure
with such evidence is obvious.
The decision in the Regency case surprised and dismayed some of
the supporters of the 1979 legislation. For example, Mary Ann Stiles,
then general counsel for the Associated Industries of Florida, wrote
(1983) that in the Regency case,
The Court failed to see that it shifted the burden of the
unemployed from the unemployment rolls to the workers'
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compensation rolls. What is accomplished in arguing that
employers should rehabilitate and reemploy injured workers
when there are no jobs available? That issue is not and never
has been a workers' compensation issue in the State of
Florida. The Court did not look at the real world when it
decided Regency.
The adverse reaction to the Regency decision, exemplified by the Stiles
statement, produced legislation in 1983. Of primary relevance for the
"legally sufficient" wage-loss requirements is the sentence added to
Section 440.15(3)(b)(2):
It shall also be the burden of the employee to show that
his inability to obtain employment or to earn as much as he
earned at the time of his industrial accident, is due to physical
limitation related to his accident and not because of economic
conditions or the unavailability of employment.
The apparent intention of this amendment was to overrule the holding
in the Regency case and require the injured worker to show that the
only reason for the loss of wages was the physical limitations caused
by the injury. This was the legal doctrine enunciated in Lake County
Commissioners v. Walburn and then rejected in Regency. The First
District Court of Appeal made a different interpretation of the 1983
amendment in City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984), petition for review denied, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1984).
The Court found that the first four tests for wage-loss benefits
(enumerated above) were met, which then required the Court to choose
between the (va) and (vb) versions of the fifth test. Rumph had made
an extensive job search and testified that once prospective employers
found out about his work injury, they would not hire him. The employer
argued this was insufficient and that as a result of the 1983 amendments
wage-loss benefits were precluded unless the "claimant establishes that
economic conditions do not affect his employ ability." In short, the
employer's position would have required the employee to demonstrate
that the sole reason for the wage loss was the worker's permanent im
pairment. This interpretation was rejected by the Court because it would
have so limited the workers' remedies as to "seriously imperil the con
stitutional validity of the workers' compensation law." The interpreta
tion of the 1983 amendment that the Court found constitutional and
therefore adopted was that wage-loss benefits were precluded "when
predicated solely on economic considerations unrelated to a claimant's
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physical limitations by ordinary proximate cause standards." Although
this interpretation seems to turn the apparent intent of the 1983 amend
ment on its head, the result indicates that sometimes two wrongs do
make a right. The questionable decision nullified a dubious amendment
that was intended to vitiate the essence of the wage-loss approach: to
provide benefits to workers who experience actual loss of earnings
because of work injuries.
Experience with the Wage-Loss Approach
This section examines the impact on various aspects of the Florida
workers' compensation program of the 1979 reform of permanent par
tial disability benefits. Data are assembled from the National Council
on Compensation Insurance, the Florida Division of Workers' Com
pensation, and various other sources.
Data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance

Chapter 3 presents extensive data from the National Council on Com
pensation Insurance on the numbers, average cost, and total cost of per
manent partial disability cases in Florida between 1958 and 1982. Here
we present additional data pertaining to the pre-1979 legislation era,
which serves as a benchmark for evaluating the impact of the new law,
plus more data on experience under the new law.
Table 9.1 presents data from the eight most recent policy years cur
rently available. Three technical aspects of the data must be discussed
before their significance can be assessed. First, a policy year in Florida
involves all policies written between December 1 of one year and
November 30 of the next year. Thus policy year 1974-75 includes
policies sold between December 1974 and November 1975. Second,
policies are in effect for 12 months. Thus the experience for policy year
1974-75 includes reports on some injuries that occurred as early as
December 1974 and some that occurred as late as November 1976.
Third, the first report basis as shown in table 9.1 reflects the actual
experience of policies in the specified policy year based on reports sub
mitted six months after the expiration of each policy sold during the
year. The fifth report basis is a simulation of what the experience is
expected to be after five years of development (and the ultimate report
basis is the simulated ultimate cost), based on development factors deriv
ed from earlier policy years in Florida. The beginning point for the
simulations is the actual data shown in the first reports, which are then

0

"es

'•E
4s
Q*
^Be
es
|
£
O

_c
*

1 1
H S

** <-.

Cfl

> u
<

t*

"1 1

3 CM
Z 0

11

M

is
V
4*

2 1Q

es

1u

O
•c?

^

1 1
z *S

«

£
«<
U
1

CN
vo
vo

r~

oo in ^3"
i—i t—i

•* vo CN

rf ON OO — en
ON en en en —
p~ ON —' OO p—
m ON

^D CO ^O

CN ON ON —' •<*
CN CN
O" V~l
OO O

ON -H CN 00 \O
CN en (Tl <N -H

vo in CN

oo
ON
—
—
^H
r~
oo

r^
oo
-H
en

o
—
en
en
CN
CN
in

vo
rin
m

en" en" en" en" •*" en"

wi oo p^- tf™1! VQ CN CN ON
en en

VO

oo ^t CN in *-* en
O in vo en CN •^in
oo r^ T}" CN

-H

00 00

m — OO CN ON vo
CN ON OO oo
t~^H ON oo
en ON CN CN
TT
oo m 8! £ £ •<*
O

O O vo

— —i CN — CN en

en -H \o en en in oo
vo ON r- O CN t~- CN
m VO CN •'t
oo ON ON O OO vo O

vo •rf CN ON en -H oo
—i ON CN oo in o ••*
en O —< CN r- CN T)en en en CN CN CN CN

in vo r~ oo ON O —i CN
oo oo oo
l
i
i i i 1 1 1

vo t^ oo ON O —
ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON

en
pON
CN

•<t
in
•*t
p-

£ S vo vo ^t"

« £8

t:
i

1

.—

296 The Transformation of Florida

ON
"*

?3

^

^^ C
CO

S 3
IM ^
O Q

C«

E J
••*

cn C
</) O.
« e
- ®
~H '•? C
. t< o
^fig

H e °

s-s s
ll
*J
2
o -fi

*1
B s
* QJ
en v

|1
J!

w* fc.

Cu ^

•3 S

O r~ r~ en -rt CN
in en vo

^ OO
VO OO

vo vo OO ON CN ON CN •<!•
CN OO CN ON m p~ vo —

— CN en m ON CN P~ CN
OO —
cs O
m en"
p^ oo"
O^ oo"
vo_^ m"
m" p~"
—<"
vo"
i—i .—i

O\

*^'

OO Tt ON
P~ OO Tt

CN CN CN CN —>

»-H

oo in
en en en en en en ••* en

4-I
§ 1
^&
S '^

^^
>• ^

ON
•""'

^ en
O O
CN —
CN, -<t

OO OO

<u
.1
u"

a

3
0

•s0)

Z

U
•§03" U
Q_ ty<
K" ^

!»"§

r^ 8
^ -1 _c

C3 3 °°

cx, 3 rz
^ ""^ t
a "H '£5

^ •* <
-2
ON ^^

CS
•w

c
u
u
ci.

<u

a
_>»
CQ
O.
Q.
CI]

00

(*-!

.23
eo
X)

u
«

.E

"3

C/5

« OO

""

Q^

<?

^

O u.
•^ o»
2 £>

^§

S 2
i-s

- Si
c

Q. 0.

S3 o

83
13 -°
'£
c

S2 22

CD

C3

c

O.JS

S

«-> . §

O
«

% J3cs"
-~

5

^

. E E
t: 3

- 2

.-. (V •-•

U ^g

^ a 5
i/i

. .

<U

0
W '"
T3
H

j£

H fi

c

§2

d °° 0 c
I S^
l|
'•S .tj "5

U CN 0

o •*

3

'o ON

O ON" J=

O 5 ON

i"! O

« 00 ?

.2

>—i ^; oo
C 2 ON

3-g

we

Si^

^"— §^
s: 'C —

il|
I
"a CN" .^ <u

i^ -"

t
*
rC en
U oo
- ON

C ^ CQ O
OO
ON
O
Cx,
5r ,O
OS

!<"*

c

ON § |
° "u in" u

1 -2 o

^ §§

a *S

1

> z_, OO
• 2i
ON
S C ~"

^"^ 1^*1 *~*

in
OO
r~
en

en in
en o
o o
in m

CN
Tf Ro
ON oS ^
in
ON 2JS

vo ^!

1^

^" vo vo en en ON rt vo
oo en
CN —' O
oo in en CN en TJ- oo —
Tj- CN CN en

P^ OO OO P~

CN ON ON

oo
Tf
m
—'
p~

•—" CN ON en
en
o
m
vo

r~ -H in

en
en
in
—'
CN
O
m
p~
O
ON

—
ON
oo
CN

CN CN CN CN CN CN

en en vo — ON oo
CN VO CN O •* •<*
en CN en •<t P~ en

ON ^^ ON

ON
O
r—
CN
in

VO CN OO CN P- VO

«£

0

V

r*

_c
.<"

es
BQ

0)

1

OS
1

i

'i01
Cg

1
JS

'£

PQ
o»
n
Qa

00 -H
P~ oo
vO CN VO p~
rt OO ON oo
^ ^ en en

1

ON

1
1
1
1 1
p~ oo ON o —
oo oo
ON ON ON ON ON

in vo P~ 00 ON O —H CN
1

ON

Tf in vo
ON

o •%* o-s

oo -«i —i Z .ts

The Transformation of Florida 297

multiplied by the appropriate development factors. As can be seen by
comparing panels A and B in table 9.1, case developments between the
first report and fifth (or ultimate) report typically decrease the number,
average cost, and total cost of minor permanent partial disability cases
and increase the number, average cost, and total cost of major perma
nent partial disability cases. This reflects, in part, the conversion of
some cases initially classified as minor permanent partial into major
permanent partial as the costs of those cases increase through time.
With these technical aspects in mind, what "lessons" can the data
in table 9.1 provide on the consequences of the 1979 reforms? Policy
years 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77 entirely involved experience under
the old law, as did about 95 percent of the policy year 1977-78 ex
perience, 23 and the data suggest a fairly stable pattern of about 11,000
to 12,000 permanent partial disability cases (major plus minor) per policy
year on a first report basis and about 11,000 to 13,000 permanent par
tial disability cases per policy year on a fifth report basis. Average cost
on the fifth report basis increased through time to about $25,000 for
major permanent partial disabilities and were fairly stable during the
period at about $3,400 for minor permanent partial disabilities. Total
costs of both major and minor permanent partial disabilities on a fifth
report basis were in the $115-$ 140 million range between policy year
1974-75 and policy year 1977-78.
Policy year 1978-79 contains policies that expired between December
1979 and November 1980, and about half of all injuries in that policy
year occurred after the effective date of the 1979 legislation. In addi
tion to the data from the 1978-79 transition year, there are data from
policy years 1979-80 through 1981-82 that are entirely under the new
law. Thus, in a rough sense, the first four policy years in table 9.1 can
be considered "old law" experience and the last four policy years "new
law" experience.
For minor permanent partial cases, the effect of the new law is con
sistent in both panels of table 9.1. Average costs have increased
moderately under the new law, while the number and total costs have
been cut in half. Thus the 1979 amendments have succeeded in
eliminating many of the cases with minor injuries from the program.
The effects of the new law on major permanent partial cases are more
complex. The numbers are clearly down on a first report basis, and
there also is probably a decline in numbers on the fifth report/ultimate
report basis. Average costs are up under the new law, especially on
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the ultimate report basis, and as a result total costs of major permanent
partial cases are higher under the new law than they were prior to the
1979 amendments. The higher costs occurred in the last two policy years,
when first the average cost and then the total cost doubled compared
to the corresponding figures under the old law.
The higher cost estimates for permanent partial cases were a major
factor in the increases in worker compensation insurance rates that began
in 1982 (table 9.2). Concern over the increases led to the appointment
of the Workers' Compensation Experience Review Committee, which
reported in October 1984. The Report found that much of the explana
tion for the higher costs was the realization by carriers, employers, and
the NCCI that wage-loss cases were more expensive than originally an
ticipated when the new law went into effect. In particular, the increase
in estimated costs of the wage-loss cases between the first and ultimate
reports (the incurred loss development factors) had to be substantially
increased as actual experience under the new law became available.
The finding that wage-loss cases have significant costs for many years
after the year of injury is reinforced by data in the next subsection.
Table 9.2
Florida Workers' Compensation Insurance Rate Revisions, 1979-86

Effective
date
August 1, 1979
January 1, 1981
July 1, 1981
January 1, 1982
September 1, 1982
December 1, 1982
March 1, 1984
January 1, 1985
January 1, 1986

Percentage change
from previous
rates

Cumulative change
from
January 1, 1978
rates

-15.0
-5.1
-15.6
-6.5
+ 10.0
+ 10.7
+ 10.1
+ 18.7
+ 11.8

-15.0
-19.3
-31.9
-36.3
-30.0
-22.5
-14.7
+ 1.3
+ 13.3

SOURCES: 1979-85 data from National Council on Compensation Insurance, 1986 Annual
Statistical Bulletin, p. 18. 1986 data from National Council on Compensation Insurance, Memoran
dum FL-86-1 (Feb. 3, 1986).
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Data from the Florida Division of Workers' Compensation

The data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance have
some advantages, such as their rough consistency with data from other
NCCI jurisdictions. There are also some disadvantages, however, such
as the limitation of results to those employers who purchase insurance,
thus omitting results for self-insuring employers. When there is a trend
to greater self-insurance, as there has been in Florida during the last
decade, 24 the NCCI data may provide misleading evidence on changes
through time in the number and total cost of permanent partial disabili
ty cases. The data collected and published by the Florida Division of
Workers' Compensation have the advantage of encompassing all
employers, including self-insurers. 25 Unfortunately, most of the annual
statistical reports published by the Division in recent years contain on
ly one line of data on permanent partial disability cases that combines
information on permanent impairment and wage-loss cases. 26 Fortunate
ly, the Division has introduced a computerized data system in recent
years that contains considerable valuable material. The tables in this
subsection are based on unpublished tabulations provided by the Florida
Division of Workers' Compensation. 27
Table 9.3 presents information on the number of cases that have receiv
ed permanent impairment benefits under Section 440.15(3)(a) or wageloss benefits under Section 440.15(3)(b) between August 1979 and
December 1985. The data are by year of injury and show a total of
about 3 1/2 times as many wage-loss as permanent impairment cases
in the first seven years of the new law. Several observations are war
ranted. An unknown number of cases appears twice because the workers
received both types of benefits. The apparent decline in numbers of
cases in recent years is misleading because there often is a considerable
lag between the date of injury and the date when the worker first qualifies
for permanent impairment or wage-loss benefits. This is particularly
true for wage-loss benefits, because the worker must both reach the
date of MMI and experience a subsequent period of wage-loss due to
the work-injury.
The lag between date of injury and the initial payment of wage-loss
benefits is documented in table 9.4. The first full year under the new
law was 1980, 28 and by the end of that year (corresponding to 0 years
after the year of injury) there were 235 cases involving 1980 injuries
that had received wage-loss benefits. The peak year for new wage-loss
cases involving 1980 injuries was 1981 (corresponding to 1 year after
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the year of injury), when 1,057 cases were established. Of interest is
that five years after the 1980 date of injury, 68 new wage-loss cases
were established. The data for 1981-83 in table 9.4 also show the pat
tern of new wage-loss cases peaking the year after the date of injury,
with numerous additional cases initially qualifying for wage-loss benefits
in subsequent years. The data in columns (1) and (2) of table 9.7 sum
marize the general relationship between time and numbers of wage-loss
cases resulting from injuries in 1980-84. One hundred percent represents
the number of wage-loss cases established by one year after the year
of injury (by December 1981 for 1980 injuries, for example). By four
years after the date of injury the percentage is 198, and by the end of
year 5 it is 213 percent. In short, there is a long and thick tail to the
number of wage-loss cases.
Table 9.3
Pernament Impairment and Wage-Loss Cases in Florida
1979-85 Injuries
Number of
impairment cases
established by
December 1985

Number of
wage-loss cases
established by
December 1985

1979 (Aug. -Dec.)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

409
1,095
1,004
870
707
492
164

1,023
2,755
3,438
3,348
2,965
2,233
495

Total

4,741

16,257

Year of
injury

SOURCE: Calculated from data in tables provided by Florida Department of Labor and Employ
ment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation (August 1986).

The wage-loss cases once established tend to receive benefits over
extended periods as well, as shown in table 9.5. For example, for 1980
injuries, 863 (or 42 percent) of the 1,059 cases established by the end
of 1982 (two years after the year of injury) received benefits during
the average month in 1982. During the average month in 1985, 439

Table 9.4
Number of New Wage-Loss Cases in Florida, by Year of Injury, for 1979-85 Injuries
1979 injuries
(August-December)
No. of years
after year
of injury

Cases with
1st payment
in year
-1-

Cumulative
total by
end of year
-2-

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

15
324
334
181
98
51
20

15
339
673
854
952
1,003
1,023

1980 injuries
Cases with
Cumulative
1st payment
total by
in year
end of year
-3-4235
1, 057
767
433
195
68

235
1,292
2,059
2,492
2,687
2,755

1981 injuries
Cases with
Cumulative
1st payment
total by
in year
end of year
-6-5339
1,488
1,018
431
162

339
1,827
2,845
3,276
3,438

H
a

1982 injuries

1983 injuries
1984 injuries
1985 injuries
Cases with Cumulative Cases with Cumulative Cases with Cumulative Cases with Cumulative
1st payment
total by
1st payment
total by
1st payment
total by
1st payment
total by
in year
end of year
in year
end of year
in year
end of year
in year
end of year
-7-8-11-12-13-14-9-10427
1,638
959
324

427
2,065
3,024
3,348

463
1,657
845

Tl

463
2,120
2,965

508
1,725

508
2,233

495

495

cT

Table 9.5
Number of New Wage-Loss Cases Receiving Benefits in Florida, by Year, for 1979-85 Injuries
1979 injuries
(August-December)
Monthly average
of cases
receiving payment
-1-

As percentage
of all established
cases
-2-

Monthly average
of cases
receiving payment
-3-

As percentage
of all established
cases
-4-

Monthly average
of cases
receiving payment
-5-

As percentage
of all established
cases
-6-

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

5
101
251
293
253
178
131

33
30
37
34
27
18
13

49
486
863
836
608
439

21
38
42
34
23
16

72
748
1,180
972
720

21
41
41
30
21

1985 injuries

1984 injuries

1983 injuries

Monthly average As percentage Monthly average As percentage Monthly average As percentage Monthly average As percentage
of all
of cases
of all
of cases
of all
of cases
of all
of cases
established
receiving
established
receiving
established
receiving
established
receiving
cases
payment
cases
payment
cases
payment
cases
payment
-14-13-12-9-8-7-11-1098
836
1,124
943

23
40
37
28

107
808
1,172

23
38
40

113
1 ,004

H
n>

1981 injuries

1980 injuries

No. of years
after year
of injury

1982 injuries

u>
o

22
45

132

27

o
o2.'
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(or 16 percent) of the 2,755 cases involving 1980 injuries received wageloss benefits.
The lags between dates of injury and the initial payments of wageloss benefits and the tendency for wage-loss cases to continue receiv
ing benefits over extended periods of time help explain the patterns for
total costs shown in table 9.6. For 1980 injuries, the wage-loss benefits
cost $356,400 in 1980 (year 0); peaked at $6,424,780 in 1982 (year
2); and were still $3,093,330 in 1985 (year 5); with a cumulative cost
through the end of 1985 of $23,400,290. The data in columns (3) and
(4) of table 9.7 summarize the general relationship between time and
total costs of wage-loss benefits involving 1980-84 injuries. One hun
dred percent represents the total costs of the wage-loss cases by one
year after the date of injury (by December 1981 for 1980 injuries, for
example). By five years after the date of injury, the percentage is 585.
The continuing increase in numbers of wage-loss cases and the ex
plosive increase in costs of the cases for the five years after the year
of injury are shown in graph 9.1, which uses the data from columns
(2) and (4) of table 9.7. The results illustrate the finding of this and
the previous subsection: that wage-loss cases have significant costs for
many years after the years of injury. They also dramatize the benefits
and costs of the wage-loss approach: benefits to workers in the form
of long-term protection, but costs to employers and carriers in the form
of extended periods of liability. One way to try to avoid these costs
is to terminate future liability by use of compromise and release
agreements—known as "washouts" in Florida.
Data on Washouts
As recounted earlier in this chapter, washouts—once widely used to
terminate payments in permanent partial disability cases in Florida—
were supposed to be greatly restricted by the 1979 law. Washouts of
future medical benefits were strictly banned, and settlements of cash
benefits were prohibited until at least six months after the date of max
imum medical improvement and then only in special circumstances. In
1983, a limited exception to the general prohibition on washouts for
all benefits (including medical) was provided: washouts are permissi
ble when there is a legitimate controversy over compensability and the
employer or carrier has provided no benefits.
The limitations on washouts contained in the 1979 legislation withstood
constitutional challenges in Johnson v. R. H. Donnelly Co., 402 So.

g

Table 9.6
Total Costs of Wage-Loss Cases in Florida, by Year, for 1979-85 Injuries
(thousands of dollars)

H
CD

1979 injuries
(August-December)

Number of
years alter
year of
injury

In year
-1-

Cumulative
-2-

In year
-3-

Cumulative
-4-

In year
-5-

Cumulative
-6-

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

9
653
2,102
1,732
1,539
1,069
786

9
661
2,764
4,496
6,035
7,103
7,889

356
3,641
6,425
5,730
4,155
3,093

356
3,998
10,422
16,152
20,307
23,400

980
5,565
8,637
7,273
5,526

980
6,546
15,182
22,455
27,982

1982 injuries

1980 injuries

1983 injuries

1981 injuries

1984 injuries

1985 injuries

In year
-7-

Cumulative
-8-

In year
-9-

Cumulative
-10-

In year
-11-

Cumulative
-12-

In year
-13-

Cumulative
-14-

694
6,373
8,787
7,608

694
7,068
15,855
23,463

730
6,164
9,486

730
6,894
16,380

809
7,906

809
8,715

967

967

O

5.'

Table 9.7
Developments by 1985 in Number and Cost
of Wage-Loss Cases in Florida, 1980-84 Injuries

Number of
years after
year of
injury

New cases in
year as
percent of
total number
of cases
established by
end of year one

0

Cumulative
total number of
cases as percent
of total number
established
by end of
year one

Total cost in year
as percent of
total cost by end
of year one

Cumulative
total cost as
percent of
total cost by end
of year one

20

20

11

11

1

80

100

89

100

2

50

150

139

239

H

3

24

178

121

360

1
C/3

4

12

198

94

468

5

5

213

77

585

H

Fof
Floi
ormation

NOTE: The percentages are the average for the available data for 1980-84 injuries shown in tables 9.4 and 9.6. Only 1980 injury year data are available
for 5 years after the date of injury; only 1980 and 1981 injury year data are available for 4 years after the date of injury; etc.
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2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The absolute prohibition on washouts of
medical benefits was challenged as unconstitutional because the provi
sion denied the worker access to the courts, was an impairment of con
tract, and was an improper exercise of the state's police power. The
court rejected all three arguments.
The essence of the washout is that in exchange for a lump-sum pay
ment of benefits the employer or carrier is released from any further
liability. Under the 1979 legislation, a practice arose that is not technical
ly a washout, since there is no complete release from liability, but that
has many attributes in common with washouts. This practice is the use
of advances, whereby a specified period of future benefits is paid in
a lump sum. The main distinction from a washout is that if the employee
has actual disability beyond the period covered by the advance, payments
can resume. But if the actual period of disability should turn out to be
less than the period covered by the advance (perhaps because the in
jured worker died), the carrier or employer cannot as a practical mat
ter recover any portion of the advance. In that sense, the use of an ad
vance defeats one of the purposes of the 1979 legislation—namely, to
limit benefit payments to times when the worker experiences actual wage
loss.
Advances are generally involuntary in the sense that the carrier or
employer opposes the settlement, while it is typically supported by the
worker and his lawyer. In Sanford v. Alachua County School Board,
425 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the First District Court of Ap
peal rejected the argument that an advancement prejudiced the carrier
because of the low discount rate (4 percent) used to calculate the lumpsum settlement and because basing the lump-sum calculations on the
entire remaining life expectancy (21.5 years) would make it impossi
ble to later challenge the claimant's status as permanently disabled if
she were to regain her earning capacity or die.
The 1983 legislation provided relief on the advance problem. Sec
tion 44.20(12)(c) was amended to provide for an 8 percent interest rate
to be used in discounting the future payments to their present value for
purposes of making a lump-sum payment. Section 440.20(13)(d) was
amended by adding a sentence limiting the advance to the greater of
$7,500 or 26 weeks of benefits in any four-year period. The threat to
the wage-loss approach posed by involuntary advancements may have
been completely ended by the First Court of Appeal decision in Murphree Bridge v. Brown, 492 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Court
stated,
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Since each month of wage-loss benefits constitutes a
separate claim, it follows that the liability for payment of
those benefits accrues monthly. Consequently, there is no
identifiable indebtedness associated with the wage-loss pro
visions which could support an award of an advance pay
ment which encompasses an amount more than the amount
due as a monthly benefit.
If the problem of involuntary advances seems to be declining, the
situation for voluntary washouts is not so clear. The percentage of per
manent partial cases involving washouts has dropped from 34 percent
under the old law to 27 percent under the new law, according to one
comparison made by the National Council on Compensation Insurance
(Workers' Compensation Experience Review Committee 1984, at p. 54).
This is progress, but hardly to the degree envisaged by Mary Ann
Stiles, one of the architects of the 1979 law, when she wrote (1983 at
p. 6):
Wash-outs have been all but virtually eliminated from the
system. The basic reason for that is, of course, that if the
Legislature allowed wash-outs under the wage loss system,
we would again be guessing into an indefinite future what
a person's loss of wages was going to be.
The extent of washouts under the 1979 law (together with the 1983
amendments facilitating washouts) has been monitored by the Workers'
Compensation Command Post, an insurance industry effort, and reported
in various issues of the Command Post Briefing. In an early issue (Vol.
1, No. 2, May 1981) the publication noted three ways the ban on
washouts was being avoided:
The initial strategy seemed to be "let's try to wash out
cases, including future medical; the Deputy Commissioner
will probably approve them." They were right; some com
missioners did approve them as a matter of course. It took
Division intervention, in the form of "reminders" of the
statutory mandate, to stop this practice.
A second method of "washing out" a client came to light
in the Baker case. Baker filed a highly questionable claim.
. . . Perhaps the carrier should have fought this "nuisance"
claim. However, "rather than risk uncertainties attendant to
litigation to this matter and incurring further costs," the par-
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ties agreed to a washout-type settlement of about $1,000. The
method of circumventing the law? A signed statement by the
claimant that no accident occurred. . . .
The final "innovative" approach is just now coming to
light. Claimants are signing stipulations agreeing to washout
all compensation benefits. No mention is made to the claim
ant of his right to future medical. The letter of the law has
been upheld, but the claimant, rarely reading the "legalese"
of the final order, doesn't know he can claim additional
medical, and therefore doesn't.
Subsequent to the 1983 amendments liberalizing the rules for washouts,
the Command Post Briefing (Vol. 4, No. 3, Apr. 1984) found the number
of washouts under the new provision growing rapidly. For all of 1984,
there were 5,269 cases washed out for an average cost of $13,235. The
Command Post Briefing (Vol. 5, No. 9, Nov. 1985) noted this was down
from 17,058 washouts in 1978 that averaged $5,282, and concluded
that it is hoped carriers and self-insurers would continue to show restraint
and wash out "only the more serious cases." While we question the
wisdom of this strategy, it is hard to disagree with the conclusion found
in the Command Post Briefing (Vol. 3, No. 4, May 1983) that "washouts
are flourishing despite the restrictive criteria" in the 1979 legislation.

Conclusions
The wage-loss approach to permanent partial disability benefits adopted
in Florida in 1979 has been widely publicized and vigorously debated.
How has the Florida experiment worked? This chapter has tried to assem
ble information that is at least reasonably reliable. There can be little
doubt that the number of permanent partial disability cases has plum
meted in Florida as a result of the 1979 legislation, which was one of
the purposes of the law. There also is persuasive evidence that one of
the other purposes of the law—to virtually eliminate washouts—has not
been achieved. In addition, the review of case law in this chapter makes
clear that the new approach to permanent partial benefits is not free
of litigation and vexatious issues.
Most observers would probably accept the preceding conclusions.
Other evaluations have been made that are more controversial, however,
and some of these are worth reporting. Surely one of the most glowing
accounts was included in The Circle Solution (Mintner 1982, p. 1):
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Since the effective date of the Wage-Loss statute, workers
have been compensated fairly; the need for workers to hire
and pay lawyers has diminished; insurance companies have
become increasingly eager to sell their products in Florida,
. . . and rates have been slashed by at least 50%.
Although this passage contains its share of hyperbole that is difficult
to document or disprove, some of it can be evaluated. For example,
the cost of workers' compensation insurance before and after the 1979
legislation can be measured. As shown in table 3.18, in 1978 a represen
tative sample of Florida employers was expending 2.641 percent of
payroll on workers' compensation insurance. This was 86 percent above
the 28-jurisdiction average of 1.420 percent. Then a series of reduc
tions took place in Florida rates, cumulating to a 36 percent decline
by January 1982, followed by a series of rate increases thru 1986 (table
9.2). In 1984, partway through this cycle of rates, Florida employers
was expending 1.552 percent of payroll on workers' compensation in
surance premiums, only 14 percent above the 28-jurisdiction average
of 1.368 percent. Thus as of 1984, Florida had improved its Florida
workers' compensation rates relative to those in other states. Perhaps
even more relevant, the National Council on Compensation Insurance
estimated that those 1984 Florida rates would have been 62 percent
higher if the wage-loss reforms of 1979 had never been enacted because
of the inflationary pressures from higher weekly maximums and medical
benefits. Thus there appears to be some merit to the 50 percent savings
alleged by The Circle Solution.
This chapter has focused on the reduction in costs sought by employers
in enactment of the 1979 legislation. But we would endorse the view
expressed in the Journal of American Insurance article on the Florida
law that "wage loss would be viewed primarily as a means of improv
ing equity, but not necessarily as a cost-saver." An evaluation in part
HI of this study shows that equity was lacking under the pre-1979 legisla
tion in Florida. We are unaware of any effort under way to evaluate
the equity of the new law. This would require a systematic effort to
collect data on all workers with permanent impairments that would
measure their benefits and their earnings before and after their injuries.
At least some of the masses of data that are needed to evaluate a wageloss system are available in the Division's files, but a major effort will
have to be mounted to use the data in an analysis of equity.
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Other evaluations of the 1979 legislation are not so favorable as those
in The Circle Solution. As might be suspected, some of the criticism
has come from those who initially opposed the law. But some of the
original supporters have also been critical, and it is not evident which
camp has raised the greatest outcry against the wage-loss approach.
The most consistently outspoken opponents of the wage-loss approach
have been the claimants' attorneys. Any hopes that the objections rais
ed to the 1979 legislation before its enactment might be overcome with
time have been largely disappointed. One claimant's attorney wrote to
one of us that: 29
To me, and for all the claimants I represent, wage loss
as it is used and adopted in Florida is a miserable failure.
The theory behind wage loss is very sound just as the theory
of communism is sound. However, from a practical aspect,
it will not work, cannot work, and represents a true rape of
the working man in the State of Florida.
As remarked, some criticisms of the 1979 law also have been ex
pressed by some of the original supporters, most notably representatives
of the employer and insurance communities who are concerned about
the case law that developed the criteria for wage-loss benefits. Certainly
some of the toughest legal issues concern instances in which the employer
or carrier feels that the worker's actual earnings in the period after the
date of MMI are not truly reflective of the worker's earning capacity,
or feels that the loss of actual earnings is due to factors other than the
work-related injury. Above, we examined at some length the cases that
led to the Regency case, which in turn led to amendments of the law
in 1983 and the Rumph case.
The decisions and 1983 amendment can be placed in perspective by
comparing Florida with New York, a state with a long history of wageloss benefits. The comparisons cannot be made point by point because
the particulars of the statutes differ, but some general comparisons can
be made. The third set of requirements for wage-loss benefits in Florida
was termed the "legally-sufficient" wage-loss requirements. These can
be related to the second question posed for New York: Can the wage
loss be attributed to the injury? In New York, the answer was, "So
long as the permanent consequences of the work-related injury are at
least a partial cause of the wage loss, nonscheduled benefits can be paid."
The New York answer is thus similar to the holding of Regency and
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Rumph, which have rejected the idea that wage-loss benefits can be paid
only if the injury is the sole cause of the wage loss. Thus what is view
ed by some as an aberration of the wage-loss approach in Florida is
a long-standing legal doctrine in New York.
If this defense of Regency is correct, then we believe it is also cor
rect to assert that the First District Court of Appeal interpretation of
the 1983 amendments in Florida was appropriate in Rumph. This is not
to say that every aspect of the Florida law is operating properly; for
one thing, as previously discussed, the extensive reliance on washouts
is disturbing. Nor is it to say that every component of the wage-loss
section in the statute is ideal; for example, as discussed by Burton (1983,
pp. 41-46), the benefit formula creates disincentives for workers to return
to work. But what this analysis does suggest is that the Rumph deci
sion, although in some respects disingenuous, is nonetheless compati
ble with the underlying philosophy of a wage-loss approach and with
the case law for wage-loss cases in other jurisdictions.

NOTES
1. State of Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Com
pensation, Analysis of Work Injuries Covered by Workers' Compensation, 1977-1978 [also titled
1977-1978 Cases Causes Costs, and so cited hereafter], table V, p. 214, shows that the estimated
number of workers covered by workers' compensation was 2,039,100 in 1970 and 3,008,800
in 1978.
2. The first section relies in part on field work conducted in Florida in 1975 by Katharine Hagerty.
3. The provision pertaining to the duration of nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits
was amended effective July 1, 1978, to provide that the specified number of weeks to be multiplied
by the percentage of disability increased with the severity of the injury. The 1978 provision, discuss
ed in the text infra, was effective only until 1979, when the wage-loss approach was adopted.
4. The discussion of Florida decisions in the balance of this section relies in part on Alpert and
Murphy (1978).
5. More precisely, wage-loss benefits are paid only when actual earnings after the date of MMI
are less than the worker's potential earnings. Generally, in workers' compensation, potential earn
ings are defined as preinjury earnings. See, however, a later section for a discussion of the Florida
wage-loss approach adopted in 1979, in which potential earnings and preinjury earnings are not
always identical.
6. See generally Stiles (1982), p. 44.
7. Compare City of Hollywood v. Castora, 380 so. 2d 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (adequate job
search before original hearing apparently required) with Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse, 411
So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (adequate job search permitted after original hearing).
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8. Bill Bard Associates, Inc. v. Totten, 418 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
9. United States Sugar Corporation v. Hayes, 407 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
10. 1977-1978 Cases Causes Costs, p. 23, earlier editions of Cases Causes Costs.
11. 1977-1978 Cases Causes Cost, p. 23.
12. Section 440.34 of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law effective July 1, 1978, provid
ed that 75 percent of the claimant's attorney's fees on claims other than medical benefits were
to be paid by the employer or carrier and 25 percent by the worker. If, however, the employer
or carrier handled the claim in a negligent, arbitrary, or capricious manner, the employer or car
rier was liable for 100 percent of the claimant's attorney fee. This provision was further modified
in 1979, as will be discussed in the next section.
13. U.S. Department of Labor, State Compliance 1983.
14. 1977-1978 Cases Causes Costs, p. 211.
15. "Florida's Bold Experiment in Cutting Worker (sic) Compensation Costs," Journal ofAmerican
Insurance (Summer 1982), pp. 21-22.
16. At various stages of the process that led to the enactment of the 1979 law, the authors of
this volume were participants. We do not want to exaggerate our roles, but we would be remiss
if we did not mention them. A major reason for our involvement is that Florida is one of the
states included in the NSF study that is the progenitor of this volume (Berkowitz, Burton, and
Vroman 1979). The preliminary results from the NSF study became available just as the move
ment for reform took off in Florida, and as a result we played cameo roles in the Florida drama.
17. The balance of this subsection relies extensively on Mintner (1982). Citations are provided
only for specific quotations.
18. Comments by Dan Miller to Conference on Workers' Compensation Co-sponsored by the
AFL-CIO and the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University,
at the George Meany Center, July 23, 1981.
19. Section 440.15(3)(b)(5) provides that for injuries occurring after July 1, 1980, the escalation
factor is 5 percent per year or the annual rate of inflation measured by the National Consumer
Price Index, whichever is less. Rather than escalating preinjury wages by 5 percent and compar
ing these earnings to actual earnings in the months when wage-loss benefits are paid, the Florida
law provides that the actual earnings will be discounted by 5 percent and compared to preinjury
earnings as a basis for the benefits. This discount procedure provides lower benefits than the escala
tion procedure would using the same percentage adjustment factor.
20. Some Florida decisions have considered the inability to find employment for reasons other
than worker's physical limitations as evidence that the job search was inadequate (the second test),
rather than viewing this fifth test as a separate requirement.
21. Although the decision in Flesche was in 1982, the law in effect before the 1979 amendments
was involved. The job search test was similar under the old law, however, and so the decision
is still useful. The Court in Flesche, note 11 at page 925, elaborated on the difficulty of defining
"adequate" when it noted, "The condition of the economy and the locale in which the work
search is conducted may create a wide disparity in the extent of the search that might be termed
'adequate' or 'inadequate.' What might be properly considered adequate in Clewiston might well
be totally inadequate in Miami, for comparable claimants similarly injured."
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22. Regency had made a job offer prior to the hearing before the deputy commissioner on the
claim for wage-loss benefits for the August to December 1980 period, for which benefits were
denied. According to the District Court, Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So. 2d 870, 880-81 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982), after the claim for the December 1980 to April 1981 period was filed, her at
torney "repeatedly requested the Regency reemploy claimant, or that Regency and the carrier
provide rehabilitation, retraining, or job placement counseling and assistance. The E/C 'stonewall
ed,' provided neither, and offered no explanation for their refusal."
23. Policy year 1977-78 contained a limited amount of experience under the new law (since policies
written in August-November 1978 did not expire until August-November 1979, when the new
law was in effect). Since about 95 percent of the policy year 1977-78 experience involved in
juries under the old act, however, the experience can be considered essentially old law data.
24. In 1977, self-insurers accounted for 12.0 percent of all benefit payments in Florida (Price
1980, table 3, p. 8). In 1984, self-insurers accounted for 30.3 percent of all Florida payments
(Price 1987, table 2).
25. For reasons unknown, however, the annual number of permanent partial cases reported by
the National Council on Compensation Insurance (table 9.1) is greater than the number of perma
nent impairment and wage-loss cases recorded by the Florida Division of Workers' Compensa
tion (table 9.3) even though the data from the Division include self-insurers.
26. State of Florida, 1984 Workers' Compensation Injuries, table 9, p. 44, shows 1,210 perma
nent impairment cases involving 1984 injuries with a total of $14,656,356 of indemnity benefits.
This apparently represents developments through June 30, 1985. The report also contains some
information on cases involving 1982 and 1983 injuries with developments through June 30, 1985.
27. These data were provided with the assistance of several present or former members of the
Division of Workers' Compensation, including J. Baxter Swing, Sheldon Kemp, Timothy Kearnes,
and Pat Partner. Robert Altvilla is the staff member who prepared the tables in response to our
requests.
28. Tables 9.4 to 9.6 contain data on wage-loss cases resulting from 1979 injuries after the August
effect date of the law, but because there is only five months' experience from 1979, the text and
table 9.7 do not deal with the 1979 data.
29. Letter from a Sarasota, Florida attorney to John F. Burton, Jr., September 22, 1981.

Part III
The Wage-Loss Study

Chapter 10
The Wage-Loss Study
of
California, Florida, and Wisconsin
This chapter is based on a wage-loss study that examined the rela
tionships among work-related injuries, earnings losses, and workers'
compensation benefits for male workers who were injured in 1968 and
who received permanent partial or permanent total disability benefits
in Wisconsin, California, or Florida. The study was sponsored by the
National Science Foundation, and considerable additional material on
the wage-loss study is contained in the NSF Report (Berkowitz, Bur
ton, and Vroman 1979) submitted at the end of the project.
Although the data analyzed in this chapter are for injuries that occur
red 19 years ago, the findings warrant discussion for several reasons.
One is that for any study to track workers for several years after the
date of injury (in this case, six years), it must involve "old" injuries.
Second, the methodology used to prepare the NSF Report has not been
widely used in workers' compensation research, and the dissemination
of the results may encourage others to conduct such studies. Third, and
most important, the findings are relevant for understanding the ap
proaches used currently in most states to compensate workers with per
manent partial disabilities. As of 1968, Wisconsin based such benefits
on the extent of impairment (category I), California based permanent
partial benefits on the extent of loss of earning capacity (category II),
and Florida offered workers the choice of the two approaches. At pre
sent, most jurisdictions pay permanent partial benefits by evaluating
the extent of impairment or the extent of loss of earning capacity. Our
findings can provide useful guidance about how these approaches are
currently operating, since nothing fundamental has changed in the ap
plication of these approaches since 1968.
The Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework was introduced in chapter 1 of this study
(see, in particular, graph 1.1). The worker represented in graph 1.1
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had wages increasing through time from A to B, corresponding to the
worker's higher productivity and general increases in the price level.
In the NSF study, such preinjury earnings data were available for 1966
and 1967. At point B, which is 1968 for the NSF study, the worker
experienced a work-related injury that permanently reduced his earn
ings. If the worker had not been injured, his earnings would have con
tinued to grow along the line B-C. Although these potential earnings
cannot be observed, they can be estimated from information such as
the worker's preinjury earnings and age. The worker's actual earnings
normally are significantly affected if the injury results in the payment
of permanent partial disability benefits; the line BDEFG in graph 1.1
traces such a result. In the NSF study, data on actual earnings were
available for the 1968 to 1973 period. When the actual earnings in the
six-year period are subtracted from the estimate of potential earnings
for the same interval, the results are the estimates of the wage loss due
to the injury. In graph 1.1, the "true" wage loss is potential earnings
(line BC) minus actual earnings (line BDEFG). Many workers do not
follow the pattern represented by graph 1.1, of course, but in all cases
we defined wage loss as the difference between potential earnings and
actual earnings between 1968 and 1973.
The workers' compensation benefits received by the workers between
1968 and 1973 were also measured in the NSF study. Between the date
of injury and the date of MMI (maximum medical improvement) the
worker is entitled to temporary disability benefits; afterward, he qualifies
for permanent disability benefits. The date of MMI is not a term used
in every state, but each has an equivalent date when the worker's medical
condition is first considered ratable for purposes of permanent disability
benefits. In the NSF study, much of the analysis involves comparisons
between the total of all types of workers' compensation cash benefits
received between 1968 and 1973 and the estimated loss of wages dur
ing this period. The ratio of benefits-to-wage loss is the replacement
rate, which is a key variable in determining the adequacy and equity
of the workers' compensation benefits in the state.

The Wage-Loss Study of Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Workers' Compensation Program*

In 1968, the year of injury for the workers in our sample, temporary
total disability benefits were 70 percent of the worker's preinjury wage,
subject to a maximum weekly benefit of $73.00 effective March 1, 1968
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(the maximum was $68.00 for 1968 injuries that occurred before March
1) and subject to a minimum weekly benefit of $8.75. Permanent par
tial disability benefits were paid for up to 1,000 weeks depending on
the severity of the injury, and the weekly benefit was 70 percent of
the worker's weekly wage, subject to a maximum weekly benefit of
$47.50 effective March 1, 1968 (the maximum was $46.00 for 1968
injuries that occurred before March 1) and subject to a minimum weekly
benefit of $14.00. Permanent total disability benefits were paid for the
duration of the disability at weekly amounts equivalent to the temporary
total disability benefit amounts (except that the minimum weekly benefit
for permanent total disability was $14.00).
The duration of the Wisconsin permanent partial disability benefits
normally was based on the extent of the worker's impairment or func
tional limitations. Typical of most workers' compensation statutes, there
was a schedule (or list) of certain impairments with a corresponding
list of durations. For example, the loss of a hand resulted in 400 weeks
of benefits, and the loss of a palm where the thumb remains was "worth"
275 weeks of benefits. The schedule primarily described amputations,
and injuries that involved loss of use of the scheduled injuries were
evaluated relative to the schedule. Thus, an injury that caused 50 per
cent loss of use of the hand resulted in 200 weeks of benefits. Finally,
injuries not on the schedule or that could not be related to the schedule
were rated on their seriousness relative to permanent total disability;
in practice, such ratings generally were based on the degree of func
tional limitations or impairment compared to a whole man. Total disabili
ty for purposes of unscheduled permanent partial disability benefits was
1,000 weeks, and so a back injury rated as equivalent to 25 percent
of total disability resulted in 250 weeks of benefits.
Presumably the purpose of the benefits in Wisconsin was (and is) to
provide compensation for work disability, that is, loss of earning capacity
or loss of actual earnings. Wisconsin had adopted the normal approach
in workers' compensation, which is not to measure work disability, but
to measure impairment or functional limitations and use these measures
as a predictor of the resulting work disability. 2
The procedure for providing permanent disability benefits in Wisconsin
is unusual because of the extensive role played by the state workers'
compensation agency. In most jurisdictions, the extent of the perma
nent disability usually is decided through litigation (often involving a
hearing before the state workers' compensation agency) or through
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negotiations between attorneys representing the worker and the employer
(often resulting in a compromise and release agreement). In the typical
jurisdiction, the workers' compensation agency is less important than
the private parties in determining the outcome of the case, but in Wiscon
sin the agency is an active participant in the determination of perma
nent partial disability benefits. Medical reports must be filed, and if
the amount of permanent partial benefits proposed by the employer or
carrier seems inappropriate, the state agency intervenes to protect the
worker's interest. One consequence of this active involvement of the
state agency in Wisconsin is that only a minority of cases in the NSF
study required a hearing or resulted in a compromise and release
agreement.
Methodology and Empirical Results for Wisconsin
This section briefly describes the methodology and empirical results
for the Wisconsin sample. 3 The first step was to reconstruct a record
of all cases involving 1968 injuries that resulted in permanent disabili
ty benefits, to eliminate certain cases from the sampling frame because
they involved workers of the wrong age or with other disqualifying fac
tors, and then to draw a sample that included all the workers with serious
injuries and some of the workers with minor injuries. The second step
was to collect data on the workers in our sample and to conduct some
initial processing and tabulation of the data. The collection involved
inspection of the case folders to verify certain data and to collect addi
tional data needed for this study, such as the timing of benefits. The
data were then key punched and a number of tabulations were prepared
showing items such as total benefits payments to the workers in our
sample. The third step was to have the Social Security Administration
process the data and prepare tabulations. Social Security received finder
cards that include inter alia each worker's social security number, age,
sex, disability rating, and present value of workers' compensation
benefits received between 1968 and 1973. Social Security then search
ed the Summary Earnings Records for 1966 to 1973 earnings, made
estimates of total annual earnings when the taxable maximum was reach
ed, performed various calculations, and provided us with tabulations.
The results from our two male samples in Wisconsin are presented
in tables 10.1 and 10.2. 4 Most Wisconsin permanent partial disability
cases paid benefits without litigation or use of compromise and release
agreements, and these uncontested cases are shown in table 10.1. The
male contested cases are shown in table 10.2. Both tables contain sum
mary data (line 1) and data for the sample disaggregated by 10-year
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age categories (lines 2-5) and by the part of the body injured (lines 6-9).
The permanent disability ratings were derived from the number of weeks
of permanent disability benefits, with 10 weeks of benefits equivalent
to a 1 percent rating.
Panel A of the tables presents the weighted counts for the workers
in the sample. Table 10.1 indicates that the total sample of male uncontested cases was 1,685, with a mean rating of 3.70 percent (as shown
in the next to last column of panel A). The sample of males who received
their benefits in contested cases contains 284.5 workers (rounded to
285 workers for textual purposes), who had an average disability rating
of 10.14 percent (table 10.2).
In both samples, the extent of disability is associated with age and
location of injury. There is a slight tendency for disability ratings to
increase with age, although 40-49-year-olds were an exception in both
samples. Injuries to the trunk and "all other cases" are the two most
serious categories and injuries to the upper extremities the least serious
for both samples. When the A panels in the two tables are compared,
there is clear-cut evidence of a positive association between severity
of injury and probability of the case becoming contested. In the 1-2
percent rating interval, 95 percent of the cases are uncontested (941
of 981 cases), but of the cases with ratings of 16 percent or more, 51
percent are contested (50 of 98 cases). Also, controlling for severity,
there is an association between injury location and controversion. For
example, among cases with ratings of 16 percent or more, 20 of 31
extremity cases were uncontested, whereas all 19 trunk cases were
contested.
Panel B shows mean potential earnings between 1968 and 1973,
calculated by multiplying each worker's 1966-67 actual earnings (from
the Summary Earnings Record) by his 1968-73 expected earnings growth
ratio (EGR). The potential earnings are estimates of what the workers
would have earned during the six years if they had not been injured
on the job.
The expected growth ratio (EGR) was derived from the experience
of workers in our control group, who were injured in 1968 and who
received a 1-5 percent permanent disability rating in California. The
actual earnings of these workers were increased to reflect their loss of
earnings during their healing periods after their injuries. We assumed
the workers with these minor disability ratings had no permanent loss
of income beyond the healing period. Then for each worker in the con-
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Table 10.1
Wisconsin Uncontested Permanent Partial Disability Cases for Men with 1968 Injuries

tO

H

Percent rating
Classification
of workers

1-2

3-5

Panel A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases
Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

11-15

16-50

51-100

Mean
ratings

Total

Weighted counts of workers and mean disability ratings
941
294
226
219.5
201.5
785
17
120
19

467
105. 5
122
140. 5
99
192
93
150
32

Panel B
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

6-10

CD

177
36
39.5
53.5
48
82
42
34
19

52
15
10
11
16
20
10
9
13

48
14
14
13
7
20
0
4
24

3.70
3.54
3.69
3.68
37.1
2.80
5.83
3.76
9.62

1,685
464.5
411.5
437.5
371.5
1,099
162
317
107

Mean potential earnings (1968-73, in dollars) t
42,567
40,144
43,641
45,298
41,925
42,740
37,364
42,497
40,529

43,938
44,412
46,232
44,383
39,973
44,084
44,193
43,123
46,136

43,320
38,743
47,880
48,995
36,673
41,644
45,224
43,355
46,279

42,472
41,693
52,464
48,364
32,905
39,699
44,276
37,036
49,113

37,960
32,671
42,605
41,628
32,434
35,516
—
37,720
40,036

42,892
40,829
44,995
45,414
40,159
42,706
43,748
42,670
44,159
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Table 10.1 (continued)
Percent rating
Classification
of workers

1-2

3-5

6-10

Panel F
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases
Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

16-50

51-100

Mean
ratings

ft

Total

696
742
626
706
696
593
1,288
1,261
842

2,479
2,316
2,509
2,316
2,846
2,057
3,141
2,636
2,348

4,957
5,078
5,451
4,999
4,412
4,503
5,371
5,803
4,485

7,807
8,388
7,224
7,360
7,934
6,716
8,410
10,254
7,326

10,980
12,846
10,286
10,327
9,851
11,641
—
13,537
10,003

2,150
2,047
2,136
2,201
2,234
1,453
3,850
2,809
4,782

Replacement rates : benefits as proportion of earnings losses
.45
.43
.21
.25
a
.39
.28
.70
a

.90
1.23
.33
2.43
9.91
1.22
.58
1.14
.66

1.15
3.80
.85
1.08
1.01
1.55
1.58
.62
1.41

.04
.27
.55
.78
.11
.32
.94
.87
1.03

*Significant at the .05 level.
f!968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent.
a. The replacement rate is not shown because the mean earnings loss estimate is negative.

1.53
1.47
1.07
2.44
2.15
1.55
—
6.82
1.29

I

era
i

Mean benefits net of legal fees (1968-73, in dollars) t

Panel G
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

11-15

.85
.98
.41
.87
19.11
.79
.77
.90
1.23

r

o

v>
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trol group, an actual EGR was calculated as the ratio of the worker's
actual 1968-73 earnings divided by the worker's actual earnings in
1966-67. Regressions were run on the actual EGRs for the control group
and the regression results were used to derive the expected EGRs for
the workers not in the control group. Each worker in Wisconsin was
assigned an expected EGR that was a function of the worker's sex, age
in 1968, and level of actual earnings in 1966-67. These were factors
that the regressions on the control group indicated were useful ex
planatory variables for the actual EGRs. 5
Panel B of table 10.1 indicates that the 941 workers with 1-2 percent
disability ratings could have expected on average to earn $42,567 from
1968 to 1973 (measured in 1968 present value dollars discounted at 6
percent, as are all dollar figures in tables 10.1 and 10.2). The mean
potential earnings for the uncontested sample ($42,892) times the sam
ple size (1,685) yields potential earnings of $72.273 million for the en
tire sample. For the contested males, panel B of table 10.2 indicates
the potential earnings for the 285 workers were $11.478 million. The
total potential earnings for both samples were thus $83.751 million.
For each worker, the actual 1968-73 earnings shown in the Social
Security Summary Earnings Records were subtracted from that worker's
potential earnings over the six-year period. Panel C shows the mean
earnings losses for the workers in each cell, and panel D shows the
standard deviation of the earnings losses for all workers in the particular
cell. Asterisked figures in panel C are statistically significant earnings
losses, as determined by comparing the cell mean to the cell standard
deviation.
The earnings loss for the male uncontested sample was $2,519 per
worker times 1,685 workers for a total of $4.244 million. For the con
tested male sample, the mean loss was $8,826, and with a sample of
285 the total loss was $2.511 million. The aggregate earnings loss for
both samples was $6.755 million. That is, we estimate that the actual
earnings between 1968 and 1973 of the 1,970 Wisconsin workers were
$6.755 million less than they would have been if the workers had not
been injured.
Panel E provides estimates of proportional earnings losses, which are
calculated by dividing the mean earnings losses from panel C by the
mean potential earnings from panel B. For the entire sample of male
uncontested cases, the workers experienced an average 5.9 percent loss
of potential earnings because of their injuries (table 10.1, panel E), and

u>

Table 10.2
Wisconsin Contested Permanent Partial Disability Cases for Men with 1968 Injuries

ON

Percent rating
Classification
of workers

3-5

1-2

6-10

Panel A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases
Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

16-50

51-100

ratings

Total

40
8
15
10
7
22
3
0
15

79
24
21
20
14
29
19
20
11

37,807
32,384
43,549
39,767
28,904
38,954
23,451

40,982
38,100
44,504
40,778
40,930
43,106
40,948
39,475
38,182

38,998

88.5
19
21
27.5
21
25
32
16.5
15

27
6
9
8
4
0
17
3
7

40,545
36,117
46,129
39,879
39,841
37,340
40,574
41,921
44,312

38,374
40,797
42,115
34,925
33,221

46
4b
8
12
15
11
11
0
15
4b
4
0
16
0
Mean potential earnings (1968-73, in dollars)!

34,933
40,925
45,639

41,940
40,150
42,992
43,285
40,260
40,635
43,781
39,052
41,833

43,754

43,754
-

p

OQ

o>

Weighted counts of workers and mean disability ratings

Panel B
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

11-15

H

Mean

10.14
8.57
9.46
9.11
9.79
7.25
13.87
7.99
10.27

284.5
65
78
80.5
57
87
90
43.5
64
40,346
37,318
44,249
40,231
38,382
40,087
39,692
40,464
41,538
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Table 10.2 (continued)

oo

Percent rating
Classification
of workers

6-10

3-5

1-2

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

1,422
1,070
1,678
1,439
1,250
1,113
1,973
—
1,764

1 . Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

51-100

Mean
ratings

Total

2,603
2,427
2,239
2,754
3,234
2,230
2,514
3,341
2,396

5,318
5,332
5,080
5,816
4,891
4,771
4,899
7,275
4,970

7,609
8,027
6,394
8,520
7,895
—
7,942
7,097
7,020

10,264
11,904
9,336
9,878
10,609
11,555
9,689
11,920
9,501

12,067

—
12,067
—
—

.33

.38

.64

.56

.80

.11
.35
a
.24
.25
a
—
.35

.33
.26
.79
.40
.28
.33
.75
.35

.86
1.06
.47
.57
.53
.82
1.09
.35

.46
.55
.87
.41
—
.64
.60
.41

1.16
.74
.76
.71
2.58
.46
.62
.99

£
\.v

5,128
4,792
4,467
5,537
5,351
3,857
5,990
5,881
5,133

.48

.58

—
.48
—
—

.56
.57
.67
.53
.56
.56
.82
.52

*Significant at the .05 level.
t!968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent.
a. The replacement rate is not shown because the mean earnings loss estimate is negative.
b. Distribution of the four cases with 51-100 percent ratings among age categories is not possible because of confidentiality requirements.

ft)

&

Replacement rates : benefits as proportion of earnings losses

Panel G
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

16-50

Mean benefits net of legal fees (1968-73, in dollars)!

Panel F
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

11-15

Q
C/J
C/5

<£
O.
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the male contested sample experienced on average a 21.8 percent loss
of potential earnings during the six-year period because of their workrelated injuries (table 10.2, panel E).
The relationship between seriousness of injury and extent of earn
ings losses is emphasized by the results in line 1 of panel E, because
the mean proportional earnings losses consistently increase as disabili
ty ratings increase. For the male uncontested cases (table 10.1), workers
with a 1-2 percent rating experienced an earnings loss estimated to be
3.6 percent of potential earnings, whereas workers with 16-50 percent
ratings experienced an average 18.9 percent loss of earnings. There
is also a clear-cut monotonic relationship between average disability
ratings and proportional earnings losses for the contested male sample
(table 10.2). Losses in the 1-2 percent rating category average 11 per
cent of potential earnings, and increase to a maximum for the four cases
with ratings in the 51-100 percent category, with average losses that
are 58 percent of potential earnings. When the two samples are com
pared, it is evident that the wage losses are consistently larger in the
contested cases. One demonstration of this fact is that for each disabili
ty rating category, the proportional earnings loss for the contested cases
exceeds the loss for the uncontested cases. For example, for the rating
category 6-10 percent, contested cases average a 20.6 percent earnings
loss and uncontested cases a 9.9 percent earnings loss.
Panel F presents the mean benefits net of legal fees for the Wiscon
sin workers. For each worker in our sample, we determined the amount
and the timing of all types of workers' compensation cash benefits receiv
ed between 1968 and 1973. From these amounts, we subtracted at
torneys' fees (which averaged about 2 percent of gross benefits for all
Wisconsin cases, including contested and uncontested cases) to arrive
at net benefits, and then calculated the present value of these benefits
as of 1968. For the entire sample of uncontested cases, the average
worker received $2,150 in benefits, which means the total net benefits
received by the sample of 1,685 workers were $3.623 million. The mean
benefits for the contested cases were $5,128 which means that the 285
workers in the sample received a total of $1.459 million in benefits.
The grand total for both samples of male workers in Wisconsin was
$5.082 million.
Panel G contains the replacement rates for the Wisconsin workers,
which were calculated by dividing the mean benefits in panel F by the
mean earnings losses in panel C. Overall, we estimate that benefits
replaced 85 percent of earnings losses for the workers in the uncontested
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sample and 58 percent of the earnings losses for the workers in the con
tested sample.

The Wage-Loss Study of Florida
The Florida Workers' Compensation Program6
In 1968, the year of injury for the workers in our sample, temporary
total disability benefits were 60 percent of the worker's preinjury wage,
subject to a maximum weekly benefit of $49. Permanent partial disability
benefits were paid for up to 350 weeks depending on the severity of
the injury, with the weekly amount the same as the temporary total
disability benefits. Permanent total disability benefits were paid for the
duration of the disability at weekly amounts equivalent to the temporary
total disability amounts.
As of 1968, the duration of the Florida permanent partial disability
benefits was determined by one of several approaches, depending on
the nature of the injury. The statute included a schedule of certain in
juries with a corresponding list of durations. The schedule provided
a fixed number of weeks for amputation or total loss of use of such
members as hands, fingers, and feet, and provided that partial loss or
partial loss of use of each member was compensated proportionally
relative to total loss of the member. For injuries that could not be rated
on the basis of the schedule, the statute provided for permanent disability
benefits based on "either physical impairment or diminution of wage
earning capacity, whichever is greater." The "physical impairment"
ratings were based on the degree of functional limitations or impairments
compared to a whole man. "Diminution of wage earning capacity" was
not defined by statute, and court cases used factors such as extent of
impairment, age, education, and ability to compete in the open labor
market as factors relevant to the determination of the extent of diminu
tion of earning capacity. The disability rating determined in a nonscheduled case was multiplied by 3.5 weeks per percentage point to determine
the duration of the permanent partial disability benefits. If the worker
was determined to be permanently and totally disabled because of the
extent of his impairment or functional limitation and factors such as
age, education, and ability to compete in the open labor market, benefits
were paid for the duration of the disability.
The extent of permanent disability was usually determined by litiga
tion or by negotiations between lawyers representing the parties. These
negotiations often culminated in compromise and release agreements
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(known as washouts in Florida), which had to be approved by the in
dustrial claims judges. However, these approvals were normally per
functory, as evidenced by lack of information in many of the Bureau's
case folders for washouts about how the judge assessed the extent of
disability and the adequacy of the settlement. 7 The passive nature of
the Florida workers' compensation agency was underlined by the
unavailability to the judges of any procedure within the agency to evaluate
the extent of permanent disability when this was a controverted issue.
Empirical Results for Florida

The methodology used for Florida was similar to that described for
Wisconsin, consisting of drawing a sample from a tape record of 1968
injuries, collecting data on the sampled cases by examining Florida case
folders, and then having the Social Security Administration process the
data and prepare tabulations, which included the information in tables
10.3 and 10.4. 8 Male regular cases—those that paid benefits without
litigation or use of a compromise and release agreement—are included
in table 10.3 and constitute less than a third of all permanent partial
disability cases. Male controverted cases are shown in table 10.4. The
format of tables 10.3 and 10.4 is similar to that of tables 10.1 and 10.2,
except that the percent rating intervals that define the columns differ
between Florida and Wisconsin. (The lowest interval, for example, is
1-2 percent in Wisconsin and 1-5 percent in Florida.) Also, the Florida
percent ratings were based not on the permanent disability ratings (as
in Wisconsin) but on the lost time charges assigned to each case on the
basis of the American National Standards Institute Z: 16 lost time scale.
This scale is an impairment rating scale that assigns to each permanent
disability case a time charge of from 1 to 6,000 days (the latter for per
manent total disability). Dividing each time charge by 60 yields a per
cent rating of from .02 to 100. 9
Panel A presents the weighted counts for the workers in the sample.
Table 10.3 indicates that the total sample of male regular cases was
1,665, with an average disability rating of 5.57 percent. The sample
of those who received their benefits in controverted cases contains 3,937
workers, with an average disability rating of 15.29 percent (table 10.4).
In both samples, the disability rating is associated with age and with
injury location. Disability ratings tend to increase with age, and of the
four injury locations, the upper extremities have the lowest average
ratings and the trunk the highest.
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Table 10.3 (continued)

u>
u>

Percent rating
Classification
of workers

1-2

3-5

6-10

Panel F
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases
Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

16-50

51-100

Mean
ratings

Total

Mean benefits net of legal fees (1968-73, in dollars) t
864
750
856
982
843
755
1,186
1,061
881

Panel G
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

11-15

1,803
1,666
1,896
1,821
1,779
1,606
2,051
1,897
1,819

2,966
2,756
3,138
2,826
3,049
2,345
3,152
3,753
3,072

4,015
3,700
3,980
4,132
4,217
3,732
4,191
4,552
—

6,399
6,447
5,040
6,999
6,800
5,725
—
6,307
7,123

1,372
1,195
1,355
1,515
1,376
1,083
2,010
1,572
2,060

Replacement rates : benefits as proportion of earnings losses
5.63
.16
a
a
a
.65
a
a
a

a
1.23
a
a
1.05
a
3.65
1.26
a

1.85
.58
21.11
3.00
1.15
a
2.16
1.06
.41

13.85
a
1.35
a
.64
a
1.13
105.57
—

*Significant at the .05 level.
t!968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent.
a. The replacement rate is not shown because the mean earnings loss estimate is negative.

1.55
12.18
.86
2.35
.82
1.24
—
.80
4.46

7.24
.30
a
a
a
1.32
3.86
a
a
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§
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Comparison of the A panels in tables 10.3 and 10.4 reveals a strong
association between size of the disability rating and probability of controversion. Only about half of the cases with 1-5 percent ratings are
controverted (1,308 of 2,449), but over nine-tenths of the cases with
26-50 percent ratings are controverted (430 of 458). Also, controlling
for severity, there is an association between injury location and controversion. For example, among cases with 1-5 percent disability ratings,
about one-third of upper extremity cases were controverted (408 of
1,153) whereas over four-fifths of trunk cases were controverted (393
of 484).
Panel B shows the mean potential earnings between 1968 and 1973
for workers in our sample. As shown in table 10.3, the mean potential
earnings for all of the males in the regular sample were $37,023
(measured in 1968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent, as are
all dollar figures in tables 10.3 and 10.4). This amount times the sam
ple size (1,665) yields potential earnings of $61.643 million for the en
tire sample of regular cases. For the controverted sample (table 10.4),
the mean potential earnings for 1968-73 were $32,735, and thus the
aggregate potential earnings for the 3,937 workers in the sample were
$128.879 million. The total expected or potential earnings for both
samples were $190.522 million.
Panel C shows the mean earnings losses for the workers, and panel
D shows the standard deviation of the earnings losses for all workers
in each cell. Statistically significant earnings losses in panel C are
asterisked. The mean earnings loss between 1968 and 1973 for the male
regular cases (table 10.3) was $190, which was not statistically signifi
cant; for the male controverted cases (table 10.4) it was $6,898, which
was statistically significant. We estimate actual 1968-73 earnings of the
5,602 workers in our two samples to have been $27.473 million less
than they would have been if the workers had not been injured.
For the entire sample of male regular cases, the workers experienc
ed an average 0.5 percent loss of potential earnings because of their
injuries (table 10.3, panel E), a loss too small to be considered statistically
meaningful. The male controverted sample, on the other hand, experienc
ed on average a 21.1 percent loss of potential earnings during the sixyear period (table 10.4, panel E).
A relationship between seriousness of injury and extent of earnings
losses for the male controverted sample is shown by the consistent in
crease in proportional earnings losses as disability ratings increase in

C

o

1
OJD

II
•"

0
<"•<

ON
=T
pj

o
"H

0
vi

V)

S
in
i
^*

o

3

*?
'H

Q)

e
.2 u

"•to*

S if

en
00
•j
CQ
^3

u

o
u

1

I

•o

'S
"S

1

u

•o
e

I

«

•3-

(3

ic

>,

L.

-H —

10 co ON *O
OO ™^ ^^ t^

OfNt^Tt

—

r** *O ^~ ^O
OO V^ t^ !*•*•

OfNOO^O

CN

fNOOOON
i—<CN-—•

CN oovoooo moooo —
ON r-mvooN oo-rj-oor—i -H

CN^OONfN
'—"'—'~^'—<

O TfrTfrcoON mr^-^Tj-

ON

ON ON ON ON

&o
U
ms g
,„
-g

"°"^
"^c^o
&So=
—« cNcn-<tin vdr^oooN

u BuSu
'ilS'lS'u'ilS'tS
ooooo

^^^^^Sil"

in CN en ^ in (**
1
I
1
1
I
U
00000-3
fN
fN m •* m •-

oo —ivofNOv oomoooN
en m en ^ *~^ ^ m CN CN
^

g gS§2 2§22

—
\O

Tt-

o inr-ooo fNt~-r~-^
en r^ ^^ ^ ON in oo in m
^t
—< —<
—i
—

o invoooN ONt^oovo

— vor-ooo omoxON
ro
—i
-H

in voooTtr- inintNm
vo
—' tN —
m -^ —«

tN Tj- ~ -^ •* inONpvq
in fNinvot^ ot^^vo

ON

m

co
ON

r-> CM »o t^ m oo co co co

336 The Wage-Loss Study

t/2
.-

3
'5s
HH

00
^D
1-H

^

JC
•4-1

2

M

o

J^

C

1
c

W5

S

&i

CQ

•4-1

u

5
"w
1
Cu
O>

e

«

E
<u

£
•o
<U

o

U.

0

•to*

U
03
'E
S

J3

E
'8 S
c"

•<!

1

•i—
/"•*
i.
«

i
—_

f*r
00
NO

*H

cn
ff

e

P vo — 00° v33ocn

m Tj-r-mm cncN-cs
P! cnrnrncN c^Pirncn

in ^5 ""^ ON co oo vo en ^^

i-Hcnvo

en ON ON en oo en en in ^°
en CN en en CN ^ en CN en
minooTfvo

^ONOO
inovo
enencN

r^wn^oo
— vo" ^^ en oo

enenenencN
fN fNenoooo fNfNencN

CNO-^OO

ONO(~-CN

-H in^ONf^ oo oo vo vo
en en en CN CN CN fN en en

CN

oo ON oo CN ^ co oo r*~ in
Tf- enONinoo cs^-inin
en en en en eN en en en en

L.

1

S

."2

£ r^ rn" rn' r5 en en' en" en
en vo - fNinON 1^Tt-nenin
en en en en

m eNoooo'rr CSOCNOO

'o
a,
e

03

- fN 0 %
r^t^'—'in
envoenr^
en en en CN

OOOOON

-HTTOP--

O — fN O

U
-s
,.

'c u

otSo =

^C^O

i
r-—«
en
en

ONVOOfN

r~- tN ON —< o ininOo
pg ^ ^ ^j. ^-j _ _ ^^ ,-j.

OO

en enenentN enenenen

-H

oo inenvooo in ON —« —«
oo TfincNO en CN —• vo

ON ON ON ON

en enenencN enenenen

ON

1
1
1
1
1
u
00000-3

CN CN en Tt in -g

^ ^^ 1 i 1 5
0000

'ilS'tS'uS'iS'u

u i)i)i)t) (_..>>- iS
00

<~^ cs ro ^^ </^ ^o r*** oo ON

0

1
(2

4£
JS

"o
•o
_c

J2
2
^

1
</}

oc
'c
e

8
s

u
"o3

m

£

*
*

OOOmON

*

*
-X-

ON

*
*
*
*

fNVD^fN

oo —< m fN O oofN^-H
vo t^t^t^m co oo i^ i~-

fN OO rj- -*

—< fN fN tN

•* -rl- ON Tj-

t— rt-ooom ON co in fN

OO

fN fN fN —i

*

CN
CN
ON
co

*

Tt
co
p*co

*

co
oo
oo
in

*

oo
ON
co
^°

*
*

*

*

*

fN CN —

OfNt~ON
^~ ^^ ON ^^

***
oo CN in oo
r~vooorvovomt~rooot~-i^

t^Ot^t^
^^

VOOOt^O
^J" CO in ^^

•t—
?
_«
"o
•o
_c

Ol

£

* * *
t~i in in in C
IK
lot^oo
in oo in ve
co co in OS
C.

vo m co vo t~- voooofN
•* fNONvor^ t^ vo o r~

fN
*

co
—
co
~^
#

CN fN fN —•
*

CN
*

oo CN oo vo
ON vo f"-~ VO

*

•^t
in
CN CN co in
ON vo ^" ON

OOOVOO
1—«
~^

* *

CU
CM

O

,0
.2

•oV

•2

1
1

1/3

^

CO fN fN CO

^"fN*—'*—'

1 t^ oo ON
' co in ^

OO ^^ CO fN

VOOO^HTj-

^coco

VO^tOOON

fN tN" CN" CN"

OOONOOO
— — fN fN

ONC-~ — ON

--fNCN—
CN — -H-^

tsi

a

^<

u.

OOOOOOOOOOr^^b^^

><

M

J
B

1
01

1

1a
1
On

U

&

B

M

^ ^^^^ DHJ<

CB

-- CN1 co rj- in vdr~ooo\

£2 S2u£i2 SS^S
<U
Q> 4> C^> (U
L*-« "^™
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 5 -g (u o
o oooo ^g^-.

CU

fNOfNOO
fNfNCN—

fN in — — i
— fN fN fN

|t^~-«'—*
iint^oo
vot^io

fN

CO

OfN^tr^
fNfNfN—

fNfNfNCO

CNTj-COCN

Ot~ — fN
—' fN fN fN

fN CO CN —<

— in fN fN

cOTtfNO
Ot^OOCN

en

—• — —' —i

ON vo r- —<
CN fN —' VD

•=

fNO — O

if,

—i

in fN co ^ in

Ji

•-

ON ON ON ON
^ in

u u u w

(L> (L>
^ J"3

t
JTT

^X

L. "C
flj 'fc-

SS«JS

K,^SSS
gC 3

«
00600060

u

fN

<D
^3

"EEE

-^ cNco'tin vdr^odoN

^ ^^^^ DHJ<C

£

U
—
00

oooo Sgl—

<1J
t^i

U
o1 o1 o1 o1 oI -S
CN CO

o

<L)
t^i

ON

—'
CO

— CN CN [^ —' ONfNfNTjTJONinr^^J' fNOONin

o OONOOON r~Ti-t~-o

r— ON^tooo TfTfONOo
in vomovo fNOOON

fN
fN

vo r-inooco r^OfNON

o cor~-coio covor— ON
oo ON co ^ ON ON CO r"~ oo
•o coint^in coi^'^j'^'

Oin»-^coco
r~ ininoo—
vovor~r~io

— vot--inr-~ COONVOVO
Tf vo^o^H OVDOOO
r~- r-r-oovo •^•r^-oot^-

—i
fN

— o c~- — m — in ON rj-

The Wage-Loss Study 337
-^ moomvo vo^ooin
o ONvor-tN om^t-H
•n OOONOO —• oo oo o

^H

r- — fN fN

oo C~-COVOON ONcoinco
in oom^fvo in — ON oo

in vo ON vo co
•n ^ *•"' ^ vo
OCO —

fN

fNco^inco

TffNfNfN

Tf inr--coo voinooco
vo in ON fN co ON ON vo in
~* in CN co fN co ^^ ^ co

CN

--> CN" co" '-•

ON oo t^ ON —« o-^invo

fN —• fN —

fN — CN CN

—

fN-^fNfN

t^ ON ^ r^- oo vo vo co co
[^ ON ^ in in ON vo ON ON
— — oovo— cNr-*—in

-^

-^

tN fNinON— inONONin
(s) _ c^ _ (-s) r~inovo
o ONfNtNin moNvot^

CO fNCOONF- — — O VO
in
vo —« ON r~ o>-<inoo
ON oomoo ONOOONOO

t/)

'3

ON ON ON ON

in fN co ^~ in

"S

ON

v>

O O O O

x (5 x u.
uu^u
L.^u.'S

U^UQ

O

CN fN co rf m ••= «
u u<u<U(u ht^SiS

„

Q

1
4s

Cu

'p S

U
'S

c
n

co oo vo •••* ^° co ^ 10 oo 1
OO CO OO CN VO — O r-- t~|D
.-. _ _H fx| « —« fN — — i
'£
*
* * # *
* * * *
L.
n

I OJ22S |g||
fN ON oo co vo inr^ooo

O
ON

*

*****
r^" ON oo in co
oo momfN
<N r~Tj-fNON
t^ vooooo^t

OO

* *
moin

—' — O Tt-

* * * * * * * * *
co QI^OOVO ^t — in vo

*
ON — O VO

*

"^ m oo fN

* *

—,

*

vo ro r~- t^-

*

TfvoinfNro
*

^~

ON ON ON ON

^

<U
-s

co fN in in >n ON co oo oo
^ vo fN in
m Tt* co ^^

ON

•n fN m TJ- in
1
1
1
1
O O O O

ui£i2"
utuuu

Wd>ci>a>CL>fcJ^^
OOOObOQO&oJJcSCtj

tN «N ro Tt in -g

1
O

£2
u

^^^^^

o oooo §; ? | —
^ ^^^^ Df-iJ<
— fNco'rfin vdr^odoN

Table 10.4 (continued)
Percent rating
Classification
of workers

1-5

6-10

Panel F
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases
Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Trunk cases
Lower extremities
All other cases

16-25

26-50

51-70

71-99

100

Total

Mean benefits net of legal fees (1968-73, in dollars) t
,106
,016
,077
,156
,203
906
,221
,073
,295

2,318
1,963
2,229
2,887
2,169
1,931
2,306
2,984
2,055

Panel G
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

11-15

Mean
ratings

3,067
2,863
2,894
3,266
3,187
2,811
3,015
3,428
3,171

5,340
4,903
5,167
5,523
5,667
4,724
5,300
5,347
6,212

8,269
7,778
8,438
8,608
7,903
6,563
8,558
8,132
8,588

11,612
10,410
12,274
12,841
10,725
9,142
12,569
11,520
11,135

14,331
17,012
12,854
15,299
12,982
—
14,502
12,199
16,216

18,203
29,643
19,454
17,946
13,202
16,144
16,842
20,597
20,448

OQ
ft)

3,534
2,869
3,468
3,880
3,837
2,280
4,001
3,520
4,040

Replacement rates: benefits as proportion of earnings losses
.27
.16
.43
.21
2.20
.23
.30
.28
.27

.50
.30
.42
1.11
.59
2.11
.72
.29
.39

.42
.42
.34
.40
.65
.76
.35
.46
.41

*Mean earnings losses differ significantly from zero at the .05 level.
f!968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent.

.60
.58
.51
.79
.54
.63
.51
.71
.87

.66
.84
.47
.64
1.17
1.15
.49
1.01
.82

.64
.75
.66
.58
.65
.80
.61
.66
.62

.67
.71
.54
.59
.90
—
.62
.51
1.04

.74
1.32
.66
.67
.75
.91
.65
.99
.75

H
n>

.51
.40
.46
.53
.75
.60
.48
.47
.57

r

o
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table 10.4, panel E, line 1. Also, for the male regular cases, the only
proportional earnings loss associated with a statistically significant mean
earnings loss is for the most serious disability rating category: workers
with 26-50 percent disability ratings experienced a 10.8 percent loss
of potential earnings during 1968-73 (table 10.3, panel E, line 1).
Panel F presents the mean benefits net of legal fees for the Florida
workers. Attorneys' fees represented about 13 percent of gross benefits
for workers in our sample. For the entire sample of regular cases, the
average worker received $1,372 in benefits between 1968 and 1973
(panel F of table 10.3); total net benefits received by the sample were
$2.284 million. The mean benefits for the controverted cases were
$3,534 (table 10.4, panel F), and total benefits for the sample were
$13.913 million. The grand total for both samples of Florida male
workers was $16.197 million in benefits.
Panel G contains the replacement rates. For all the workers in the
male regular sample, the replacement rate is 7.24 ($1,372 -r- $190).
That is, we estimate benefits were 724 percent of earnings losses for
the workers in the male regular sample. For all the workers in the con
troverted sample, benefits are estimated to have replaced 51 percent
of the earnings losses (table 10.4).

The Wage-Loss Study of California
The California Workers' Compensation Program 10
In 1968, the temporary total disability benefits were 65 percent of
the worker's average weekly earnings (which were defined as 95 per
cent of actual earnings), subject to a maximum weekly benefit of $70.00
and a minimum weekly benefit of $25.00. Permanent partial disability
benefits were paid for up to 400 weeks depending on the severity of
the injury at a rate of four weeks for each percent of permanent disability,
and the weekly benefit was 65 percent of the worker's average weekly
earnings, subject to a maximum weekly benefit of $52.50 and a minimum
weekly benefit of $20.00. Workers with permanent disability ratings
of 70 percent or above also received life pension benefits, which began
when their permanent partial disability benefits terminated. The week
ly pension amount was 1.5 percent of average weekly earnings for each
percent of disability rating above 60 percent. In 1968, the maximum
average weekly earnings considered in calculating the life pension were
$80.77.

340 The Wage-Loss Study

The permanent disability ratings in California are determined by a
unique approach that is described in chapter 7. One distinctive feature
of the California statute is that rather than containing a schedule of cer
tain injuries with a corresponding list of durations, it authorizes the ad
ministrative director of the Division of Industrial Accidents to issue a
comprehensive schedule to be used to rate all permanent disabilities,
and the schedule is to take account of the nature of the injury, the
worker's occupation and age, and his diminished ability to compete in
an open labor market. The schedule that has been issued pursuant to
this statutory provision provides guidance for rating most injuries and
diseases on the basis of the resulting impairment or functional limita
tions or work disability (loss of wage-earning capacity) or a combina
tion of these consequences.
The method of determining the permanent disability ratings in Califor
nia is also unique. Within the state workers' compensation agency is
the Disability Evaluation Bureau (formerly the Permanent Disability
Rating Bureau), which applies the rating schedule in many of the cases
involving permanent disability benefits. There are five main types of
rating procedures used by the Bureau, of which two are of particular
relevance here because they help define our samples of California
workers. Informal ratings (formerly designated advisory ratings) are
made in voluntary cases, that is, cases in which no application for ad
judication has been filed with the workers' compensation agency. The
Bureau prepares the informal rating at the request of the employee and
employer (or carrier), normally on the basis of medical reports sub
mitted with the rating request. If the rating is acceptable to both par
ties, compensation is paid to the employee without further notification
to the agency. The parties are not required to obtain informal ratings,
are not bound by the ratings, and typically either do not bother to use
the procedure or do not accept the ratings they obtain. Formal ratings
are prepared by the Bureau at the request of a workers' compensation
judge during the course of a litigated case. The rating is based on a
description of the disability prepared by the judge, and the Bureau does
not have access to the medical reports or other information in the case
file as a basis for the rating. The judge will consider objections to the
rating from the parties and the rating may be modified during the litiga
tion process, but normally the rating serves as a basis for the decision
(known as a findings and award).
Most California permanent disability cases pay benefits without in
formal or formal ratings being prepared by the Disability Evaluation
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Bureau. We term these cases "Other WCAB" cases because a Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board judge is involved. The judge may issue
a findings and award without using the Bureau (a relatively unusual
procedure) or, quite commonly, approve a compromise and release
agreement or a stipulated findings and award (in these procedures, the
judge can approve an agreement reached by the parties without con
ducting a regular hearing). Some of the Other WCAB cases in our sample
contain ratings made by the Bureau other than informal or formal ratings,
but the typical Other WCAB case involves a compromise and release
or stipulated findings and award that the workers' compensation judge
has approved without considering a rating from the Disability Evalua
tion Bureau.
Empirical Results for California

The methodology used for California was similar to that described
for Wisconsin, consisting of drawing a sample of 1968 injuries, col
lecting data on the sampled cases by examining case folders, and then
having the Social Security Administration process the data and prepare
tabulations, which include the information in tables 10.5-10.7. n The
main difference in the California methodology is that tape records of
1968 injuries were available only for those workers with informal ratings
or formal ratings, and approximately 40,000 case folders were physically
inspected in order to draw the Other WCAB sample.
Male informal cases—those in which an informal rating was receiv
ed from the Disability Evaluation Bureau and benefits were paid on the
basis of the informal rating—are included in table 10.5, and constitute
about 10 percent of the male cases in our sample. 12 Male formal cases—
those in which formal ratings were received from the Bureau—are in
cluded in table 10.6 and constitute about 20 percent of our male cases. 13
The Other WCAB cases, in which permanent disability benefits were
received but neither informal nor formal ratings played a part, are in
cluded in table 10.7 and constitute about 70 percent of our male cases.
The format of tables 10.5-10.7 is similar to that of tables 10.1-10.4,
except that the percent rating intervals that define the columns differ
among the states. (For example, California has an 11-25 percent disabili
ty rating interval, whereas Florida has both an 11-15 percent interval
and a 16-25 percent interval.) The percent disability rating used to
classify each California case was constructed by using the dollar amount
of the permanent disability award as a proxy for the disability rating.
The award was divided by four times the weekly rate for permanent
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Percent rating
Classification
of workers

1-5

6-10

11-25

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Back
Lower extremities
All other cases

51-69

70+

H
O>

Total

M
CTQ

Mean benefits net of legal fees (1968-73, in dollars) t

Panel F
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

26-50

Mean
ratings

856
659
865
757
1,253
805
1,280
756

2,312
2,326
2,297
2,326
2,297
2,118
2,633
2,825
2,233

4,358
4,690
4,327
4,222
4,374
4,093
4,928
4,593
4,294

8,016
8,104
8,431
7,603
8,020
8,050
8,586
7,573

2,032
1,459
1,797
2,123
2,650
1,601
5,454
2,669
3,011

Replacement rates : benefits as proportion of earnings losses

Panel G
1. Workers age 20-59

a

a

a

2.9

a

Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Back
Lower extremities
All other cases

.30
a
a
a
a

a
2.08
a
7.42
a
a
a
26.99

191.66
1.49
a
14.22
a
1.47
1.40
a

.00
.67
3.00
a
1.54
2.51
a
a

1.55
a
a
a
a
2.26
a
a

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

a
a

*Mean earnings losses differ significantly from zero at the .05 level.
t!968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent.
a. The replacement rate is not shown because the mean earnings loss estimate is negative.

~

C
D-
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disability benefits to determine a disability rating. This procedure was
necessary because for half of the Other WCAB sample, no disability
rating of any kind was available in the case folder. This estimating pro
cedure produces ratings identical to the informal ratings and formal
ratings when the ratings were used to determine the amount of perma
nent disability benefits. For other cases, such as compromise and release
cases, the procedure produces an approximation of the implicit disability
rating that allows comparisons to be made among all types of Califor
nia cases. 14
Panel A presents the weighted counts for the workers in each sam
ple. Table 10.5 indicates that the total sample of male informal cases
was 1,584 workers, who had an average disability rating of 7.21 per
cent. Table 10.6 shows that the 3,213 male cases with formal ratings
had average disability ratings of 22.08 percent, and table 10.7 reveals
that the average disability rating was 12.51 percent for the 11,182 cases
in the sample of Other WCAB cases.
In all three samples, the size of the disability ratings is associated
with age and injury location. With only one minor exception, mean
disability ratings increase with age. Among the four injury locations,
upper extremity injuries have the lowest average rating and back in
juries the highest average rating in each sample. Comparison of the A
panels of tables 10.5-10.7 reveals an association between the size of
the rating and the method of resolving the case. Most cases in all ratings
categories were resolved without the use of formal or informal ratings
and thus fall in the Other WCAB sample. Informal ratings account for
14 percent of the cases with ratings of 5 percent or less, and decline
in importance for more serious cases. In contrast, formal ratings ac
count for less than one in ten of the cases with ratings of 5 percent or
less, but increase in importance for more serious cases and represent
more than four out of ten of the cases with ratings of 51 percent or
more. Also, controlling for severity, there is an association between
injury location and the method of resolving the case. For example, among
cases with 6-10 percent disability ratings, about 15 percent of the up
per extremity cases were in the informal sample (270 of 1,641), but
only about 2 percent of the back cases were in the informal sample (17
of 985).
As shown in table 10.5, panel B, the mean potential earnings for all
of the workers in the male informal sample were $45,436 (measured
in 1968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent, as are all dollar
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figures in tables 10.5-10.7). This amount times the sample size (1,584)
yields potential earnings of $71.971 million for the entire male infor
mal sample. For the male formal sample (table 10.6), the mean poten
tial earnings were $40,144 and the aggregate potential earnings were
$128.983 million. For the Other WCAB sample (table 10.7), the mean
potential earnings were $38,683 and the aggregate potential earnings
$432.551 million. The total expected or potential earnings for all three
samples were thus $633.505 million.
The meaning of the -$1,500 earnings loss figure for the male infor
mal cases (table 10.5) is that actual earnings exceeded our estimate of
potential earnings by $1,500 per worker, a result that was not statistically
significant (table 10.5, panels C and D). For the male informal sample
of 1,584 workers, actual earnings exceeded our estimates of potential
earnings by $2.376 million. For the male formal cases (table 10.6),
the mean loss was $10,633 and statistically significant, and the aggregate
earnings loss $34.163 million. For the Other WCAB cases (table 10.7),
the mean loss was $7,166 and statistically significant, and the aggregate
earnings loss was $80.138 million. We estimate that actual earnings
of the 15,979 California workers in our three male samples between
1968 and 1973 were $111.925 million less than they would have been
if the workers had not been injured.
Panel E provides estimates of proportional earnings losses, which are
the mean earnings losses from panel C divided by the mean potential
earnings from panel B. For the entire sample of male informal cases,
the workers experienced an average 3.3 percent negative earnings loss,
which was not statistically significant. Essentially, we found that workers
in our sample of male informal cases experienced no earnings losses
because of their injuries. Workers in the male formal cases (table 10.6,
panel G), however, experienced on average a 26.5 percent loss of poten
tial earnings during 1968-73 because of their injuries, and the male Other
WCAB cases had an average loss of 18.5 percent (table 10.7, panel
G). A relationship between seriousness of injury and extent of earn
ings losses for all three samples is shown by the consistent increases
in proportional earnings losses as disability increases in panel E, line
1 of tables 10.5-10.7. Of the three samples, it is evident that earnings
losses are lowest in the informal sample. When severity of injury is
controlled for, neither of the other two samples consistently shows greater
earnings losses than the other.
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Table 10.7 (continued)
Percent rating
Classification
of workers

1-5

6-10

11-25

Panel F
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Back
Lower extremities
All other cases
Workers age 20-59
Workers age 20-29
Workers age 30-39
Workers age 40-49
Workers age 50-59
Upper extremities
Back
Lower extremities
All other cases

51 +

Total

802
733
773
804
1,019
831
892
896
599

1,951
1,990
2,054
1,770
2,065
1,976
1,944
2,057
1,734

3,886
3,863
4,120
3,979
3,565
3,964
3,871
3,748
4,043

7,864
7,318
7,637
8,406
8,030
6,966
8,208
8,065
7,442

14,664
13,780
14,112
15,428
14,957
12,988
15,695
13,661
14,140

n>

2,905
2,370
2,739
3,607
3,225
2,014
4,301
3,001
2,425

Replacement rates : benefits as proportion of earnings losses
.18
.17
.14
.52
.22
.24
.08
.37
.22

.36
.42
.25
.87
.23
.46
.20
.81
.54

*Mean earnings losses differ significantly from zero at the .05 level.
t!968 present value dollars discounted at 6 percent.

.40
.53
.34
.55
.33
.64
.31
.54
.30

.65
1.01
.47
.75
.56
.90
.58
.66
.90

.58
.55
.42
.54
2.90
1.00
.52
.75
.53

H
ft

I
OQ

Mean benefits net of legal fees (1968-73, in dollars) f

Panel G
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

26-50

Mean
ratings

.41
.43
.30
.64
.38
.46
.33
.59
.43

r
o
O.
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Panel F presents the mean benefits net of legal fees for the Califor
nia workers. 15 Attorneys' fees represented about 6 percent of gross
benefits for workers in our sample. For the sample of male informal
cases, the average worker received $2,032 in benefits between 1968
and 1973 (panel F of table 10.5) and the total net benefits received by
the sample were $3.219 million. The mean benefits for the male for
mal cases were $4,934 (table 10.6, panel F), and aggregate benefits
for the sample were $15.853 million. For the Other WCAB cases, the
mean benefits were $2,905 (table 10.7, panel F) and aggregate benefits
$32.484 million. The grand total for all three samples of California male
workers was $51.556 million.
Panel G contains the replacement rates. The replacement rate could
not be calculated for workers in the male informal sample, since we
estimate a negative earnings loss for that sample. Overall, we estimate
that benefits replaced 46 percent of earnings losses for workers in the
male formal sample and 41 percent of the earnings losses for workers
in the male Other WCAB sample.

Comparisons of the Three States16
The panel A data show several similar patterns across the three states.
The mean disability rating for the contested case sample is higher than
the mean rating for the uncontested sample in each state. (Among the
contested samples we include the Florida controverted cases and the
California formal and Other WCAB cases; among the uncontested cases
we include the Florida regular cases and the California informal cases.)
A related finding is that the proportion of cases contested increases with
increases in the disability ratings, a phenomenon demonstrated by com
paring the number of cases in line 1 for the uncontested and contested
cases in each state. Another common pattern is that disability ratings
tend to increase with age; this relationship is particularly evident in
Florida and California. The data by part of body injured (lines 5-9) also
show some consistency across states. Trunk cases (including for this
discussion the California back cases) and all other cases are the types
most likely to be litigated, and upper extremity cases the least likely.
Among contested cases, trunk injuries always have the highest mean
rating, and among uncontested cases, upper extremity injuries always
have the lowest mean rating.
The panel A data also show some important differences among the
states. The total male samples are 15,979 in California, 5,602 in Florida,
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and 1,970 in Wisconsin, reflecting in part the variations among the states'
labor force sizes. Of more significance is the variation in the propor
tion of cases that are contested in each state. In Wisconsin, 14 percent
of the cases were contested (285 of 1,970 cases), compared to 70 per
cent of the Florida cases (3,937 of 5,602 cases) and 90 percent of the
California cases (14,395 of 15,979 cases). 17 Another significant dif
ference involves the mean disability ratings. Among uncontested cases,
for example, Wisconsin workers had disability ratings averaging 3.70
percent, whereas Florida workers averaged 5.57 percent and Califor
nia workers 7.21 percent. For all of the Wisconsin workers—involving
both contested and uncontested cases—the average disability rating was
4.63 percent; the corresponding figure for all Florida workers was 12.40
percent and for all California workers 13.91 percent. (Those overall
disability ratings for each state were constructed by using the sample
sizes for the uncontested and contested cases as weights.) Thus, Wiscon
sin stands out among the three states for having the fewest contested
cases and the lowest disability ratings.
The panel B data show the potential or expected earnings for the
workers in the samples. In all three states, workers aged 30-49 had higher
expected earnings than younger and older workers, reflecting the nor
mal relationship between age and earnings. As anticipated, in light of
previous studies of interstate differences in earnings, California workers
in our sample had the highest expected earnings, followed by Wiscon
sin and then Florida workers. In both California and Florida, potential
earnings are markedly higher for workers in the uncontested cases
samples than for workers in the contested cases samples, largely because
workers in the uncontested samples were relatively high-wage workers
before their injuries. In Wisconsin, this differential is less pronounced. 18
Examination of the data in panels C and D, which show the mean
earnings losses and the standard deviations of those losses, reveals fur
ther notable similarities and differences among the states. In all three
states, the contested cases sample has statistically significant earnings
losses for the entire sample and for the workers in each of the disabili
ty rating categories in line 1 of panel C (the one exception is for Wiscon
sin contested cases with 1-2 percent ratings, in which the earnings losses
are insignificant). The states differ in the results for uncontested cases,
however. In Wisconsin, the entire uncontested sample and all rating
categories except 1-2 percent show statistically significant losses. In
Florida, except for the 26-50 percent rating category, the earnings losses
are not statistically significant, and in California none of the disability
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rating categories shows earnings losses. In all three states, earnings losses
are greater for contested cases than for uncontested cases for workers
with the same disability ratings. Also, among contested cases, back cases
consistently show the largest earnings losses and upper extremity cases
the smallest losses. There is no stable relationship between age and size
of earnings losses.
The average earnings loss for all Wisconsin workers was $3,430 (a
figure calculated by taking the weighted average of the $2,519 loss for
uncontested cases and the $5,128 loss for contested cases); the loss
figures for all Florida workers and all California workers are $4,904
and $7,004, respectively. Since, as previously described, the average
disability ratings in the three states were 4.63, 12.40, and 13.91 per
cent, the results indicate that each 1 percent of disability rating is
associated with $741 of earnings losses in Wisconsin, $396 in Florida,
and $504 in California. Thus Wisconsin disability ratings appear to be
rather stringent in terms of the amount of lost earnings associated with
a particular rating compared to the ratings in the other states.
The panel E data on proportional earnings losses also show signifi
cant patterns and variations across the three states. The proportional
earnings losses increase with higher disability ratings in each of the seven
samples, as can be seen by moving to the right in line 1 of panel E
of tables 10.1-10.7 (only the Florida uncontested cases show some ir
regularity in this respect). Another consistent pattern is that contested
cases have higher proportional earnings losses than uncontested cases,
even when disability ratings are held constant. There are 18 instances
in which the panel E, line 1 entry for a state's contested cases can be
compared to an entry with the same disability ratings for the state's
uncontested cases, and in all 18 instances the contested cases show greater
proportional earnings losses. Among the contested cases, trunk cases
consistently show the greatest proportional earnings losses and upper
extremity cases the least. No such stable relationship exists for differences
among workers classified by age.
Wisconsin uncontested cases have higher proportional earnings losses
than the uncontested cases in Florida and California. All three states
have proportional earnings losses of about 20 percent for their contested
cases. 19 When the uncontested and contested cases in each state are com
bined by using sample sizes as weights, the average proportional earn
ings loss for all Wisconsin workers works out to .082; for all Florida
workers, to .150; and for all California workers, to .179. That is, the
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male Wisconsin workers in our uncontested and contested cases samples
combined had earnings losses in 1968-73 that averaged 8.2 percent of
their potential earnings during the six-year period, and Florida and
California workers experienced 15.0 and 17.9 percent losses, respec
tively. Carrying the comparisons one step further, recall that the panel
A discussion indicated that the average disability rating for all Wiscon
sin workers (including uncontested and contested cases) was 4.63 per
cent, for Florida workers 12.40 percent, and for California workers
13.91 percent. Thus the ratio of 1968-73 proportional earnings losses
to disability ratings was 1.77 in Wisconsin (8.2 percent earnings losses
divided by 4.63 percent disability ratings), and the ratios in Florida and
California were 1.21 and 1.29, respectively. This is additional evidence
that the Wisconsin ratings are stringent in terms of the extent of earn
ings losses associated with a particular rating compared to the ratings
in Florida and California.
The panel F data on net benefits show some similarities among the
states, although the differences are more pronounced. All states pay
higher benefits on average to workers with higher disability ratings (as
shown by moving to the right on line 1 of panel E), and all states show
higher average benefits for contested cases than for uncontested cases,
largely reflecting the more serious injuries experienced by typical
workers in contested cases. For uncontested cases, the Wisconsin sam
ple had average benefits of $2,150, more than the Florida average of
$1,372 and the California average of $2,032. For contested cases, the
Wisconsin sample had average benefits of $5,128, more than the Florida
average of $3,534 and the California averages for two contested cases
samples of $4,934 and $2,905. Because a relatively high proportion
of Wisconsin cases is uncontested, however, the average benefit for
all Wisconsin workers was $2,580, less than the Florida average of
$2,891 and the California average of $3,226. (These averages were con
structed by using the sample sizes in each state as weights.) Again ex
tending the comparison, it is interesting that the benefits associated with
each 1 percent of disability rating were $557 in Wisconsin ($2,580
average benefits divided by the average disability rating of 4.63 per
cent), more than twice the benefits per 1 percent of rating of $233 in
Florida and $232 in California. The difference between Wisconsin and
the other states reflects in part the differences in benefit formulas discuss
ed earlier in this section and the smaller percentage of gross benefits
in Wisconsin used to pay attorneys' fees.
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The final comparisons among the three states are based on the panel
G data, which are the replacement rates (benefits divided by earnings
losses). In each state, the replacement rate for the uncontested cases
was higher than for the contested cases. The replacement rate is in the
range of .4 to .6 for all the samples of contested cases, meaning that
benefits replaced between 40 and 60 percent of earnings losses for these
workers. The replacement rate is much more variable for uncontested
cases: benefits replaced 85 percent of earnings losses for Wisconsin
workers and 724 percent of earnings losses for Florida workers; Califor
nia workers in the uncontested cases sample on average had no earn
ings losses to replace, and so the replacement rate can be considered
infinite.
For contested cases in all three states, the replacement rates tend to
increase for workers with higher disability ratings (as shown by mov
ing to the right in line 1 of panel E), although a drop in the replacement
rate for the most serious category of injuries occurs for the Wisconsin
sample and the two contested cases samples in California. The apparent
general tendency for replacement rates to increase with disability severity
must be viewed with caution, since for the most serious cases, signifi
cant earnings losses probably continue after the 1968-73 period, whereas
most workers' compensation benefits were exhausted during that period;
if replacement rates were calculated for a period extending beyond 1973,
the replacement rates would probably drop more rapidly for serious
injury cases than for minor injury cases. There are no obvious and pro
nounced relationships between replacement rates and age or part of body
injured. In both Florida and California, trunk cases have the lowest
replacement rates in the controverted cases samples, but this relation
ship is not found in Wisconsin.
The overall replacement rate for all Wisconsin workers was .75, in
dicating that benefits replaced 75 percent of lost earnings for the workers.
In Florida, benefits replaced 59 percent of lost earnings, while in Califor
nia the benefits replaced 46 percent of earnings losses. (These averages
were constructed by using sample sizes as weights.) Underlying these
differences in overall replacement rates is an interesting set of relation
ships. For a given disability rating, say 10 percent, Wisconsin workers
on average experience somewhat greater earnings losses than do workers
in Florida or in California ($7,410 in Wisconsin, $3,960 in Florida,
and $5,040 in California) but the Wisconsin workers on average received
considerably more benefits for the same rating ($5,570 in Wisconsin
versus $2,330 in Florida and $2,320 in California), and so the ratio
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of benefits to earnings losses—the replacement rate—was higher in
Wisconsin (.75) than in Florida (.59) or California (.46).
The preceding comparisons have been based on the entire sample line
(line 1) or the Total column, but the panel G replacement rates in the
cells defined by lines 2-9 and the several rating columns also deserve
attention. The dominant characteristic of these rates in all the tables
is the considerable variability as comparisons are made by moving down
a column or across a row. For example, for the Wisconsin male uncontested cases, the average replacement rate for all workers with 3-5
percent ratings is .90 (table 10.1, panel G, line 1), but when these cases
are disaggregated by age (lines 2-5) the replacement rates vary from
.33 to 9.91, and when they are disaggregated by part of body injured
(lines 6-9) the replacement rates vary from .58 to 1.22. The significance
of this characteristic variability is considered in chapter 11.
NOTES
1 More details on the Wisconsin workers' compensation program are included in Berkowitz,
Burton, and Vroman (1979), chapter 13, section A, and in chapter 7 of the present study.
2. The idea that a particular consequence of an injury may be the operational basis for compensa
tion because it serves as a convenient proxy for other consequences of the injury is discussed
in chapter 2.
3. The methodology for the NSF research and the Wisconsin results are discussed in detail in
chapters 10 and 13 of Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman (1979).
4. A sample of Wisconsin females is discussed in Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman (1979), chapter
13. The results are less reliable due to the smaller sample size and problems with control
methodology.
5. As explained in chapter 10 of the NSF Report (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman, 1979), data
on education, assets, marital status, and work experience (which human capital studies suggest
would be useful predictors of EGR behavior) were unavailable for the workers in our sample.
The NSF Report also presents results (in appendices to chapters 11-13) of an alternative method
of calculating potential earnings that relies on the actual earnings experience of California workers
in the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) maintained by the Social Security Administra
tion. The results using the CWHS control group methodology are generally consistent with those
shown in tables 10.1-10.7 of this report.
6. More details on the Florida workers' compensation program are included in Berkowitz, Bur
ton, and Vroman (1979), chapter 12, section A, and in chapter 9 of the present study.
7. The lack of information in the folders for washout cases about the basis for the settlement causes
problems because typically the settlement amount includes an unspecified payment to defray future
medical expenses. We adopted the procedure used by the Florida Bureau of Workers' Compen
sation to allocate the settlement amounts in compromise and release agreements between cash
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benefits and medical benefits. For settlements up to $10,000, 70 percent was allocated to cash
benefits; for settlements between $10,000 and $15,000, 60 percent was allocated to cash benefits;
and for settlements over $15,000, 50 percent was allocated to cash benefits. The estimates of
cash benefits were then divided by the weekly benefit rate to produce an implied number of weeks,
which then served as the basis for the Florida estimates of the extent of disability. Compared
to the procedure used to rate California compromise and release cases, the Florida procedure
tends to lower the disability rating and the amount of cash benefits.
8. The Florida cases are discussed in detail in chapter 12 of Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman
(1979), which also includes information on a sample of female controverted cases.
9. For many Florida workers, the Z:16 time charge is derived from the disability rating that is
used to determine the duration of permanent disability benefits. This derivation of Z: 16 charges
from the disability ratings occurs in nonscheduled cases and in cases resolved by compromise
and release agreements.
10. More details on the California workers' compensation program are included in Berkowitz,
Burton, and Vroman (1979), chapter 11, section A, and in the first section of chapter 7 of the
present study.
11. The California cases are discussed in detail in chapter 11 of Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman
(1979), which also includes information on a sample of females with formal ratings.
12. A case that had an informal rating that did not serve as the basis for benefits (because, e.g.,
the case was subsequently resolved by an award by a workers' compensation judge) was dropped
from the male informal sample.
13. Some cases with formal ratings from the Disability Evaluation Bureau were resolved by com
promise and release agreements or findings and awards where the amount of permanent disability
benefits did not correspond to the disability ratings in the formal ratings. The percent rating for
these cases is based on the general procedure discussed infra in the text that derives the disability
rating from the amount of the permanent disability award.
14. The problems of constructing disability ratings and the implications for comparisons of workers
within and among states are discussed in Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman (1979), chapters 10
and 14.
One problem is that compromise and release agreements often include an unspecified sum to
cover future medical expenses. In California, the first state in which we collected data for the
NSF study, we were unable to determine from case folders for compromise and release cases
how to separate the amounts for future medical expenses from the amounts for cash benefits for
permanent disability, and we treated the entire amount of the settlement as cash benefits. This
procedure raised the disability rating in any case where part of the settlement was for future medical,
since—as explained in the text—the disability rating was calculated by dividing the permanent
disability award by four times the weekly rate for permanent disability benefits. In some instances—
most notably serious back injuries—our procedure produced implicit disability ratings that ex
ceeded 100 percent. While the estimating procedure for disability ratings thus tended to exag
gerate the ratings for those cases in which the compromise and release settlement contained an
amount for future medical, the procedure also tended to exaggerate the amount of cash benefits
and understate the amount of medical benefits received in these cases. Since the test for adequacy
of benefits discussed in section G compares cash benefits to earnings losses, our procedure tends
to overstate the adequacy of the California workers' compensation benefits.
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Compromise and release cases were handled differently in Florida. There the Bureau of Workers'
Compensation had devised a procedure to allocate compromise and release settlement amounts
between cash benefits and medical benefits, and we adopted the Bureau's procedure, as discussed
in footnote 7.
Compromise and release cases were handled still differently in Wisconsin, where they are unusual.
Case folders were examined and settlement amounts were allocated between cash benefits and
medical care on a case-by-case basis. The estimates of the permanent disability cash benefits were
divided by the weekly permanent disability benefit rate to produce an implied number of weeks,
which when divided by 10 produced the permanent disability rating for the case. Because com
promise and release cases are unusual in Wisconsin and because the files normally contained suf
ficient information to permit allocations between cash benefits and medical care, the accuracy
of the disability ratings for Wisconsin workers is less of a concern than the accuracy of the disability
ratings for California and Florida workers.
15. A worker's disability rating and his permanent disability benefits are essentially simultaneously
determined. For workers with identical ratings (informal or formal), total benefits differ only
to the extent the workers received different amounts of temporary disability benefits or had dif
ferent weekly rates for permanent benefits (an uncommon occurrence for the California workers
injured in 1968, since most received the $52.50 per week maximum benefit). For workers without
disability ratings from the rating bureau or who received an award or settlement subsequent to
receiving a rating from the rating bureau, a disability rating was simulated using the procedure
described in footnote 14. The inherently close relationship between disability ratings and amounts
of benefits means that no particular significance should be attached to the relatively close rela
tionship between benefit amounts and disability ratings shown in panel F of tables 10.5-10.7.
What is not inherently close is the relationship between loss of earnings on the one hand and the
disability rating or amount of benefits on the other. As panels C, F, and G of tables 10.5-10.7
show, these relationships are not particularly close.
The inherent relationship between disability ratings and benefit amounts and the lack of par
ticular significance for the relationship is also true for the Wisconsin and Florida results shown
in tables 10.1-10.4.
16. A more extensive comparison of the empirical results involving California, Florida, and Wiscon
sin is included in Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman (1979), chapter 14. The three states are evaluated
in terms of adequacy, equity, and efficiency in chapter 11, infra.
17. The term "contested cases" is used in this comparison to include all cases in which the par
ties have indicated to the state agency that they disagree over some aspect of the case that they
would like the agency to resolve or in which the parties resolved a disagreement by negotiations
and approval of the negotiated settlement by the state agency is required. Thus the term "con
tested case" includes inter alia cases resolved by an agency decision after a formal hearing and
compromise and release agreements, which require agency approval in Florida, Wisconsin, and
California.
18. California workers in the male informal sample had 1966-67 earnings that on average were
$2,633 higher than the 1966-67 earnings of workers in the male formal sample and $3,288 higher
than the 1966-67 earnings of workers in the Other WCAB sample (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman
[1979], chapter 11). Florida workers in the male regular sample had 1966-67 earnings that on
average were $2,105 higher than the 1966-67 earnings of workers in the male controverted sam
ple (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman [1979], chapter 12). Wisconsin workers in the male uncontested sample had 1966-67 earnings that on average were only $781 higher than the 1966-67
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earnings of workers in the male contested sample (Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman [1979], chapter
13). All of the intrastate differences in sample means were statistically significant.
19. The California male formal cases have proportional earnings losses of .265 and the Califor
nia Other WCAB cases have losses of .185 (tables 10.6-10.7, panel E). A weighted average of
the proportional earnings losses for these two samples of contested cases is .203.

Part IV
Evaluation
and
Possible Reforms

Chapter 11
Evaluation of Permanent
Disability Benefits
This chapter evaluates the performance of the workers' compensa
tion program in providing permanent partial disability benefits. Chapter
12 discusses some of the policy alternatives that could be used to im
prove the performance.
The criteria we use to evaluate permanent disability benefits are those
articulated in chapter 2: permanent partial benefits should be adequate,
equitable, and efficiently provided. 1

Replacement Rates as Tests of Adequacy and Equity
The evaluation of the adequacy and equity of permanent partial disabili
ty benefits will largely rely on the replacement rates shown in tables
10.1-10.7 for the workers' compensation programs in California,
Florida, and Wisconsin. The adequacy and equity tests will be applied
following a review of some conceptual issues and limitations of our data.
(1) Which consequences should be compensable? As discussed in
chapter 2, there are two possible purposes for permanent disability
benefits: to compensate workers for work disability (loss of actual earn
ings or loss of earning capacity), and to compensate workers for per
manent impairments or the other consequences of their injuries or
diseases. Our assessment of the adequacy of permanent disability benefits
assumes their only purpose is to compensate for work disability. This
assumption, which seems warranted since most workers' compensa
tion programs purport to pay benefits only for work disability, tends
to improve the Wisconsin, Florida, and California records. If a por
tion of the benefits were considered payments for impairment, the
balance of the benefits (which would be considered payments for work
disability) would be less adequate in comparison to the loss of earnings.
(2) Which is the relevant aspect of work disability? We assume that
actual loss of earnings, as opposed to loss of earning capacity (see chart
1.2), is the proper measure of work disability. Although state programs
365
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are more likely to operationally base the permanent disability benefits
on loss of earning capacity, they presumably do so because they expect
that loss of capacity will manifest itself in some subsequent actual loss
of earnings.
(3) How should earnings losses be measured? A fundamental issue
in measuring the extent of earnings losses is deciding the reference wage
against which the disabled worker's actual earnings will be compared
in order to determine the extent of earnings losses. Operationally in
workers' compensation, the reference wage almost invariably is the
worker's own wage before the occurrence of the work-related disabili
ty. A conceptually superior reference wage is the earnings the worker
would have earned if he had not experienced the work-related injury
or disease. Calculation of this reference wage requires a projection of
the worker's predisability wage into the future, ideally on the basis of
factors such as the worker's age, sex, education, work experience, and
other characteristics that affect age-earnings profiles. In our study, data
on many of these factors are unavailable and postinjury potential earn
ings were estimated on the basis of each worker's preinjury earnings,
age, and sex.
Earnings losses should be measured as the difference between the
projected earnings and the worker's actual earnings in the postinjury
period, where the actual earnings are adjusted to reflect any other fac
tor than the work injury that affects the earnings. If, for example, two
years after the work injury the worker is involved in a nonwork acci
dent that affects his earnings, the actual earnings figure should be ad
justed. Our data do not permit adjustments on a case-by-case basis for
these other influences on postinjury earnings, since our only sources
of information are the workers' compensation agency files and the Social
Security summary earnings records. Our methodology, however, ac
counts for these other influences when the results for groups of workers
are considered. The workers in our control group are also subject to
these postinjury influences on actual earnings, and thus the earnings
growth ratios (EGRs) described in chapter 10 that were derived from
the actual earnings in 1968-73 of the control group workers have built
into them the influence of the factors other than work injuries that af
fect actual earnings. 2 In short, the earnings losses we show are associated
with the 1968 injuries to the workers in our samples and are in excess
of earnings losses caused by other adverse events that influenced these
workers from 1968 to 1973. 3
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The accuracy of the estimates of earnings losses for individuals is
also limited because of the data source we used for earnings. Social
Security earnings records do not include information on all types of
earnings (for example, some state and local government employees are
not covered by the Social Security system). Also, the records only in
clude reports of actual earnings up to the taxable maximum; estimates
of total annual earnings were made for workers who reached the tax
able maximum.
The limitations of our data mean that our results must be used with
some caution. Estimates of potential earnings, actual earnings, and earn
ings losses for individual workers are particularly vulnerable to error.
Results for groups of workers, however, are more reliable, as evidenced
by the statistical significance of the earnings losses for many of the groups
of workers shown in the C panels of tables 10.1-10.7.
For some cells in the C panels, our estimates of mean earnings losses
are negative (the replacement rates in corresponding cells in the G panels
are missing). This occurrence is pronounced for the cases with 1-5 per
cent ratings for the California male informal cases (table 10.5) and the
Florida male regular cases (table 10.3). In only one instance, however,
are the negative earnings losses statistically significant (table 10.5). In
other words, our estimates of actual earnings for some workers in
1968-73 exceed, in all but one case by a statistically insignificant amount,
our estimates of potential earnings for these workers. We interpret these
negative entries to mean that average earnings losses were essentially
zero and that very high average replacement rates (in excess of 100
percent) should be inferred for the workers in these cells.
(4) What is the proper measure of earnings ? According to the Na
tional Commission, the "basic measure of the worker's economic loss
is the lifetime diminution in remuneration attributable to the work-related
injury or disease. This can roughly be described as wage loss, although
remuneration is composed of earnings plus supplements" (National Com
mission Report 1972, p. 36). Supplements include fringe benefits, such
as health insurance, and legally mandated employer expenditures. The
Commission concluded that the appropriate measure of lost remunera
tion is not the difference between total remuneration before and after
the disability, but the difference in net remuneration. This comparison
reflects factors that are affected by disability such as taxes, work-related
expenses, some fringe benefits that lapse, and the worker's uncompensated expenses resulting from the work-related impairment.
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It is exceedingly difficult to use the National Commission's measure
of the worker's economic loss. Data on fringe benefits, taxes, and other
factors are not routinely collected by workers' compensation agencies,
and are difficult to obtain without extensive contacts with workers and
their employers. Also, the Social Security records of earnings have no
data on supplements or income taxes.
These difficulties of data collection mean that most researchers do
not use the net remuneration concept described by the National Com
mission, but instead use data that are conceptually less appropriate but
operationally much more accessible. Such data are used in part III,
because the realistic alternatives are no data at all or better data for a
much smaller sample. We believe the data, despite their deficiencies,
are reasonably appropriate for evaluation purposes. Nonetheless, we
acknowledge that the assessment of the adequacy and equity of the
workers' compensation benefits must be made without any direct in
formation for items such as taxes and fringes. The direction of any bias
in the assessment because of these omissions is unclear. The absence
of information on fringe benefits means the measure of earnings
understates the total amount of lost remuneration. On the other hand,
since workers' compensation benefits are tax free while the income lost
because of the injury would have been taxed if received, the earningslosses replacement rates may understate the effective proportion of net
remuneration replaced by workers' compensation benefits.
(5) How should attorneys 'fees be treated? Another issue is whether
the gross benefits paid by the employer or the benefits net of attorneys'
fees received by the worker should be counted. We believe the ap
propriate measure of benefits for the adequacy test is benefits net of
attorneys' fees. For a worker, although the payment of an attorney's
fee may be a good investment, only the amount of the award that re
mains is available to replace lost earnings.
(6) Should benefits from other programs be considered? Workers'
compensation benefits are not the only source of disability benefits receiv
ed by workers. Many workers with serious injuries, for instance, may
be receiving Social Security Disability Insurance benefits or other forms
of government or private assistance. In principle, these benefits should
be included when considering the adequacy and equity of benefits. In
practice, information on the supplementation of workers' compensa
tion benefits by private or public sources is fragmentary. 4 Our data are
for that reason confined to workers' compensation benefits. In general,
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supplementation of workers' compensation benefits probably is not
significant for most workers with nonserious injuries but is likely to
be relatively important for older workers and for workers with serious
injuries.
(7) Over what period should earnings losses and benefits be
calculated? The period over which earnings losses and benefits are
calculated will affect the assessment of adequacy. In principle, the data
should pertain to the worker's entire life, since losses and benefits may
persist over long periods. The data in tables 10.1 to 10.7, however,
pertain only to 1968-73 (for reasons explained in chapter 10). Among
younger workers and workers with high disability ratings, post-1973
earnings losses are probably much larger than post-1973 benefits. Thus
the replacement rates are biased upward for the serious injury cases
and for the injuries involving younger workers compared to the replace
ment rates that would be found if lifetime benefits and lifetime earn
ings losses were compared. Overall, the limitation of our data to 1968-73
means that our replacement rates overstate the adequacy of the benefits
in Wisconsin, Florida, and California.
(8) Should the individual or the family be analyzed? Much of the re
cent literature on labor supply has used the family as the unit of analysis,
and this approach has been useful in analyzing topics such as retire
ment decisions and labor force participation for women. Because of
the limitations of our data, our estimates of earnings losses pertain on
ly to the injured workers, and because the disability of the workers may
cause other family members to increase their participation in the labor
market, our estimates exaggerate the total loss of family income caus
ed by the work-related injuries. Also, other family members may qualify
for benefits from a social insurance program because of the worker's
injury. If these additional transfer payments and earnings were con
sidered and the family were used as the unit of analysis, the replace
ment rates probably would increase.
A Recapitulation of the Eight Factors. We recognize there are several
limitations to the replacement rates used in this study. 5 (1) If workers'
compensation benefits are meant in part to provide compensation for
consequences other than work disability, then our replacement rates are
too high. (2) We assume that actual loss of earnings—not loss of earn
ings capacity—is the proper measure of work disability. It is not clear
which measure of work disability would be larger, so there is no clear
implication for the size of our replacement rates. (3) The accuracy of
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the replacement rates depends on the accuracy of our estimates of the
workers' potential earnings, of their actual earnings, and of the benefits
received by workers after their injuries. Particularly for the first of these
estimates, we recognize that our data have some limitations. However,
there is no reason to believe our estimates of the total earnings losses
in each state are too high or too low, and thus no reason to think the
estimating problem biases our replacement rates either way. (4) Our
estimates of earnings losses probably exaggerate the workers' losses
of spendable earnings because of the effect of payroll and income taxes,
but understate the loss of total remuneration since fringe benefits that
lapse because of the work-related injury are not considered. These fac
tors have contrary implications for the size of our replacement rates
and it is not evident which dominates. (5) We assume that attorneys'
fees should be deducted before benefits are compared to earnings losses,
a decision that tends to reduce our replacement rates, especially for
serious injury cases that are more likely to involve litigation. (6) Other
transfer payments besides workers' compensation benefits are not con
sidered. In the case of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits,
we know that older workers and workers with higher disability ratings
are more likely to receive these benefits. (See Vroman 1977.) If all
transfer payments were considered, the replacement rates would be
higher in general, and probably would increase most substantially for
older workers and workers with serious injuries. (7) The replacement
rates cover benefits and earnings losses for 1968-73, and not post-1973
developments. Among younger workers and workers with high disability
ratings, post-1973 earnings losses are probably much larger than
post-1973 benefits. Thus the replacement rates in tables 10.1 to 10.7
are biased upward for the serious injury cases and for the injuries in
volving younger workers compared to the replacement rates that would
be found if lifetime benefits and lifetime earnings losses were compared.
(8) Our estimates of earnings losses pertain only to the injured workers,
and because the disability of the workers may cause other family
members to increase their participation in the labor market, our estimates
exaggerate the total loss of family income caused by the work-related
injuries.
Implications of the Eight Factors for the Adequacy Test. The ade
quacy test is primarily concerned with the average replacement rate for
all workers in a state included in the restricted universe from which
our sample was drawn. Two of the factors just discussed (numbers 2
and 3) have no obvious implications for the size of our replacement
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rates. Three of the factors (numbers 5,6, and 8) tend to make our
replacement rates too low, while two factors (numbers 1 and 7) tend
to make our replacement rates too high. The fourth factor has conflict
ing components and the net influence of the factor on the size of our
replacement rates is unclear. The overall impact of the eight factors
on the value of the average replacement rate in each state is also unclear.
The only solution that seems feasible is to use the state-wide replace
ment rates without any adjustments, recognizing that the values may
be too high, too low, or just right.
Implications of the Eight Factors for the Equity Test. The equity test
is primarily concerned with comparisons among the replacement rates
for the different cells of the samples within each state, where the cells
are defined by age, sex, nature and severity of injury, and type of ad
ministrative procedure used to provide the benefits.
The effect of five factors (numbers 1-4 and 8) should be reasonably
uniform across the individual cells in tables 10.1-10.7, and should not
seriously affect our equity evaluation. If our exclusion of attorneys' fees
is improper (number 5), our replacement rates for serious injuries are
too low compared to those for minor injuries.
The implication of the seventh factor is that our replacement rates
are too high for cases involving serious injuries and younger workers
(since we ignore post-1973 developments), while the sixth factor means
that the replacement rates are too low for cases involving serious in
juries in older workers (since transfer payments other than workers'
compensation are more likely for serious injuries in older workers).
The sixth and seventh factors appear to offset each other insofar as they
give rise to biases in our replacement rates involving serious versus
nonserious injuries, but the two factors both suggest that our replace
ment rates tend to understate the adverse consequences for younger
workers relative to the adverse consequences for older workers.
Although these eight factors complicate the evaluation of the replace
ment rates on the basis of equity, we believe that the problems are not
so serious that evaluation is untenable.

Adequate Permanent Disability Benefits
Before we apply the adequacy test, an additional question must be
answered: what proportion of earnings losses should be replaced by
workers' compensation benefits? As discussed in chapter 2, the Na-
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tional Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws indicated
that benefits should "provide substantial protection against interrup
tion of income." But the National Commission did not make specific
recommendations for permanent partial disability benefits that would
permit a translation of providing "substantial protection against inter
ruption of income" into a numerical or quantitative standard. For tem
porary total and permanent total disability, the National Commission
recommended that, subject to the state's maximum weekly benefits, the
total disability benefits be at least 66 2/3 percent of the difference be
tween the worker's earnings before and after the injury or disease.
The National Commission provided a higher standard for the ade
quacy of disability benefits when it recommended that permanent total
benefits be increased through time in the same proportion as increases
in the state's average weekly wage. Similar protection for permanent
partial disability would require the benefits to be escalated through time.
This scheme would roughly approximate the conceptually superior ap
proach previously discussed of basing benefits on the difference be
tween the wages a worker would have earned if he had not been in
jured and the wages actually earned after the injury.
We consider the replacement of 66 2/3 percent of earnings losses
calculated on the basis of the postinjury potential earnings to be the proper
test, but we also recognize this is a stringent test in terms of the tradi
tional approach in workers' compensation, which is to relate benefits
to preinjury earnings. A more lenient test for adequacy, which may
be particularly appropriate for 1968-73, a period when wages probably
grew more rapidly than was expected as of 1968, is that at least 50 per
cent of earnings losses calculated on the basis of postinjury potential
earnings should be replaced by benefits. 6 As indicated in chapter 10,
the Wisconsin workers in our sample had 75 percent of their lost earn
ings replaced by benefits, the Florida workers 59 percent, and the
California workers 46 percent, which means that these states as of 1968
had benefits that ranged from adequate by the stringent test (Wiscon
sin) to adequate by the lenient test (Florida) to somewhat inadequate
(California). For these three states as of 1968, we conclude that benefits
were generally adequate.
Our findings for California workers injured in 1968 can be compared
to the results from Economic Consequences ofJob Injury (1984), a study
conducted by the California Workers' Compensation Institute, hereafter
CWCI Economic Consequences. The sample included 8,364 cases of
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serious claims incurred under workers' compensation insurance policies
issued in 1975-76. Earnings records for each worker were obtained from
the State Employment Development Department and 1,076 of the
workers were also interviewed. Earnings losses for each worker were
determined for the four years after the injury. The procedure to estimate
the losses was similar to that described in chapter 10 for our wage-loss
study, although the CWCI did not escalate preinjury wages over the
four years to determine postinjury potential earnings. The interviews
allowed the CWCI to eliminate some of the gross earnings losses due
to factors other than the work-injury, such as earnings declines due to
voluntary retirements. After adjustment to earnings losses for reasons
unrelated to the work injuries, the net earnings losses in the four years
after the injury averaged $8,080 per worker. The projected net earn
ings losses over the working lives of the employees averaged $17,700.
The study found that on average, workers' compensation income benefits
(for both temporary and permanent disability) replaced only 49 per
cent of the net earnings lost by permanently disabled workers over their
working lives, a replacement rate that the CWCI termed inadequate.
The CWCI study also extrapolated its results through 1984, consider
ing the general increase in wages after the injury dates for the workers
in its sample and the infusion of nearly $1 billion in additional benefits
into the California program as a result of 1983-84 benefit changes
(described in chapter 7). The net result of the offsetting factors was
that the proportion of earnings losses replaced by benefits dropped to
47 percent in 1984 from the previous 49 percent. These results, although
based on a methodology somewhat different from ours, are consistent
with the replacement rate of 46 percent we found for California workers
injured in 1968 and reinforce the conclusion that the state's benefits
for permanently disabled workers are inadequate.
Equitable Permanent Disability Benefits
The most straightforward test of equity for disability benefits has two
dimensions: horizontal equity requires that workers with equal losses
of earnings (or losses of earning capacity) should receive equal benefits;
a narrow test of vertical equity requires that workers with different losses
should receive benefits proportional to their losses. A more general test
for vertical equity only requires that there be a consistent relationship
between losses and benefits. Society may decide, for example, that the
proportion of benefits to losses should increase (or decrease) as losses
increase. Although the general formulation of vertical equity is more
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difficult to translate into empirical tests than the narrow test, reasonable
requirements appear to be (1) that the ratio of benefits to earnings losses
consistently increase (or decrease) as earnings losses increase, and not
fluctuate (that is, that the relationship between the replacement rates
and earnings losses be monotonic7) and (2) that there should be no abrupt
changes in the ratio of benefits to earnings losses as earnings losses
increase.
It is possible to have benefits that are inadequate yet equitable. For
example, as we use those terms, benefits that replace 10 percent of lost
wages for all workers, no matter their ages or types of injury, would
be inadequate yet equitable. It is also possible to have benefits that are
adequate yet inequitable. For example, on the average for all workers
in a state, benefits may replace 70 percent of lost wages, and we would
consider such an overall figure to be adequate. If some workers received
100 percent of their lost wages replaced by benefits and others only
40 percent, however, the benefits would be inequitable.
Applying the equity criterion properly requires some sensitivity to
the conceptual issues and data limitations discussed above. Of particular
relevance are the facts that (1) the replacement rates cover benefits and
earnings losses for 1968-73, and not post-1973 developments, and (2)
transfer payments other than workers' compensation benefits are not
considered. The first factor means our replacement rates are too high
for cases involving serious injuries and younger workers, while the sec
ond factor means that the replacement rates are too low for cases in
volving serious injuries and older workers. The two factors appear to
offset each other insofar as they introduce biases into our replacement
rates involving serious versus nonserious injuries, but they both sug
gest that our replacement rates tend to understate the adverse conse
quences for younger workers relative to the adverse consequences for
older workers.
Application of the Equity Test. An obvious way to begin applying
the equity test is to compare the replacement rates for the entire male
samples in the three states. The differences in the replacement rates—
.75 for Wisconsin, .59 for Florida, .46 for California—suggest that
workers injured in different states in 1968 fared quite differently. There
is, in short, interstate inequity.
The Wisconsin results provide a model of how the equity test can
be applied within a state. 8 The relationship between replacement rates
and severity of disability can be determined by moving across the rows
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in panel G of tables 10.1 and 10.2. Examination of each male sample
in total (panel G, line 1) reveals a tendency for replacement rates to
increase with the size of the disability rating. Although the relation is
not strictly monotonic, the results can be considered consistent with
the general test of vertical equity. 9 The regularity of the relationship
between size of the disability rating and the replacement rates dissolves,
however, when the male samples are disaggregated by age or part of
body. In other words, moving across the replacement rate values in
rows 2 to 9 in panel G of tables 10.1 and 10.2 reveals fluctuations that
are inconsistent with any acceptable version of a vertical equity test.
A horizontal equity test is provided by moving down the columns
in panel G. The results indicate that workers with similar disability
ratings, but with different ages or parts of body injured, experience wide
ly varying rates in terms of the proportion of their earnings losses replac
ed by workers' compensation benefits: horizontal equity is lacking.
Comparisons of replacement rates by type of administrative procedure
are also possible for the two male samples. Not only is the replacement
rate higher overall for the uncontested sample than the contested sam
ple (85 percent versus 58 percent), the replacement rate is consistently
higher for the uncontested sample for each of the entries in line 1 of
panel G of tables 10.1 and 10.2. Contested cases do not fare as well
as uncontested cases in Wisconsin in terms of replacement rates.
Overall conclusions about the equity of Wisconsin workers' compen
sation benefits must be made with some caution, both because of the
previously remarked problems in calculating the replacement rates and
because of the choices for equity standards, particularly in determin
ing the appropriate tests for vertical equity. Subject to these cautions,
several conclusions can be drawn from the Wisconsin data. First, there
is some evidence from Wisconsin consistent with the equity test. For
example, the Total column of the male contested cases (table 10.2, panel
G) indicates a reasonable consistency in replacement rates across workers
classified by age and by injured part of body. Also, there is an overall
relationship between replacement rates and severity of disability that
is reasonably consistent with a vertical equity test for both the male
uncontested and male contested cases (tables 10.1 and 10.2, panel G,
line 1). Second, there is some evidence of systematic differences in
replacement rates among workers that violate the equity test in Wiscon
sin. For example, the replacement rates for males in the uncontested
sample consistently exceed those for males in the contested sample, even
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when severity of disability is held constant, and this appears inconsis
tent with the horizontal equity test. Third, the Wisconsin results pro
vide numerous examples of unsystematic differences in replacement rates
among groups of workers that violate horizontal and vertical equity.
Both tables demonstrate erratic movement in replacement rates as one
moves down the columns in panel G, which violates the test for horizontal
equity, for example. Fourth, the comparisons made so far pertain to
differences among the mean replacement rates for groups of workers.
Given the problems of estimating earnings losses for individual workers,
we feel more comfortable about equity tests involving groups of workers.
If, however, variations in replacement rates were examined at the in
dividual worker level, the large dispersion within cells would suggest
extreme problems of achieving equity on an individual basis. (See
Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman 1979, chapter 15, appendix B.)
Similar conclusions about horizontal and vertical equity are appropriate
for the Florida male samples shown in tables 10.3 and 10.4. First, the
Total column of the male regular cases (table 10.3, panel G) indicates
a reasonable consistency in replacement rates across workers classified
by age and part of body injured. Also, there is an overall relationship
between replacement rates and severity of disability that is reasonably
consistent with a vertical equity test for the male controverted cases
(table 10.4, panel G, line 1). Second, there is some evidence from Florida
of systematic differences in replacement rates among workers that violate
the equity test. For example, the replacement rates were consistently
low for workers with injuries to the trunk and consistently high for
workers with injuries to the upper extremities, after adjusting for age
and severity of injury. Also, the replacement rates for males in the regular
sample consistently exceed those for males in the controverted sample,
even when severity of disability is held constant, and this also violates
horizontal equity. Third, there are numerous violations of horizontal
and vertical equity shown by the unsystematic fluctuations in replace
ment rates as one moves down the columns or across the rows in tables
10.3 and 10.4. Finally, even worse equity problems are evident from
the variations in replacement rates among the individuals in the cells
of the two tables.
The California data in tables 10.5-10.7 also indicate a mixed record
of compliance with the horizontal and vertical equity tests, although
more effort is needed to find evidence of compliance with the criterion
than in the other states. First, there is an overall relationship between
replacement rates and severity of disability that is reasonably consis-
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tent with a vertical equity test for the male formal cases and male Other
WCAB cases (line 1, panel G, of tables 10.6 and 10.7). The replace
ment rates tend to increase with severity, meeting the general test of
vertical equity, although the increase in the replacement rate from .18
to .58 as one moves across table 10.7, panel G, line 1 seems to repre
sent a pronounced inclination to favor serious injuries. In Wisconsin
and Florida there was a reasonable consistency in replacement rates
across workers classified by age and injured part of body for the Total
column of the contested cases, but the two contested case samples in
California show much less consistency. To illustrate, the overall replace
ment rate for the Wisconsin contested cases was .58, and the variation
among the eight components of the sample was from .52 to .82 (table
10.2, panel G, Total column); for Florida workers in the controverted
case sample, the overall replacement rate was .51 and the variation
among the eight components was from .40 to .75 (table 10.4, panel
G, Total column); whereas for California workers in the male formal
cases sample, the overall replacement rate of .46 when disaggregated
into the eight components snowed a greater than two-to-one variation
(.34 to .69), and the California Other WCAB sample, with an overall
replacement rate of .41, reflected a similar variation (.30 to .64) in the
disaggregated sample (Total columns of panel G, tables 10.6 and 10.7).
There are some patterns of systematic differences in replacement rates
among groups of California workers that violate the equity test. Thus,
in the male formal cases and the Other WCAB cases (tables 10.6 and
10.7), workers with back injuries consistently have lower replacement
rates than workers in the samples with other types of injuries, but
equivalent disability ratings. More compelling than the pattern of in
equity are the apparently unsystematic variations in replacement rates
among groups of California workers that violate tests of horizontal and
vertical equity. These inequities can be found by moving across the rows
or down the columns of panel G in tables 10.5-10.7. Finally, if intracell
variations in replacement rates were examined, further evidence of in
equity would be found.
We conclude that the equity criterion was seriously violated for the
benefits provided to the workers injured in 1968 who were in our
samples. Although Wisconsin appears to have done somewhat better
than Florida, which in turn did somewhat better than California, none
of the states appears to have done a satisfactory job of meeting the tests
of horizontal and vertical equity. One interesting finding that is consis
tent with the alternative test of vertical equity is that in all three states,
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replacement rates rather consistently increase with the severity of in
juries in the contested case samples. This finding casts some doubt on
one of the most widely dispensed shibboleths of the workers' compen
sation field, namely, that permanent partial disability benefits tend to
overcompensate minor injuries relative to major injuries. As previous
ly noted, however, the results do not reflect any developments after
1973, when wage losses for serious injuries were likely to continue and
benefits were largely ended, which means the earnings-losses replace
ment rates are likely to decline over time for serious injuries. Even if
a modicum of vertical equity is provided by the relationship between
severity and replacement rates, our overall assessment of the perma
nent partial disability benefits on the equity criterion is that there are
relatively serious shortcomings. We do not suggest that the benefits will
not provide even a rough sort of justice. We do believe, however, that
the deficiencies on the equity criterion are much more serious than the
deficiencies on the adequacy criterion.
Our findings of inequitable benefits for California workers were sup
ported by the evidence in the recent study by the California Workers'
Compensation Institute, CWCI Economic Consequences. As describ
ed in the adequacy section, the CWCI methodology was somewhat dif
ferent from the methods used in our wage-loss study (chapter 10). The
CWCI, for example, projected earnings losses over the working lives
of the employees, whereas we confined our estimates to the six-year
period after date of injury. This probably explains why we found that
replacement rates increased with severity, while the CWCI found that
the replacement rates for permanently and partially disabled workers
declined with the severity of the injury: from 88 percent for workers
with permanent disability ratings of 1-9 percent to a replacement rate
of 32 percent for workers with 70-99 percent ratings. The replacement
rate for permanent total disability cases was 64 percent, reflecting the
higher maximum weekly benefit for total disability than for partial
disability. The CWCI (Economic Consequences) found that "replace
ment rates vary widely according to injury severity and the age of the
worker" (p. 7), which led the Institute to criticize the California benefits
as inequitable because "replacement of earnings loss due to the injury
is not accomplished in any rational matter" (p. 8). Although the par
ticulars of our results and those in the CWCI Economic Consequences
differ, the central message does not: there are serious inequities in the
permanent disability benefits for injured workers.
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Efficient Permanent Disability Benefits
The question of efficiency concerns the administrative costs of pro
viding benefits incurred by the participants in the workers' compensa
tion delivery system, including employers, insurance carriers, workers,
attorneys, and governmental agencies. The term efficiency is used to
describe two concepts, as explained in chapter 2. One meaning of effi
ciency, termed myopic efficiency, is that administrative costs are at the
lowest possible level without regard to the quality of benefits provid
ed. Although this disregard for quality is usually not made explicit, it
appears that what some people mean by maximum efficiency is the
cheapest delivery system. The other meaning of efficiency, termed
panoramic efficiency, is that a particular quality of benefits is provided
at the least possible administrative costs. Thus, if two delivery systems
provide benefits of equal adequacy and equity, the delivery system that
does so with lower administrative costs has greater panoramic efficiency.
We do not believe it is meaningful to say that one delivery system
has lower administrative costs than another delivery system unless the
differences in the quality of the benefits are specified. Only with the
latter information can judgments be made about the relevant concept,
namely the panoramic efficiency of the delivery systems.
There are other criteria for judging a delivery system that can be con
sidered part of a broadly defined efficiency test. First, the delivery system
should not aggravate the problem the benefits are meant to remedy.
Thus, if a particular delivery system induces workers to prolong un
necessarily their periods of work disability or to exacerbate their func
tional limitations, that system ceteris paribus is less efficient than a
delivery system without these inducements. Second, the delivery system
should facilitate (or at least not impede) the achievement of the objec
tives of workers' compensation other than providing adequate and
equitable cash benefits. Thus, a particular delivery system that helps
achieve the safety objective is preferable to a system that does not, ceteris
paribus.
Evaluation using the efficiency criterion is especially difficult. For
one thing, data on the expenses of administering the program that are
borne by employers and others in the private sector, the amount of at
torneys' fees, and the lags in payments of permanent disability benefits
after a workers' condition is permanent and stationary, as well as a varie
ty of other types of data relevant to the assessment of the efficiency
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of the delivery system, are scarce. Another reason the efficiency criterion
is hard to apply is that the quality of benefits and the administrative
costs must be simultaneously considered in order to evaluate the
panoramic efficiency of a state's workers' compensation program. It
would be foolish, for example, to prefer one jurisdiction merely because
its administrative costs are lower than the costs in a second jurisdic
tion. The first jurisdiction's administrative costs may result from lowerquality benefits, and thus represent no greater panoramic efficiency.
(In terms of graph 2.2, the two jurisdictions could simply be at dif
ferent points on the Quality/Costs Constraint line.)
Application of the Efficiency Test. An important aspect of the effi
ciency test concerns the types of delivery system used to provide workers'
compensation benefits. One model (typified by Wisconsin) relies on
an active state agency that makes many decisions itself, closely super
vises the operation of employers and private carriers, and limits the
role for attorneys. A considerably different mode (typified by the federal
ly operated Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act) relies
on the private parties, particularly attorneys, to make most of the deci
sions about benefit payments. The agency is essentially passive, although
it will resolve disputes brought to it by the private parties. An in
termediate model (typified by Florida prior to the 1979 reforms and
by California) involves a state agency that conducts a minimal review
of the decisions made by the private parties and that resolves disputes
in a relatively high proportion of the cases, but that nonetheless relies
on extensive attorney involvement to make the delivery system operate.
How attorneys are used is an important feature differentiating these
three delivery system models. As recounted by many commentators on
the history of workers' compensation, the original notion was that the
elimination of the fault concept and the prescription of benefits by statute
would enable employees to protect their interest without external
assistance. From that standpoint, the substantial reliance on lawyers
in California and Florida before 1979 suggests at the minimum a lack
of myopic efficiency. And yet the involvement of attorneys can also
be viewed as a prima facie indictment of the idea that workers' com
pensation laws can be self-administering; attorneys may be in the system
because they help achieve the criteria of adequate and equitable benefits.
In other words, their involvement may represent a lack of myopic effi
ciency but not a lack of panoramic efficiency. Whether, in fact, attorneys
help achieve the equity and adequacy of benefits is not clear a priori.
On one hand, they receive fees that generally are subtracted from the
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workers' awards, which, in a nominal sense, reduces the adequacy of
the benefits. On the other hand, attorneys increase the awards in some
cases in which they are involved and probably have an indirect impact
on the amount of benefits in other cases in which they are not involved
(similar to the "threat" effect that unions have on wages in nonunionized
firms). Thus on a priori grounds, the impact of attorneys on the ade
quacy of benefits is unclear. Likewise, the impact of attorneys on the
equity of benefits is unclear. They may take cases in which benefits
would otherwise be inappropriately low, or alternatively their involve
ment may be on a basis unrelated to the relative undercompensation
of the case, such as the worker's membership in a union.
The data from Wisconsin, Florida, and California shed some light
on the question of whether the use of attorneys improves panoramic
efficiency. In terms of the ability to deliver benefits without litigation,
Wisconsin clearly surpassed California and Florida before 1979. As
shown by the distribution of cases between tables 10.1 and 10.2, more
than 5 out of 6 permanent partial disability cases in Wisconsin were
resolved without a contest (including use of compromise and release
agreements). By contrast, more than 2 out of 3 Florida permanent
disability cases were controverted, and only 1 in 10 California perma
nent disability cases was resolved by use of informal ratings rather than
reliance on a more litigious approach, such as use of a compromise
and release agreement or a formal hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge. A related finding is that legal fees amounted to only about
3 percent of benefits for the workers in our Wisconsin sample, com
pared to about 12 percent in Florida and about 6 percent in California.
Wisconsin thus appeared to be superior to California and Florida in
the handling of permanent partial disability benefits without excessive
litigation, thus providing some evidence that it had greater myopic ef
ficiency. Moreover, the Wisconsin benefits for the workers in our
samples were more adequate and more equitable than the Florida and
California benefits, suggesting that the Wisconsin delivery system also
provided greater panoramic efficiency than the delivery systems in the
other two states. We believe this conclusion is valid even when con
sideration is taken of the administrative expenditures in both the public
and private sectors, including the expenses of operating the state workers'
compensation agencies and state courts as well as the cost of attorneys'
fees for claimants, employers, and carriers. The Wisconsin agency has
a particularly impressive record in terms of budget and staff compared
to the other jurisdictions in our study (table 4.1).
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The Florida and California delivery systems are representative of the
systems in most of the jurisdictions in our ten-state study. There ap
pears to be a general concern for myopic efficiency in workers' com
pensation, which manifests itself in inadequate resources for state agen
cies and undue reliance on litigation. The consequence of this narrow
concern appears to be a loss of panoramic efficiency.

Conclusions
Our overall evaluation of permanent partial disability benefits in the
workers' compensation jurisdictions included in our wage-loss study
and in our 10-state study is based on the criteria of adequacy, equity,
and efficiency. Adequacy was not a major problem as of 1968, the date
when the workers in the three states in our wage-loss study were in
jured. The major failing we have documented is the lack of equity of
the permanent partial disability benefits. The three states we examined
most intensively—California, Florida, and Wisconsin—provide con
siderable evidence that the benefits were not closely matched to the
workers with earnings losses. This judgment is based to a large extent
on our sample of workers injured in 1968, but there is little reason to
believe that workers injured more recently would have done any better
on the equity criterion. Only in Florida have the criteria used to deter
mine the amount of permanent partial disability benefits and the pro
cedures used to provide these benefits changed significantly since 1968,
and—as stressed in chapter 9—there are no data indicating the impact
of these changes on equity. Efficiency was also a significant problem
in most jurisdictions, although Wisconsin did reasonably well on this
criterion.
The balance of the section attempts to identify the causes of the defi
ciencies of adequacy, equity, and efficiency.
Lack of Adequacy was not a major problem in the three states in the
wage-loss study. Underlying this conclusion are some interesting fin
dings. One is that the adequacy of permanent partial disability benefits
is almost impossible to evaluate simply by looking at the statutory pro
visions of a workers' compensation program. For example, the Wiscon
sin statute as of 1968 had a maximum weekly benefit for permanent
partial disability benefits of $47.50, and the benefits were paid for a
maximum duration of a thousand weeks. This was in contrast to Florida,
where the weekly maximum for permanent partial disability benefits
was $49.00 and the maximum number of weeks was 350. The statutory
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provisions suggest that Wisconsin permanent partial disability benefits
would be much more adequate than those in Florida. Our evidence sug
gests, however, that the permanent partial disability rating standards
are much more stringent in Wisconsin than in Florida, 10 and so for a
given injury the apparently greater benefits provided by the Wisconsin
statute were partially offset by a lower disability rating. The end result
was that the adequacy of the Florida and Wisconsin benefits in practice
appears to be much more similar than the statutes would suggest.
We draw two implications from this comparison of Wisconsin and
Florida. An obvious one is that any attempt to assess the differences
among states in the adequacy of permanent partial disability benefits
must go beyond comparisons of statutory matters such as weekly benefits
and maximum durations and must also consider the standards used to
rate disabilities. A less obvious implication, and one that the data only
suggest and do not prove, is that, given the extent of discretion inherent
in most rating systems for permanent partial disabilities, workers' com
pensation programs have some ability to be self-correcting on the ade
quacy criterion. If adequacy of permanent partial disability benefits is
widely considered a problem in the state because of low weekly maximums and limited durations, the participants in the delivery system
have some opportunities to increase the size of the disability ratings
in order to compensate for the low statutory provisions and thus pro
vide a rough sort of justice. This phenomenon is hard to document;
there are limits to the parties' ability to carry out such a self-correcting
practice; and such a strategy is surely not the ideal way to deal with
an adequacy problem (especially since the self-correction mechanism
probably aggravates any problems of equity); but we sense that this sort
of countervailing activity is taking place in some jurisdictions.
Lack of Equity is a major problem, and the causes appear to be a mix
ture of the procedures used by the state and the criteria for permanent
partial disability benefits. Chapter 4 discusses four aspects of the pro
cedures used by state workmen's compensation agencies, namely recordkeeping, monitoring, evaluation, and adjudication. A major source of
the lack of equity appears to be inattention by state agencies to the
monitoring and evaluation aspects of procedure, and too much emphasis
on adjudication. The result is inconsistent treatment of similar injuries
because the amount of benefits a worker receives is affected by the
policies of his employers or the insurance carrier and by whether the
employee hires a lawyer. As we indicated earlier, Wisconsin appears
to do better on the equity criterion than California and Florida, and one
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reason is that the Wisconsin workers' compensation agency's greater
attention to monitoring reduces the importance of employers, carriers,
and attorneys in determining the outcome of cases.
Probably even more important than procedural deficiencies as a cause
of inequity are the characteristics of the criteria used to evaluate the
extent of permanent partial disability (see Burton 1983, pp. 24-28). In
general, states use criteria that permit and even require a considerable
exercise of discretion, and the almost inevitable result is that similar
injuries receive dissimilar ratings. Here again Wisconsin shines in com
parison to most states because of its emphasis on objective factors in
rating and its use of comprehensive guidelines to evaluate a wide range
of impairments and functional limitations. In most states, there is more
opportunity for subjective factors (such as pain and lack of endurance)
to be considered in evaluating the seriousness of the impairments and
functional limitation, and these subjective factors allow the evaluator
more room to exercise discretion, which in turn results in inconsistent
treatment. Probably the worst of all possible criteria in terms of ensur
ing consistent treatment is the approach used in most jurisdictions for
nonscheduled injuries. This approach allows the loss of wage-earning
capacity to be assessed on the basis of facts relevant for the particular
case: almost invariably reasonable people can and do differ about the
extent of disability for a given worker. Thus the rating criteria now
used in most states contain a number of subjective elements or require
the assessment of imponderables such as loss of wage-earning capaci
ty, and the considerable exercise of discretion required to apply the
criteria results in inconsistent ratings of similar injuries. 11
Another apparently important source of inequity is the timing of ap
plication of the criteria used to evaluate permanent partial disabilities.
Ordinarily, a worker's permanent partial disability is rated as soon as
his permanent injury is considered stable. This approach requires an
ex ante assessment of the consequences of a particular injury on a
worker's earnings. After reviewing the results in California, Florida,
and Wisconsin of these ex ante evaluations, we conclude that in a high
proportion of cases the states are not able to predict with any reasonable
degree of accuracy what the consequences of work-related injuries will
be for the workers' labor market experience.
Panoramic efficiency is achieved to the extent that benefits of a
specified level of adequacy and equity are provided with the least ad
ministrative cost. 12 As evidenced by the extent of litigation in most
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jurisdictions compared to Wisconsin, inefficiency seems to be a serious
problem, since there is no apparent gain in adequacy or equity in these
other states compared to Wisconsin. The inefficiency also appears to
be caused by a mixture of the procedures and the criteria used to pro
vide permanent partial disability benefits.
The emphasis in most state workers' compensation agencies is on ad
judication, not on the other administrative functions such as monitor
ing and evaluation. Many state agencies fell into this role of being
primarily an adjudicatory body by accident. When workers' compen
sation was established, the view was widely held that the program would
be largely self-administrating since benefits amounts and durations were
specified in the statute. Unfortunately, in practice the workers' com
pensation program was complex and required numerous controversial
decisions, especially in the area of permanent partial disability benefits.
A substantial delivery system was needed to make these decisions, and
essentially states had to choose between two types of delivery systems.
One allowed the private parties to work out their own arrangements
for the administration of the act with state agencies acting as quasi-courts
to adjudicate those disputes the parties could not resolve by negotia
tions. This approach was taken in most states. The alternative type of
delivery system turned to the state workers' compensation agency to
fill the emerging need for administration; the state agency pursued the
record-keeping, monitoring, and evaluation roles. This approach was
chosen in only a few states, of which Wisconsin is probably the best
example.
The delivery system that makes the workers' compensation agency
primarily a quasi-court was chosen in most states for a mixture of
reasons. It reflects in part the interest of attorneys and others who benefit
from a delivery system that operates largely on the basis of private
negotiations and litigation. Another reason is that in most jurisdictions,
state administrators have not pursued the model of an active state
workers' compensation agency, often because these administrators were
drawn from the ranks of practitioners who had never seen the activeagency model in operation. And certainly another important reason is
that efficiency is often equated with a small budget—that is, the goal
is myopic efficiency, not panoramic efficiency. State legislators often
see the cost of running a state agency as the only relevant cost of the
delivery system, and by holding down agency costs they provide a strong
incentive for the litigation-based approach to a delivery system. What
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is often not appreciated is that a low-cost agency is not cheap when
the total resource costs of the delivery system are considered.
Another possible reason for the use of a litigious delivery system is
that workers may assume they are unlikely to be injured on the job.
As a result, they may be unwilling to support an active agency, which
requires both time to be established successfully and resources on a con
tinuing basis. When, however, workers are injured on the job (to their
surprise), they can obtain crucial assistance from lawyers on short notice.
Thus, unwillingness to think about the unpleasant topic of work-related
injuries fosters litigation, since legal services can be purchased after
the injury occurs, but good administration cannot.
The criteria used to provide permanent partial disability benefits also
encourage litigation, which in many jurisdictions appears excessive.
Lawyers can make a big difference in the outcome of a case when the
criteria are loose, and naturally lawyers are attracted to the program
under these circumstances. Again, part of the success of Wisconsin in
reducing the incentive to litigation is that comprehensive rating guidelines
reduce the chance for disagreement and thus limit the usefulness of
lawyers.
We have concluded that the state workers' compensation programs
have deficiencies in their permanent partial disability benefits in terms
of adequacy, equity, and efficiency, and we have attempted to delineate
some of the causes of these deficiencies. The final chapter will examine
some policy issues that states can consider in attempting to improve
their permanent partial disability programs.
NOTES
1. One qualification of the evaluation in chapter 11 is that the emphasis is on cash benefits, and
little attention is given to other objectives of workers' compensation, such as the provision of
adequate medical care and the encouragement of safety.
2. We are not able to adjust our estimates of earnings losses to reflect the reduction in labor sup
ply that may be caused by the receipt of workers' compensation benefits. If such a reduction in
labor supply occurs, actual earnings after the injury will be reduced and our estimates of the earn
ings losses caused by the work-related injuries could be exaggerated. We have partially control
led for this benefits-induced reduction in labor supply because the earnings growth ratios (EGRs)
for our control group reflect any such reductions for workers with minor permanent partial disability
ratings. To the extent that the higher benefits for more serious injuries induce even greater reduc
tions in labor supply, we exaggerated the wage losses caused solely by these injuries.
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3. Technically, our control methodology did not follow the procedure described in the text that
calculated earnings losses as the difference between potential earnings and actual earnings ad
justed to show the adverse impact of factors such as nonwork injuries. We calculated the earnings
losses by subtracting unadjusted actual earnings from potential earnings that were adjusted to reflect
the impact of the adverse factors. For individual cases the procedure may yield different estimates
of earnings losses, but on average the amount of earnings losses in the two procedures is the same.
4. One study of workers who receive multiple benefits is Johnson, Cullinan, and Currington (1979).
5. The eight factors discussed in the text are not the only possible limitations to our replacement
rates. Another potential problem is the limitation of our data to those workers injured in 1968
who received permanent disability awards. Some workers may have been injured that year at
work and sustained permanent disabilities that were never compensated because, e.g., they worked
for uncovered employers or they never filed claims. These workers, in effect, had replacement
rates that were zero. If there were such workers, our replacement rates are higher to an unknown
degree than the replacement rates for all workers who sustained permanent disabilities because
of 1968 work injuries.
6. The data in tables 10.1-10.7 are six-year aggregates and thus are not appropriate for an ade
quacy test that compares a worker's actual earnings prior to the work-related injury with the worker's
actual earnings subsequent to the injury. Many workers with minor permanent injuries experience
most or all of their wage losses the first year or two after the injury and then their earnings resume
their normal growth pattern. For example, suppose a worker earns $1000 in 1967 (the year before
injury) and that his earnings would have increased $100 a year thereafter if he had not been in
jured. Assume that the worker has no earnings in 1968 and earns only $200 in 1969 as a result
of the injury, but then his earnings rebound to $1300, $1400, $1500, and $1600 for 1970-73.
This worker would show $1800 of earnings loss if his preinjury wages are compared with his
postinjury actual earnings over a two-year period (1968-69) but no earnings losses if his prein
jury wages are compared with his postinjury actual earnings over a six-year period (1968-73).
Suppose the worker received $1200 of workers' compensation benefits (all paid in 1968 and 1969).
This would produce a replacement rate of .67 if earnings losses and benefits are compared over
a two-year period but an infinitely large replacement rate if earnings losses and benefits are com
pared over a six-year period.
The procedure we use to measure earnings losses and replacement rates is not as sensitive to
the length of the period during which the adequacy and equity assessments are made. Using the
example in the previous paragraph, we would show $1100 of earnings losses in 1968 and $1000
of earnings losses in 1969, and no earnings losses in subsequent years. Thus the dollar amount
of earnings losses ($2100) and the replacement rate of .48 ($1000 of benefits divided by $2100
of earnings losses) would be the same whether calculations were done over 1968-69 or over 1968-73.
(Proportional earnings losses would vary depending on whether a two- or six-year period were
used, but this variable is not used in the adequacy and equity assessments.) Our estimates of replace
ment rates shown in tables 10.1-10.7 are deficient to the extent that benefit payments and earn
ings losses extend beyond the period for which we have data (1968-73); this point is discussed
in this chapter.
7. As discussed in the text, the definition of vertical equity that requires a strict proportionality
of benefits to losses is a special case. More generally, vertical equity only requires that there
be a consistent relationship between losses and benefits. Ultimately, policy makers must decide
what is a consistent relationship between losses and benefits. In general, little guidance has been
provided by policy makers about their intentions for vertical equity. The use of minimum and
maximum weekly benefits implies, however, that the desired policy is to replace a higher proper-
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tion of lost earnings for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers. Also, the use in most
states of maximum durations for benefits for serious permanent partial disabilities implies that
the desired policy is to replace a higher proportion of lost earnings for workers with minor in
juries than for workers with serious injuries. In California, however, workers with permanent
disabilities rated at 70 percent or more of total disability are eligible for life pensions, which sug
gests that the intent is to replace a higher proportion of lost earnings for more serious injuries.
These examples suggest that it is difficult if not impossible to infer the definition of vertical
equity that policy makers explicitly or implicitly intended when they established the various state
workers' compensation programs. Absent the guidance about what policy makers intended, we
will use two alternative definitions of vertical equity: first, the narrow test of vertical equity im
plied by the National Commission's definition of equitable, namely the requirement of a strict
proportionality of benefits to losses; and second, when appropriate, a more general formulation
of vertical equity, which assumes that, among workers who differ in terms of the severity of their
work disabilities, the desired relationship between earnings losses and benefits is monotonic. That
is, if workers with moderate work disabilities have a higher proportion of their lost earnings replaced
by benefits than do workers with minor work disabilities, then workers with severe work disabilities
should have at least as high a proportion of their lost earnings replaced by benefits as workers
with moderate work disabilities. Thus, a state that replaced 20 percent of lost earnings for workers
with minor work disabilities, 60 percent for workers with moderate work disabilities, and 40 per
cent for workers with severe work disabilities would violate the more general test of vertical equity.
8. Application of the equity test within a state largely involves an analysis of the cell-to-cell variations
in the mean replacement rates in the various rows and columns of panel G in tables 10.1-10.7.
When the source of this variability is related to the data in panels C and F of the tables, it is
evident that the benefits in panel F show a much more regular pattern down columns and across
rows than do the earnings losses in panel C, and that the irregularities in earnings losses are primarily
responsible for the lack of regularity in the panel G values.
The conclusion that the source of variability in replacement rates is the erratic pattern of earn
ings losses must be used with some caution, however, since the result is in one sense a statistical
artifact caused by the format of our tables. There are three variables reflected in tables 10.1 to
10.7: (1) the permanent disability rating explicitly or implicitly assigned by the workers' com
pensation program to each worker in our sample, (2) the total amount of workers' compensation
benefits received by each worker, including temporary and permanent disability benefits, and
(3) the earnings losses between 1968 and 1973 for each worker. In practice, the first two of these
variables are highly correlated with each other across workers, while neither is highly correlated
with the extent of earnings losses. Our tables use (1) disability ratings to establish the column
intervals, and, not surprisingly, show that mean benefits (2) can be "predicted" reasonably well
but that (3) mean earnings losses cannot. It would have been possible to construct tables that defined
column intervals by the amount of earnings losses in each case; if panels C, F, and G of tables
10.1 to 10.7 had then been constructed using the same data, panel F (showing mean benefits)
would have appeared erratic, panel C (showing mean earnings losses) would have shown a regular
relationship across rows and down columns, and panel G (showing replacement rates) would have
had the same values in the Total column as panel G in the present version of tables 10.1 to 10.7
and would have had values in other columns that demonstrated no pattern of regularity. This ap
proach to a formatting of the tables might be considered evidence that the irregularity of the replace
ment rates can be traced back to erratic variations in benefits, rather than erratic variations in
earnings losses.
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We believe our approach to tabulation (using the size of the disability ratings to set the column
intervals) is more appropriate than the alternative approach (using the extent of earnings losses
to set column intervals) for at least two reasons. First, the research design virtually dictated this
approach, since we wanted a sample of permanent disability cases in each state, not the universe
of cases, and at the time the sample was drawn, we had information on the disability ratings but
not the earnings losses. In other words, the only way to reduce our overall sample size by apply
ing sampling fractions to certain cells was to rely upon information available from the agency
tape records, which included no information on earnings losses. Second, the use of disability ratings
as column headings implicitly reflects a model in which disability ratings are used to predict earn
ings losses, and that operationally is the way workers' compensation programs are designed. In
other words, the disability ratings are assigned on a prospective basis before the actual loss of
earnings occurs, and the ratings are ex ante predictions of lost earnings.
Although we believe our approach to tabulation is appropriate, we do not believe the crucial
elements of our findings depend on it. Among workers who receive workers' compensation benefits,
there are three variables with large standard deviations relative to their means: (1) disability ratings,
(2) workers' compensation benefits, and (3) earnings losses. The values of the first two variables
are closely correlated, and neither of them is closely correlated with the extent of wage loss. One
way to demonstrate the lack of correspondence between benefits and earnings is reflected in our
tables, to which the analysis in the text of the chapter now turns.
9. If the replacement rates were calculated for lifetime earnings losses and lifetime benefits, the
replacement rates would probably be more similar across the disability rating categories. This
result would be more consistent with the narrow test for vertical equity.
10. As discussed in chapter 10, each 1 percent of disability rating is associated with $741 of earn
ings losses in Wisconsin and $396 in Florida.
11. The recent conversion of Wisconsin from ratings for nonscheduled permanent partial disabilities
based on extent of impairment to ratings based on loss of earning capacity (discussed in chapter
7) is not a propitious development in our view.
12. As discussed above, a broadly defined test of efficiency requires that the delivery system should
provide adequate and efficient cash benefits without impeding other objectives of workers' com
pensation. By such a test, in addition to the high costs of litigation, another deficiency of the
delivery system approach described in the text that relies on extensive litigation is the interference
with the rehabilitation process that is caused by a litigious environment.

Chapter 12
Possible Reforms of Permanent
Partial Disability Benefits
The preceding chapter characterized permanent partial disability
benefits in the jurisdictions we examined as generally adequate, seriously
inequitable, and apparently provided with great variations in efficien
cy among the jurisdictions. The judgments of adequacy, equity, and,
to a lesser extent, efficiency are based on the data from our wage-loss
study of California, Florida, and Wisconsin. The judgments of efficiency
and, to a lesser extent, equity are based on the evidence from the 10-state
study.
The question to be considered in this chapter is, given the deficien
cies in the current handling of permanent partial disability benefits, what
are the policy alternatives that should be considered in the quest for
benefits that are adequate, equitable, and efficiently provided?
Issues in Designing a Program
Each jurisdiction must resolve a number of issues when a program
for permanent partial disability benefits is designed or revised. Resolution
of these issues is difficult because the criteria of adequacy, equity, and
efficiency on which the decisions must rest often come into conflict.
Complicating the decisionmaking process is that efficiency has two
meanings: myopic efficiency—in which the only concern is the reduc
tion of administrative cost without regard to the quality of the program,
and panoramic efficiency—in which the goal is the lowering of ad
ministrative cost without reducing the program's quality. (Chapter 2
provides an extended discussion of these concepts.)
Given the inadequate level of workers' compensation benefits in many
jurisdictions and the extensive reliance on litigation, policy makers
sometimes face policy options in which a change in administrative pro
cedures will reduce the program's administrative cost without under
mining adequacy or equity—thus achieving both myopic and panoramic
efficiency.
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Policy makers nonetheless will often face choices in which the only
way to cut administrative cost is to reduce the quality of benefits. Such
a choice has lower administrative costs and thus higher myopic effi
ciency, but the lower quality of benefits may reduce panoramic
efficiency.
Equity is the aspect of the quality of benefits that seems most likely
to deteriorate as myopic efficiency is increased (by reducing ad
ministrative costs). Several examples of the myopic efficiency-equity
trade-off will be offered in this section.
One useful way to array policy makers' alternatives is to pose a series
of questions that must be resolved in designing a program providing
permanent partial disability benefits.
1. Which Consequence (or Consequences) of Injuries and Diseases
Should Be Compensated? As catalogued in chart 1.2 and discussed in
chapter 1, there are several consequences of injuries and diseases, in
cluding impairment, functional limitations, work disability, and nonwork disability. Some of these consequences can be further divided;
work disability, for example, can be subdivided into loss of earning
capacity and loss of actual earnings. Policy makers must decide which
of these consequences warrant compensation.
Chapter 2 examined some opinions on this question. Larson argues
that the sole basis for workers' compensation benefits should be work
disability. In contrast, the National Commission concluded that, although
work disability should be the primary basis for benefits, there is a second
ary role for impairment. (As explained in chapter 2, impairment as us
ed by the National Commission is broad enough to include functional
limitations and nonwork disability as those terms are used in this report.)
Most state workers' compensation programs have never explicitly
decided which consequences should be compensable, and the implicit
decisions reflected in their statutes, regulations, and practices are often
ambiguous or conflicting. Obviously, workers' compensation programs
can survive without directly answering the question about the purpose
of the benefits, but the failure to do so is one source of problems.
Moreover, explicitly deciding the purpose of the benefits will make it
easier to answer the balance of the questions that must be resolved in
designing policy.
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2. Which Consequence (or Consequences) of Injuries and Diseases
Should Operationally Be Made the Basis for Benefits? Question 1 was
concerned with the underlying purpose for benefits: that is, which con
sequences warrant compensation. Once that question has been answered,
it must be decided whether the consequences that warrant compensa
tion should be compensated directly or indirectly. To compensate in
directly means to make one consequence the operational basis for benefits
because it serves as a convenient proxy for another consequence.
Assume, for example, that the first question is resolved with a deci
sion to compensate work disability. The second question requires
deciding whether work disability should be compensated directly or in
directly (by, for instance, relating benefits to the extent of impairment).
The answer to this question is important, because the incentives built
into the program depend upon what is operationally the basis for benefits.
If benefits are linked to the extent of impairment, then workers have
an incentive to exaggerate the extent of their impairments, and employers
and carriers have an incentive to reduce those impairments. On the other
hand, linking benefits to the extent of work disability encourages
employees to exaggerate the extent of disability and employers and car
riers to reduce the residual work disability experienced by workers.
This incentive may encourage employers to provide vocational rehabilita
tion services and reemploy the workers, since these actions should reduce
the extent of disability.
The decision about what operationally is made the basis for benefits
starkly poses the trade-off between equity and low administrative costs
(myopic efficiency). Suppose the answer to the first question is that the
underlying purpose of benefits is to compensate workers for their ac
tual loss of earnings. Operationally, this could either be done directly,
by compensating the actual loss of earnings, or indirectly, using one
of three other measures as a proxy for or approximate estimate of the
actual loss of earnings: loss of wage-earning capacity, functional limita
tions, or impairment. Probably the least expensive strategy is to base
benefits on impairment. (The use in workers' compensation programs
of schedules that purport to pay benefits because of work disability can
be understood as an attempt to obtain efficiency.) But benefits deter
mined in this way are likely to be inequitable.
Probably the most equitable operational basis for benefits, assuming
the purpose of the benefits is to compensate for actual loss of earnings,
is actual earnings losses. But a wage-loss system that pays benefits for
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an extended period of time as actual wage losses develop requires con
siderable resources. Case files must be maintained for long periods,
an estimate must be made of the worker's potential earnings (what he
would have earned had he not been injured), and the source of the
worker's earnings losses must be determined when actual earnings are
less than the estimated potential earnings. If the estimate of a worker's
potential earnings is to be realistic, the estimating procedure must
recognize the complex relationship between earnings and factors such
as the worker's age, education, and labor market experience. Also, as
suggested in chapter 1, the causes of wage loss are complex and
numerous. No one seriously proposes that every worker whose postinjury earnings fall below his estimated potential earnings (or even below
his preinjury earnings) should receive benefits. The immense problems
of administering the pure wage-loss system have not, to our knowledge,
been successfully solved in any jurisdiction. In Michigan, cited with
favor by the National Commission, the wage-loss system appears to
work only because many workers sign redemption agreements that end
their eligibility for subsequent wage-loss benefits. The same problem
of premature termination of eligibility for wage-loss benefits is emerg
ing in Florida under the guise of washouts, as discussed in chapter 9.
The premature closing of potential wage-loss claims may not be an
inevitable consequence of a wage-loss system, 1 but the evidence from
our 10-state study indicates that workers, employers, and carriers are
strongly averse to the long-term risks inherent in a pure wage-loss
system. 2 If these risks are accepted and eligibility for wage-loss benefits
is provided for an extended duration after the injury occurs, the ad
ministrative costs will be high—which will discourage states solely con
cerned with myopic efficiency. Even so, because the potential gains
in equity appear to be substantial, the administrative costs may be
justifiable in terms of panoramic efficiency. 3
3. If More Than One Consequence of Injuries and Diseases is Compensable, Should There Be Multiple Benefits? If more than one of the
consequences of work-related injuries and diseases warrant compensa
tion, then policy makers must decide if there should be one type of benefit
that attempts to compensate two or more consequences, or whether there
should be multiple benefits.
Suppose that both impairment and work disability are judged to war
rant compensation. One operational approach would base benefits solely
on impairment; this means that the benefits would be designed to com-

Possible Reforms 395

pensate impairment directly and to compensate impairment as a proxy
for work disability. This approach would be a relatively inexpensive
way to provide benefits for both impairment and work disability, but
appears to be unlikely to meet the equity criteria insofar as compen
sating work disability is concerned. The problems inherent in the use
of one benefit to compensate two consequences, and the virtues of a
dual benefit system, were discussed by the National Commission.
We believe that the primary basis for workmen's compen
sation benefits should be the worker's loss of wages. We also
believe that limited payments for permanent impairments are
appropriate. A major difficulty with present permanent par
tial benefit provisions is that most seem to use one formula
which bases benefits on both the impairment and disability
bases. Combining both bases into one formula appears
unworkable.
Consideration should be given to the use of two types of
benefits:
permanent partial impairment benefits, paid to a worker
solely because of a work-related impairment
permanent partial disability benefits, paid to a worker
because he has both a work-related impairment and a resul
tant disability.
A worker might be eligible for both types of benefits. The
impairment benefits would be based on the worker's impair
ment relative to the whole man. If, for example, the whole
man was defined as 400 weeks, and ... a worker was 50
percent impaired, then he would be eligible for 200 weeks
of benefits.
Impairment benefits are justified because of losses an im
paired worker experiences that are unrelated to lost remunera
tion. . . . Since impairment benefits have no relationship to
wage loss, there would be no necessity to link the value of
the weekly benefits to the worker's own weekly wage; the
weekly benefit could be the same amount for all workers in
the State.
In contrast, the disability benefits could be based on ac
tual wage loss or loss in wage-earning capacity. (National
Commission 1972, pp. 68-69)
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More than two consequences of injuries and diseases may be con
sidered worthy of compensation, and a benefit scheme could be designed
accordingly. For example, a "modest proposal" for reform might in
clude three types of benefits: (1) Type A benefits, based on the extent
of the worker's impairment; (2) Type B benefits, based on the loss of
wage-earning capacity (Type B benefits could be calculated by using
the impairment ratings from the Type A benefits and modifying the
ratings by factors such as age and education); and (3) Type C benefits,
paid in the event of continuing wage loss after the Type B benefits ex
pire. A worker might be eligible for all three types of benefits. The
rationale for the threefold approach to benefits is that the Type A and
Type B benefits compensate workers for impairment and work disability
with relatively low administrative expenses, while the Type C benefits
provide a safety valve when the Type B benefits result in highly in
equitable benefits for a worker whose actual wage loss far exceeds the
amount expected on the basis of injury, age, and education.
4. What Standard Should Be Used to Evaluate Cases ? Answers to
questions 2 and 3 determine which consequences will be operationally
important for determining permanent partial benefits. The next ques
tion concerns the standards to be used in evaluating these consequences.
Impairments are likely to be an operationally important basis for
benefits in a workers' compensation program, whether or not they are
serving as a proxy for something else. One device used in almost every
jurisdiction to rate some impairments is the schedule. The inclusion of
scheduled injuries in a statute presumably reflects a desire for myopic
efficiency. 4 But schedules have been subject to criticism in recent years.
The National Commission argued that although schedules may cut cor
ners, those currently (in 1972) in use included only a fraction of
"medically identifiable permanent impairments" and typically had gone
unrevised for years despite major medical advances (National Commis
sion 1972, p. 69). To these drawbacks of schedules, we would add that
their application in various states shows great inconsistency (see chapter
5).
If schedules were expunged from workers' compensation statutes,
what would be used in their place? One alternative would be to allow
the jurisdiction's workers' compensation agency to adopt a comprehen
sive set of guidelines that could be used to evaluate a large variety of
impairments, not just the limited number appearing in the typical
schedule. One possible set of guidelines is the AM A Guides to the
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Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. California is an example of a state
that has not included a list of scheduled injuries in its statute, but rather
has relied on a comprehensive set of guidelines for evaluating the con
sequences of injuries or disease.
Both the California approach and the AMA Guides go beyond the
rating of impairments and also provide standards for rating functional
limitations, as those terms are defined in chapter 1. Assuming that states
that decide to use impairments as an operational basis for benefits also
intend to use functional limitations for the same purpose, it should be
noted that the AMA Guides approach and the California approach to
rating differ significantly. The AMA Guides confine the ratings almost
exclusively to impairments and objective manifestations of functional
limitations. California's guidelines allow, in addition, consideration of
subjective manifestations of functional limitations, such as pain and lack
of endurance. For the policy maker, the difference between the AMA
approach and the California approach can be posed as a choice between
myopic efficiency and equity. Abandonment of the current California
schedule in favor of the AMA approach could be viewed as a sacrifice
of equity (since the argument is made that the subjective manifestations
can provide useful guidance concerning the seriousness of the conse
quences of the injury) for lower administrative costs. The policy maker
is again faced with alternatives that reflect conflicting values.
The California schedule can illustrate another of the choices that has
to be made in deciding what standards should be used to evaluate con
sequences. The purpose of the California schedule is to provide an
estimate of the loss of earning capacity that a worker experiences because
of an injury or disease. The rating of the impairment (or functional limita
tion) is combined with information on the worker's age and occupation
to provide an estimate of the loss of earning capacity. 5 This is a relatively
inexpensive way to estimate the loss of earning capacity compared to
the procedure used in some states to evaluate "unscheduled" perma
nent partial injuries. As indicated in chapter 7, the factors considered
in some states to evaluate unscheduled injuries are quite extensive: the
worker's injury, age, occupation, experience, and the state of the labor
market, for example. Since these factors are complex and must be ap
plied on a case-by-case basis, considerable discretion arises in the ap
plication of these provisions. Exercise of that discretion invites the use
of lawyers, referees, and claims managers, among others, which makes
the resolution of many unscheduled injury cases an expensive process.
The result may be greater equity than that obtained by using the Califor-
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nia approach, but also more expense. The myopic efficiency-equity trade
off is again posed. 6
5. Who Should Apply the Standards ? After a jurisdiction decides such
questions as which consequences shall be compensable and what stan
dards shall be used to evaluate these consequences, a decision must be
made about who shall be given the authority to apply the standards in
individual cases.
Employers (and carriers) could be given primary responsibility to
evaluate their own employees and compensate them on the basis of the
seriousness of the consequences of their injuries and diseases. Until about
20 years ago, California had a procedure known as "self-rating" that
was used by employers to evaluate some workers, with little review
of the determinations by the workers' compensation agency. Although
such an approach is probably the least expensive way to apply workers'
compensation standards, most jurisdictions have not followed it, prob
ably because of a concern about the equity and adequacy of the benefits
that would result.
Another approach would assign primary responsibility for the applica
tion of the standards to employers (and carriers) and to plaintiffs' at
torneys, with involvement by the state agency only when the private
parties cannot reach a settlement of their own. This approach, ex
emplified by Florida before 1979 and by California today, reduces the
need for an active state agency. When the costs of administering the
program are defined to include attorneys' fees, however, the approach
is not inexpensive. Data on the operation of the programs in Florida
and California presented in part III indicate that benefits are relatively
adequate but highly inequitable. Thus the approach that relies on the
parties negotiating their own settlements appears to lack panoramic ef
ficiency: administrative costs (including attorneys' fees) probably could
be lowered without reducing the adequacy and equity of the benefits.
Another approach to the application of standards would assign primary
responsibility to the state workers' compensation agency, which would
closely monitor the decisions made by the private parties, or even
evaluate the extent of disability in each case, subject to a review of the
exercise of its discretion by appeals to the court system. This approach
is consistent with the National Commission's view that the "key to an
effective delivery system is the agency's active pursuit of the ad
ministrative obligations" (National Commission 1972, p. 101). The
resources devoted to administering the system are probably no greater
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in this approach than if employers (and carriers) were given primary
authority for applying the standards, but the result of active agency par
ticipation should be greater equity of benefits. Wisconsin has an active
state agency—stressing record keeping, monitoring, and evaluation—
and our results suggest the active agency approach provides more
panoramic efficiency because the quality of the benefits is superior.
(Chapter 4 discusses the various administrative tasks performed by state
workers' compensation agencies.)
The three approaches just described—primary reliance on employers
(and carriers); primary reliance on negotiations between the private par
ties; and primary reliance on the state agency—are models that repre
sent the outer limits of what states can do. Most states, in practice, use
a mixture of these approaches. California, for example, places primary
reliance on the state agency to determine the benefits for one type of
permanent partial disability benefits ("voluntary" benefits, based on
informal ratings from the Disability Evaluation Bureau), while the private
parties largely determine the benefits for another type of permanent par
tial disability benefits (compromise and release settlements, which are
generally accepted by the state agency with minimal supervision).
6. What Meaning Shall Be Given to the Criteria of Adequacy, Equi
ty, and Efficiency, Especially When the Criteria Come into Conflict?
In order to answer the previous questions, and to resolve the other issues
that arise in designing a program to provide permanent partial disabili
ty benefits, policy makers must decide what interpretations should be
given to the criteria of adequacy, equity, and efficiency, and how con
flicts among these criteria should be resolved. Answers to these ques
tions are, to a large extent, value judgments: there are no "right"
answers.
The adequacy criterion requires policy makers to decide which con
sequences of injuries and diseases should be compensable, and what
proportion of the losses should be replaced. The National Commission
concluded that a substantial proportion of lost income (work disability)
should be replaced by workers' compensation benefits, and that a limited
amount of benefits for impairment should also be provided. 7 The Na
tional Commission distinguished workers' compensation from other
social insurance programs as to the proportion of lost income to be replac
ed by benefits. The reason for higher benefits in workers' compensa
tion is that "in exchange for the benefits of workmen's compensation,
workers renounced their right to seek redress for economic damages
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and pain and suffering under the common law. In no other social in
surance program such as Social Security or unemployment compensa
tion, did workers surrender any right of value in exchange for benefits"
(National Commission 1972, p. 37).
It is clear that the National Commission's reasoning would justify
workers' compensation benefits much higher than the benefits in other
social insurance programs, which is a result some policy makers may
find unacceptable. 8 It is also clear that if workers' compensation were
abolished and employees were allowed to sue their employers under
current doctrines of liability, the workers' compensation benefits recom
mended by the National Commission would appear trifling compared
to the damages awarded to plaintiffs when the employers were held liable
for damages. (Whether, on the average, injured workers would fare
better under liability suits as opposed to the workers' compensation
benefits recommended by the National Commission is unclear, since
many workers eligible for workers' compensation benefits could not
prevail in court suits. Even if workers would do better on average by
relying on liability suits, thus improving adequacy, the all-or-nothing
element of the approach would aggravate the problem of equity.)
As indicated earlier, the trade-off between equity and administrative
costs is likely to appear when a decision has been made that the underly
ing basis for benefits should be work disability, and a choice must be
made of an operational basis for the benefits. At one extreme, using
impairment as a proxy for work disability is inexpensive but likely to
be inequitable. At the other extreme, using actual wage loss as a basis
for the work-disability benefits is likely to be more equitable but ex
pensive, thus reducing myopic efficiency.
What is the right mixture of equity and myopic efficiency under these
circumstances? Support for an emphasis on equity can be found in the
National Commission's discussion of permanent partial benefits. The
Michigan approach was described as paying benefits on the basis of
actual wage loss as it develops over an extended period, and praised
because the method "has the substantial merit of matching benefits to
a worker's actual loss of wages, rather than basing benefits on guesses
about future wage loss" (National Commission 1972, p. 69).
There are arguments to counter the National Commission's devotion
to equity, however. For one thing, the Commission's description of
the Michigan approach seems rather naive. As discussed in chapter 8,
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the practice in Michigan deviates substantially from the theory. Another
reason for accepting imperfect equity was stated by Berkowitz (1975): 9
One goal of workers' compensation ... is prompt and cer
tain payment of compensation due the worker. Given such
a goal, we should expect to sacrifice some equity. As the
Bradley Commission Report put it, "Social insurance relies
on the 'magic of averages' to arrive at an overall equity in
social justice. This means inescapably that one individual may
get somewhat more and another somewhat less than precise
individual justice would indicate."
This section has posed six questions that must be answered explicitly
or implicitly in the design of a program that provides permanent par
tial disability benefits. Answers to these questions will determine the
extent of adequacy, equity, and efficiency of a state's program. In some
instances, proper answers will enable a state to improve its program
on one of these criteria without reducing its accomplishments on the
other criteria. In other instances, a state will have to sacrifice its ac
complishments on one criterion in order to improve on another: the deci
sion on the proper trade-off is essentially a value judgment for which
there is no right answer. In this section we have tried to avoid impos
ing our value judgments.
In the next section we will present some policy prescriptions that
reflect, among other things, our views on the proper trade-offs among
adequacy, equity, and efficiency.

Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
This section provides our answers to the six questions and discusses
other matters.
The Compensable Consequences of Injuries and Diseases

We accept the view that work disability should be the primary basis
for permanent partial disability benefits, and that there is also a legitimate
secondary role for compensation based solely on impairment. Even when
there is no possibility that a permanent impairment will result in the
loss of wage-earning capacity or actual earnings losses, it should not
be ignored in the design of a workers' compensation program. We are
not as concerned about whether the benefits are considered a payment
for the impairment per se or a payment for the function limitations and
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non-work disability that are likely to flow from the impairment, because
we believe either view of the impairment represents a justifiable basis
for benefits.
Like most commentators who argue there is some role for compen
sation for impairment, we view the role as secondary to compensation
for the worker's loss of earning capacity or loss of actual earnings. The
argument that workers can receive benefits even when their employers
are not at fault justifies some limitations on the amount of compensa
tion for impairments per se, functional limitations, and nonwork disabili
ty. Thus, most of the permanent partial disability benefits should be
directed to the compensation of work disability.
The Operational Basis for Work Disability Benefits. We will review
the advantages and disadvantages of three approaches to operationalizing work disability benefits, and then will offer a hybrid approach that
we believe is desirable.
Work disability criterion I (WDI): a comprehensive schedule of im
pairments and functional limitations. A comprehensive schedule of im
pairments and functional limitations, such as the American Medical
Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, could
be used to rate the permanent consequences of every work-related in
jury and disease, and the rating could serve as the basis for permanent
partial disability benefits designed to compensate for work disability.
Obviously, in this approach, impairments and functional limitations are
a proxy for work disability. Although rating systems other than the AM A
Guides can be used, the Guides represent probably the epitome of the
search for consistency in ratings, since they are comprehensive and place
little reliance on subjective factors, such as residual pain, over which
raters are more likely to disagree.
The primary advantage of the WDI criterion is that it greatly limits
the rater's opportunity to exercise discretion, which means less oppor
tunity for litigation. In our terms, this approach probably would result
in the greatest efficiency in the narrow sense of minimizing administrative
costs. There are, however, a number of disadvantages to the WDI
criterion. If the primary purpose of permanent partial benefits is to com
pensate for work disability, then this approach has serious problems,
because our evidence from the wage-loss study indicates that similar
or identical impairments result in quite disparate earnings losses. Fur
thermore, our field work in the 10-state study leads us to believe that
it is unrealistic to expect the participants to look only at "objective"
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factors (such as amputation or total loss of use of a bodily member)
when determining the extent of impairment or functional limitations,
and equally unrealistic to think that only impairments and functional
limitations will be considered in making ratings, and not matters such
as age, occupation, and the likely prospects for reemployment—even
when these factors are not included in the state's rating system. As a
result, much of the purported gain in efficiency for a "pure" impair
ment rating system is illusory. Apparently the basic reason is that the
parties rebel at the rating that would be produced if the only factors
that could be considered were objective evidence of the extent of im
pairment and functional limitations.
One way to modify the WDI criterion would be to explicitly incor
porate certain objective factors, such as the worker's age, education,
and amount of work experience, along with the rating of the worker's
impairment, into a formula that produces an estimate of the worker's
loss of wage-earning capacity. This can be considered a scheduled assess
ment of the loss of earning capacity. This operational criterion for work
disability benefits (labeled the WDIa approach) is similar to the California
rating system. As envisaged here, however, the formula would use age,
education, and work experience rather than age and occupation as fac
tors to modify the "standard rating" of impairment or functional limita
tions. We also would have the standard rating based on objective fac
tors associated with the impairment or functional limitation, and not
on subjective factors, as in California. WDIa-type benefits are likely
to do a better job than WDI-type benefits in predicting the amount of
earnings losses that workers will experience, but our California results
suggest that the predictions will still be seriously wrong in many cases.
Work disability criterion II (WDII): nonscheduled assessment of loss
of earning capacity. A second basic approach to the quest for opera
tional criteria for work disability benefits is to assess the loss of earn
ing capacity on the basis of the facts in each case. This is essentially
the approach used now in many states to rate nonscheduled injuries,
as described in chapter 7. Statutes provide that for those injuries not
included in the schedule, the extent of disability shall be determined
on the basis of the worker's loss of earning capacity. The statutes
sometimes list factors to be considered, such as the extent of the worker's
impairment, his age, his ability to compete in the open labor market,
and so on. The main purported advantage of this loss of earning capacity
approach is the ability to consider much more information about the
worker than can be considered in the WDI or WDIa approaches. But
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we do not believe that accurate predictions can be made about the ex
tent of earnings losses a worker will experience on the basis of this in
formation when the judgments are made on an ex ante basis. The rela
tionships among type and severity of injury, age, sex, education, prior
work experience, motivation, and other factors are so complex that mean
ingful predictions about how particular workers will fare in the labor
market are often impossible. As a result, we think that the added infor
mation that can be incorporated into the loss of earning capacity ap
proach where each case considers all the relevant facts is not very helpful.
The disadvantage of the approach is that disagreements are almost in
evitable about the impact of these various factors, and as a result litiga
tion is virtually invited. The end result is an approach that is expensive
to administer and produces little equity in the sense of matching wage
loss and workers' compensation benefits. We conclude that the approach
that assesses the loss of earning capacity on the basis of the facts in
the particular case is the worst possible solution to the quest for opera
tional criteria to compensate work disability. We pronounce this harsh
judgment cognizant that this is the approach used in most jurisdictions
for rating nonscheduled permanent partial disability cases.
Work disability criterion III (WDIII): "pure" wage-loss. A "pure"
wage-loss approach is another possible operational criterion for work
disability benefits. The essence of this approach is that the worker's
actual earnings after his injury are monitored and a proportion of the
difference between these actual earnings and an estimate of his poten
tial earnings had he not been injured are paid as workers' compensa
tion benefits. Benefits are paid retroactively as the worker experiences
wage loss that can be attributed to the work-related injury or disease.
The "pure" wage-loss approach would keep cases open until retire
ment age. To protect the right to file claims during this extended period,
compromise and release agreements would be prohibited.
The greatest potential advantage of the "pure" wage-loss approach
is that it improves the chances of matching permanent partial disability
benefits with actual wage loss. In our terms, this closer correspondence
between benefits and wage loss would represent an improement in the
quity of the benefits. It must be stressed, however, that the search for
equity in the wage-loss approach must face pitfalls. Although the
preceding paragraph provided the essence of the wage-loss approach,
the operational version in invariably more complicated. In the normal
approach to wage-loss benefits (described in chapter 8), the amount of
compensable wage loss is the difference between the postinjury poten-
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tial earnings the worker would have been able to earn but for the injury
and the greater of (1) postinjury actual earnings or (2) postinjury poten
tial earnings in light of the worker's injury. As discussed in chapter
9, Florida does not compare (1) and (2), but nonetheless does not always
accept postinjury actual earnings at face value; the wage-loss approach
there must somehow sort out the incidents of wage loss due to the workrelated injury from those due to other causes.
Determining what a worker would have been able to earn but for a
work-related injury is also a difficult task, particularly if the law does
not just mechanically equate postinjury potential earnings with preinjury actual earnings. The problem of estimating postinjury potential ear
nings is especially difficult for workers who are very young or very
old or female. Younger workers are more likely to be working less than
full time because of their attendance in school, and older workers are
likely to retire. Historically, women have been more likely than men
to have intermittent spells of withdrawal from the labor force, and
although the differences have been narrowing substantially in recent
years, nonetheless the stability of employment is still higher for men
than for women. For these groups of workers—the young, the old, and
women—predictions of postinjury potential earnings are especially
challenging. In some instances, extrapolation into the postinjury period
on the basis of the worker's earnings before injury will exaggerate the
earnings the worker would have earned if he or she had never been
injured. For example, a worker who was working full time up to the
date of injury may have been on the verge of retiring or returning to
school. In other instances, extrapolation on the basis of the preinjury
earnings may underpredict the potential earnings that a worker would
have earned if he or she had not been injured. This might occur, for
example, for a student who had been working part time prior to the
injury and was on the verge of entering the labor force on a full-time
basis, or for a woman who had temporarily left the labor force to raise
children and who experienced a work-related injury just as she was begin
ning to phase back to a full-time job.
Because of these complications in determining the extent of wage loss
associated with a particular work-related injury or disease, the wageloss approach may fail to match benefits with wage loss, and thus may
fail to achieve the goal of equity. 10 The complications also mean the
wage-loss approach can be relatively expensive to administer. If, for
example, any worker were eligible for benefits who had even a slight
deficiency in actual earnings after his injury compared to the estimate
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of his potential earnings, many cases could qualify for benefits, since
even without the impact of injuries there are considerable variations
in wages that would trigger the benefit system. Another concern is that
the wage-loss system can provide undesirable disincentives to work.
The disincentive occurs because the greater the wage loss, the higher
the benefits. The rational response of workers to incentives to limit their
labor supply and thus increase their benefits is an especially acute prob
lem for workers who are still recovering from their work-related in
jury and in the process of rehabilitation when they need every incen
tive to regain their confidence and productive skills. 11
Another aspect of the wage-loss system that must be considered is
the general aversion to the approach shown by workers, employers,
and carriers. As discussed in our 10-state study, the experience in states
such as Michigan, Ohio, and Florida suggests that the parties are not
enamored with a system that prolongs the period during which there
is uncertainty about the amount of benefits to be paid. A course com
monly followed to avert the uncertainty is to terminate prematurely the
potential eligibility for wage-loss benefits through devices such as com
promise and release agreements. Thus a wage-loss system, if it is go
ing to provide benefits for the entire duration of the loss of earnings,
will require careful monitoring by the state agency to keep the parties
from opting out of the system.
It is possible to think of modifications that can blunt some of the
criticisms of a pure wage-loss approach. For example, a delay between
the date that the worker is considered to have reached maximum medical
improvement and the date when the wage-loss benefits begin would allow
the rehabilitation process to proceed without the work disincentives
operating at the critical stages of rehabilitation. It must be recognized,
however, that such a lag would be indefensible if no other benefits were
being paid during that period.
Another modification that would improve the efficiency of the wageloss approach is a requirement that a nontrivial minimum level of earn
ings losses must be experienced before a worker is eligible for wageloss benefits. For example, a wage loss of only 10 or 20 percent of
the estimated potential earnings might be considered an amount likely
to have been caused by factors other than the work-related injury and
thus would not establish eligibility for benefits. Such a threshold for
eligibility would substantially reduce the number of cases that could
receive benefits if a pure wage-loss system were adopted. 12 (A more
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detailed example of a system with a threshold limit of losses is describ
ed below.)
Work Disability Criterion: A Hybrid Approach. We have described
three approaches to operational bases for work disability benefits: a com
prehensive schedule of impairments (WDI), a nonscheduled assessment
of loss of earning capacity (WDII), and a "pure" wage-loss approach
(WDIII). Each approach has some merits and disadvantages, although
we can see little of merit in the WDII approach despite its general use
in most states. We believe the best solution combines elements of the
WDI and WDIII approaches. These two approaches can be combined
in a number of ways, as the balance of this subsection indicates.
Our hybrid approach begins with a period of presumed disability
benefits that commence as soon as the worker's permanent condition
is rated. The amount and duration of the benefits do not depend on
demonstration of actual loss of earnings. The worker is rated on the
severity of his impairment and functional limitations based on a com
prehensive set of guidelines issued by the state workers' compensation
agency. These guidelines should emphasize objective factors for rating
(such as loss of motion) and minimize the use of subjective factors (such
as loss of endurance). The obvious example of the rating guidelines
we have in mind is the American Medical Association's Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. These guidelines cover all types
of injuries and thus eliminate the distinction between scheduled and
nonscheduled injuries. We think there is no convincing reason to maintain
the conventional distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled in
juries. Also, we would not draw a distinction between permanent par
tial disability and permanent total disability: the same set of guidelines
should be used to evaluate all degrees of permanent disability between
1 percent and 100 percent.
The evaluation of the seriousness of the worker's impairment or func
tional limitations produces a standard rating that varies between 1 per
cent and 100 percent. (The benefits are intended only for a worker with
at least a minimal permanent impairment.) Although the standard rating
could be used without modification, an acceptable alternative approach
would modify the rating on the basis of objective information such as
the worker's age, level of education, and years of work experience.
These factors are used to provide an approximation of the influence
of personal characteristics on a worker's labor market experience, given
the seriousness of the injury. The factors would be incorporated by use

408 Possible Reforms

of a formula, such as the one used in California, and their influence
on the standard rating would not vary from case to case because of an
assessment by the administrative law judge about their likely impact
for particular workers. The formula incorporating the adjustment fac
tors would be designed so that on average the standard ratings would
translate into the same level of modified ratings. In short, the modifica
tion factors would be as likely to increase as to decrease the standard
rating.
Once the modified rating (or standard rating, if the jurisdiction decides
not to incorporate other factors into a formula) is determined, the amount
and duration of the presumed disability benefits depend on the size of
the modified rating (for example, each 1 percent of rating might result
in four weeks of benefits). The weekly benefit could be 66 2/3 percent
of the worker's preinjury wage, subject to a maximum benefit of 100
percent of the state's average weekly wage. An alternative approach
that we prefer pays the initial benefits for a fixed duration for all cases
(for example, six months), with the amount of the weekly benefit vary
ing as a function of the size of the modified rating. Thus a 5 percent
rating would produce six months of benefits, with the weekly benefit
equal to 5 percent of the worker's preinjury wage, subject to a max
imum benefit of 100 percent of the state's average weekly wage. It may
be that a fixed duration of longer than six months for the presumed wageloss benefits would be desirable. An important principle is that these
presumed disability benefits are paid without requiring the worker to
demonstrate any actual loss of earnings, and it is important that the period
of presumed disability benefits be long enough for most workers to
recover their strength and earning capacity so that they are unlikely to
be experiencing actual wage loss by the end of the period.
The weekly benefit amounts just described are meant to illustrate how
the approach operates: the appropriate amounts for a particular state
are a consequence of several matters, including the generosity of the
rating system used to evaluate the impairments and functional limita
tions. The AM A Guides are relatively strict compared to the rating stan
dards used in most states, and if the AM A Guides are used, then the
weekly benefit amounts for each 1 percent of rating can be relatively
large. The proper combinations of weekly benefit amount, duration of
benefits, and rating system must be worked out on a state-by-state basis.
As a rough guide to the desired combination, we believe that the benefits
produced by the presumed disability benefits provisions should be no
more than the amounts currently paid in most states under their present
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permanent partial disability benefit provisions (and perhaps should be
even less), because in our scheme these presumed disability benefits
can be followed by a second type of benefit for many workers.
In our scheme, the second type of benefits are modified wage-loss
benefits. Table 12.1 provides information on a number of aspects of
a wage-loss program that must be considered by policy makers, and
indicates two types of modified wage-loss benefits. The extensive type
represents the most developed form of wage-loss benefits that we can
envisage a state adopting. Because so little is known about the opera
tion of wage-loss benefits, however, we also indicate how a number
of aspects of wage-loss benefits could be handled in a more limited
fashion.
The wage-loss benefits described in table 12.1 are designed to com
plement the presumed disability benefits of the type just described that
begin on the date of MMI and continue for six months, with the week
ly amount of benefits varying in proportion to the worker's permanent
disability rating. Because of the general lack of experience with wageloss benefits, a state initially may want to restrict the benefits to workers
with ratings that are at least moderately serious. Aspect 1 in table 12.1
indicates that a limited type of wage-loss benefit might use an 11 per
cent permanent disability rating as a minimum level for eligibility for
these benefits. (Workers with ratings of 10 percent or less will be receiv
ing presumed disability benefits during the first six months after their
injuries are rated.) The extensive type of wage-loss benefits is available
to all workers with a permanent disability rating of 1 percent or greater.
The worker is first eligible for the wage-loss benefits at the end of
the six months of presumed disability benefits under both our limited
and extensive types of wage-loss benefits (aspect 2). Aspects 3-7 per
tain to a method of calculating the amount of wage-loss benefits. The
earnings shortfall is the difference between potential earnings and ac
tual postinjury earnings (or postinjury earning capacity if that figure
is greater than actual earnings). The earnings shortfall must exceed 20
percent of potential earnings before the worker is eligible for wageloss benefits in the limited type of wage-loss benefits; the excess amount
above the 20 percent threshold is defined as compensable wage loss.
The wage-loss benefits are calculated as 80 percent of the compensable
wage loss. One difference between the limited and extensive types of
wage-loss benefits pertains to the threshold, which is only 10 percent
of potential earnings in the extensive type. Another crucial difference

Table 12.1
Variations in Wage-Loss Benefits
Type of wage-loss benefits
Aspect of benefits

Limited

Extensive

1.

Workers potentially eligible for
wage-loss benefits

Workers with permanent disability
ratings (PDR) over 10%

Workers with permanent disability
ratings (PDR) of at least 1 %

2.

Earliest date of eligibility (EDI)

Six months after date of maximum
medical improvement

Same

3.

Potential earnings

Worker's preinjury earnings

Worker's preinjury earnings increased through
time to reflect changes in wages or prices

4.

Earnings shortfall

Potential earnings minus greater of
(1) worker's actual earnings after EDI
or (2) worker's earning capacity after EDI

Same

5.

Threshold

20%of potential earnings

10% of potential earnings

6.

Compensable wage loss

Earnings shortfall minus threshold

Same

7.

Amount of wage-loss benefits

80% of compensable wage loss

Same

8.

How soon after EDI must earnings
shortfall commence or elibibility ends

PDR 11-25% one year
PDR 26-50% two years
PDR 51-100% three years

PDR
PDR
PDR
PDR

1-10% one year
11-25% two years
26-50% three years
51-100% five years

Duration of break in shortfall that
will cause eligibility to lapse
to lapse

PDR 11-25% one year
PDR 26-50% two years
PDR 51-100% three years

PDR
PDR
PDR
PDR

1-10% one year
11-25% two years
26-50% three years
51-100% five years

10.

Maximum duration for benefits

350 weeks after EDI or until
worker reaches normal retirement
age, whichever is sooner

Until worker reaches normal
retirement age

11.

Burden of proof on whether
earnings shortfall is workrelated

PDR 11-50%, employee must
show shortfall is work-related

PDR 1-40%, employee must
show shortfall is work-related

PDR 51-100%, employer must
show shortfall is not work-related

PDR 41-100%, employer must
show shortfall is not work-related

Burden of proof on whether
worker's earning capacity after
EDI is greater than actual
earnings

PDR 11-50%, employee must
show actual earnings equal
earning capacity

PDR 1-40%, employee must
show actual earnings equal
earning capacity

PDR 51-100%, employer must
show earning capacity is greater
than actual earnings

PDR 41-100%, employer must
show earning capacity is greater
than actual earnings

Compromise and release

Yes, if approved by appeals board
as in best interests of worker

PDR 1-25%, yes if approved by appeals
board as in best interests of worker

12.

13.

PDR 26-100%, no
14.

Rehabilitation requirements

Worker must accept rehabilitation
approved by state agency or not
eligible for benefits

Same

15.

Financing of wage-loss benefits

Employer responsible for all benefits

Employer responsible for first 350 weeks of
benefits; special fund responsible thereafter

2
oT

n>
»i
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412 Possible Reforms

involves the calculation of potential earnings. In the limited type, the
potential earnings are equal to the worker's preinjury earnings, whereas
in the extensive type the potential earnings are the worker's preinjury
earnings adjusted through time to reflect changes in the state's wages
or prices. The most obvious adjustment method is to increase the
worker's preinjury wages by the same percentage that the state's average
weekly wage has increased between the year when the worker was in
jured and the year when the potential earnings are calculated.
To illustrate how the limited wage-loss benefits would be calculated,
assume a worker is injured in 1987 when his preinjury earnings are
$400 a week. In 1990 his actual earnings are $200 a week and he is
eligible for wage-loss benefits. Then the worker's earnings shortfall
is $400-$200=$200; the compensate wage loss is $200-(20 percent
x $400) = $120; and the wage-loss benefit is 80 percent x $120=$96.
To illustrate the extensive wage-loss benefit, assume that the state's
average wages increase 25 percent between 1987 and 1990. Then poten
tial earnings for the worker are equal to 125 percent x $400 = $500;
the earnings shortfall is $500-$200=$300; the compensable wage loss
is $300-(10 percent x $500) = $250; and the wage-loss benefit is 80 per
cent x $250 = $200.
The purposes of the 20/80 formula in the limited wage-loss approach
are several. A 20 percent earnings loss is a minimum requirement to
warrant any benefits because we do not want the benefit payments to
be triggered by the minor fluctuations of earnings that many workers
experience for reasons having nothing to do with work-related injuries
or diseases. But once the worker does have a substantial earnings loss,
then a relatively high proportion (80 percent) of the loss should be replac
ed. For those jurisdictions that conclude the 20/80 formula is too par
simonious, the extensive type of wage-loss benefit provides an alter
native formula, namely a 10 percent threshold of earnings loss and an
80 percent replacement rate above this figure. Burton (1983, pp. 41-46)
argues that increasing the replacement rate above 80 percent is not an
appropriate method to improve the generosity of the benefits because
of the disincentives to return to work caused by an excessive replace
ment rate.
Several decisions must be made concerning the time limits within
which workers much establish their eligibility for wage-loss benefits
and the potential duration for the benefits. As a practical matter, the
wage-loss system cannot be expected to provide compensation to a
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worker whose initial earnings losses occur 25 or even 10 years after
his work-related injury. 13 Aspect 8 suggests some time limits. For ex
ample, the limited type of wage-loss benefits could require a worker
with a 51 to 100 percent permanent disability rating to experience earn
ings shortfall within three years after his earliest date of eligibility for
wage-loss benefits or he cannot thereafter claim the benefits. The time
by which initial eligibility must be established is extended for the more
extensive type of wage-loss benefits. It will be necessary to include a
provision in the state laws to protect employees against their employers
maintaining them on the payroll until the eligibility period is over and
then discharging or demoting them in an obvious ploy to avoid pay
ment of wage-loss benefits.
Aspect 9 concerns the duration of employment at wages high enough
to cause no earnings shortfall that will extinguish the continuing eligibility
for the benefits for a worker who has qualified for the benefits. In the
case of the limited type of wage-loss benefits, for example, a worker
with a permanent disability rating of 11 to 25 percent who experiences
a one-year period of employment at wages that produce no earnings
shortfall will lose eligibility for additional benefits.
Another important aspect of wage-loss benefits is the maximum dura
tion for the benefits. A limited type of wage-loss benefit could use a
maximum of 350 weeks. Although this means that some workers will
have their wage-loss benefits terminated after approximately seven years,
which could cause severe hardship, nonetheless the hardship is probably
much more severe under most current workers' compensation programs.
Further, after some experience with a maximum duration of 350 weeks,
a state would have enough information to decide whether to move to
the unlimited duration that is a component of the extensive wage-loss
benefits. For either the limited or extensive wage-loss benefits, however,
eligibility for benefits would terminate at the worker's normal retire
ment age. That age would presumably be 65 for most workers (the age
when they would be eligible for full Social Security benefits), but the
age might be earlier or later if the worker or employer can demonstrate
that the standard age for retirement in a particular industry or occupa
tion is not 65. The provision concerning the maximum age for eligibility
would have to be drawn carefully so that workers would not receive
wage-loss benefits during their normal retirement years. 14
Another aspect of wage-loss benefits concerns who has the burden
of proof to establish whether an earnings shortfall is caused by the workrelated injury or disease, or by other (noncompensable) reasons, such
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as unemployment due to adverse economic conditions associated with
a business cycle. For the limited type of wage-loss benefit, the employee
must demonstrate that the shortfall is work-related if his permanent
disability rating is from 11 to 50 percent, but the employer must show
that the shortfall was not work-related if the permanent disability rating
is greater than 50 percent (see aspect 11). For the extensive type of
wage-loss benefits, the level of rating at which the burden of proof shifts
from the employee to establish his eligibility to the employer to establish
the lack of eligibility is lowered. Aspect 12 deals with the associated
legal issue of the relationship between actual earnings in the postinjury
period and postinjury earning capacity. For the limited type of wageloss benefit, a worker with a permanent disability rating from 11 to
50 percent has the burden to show that actual earnings are equal to earn
ing capacity (if actual earnings are found to be less than earning capacity,
then the earnings shortfall is calculated as the difference between potential
earnings and postinjury earning capacity); and the employer has the
burden of proof to establish that earning capacity is greater than actual
earnings if the employee has a permanent disability rating greater than
50 percent. The burden of proof shifts to the employer at a lower per
manent disability rating in the case of the extensive type of benefits.
In a case in which the employer has this burden and fails to establish
that postinjury earning capacity exceeds postinjury actual earnings, the
earnings shortfall is calculated as the difference between potential earn
ings and actual earnings. Aspects 11 and 12 will have to be carefully
translated into legislation in light of the state's legal philosophy and
the stringency of the permanent disability rating standards used in the
workers' compensation program. The purpose is to allow employers
to defend themselves against claims for wage-loss benefits based merely
on the circumstance that the workers' actual earnings in the postinjury
period are less than the workers' potential earnings. The difficult task,
however, is to find statutory language that provides employers this pro
tection without placing undue requirements on workers to demonstrate
that their earnings losses are work-related. The Florida experience ex
amined in chapter 9 indicates that this balancing of employer and
employee interests is one of the most difficult tasks in a wage-loss system.
Aspects 11 and 12 in table 12.1 may provide solutions that are too
simplistic, but at least they make explicit certain critical legal issues
that are implicit in any wage-loss approach but that are often given in
adequate attention in drafting statutory language.
An essential part of the wage-loss approach is that earnings losses
are assessed after they occur, and then benefits are paid on a retrospec-
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tive basis. This approach obviously will not work if before the earn
ings losses occur the employee signs a compromise and release agree
ment waiving his right to any such benefits. At a minimum (aspect 13,
table 12.1), a compromise and release agreement should be approved
only if the appellate level of the state workers' compensation agency
judges that it is in the best interest of the worker. An extensive type
of wage-loss benefit could require such approval for workers with per
manent disability ratings of 1 to 25 percent, and absolutely prohibit com
promise and release agreements for more serious injuries.
One of the main advantages of the wage-loss approach is that
employers have a strong incentive to reemploy and rehabilitate workers
in order to reduce their potential liability for benefits. In order to com
plement this incentive for employers, the wage-loss benefit program
should provide strong encouragement to workers to undergo rehabilita
tion. Our recommendation is that workers lose their eligibility for wageloss benefits unless they accept rehabilitation services approved by the
state workers' compensation agency (aspect 14, table 12.1). These ser
vices would be paid for by the employer, carrier, or state.
Finally, decisions must be made about the financing of wage-loss
benefits. One reason for the strong pressure for compromise and release
agreements and premature termination of eligibility for long-term benefits
is employers' and carriers' concern about the uncertainty associated with
long-term cases. We suggest that for a limited type of wage-loss benefits,
in which the maximum duration is 350 weeks, the employer (or its car
rier) can assume all of the financial liability for its own workers (aspect
15). On the other hand, for the extensive type of wage-loss benefits,
in which payments can continue for decades, the employer (or its car
rier) can be responsible for the initial phase of the benefits (for exam
ple, 350 weeks) and then liability for the continuation of the benefits
is assigned to a special fund financed by assessments on carriers and
employers.
It should be evident that the recommendations summarized in table
12.1 are not meant to be unalterable solutions. Each state must design
its own wage-loss benefits in light of the economic and legal condi
tions in the state. Some of the elements from the Limited Benefits col
umn in table 12.1 can be combined with some of the elements from
the Extensive Benefits column in order to meet a state's particular needs.
It also should be stressed that a state that does not want to move im
mediately to permanent partial disability benefits reform as substantial
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as that represented in the Limited Benefits column of table 12.1 can
nonetheless begin to move toward a wage-loss approach. That is, smaller
increments toward the wage-loss approach are feasible than even the
limited wage-loss benefits envisaged in table 12.1. A state with a typical
program for permanent partial disability benefits that incorporates
scheduled and nonscheduled benefits can graft some elements of the
wage-loss program onto its current system. For example, the state may
change its law so that workers who receive a relatively high disability
rating under their current state law (e.g., equivalent to 40 percent or
more of total disability) could be eligible for wage-loss benefits after
their benefits under the current state law expire. A high cutoff point
in terms of the disability ratings would limit the potential claimants to
a small number, so that the plan would not be very expensive or disrup
tive to the current state program. Thus, a worker who now receives
permanent partial disability benefits for 150 weeks would become eligible
for wage-loss benefits if he has continuing actual wage loss after the
150 weeks. The wage loss could be determined on the basis of the 20/80
formula summarized in table 12.1, and some of the other matters, such
as burden of proof and the duration of wage-loss benefits, also could
be resolved by using table 12.1 as a guide. This incremental approach
to a wage-loss system would allow the state to monitor its own experience
and determine how many workers have substantial continuing wage loss
for long periods of time, and as evidence accumulates the state may
decide to move further in the direction of the limited or extensive wageloss benefits spelled out in table 12.1.
The Operational Basis for Impairment Benefits. The preceding discus
sion is concerned with several alternative operational bases for work
disability benefits. If a state decides to compensate explicitly for im
pairment, an operational basis for this type of benefits must also be deter
mined. We think the choice is clear: namely, the extent of impairment
or functional limitation should be determined by use of comprehensive
guidelines, such as the AM A Guides. Even if the purpose of the im
pairment benefits is to compensate for the subsequent consequence, nonwork disability, it is difficult to imagine an operational way to measure
nonwork disability directly other than by an expensive and almost in
variably arbitrary case-by-case analysis of each worker's life style and
how it was affected by his work-related injury or disease. As a prac
tical matter, the only feasible approach is to measure the impairment
and functional limitations and use the rating as a proxy for nonwork
disability.
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Each worker with a permanent disability rating of 1 percent or more
could receive impairment benefits. Since these benefits are not design
ed to compensate for work disability, there is no reason to relate the
amount of the benefits to the level of preinjury earnings. Rather we
would use the same amount of benefits per percent of disability for all
workers. A simple formula would give each worker $200 for each 1
percent of his standard rating; thus a 15 percent rating would result
in $3000 of impairment benefits. A more complex formula would pro
vide proportionally greater benefits for more serious impairments. For
example, a 1 to 10 percent standard rating could receive $100 per per
cent; an 11 to 25 percent rating could receive $200 for each percent
in this interval; a 26 to 50 percent rating could receive $400 per percent
age point in this interval; and ratings over 51 percent could receive $500
per percent in excess of 50 percent. Thus a 30 percent rating would
result in $5,500 of impairment benefits. The impairment benefits could
be paid in a lump sum at the time of the rating.
The Use of Multiple Benefits
We have stated our belief that permanent partial benefits are war
ranted both because the worker experiences a work disability and because
of the impairment per se. How should this dual purpose be translated
into an operational basis for benefits?
One possibility would be to have a three-tiered benefits system, pay
ing (1) impairment benefits that are operationally based on the stan
dard rating of the worker's impairment and functional limitations; (2)
presumed work-disability benefits that are paid for six months with the
amount of the weekly benefit determined by the size of the modified
impairment rating; and (3) wage-loss benefits that are paid after the
six months for those workers who qualify on the basis of the criteria
in table 12.1. Thus every worker with a permanent disability rating of
at least 1 percent would receive two types of benefits (impairment and
presumed disability), and some would also receive a third type
(wage-loss).
A simpler dual-benefit system would collapse the impairment benefits
and presumed disability benefits into IPD benefits (impairment/presumed
disability benefits). All workers with a permanent disability rating of
at least 1 percent would receive IPD benefits, and some workers would
also qualify for wage-loss benefits. Since the primary purpose of per
manent partial disability benefits is to compensate for work disability,
the IPD benefits would be wage-related. If there were a dual-benefit
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system, the amount of the IPD benefits would be somewhat larger than
the amount of the presumed disability benefits under a three-tiered system
in order to incorporate both purposes—compensating work disability
and compensating impairment—into the IPD benefits.
An advantage of the three-tiered benefits approach is that the judgments
of adequacy and equity would be simplified. The total amount of the
presumed disability benefits and wage-loss benefits can be compared
to the worker's actual loss of earnings, since the sole purpose of these
two types of benefits is to compensate for work disability. Awarding
the initial six months of permanent disability benefits with the purpose
of compensating for impairment and work disability (the IPD benefits)
complicates judgments, since some proportion of the benefits are pay
ment not for work disability, but for the other consequences of the workrelated injury or disease.
If a dual-benefit approach is selected, the preferred method collapses
the impairment and presumed work-disability benefits into IPD benefits
and then allows wage-loss benefits to start after six months. An alter
native dual-benefit approach uses impairment benefits and wage-loss
benefits, with the latter commencing immediately after the worker
reaches MMI. This approach is not desirable, however, because, as
indicated earlier, we believe that granting eligibility for wage-loss
benefits immediately after MMI can represent a disincentive to
rehabilitation.
Standards to Be Used in Evaluating Impairments
and Functional Limitations

The previous discussion made clear our preference for evaluating im
pairments and functional limitations by using comprehensive guidelines,
such as the AM A Guides, that primarily rely on objective factors, rather
than subjective factors such as pain and lack of endurance. A major
reason for use of these guidelines is that they minimize the amount of
discretion available to the personnel rating injured workers. In most
workers' compensation programs today, reducing the existing discre
tionary scope could often work to an employee's disadvantage. In our
approach, however, the lack of flexibility at the rating stage is not critical,
because the actual wage-loss benefits serve as a safety valve. That is,
if the initial prediction of presumed work disability is unduly low, the
wage-loss benefits can help offset the error.
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Application of the Rating Standards
Most of our recommendations discussed so far in this section have
concerned the appropriate standards for rating impairments and work
disability and the types of benefits that should be paid to workers with
permanent partial disabilities. Administrative arrangements and pro
cedures are also an important component of our recommendations. One
particularly important matter concerns who should make the decision
on a case-by-case basis about the appropriate rating. The typical pat
tern in most jurisdictions is for the employee and employer (or the
lawyers or carriers representing these parties) to negotiate an agree
ment about the extent of permanent disability. When an agreement cannot
be reached, the issue is resolved by an administrative law judge in the
workers' compensation agency. 15 In view of the expense of litigation
and the inconsistencies among ratings that occur, depending on such
vagaries as whether the worker is represented by a lawyer and who his
employer is, we do not think this approach is appropriate. In order to
reduce litigation and inconsistencies, we would assign primary respon
sibility for assigning ratings to an impairment rating division (IRD) that
is a component of the workers' compensation agency.
The IRD would be required to rate the extent of the worker's perma
nent disability (or the extent of the worker's impairment and functional
limitations, if that is the basis of the rating) before permanent partial
disability benefits are paid or before the case can be taken to a hearing
before the administrative law judge when the amount of permanent partial
disability benefits is an issue. The IRD would make a rating based on
medical evidence from the treating physician, from an examining doc
tor selected by the worker, or from a doctor chosen by the employer.
When there is a conflict in medical evidence, the IRD must resolve it,
either by using a doctor who is a staff member of the workers' com
pensation agency or by obtaining evidence from an impartial doctor the
IRD selects.
The rating assigned by the impairment rating division must be used
by the parties and the workers' compensation agency (including ad
ministrative law judges) unless the worker or the employer can
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the rating is capricious,
arbitrary, or grossly inappropriate. If the parties can convince the ad
ministrative law judge that the rating is defective, then the case must
be returned to the IRD for further consideration. The parties and the
administrative law judge may submit additional information for con-
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sideration by the IRD, but the IRD also must have the right to obtain
additional medical information if the case is referred back to it, and
the IRD is ultimately responsible for deciding the appropriate rating.
This scheme provides the impairment rating division with an amount
of authority that is found in none of the workers' compensation pro
grams we examined. We are convinced that such centralization of rating
authority and protection of the IRD's rating are necessary if consisten
cy among awards is to be assured and the incentive for litigation is to
be reduced. The ultimate justification for this degree of centralization
of authority over the ratings in our scheme is that if the IRD seriously
underestimates the adverse economic consequences of a work-related
injury or disease, the wage-loss benefits are available to the worker
after six months, a safeguard that is missing now in almost every state
workers' compensation program. In short, we place considerable em
phasis on efficiency of the rating process and consistency among the
ratings (even though they may be inaccurate predictors of the extent
of work disability) because the wage-loss benefits can deal with the equity
problems caused by seriously deficient predictions of earnings losses.
There are several complementary policies that will facilitate the role
we have specified for the impairment rating division. One is that the
IRD would train physicians in the state to apply the rating standards
being used, which should help reduce the potential for disagreement
between the parties concerning the appropriate ratings. Also, inap
propriate litigation can be discouraged by limiting attorneys' fees in
cases involving disputes over the extent of the permanent disability
ratings to an amount that is proportional to the increase in the disability
rating between the IRD's initial rating in the case and the rating ultimately
assigned by the IRD. If the initial rating is not changed as a result of
the hearing, the attorney is not entitled to any fee for the part of the
case concerned with the extent of the disability rating. (In most perma
nent partial disability cases that is the sole issue.) If this stringent re
quirement for attorneys' fees were used by a state, the fees could ap
propriately be added to the worker's award rather than subtracted, as
is the practice in most workers' compensation programs now.
We recognize that some states will be reluctant to move to an im
pairment rating bureau of the sort we prescribe, at least initially. A tran
sition stage could involve the use of neutral doctors approved by the
state workers' compensation agency to make ratings based upon a com
prehensive set of guidelines issued by the state. These physicians could
be in private practice and would be certified because of their neutrality
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between the parties. They could be approved by a selection committee
that includes representatives of workers and employers. We do not
believe that the use of such doctors is ideal, especially if a state uses
a rating formula that incorporates factors other than the extent of im
pairment and functional limitations, such as age and education. Also,
even if standards are widely promulgated, their application may be in
consistent among doctors. The use of an impairment rating division is
likely to reduce such inconsistencies.
Other Prerequisites for a Wage-Loss System

A state that adopts the benefit proposals we have suggested must be
willing to expend administrative resources for their implementation.
The benefit proposals are new and relatively complex, and there is con
siderable potential for litigation and thus for the system to be under
mined. The key to the successful operation of the program is an active
state workers' compensation agency. The components of such an agency
have been described in some detail in chapter 4, and only a few points
will be reemphasized here. One is that an active state agency requires
adequate resources and manpower. As we have stressed in part IV of
this report, the practice in many states of equating efficiency with low
budgets for workers' compensation agencies is a clear instance of false
economy; the almost inevitable consequence of an underfunded agen
cy is the encouragement of litigation, which in turn requires the utilization
of considerable resources in the private sector to administer the program.
Another point is that it is important to separate the adjudication function
in the agency from the administrative function. In some states, ad
ministration takes second place to adjudication partially because the chief
administrator is also a member of the appeals board. Although such
an arrangement does not always undermine administration, we believe
that such matters as record keeping, monitoring, and evaluation usual
ly receive due attention only when there is an administrator who
understands these are his responsibilities and that one measure of his
success is the extent to which he can reduce adjudication.
Another important aspect of a workers' compensation program that
incorporates wage-loss benefits is the encouragement of rehabilitation.
One of the most desirable consequences of a program that potentially
involves wage-loss benefits of substantial amounts paid over long dura
tions is that there is a strong incentive for employers to avoid unnecessary
payment of benefits by providing rehabilitation at an early stage of the
case.
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A final prerequisite for a wage-loss system worth stressing is that
the wholesale reliance on compromise and release agreements to resolve
disagreements about the extent of disability and to prematurely end poten
tial claims should by all means be avoided, because of the threat to equity
it represents. An essential attribute of the wage-loss approach is that
some protection is provided for workers with unanticipated wage loss
that occurs long after the permanent disability ratings are made. The
best way to overcome the poor record of ex ante predictions about the
extent of wage loss is to begin to supplement the initial benefits with
ex post benefits for workers who have unusually large earnings losses.
This requires that cases be open longer, which means that employers
and carriers have greater potential long-term liability and thus higher
risks. Devices other than compromise and release agreements must be
sought to enable the parties to live with risk, such as separate funds
for cases with extended durations of wage-loss benefits.
Some Tests for the Operational Versions of Our Proposals

The proposals we have made concerning the types of permanent par
tial disability benefits that are appropriate and the procedures that should
be used to provide these benefits would involve significant modifica
tions of the permanent partial disability benefit programs in most states.
There are several ongoing tests that could be used to monitor the per
formance of our proposals and decide whether they have achieved their
goals. If these tests are not being met, the evidence will help the par
ticipants in the system redesign the program. We recognize that our
proposals will initially need to be adapted to each state and will require
continuing monitoring and modification.
The criterion of efficiency is reflected in two tests. One concerns the
extent of litigation in permanent partial disability cases over the extent
of disability. If, at the stage of the case where the permanent ratings
are being determined, litigation occurs in more than 15 or 20 percent
of the cases, the system is not serving the purpose of reducing litiga
tion. The program would then have to be modified either by making
the standards more comprehensive or objective or by increasing the pro
tection afforded to the ratings made by the impairment rating division.
Another test of efficiency concerns the proportion of cases that qualify
for wage-loss benefits after the initial six months of presumed disabili
ty benefits expire. If more than 20 or 25 percent of the cases that qualify
for presumed disability benefits also qualify for wage-loss benefits, ad
justments are probably needed. One possible adjustment is to extend
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the duration of the presumed disability benefits from six months to a
longer period, such as a year. Some workers experiencing actual wage
loss after six months would have recovered their earning capacity by
the end of the year and thus would not qualify for wage-loss benefits.
Extending the duration of the presumed disability benefit would prob
ably require a reduction in the amount of the weekly benefit in order
to avoid substantially increasing the cost of the system.
The equity criterion that requires benefits to be matched to wage loss
can best be evaluated by monitoring the earnings losses of workers.
This might require an examination similar to the procedure used in this
research project, in which earnings reported to the Social Security system
are evaluated periodically to see if earnings losses are matched by per
manent disability benefits. That form of monitoring requires considerable
effort, however, and there are other simpler tests that will provide at
least some evidence about whether the equity goal is being achieved.
For example, the proportion of cases that are terminated by compromise
and release agreements is an indicator of potential lack of equity, since
those cases in which unanticipated wage loss occurs after the compromise
and release agreement is signed are bound to involve equity problems.
A system in which more than 5 or 10 percent of the permanent partial
disability cases are terminated by compromise and release agreements
is not likely to provide sufficient equity.
Finally, assessment of adequacy (which concerns the proportion of
lost earnings replaced by benefits) probably requires monitoring of ac
tual wage loss and comparison between the losses and the benefits. Our
study has convinced us that examination of statutory benefit amounts
and durations provides little guidance to adequacy because of the critical
importance of the rating system in determining the amount of benefits
a particular injury will receive.
The Wage-Loss Concept in Florida
The Florida legislation of 1979 is the most widely discussed innova
tion in providing permanent partial disability benefits in the last decade,
and so warrants special attention. The legislation provides impairment
benefits that are paid to workers with certain types of permanent im
pairments (amputations, loss of 80 percent or more of vision, or serious
head or facial disfigurements) but are not paid to workers with other
types of permanent impairments (such as total or partial loss of use of
a body member). The impairment benefits as of 1986 were $250 for
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each percent of permanent impairment for 1 to 10 percent ratings, and
$500 for each percent over 10 percent. Thus a worker with a 60 per
cent impairment rating receives $27,500. These impairment benefits
can be paid in a lump sum as of the date of maximum medical
improvement.
Workers with permanent impairments are also eligible for wage-loss
benefits as of the date of MMI if sufficient wage loss occurs. Wageloss benefits are paid to workers with at least a 15 percent loss of earn
ings. Benefits are 95 percent of the earnings losses in excess of the 15
percent threshold. The maximum wage-loss benefit is the lesser of 66.66
percent of the worker's preinjury wage or 100 percent of the state's
average weekly wage. There is, in effect, a 5 percent per year escala
tion in potential earnings used to calculate wage loss (this figure was
3 percent a year for injuries that occurred before July 1, 1980).
The maximum duration for the wage-loss benefits is 525 weeks (an
increase from 350 weeks for injuries that occurred before July 1, 1980).
When the worker becomes eligible for Old Age benefits from Social
Security (normally at age 62), the wage-loss benefits are reduced by
the amount of the Old Age benefits. Workers lose their eligibility for
additional wage-loss benefits if they do not experience at least three
consecutive months of compensable wage loss in each two-year period.
The 1979 Florida legislation thus establishes two types of benefits
for workers with permanent consequences of their work-related injuries
or diseases. Impairment benefits are paid to workers with the specified
types of permanent impairments. Wage-loss benefits are paid to workers
with wage losses that meet the statutory prerequisites. An individual
worker may be eligible for impairment benefits, or wage-loss benefits,
or both types of benefits, or neither type of benefit, depending upon
the exact nature of the permanent impairment and the timing and amount
of the earnings losses.
Evaluation of Florida Wage-Loss Benefits

The Florida wage-loss benefits will be evaluated here on the basis
of some of the aspects for such benefits included in table 12.1. 16 The
record is mixed. Florida's system conforms with the first aspect of the
extensive type of wage-loss benefits because the law makes all workers
with permanent disability ratings of at least 1 percent potentially eligi
ble for wage-loss benefits. The Florida legislation also conforms with
the fifth aspect, which requires that wage-loss benefits be paid only to
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workers with at least moderate lost earnings (the requisite in Florida
that there be at least a 15 percent loss before any wage-loss benefits
are paid is midway between the thresholds for the limited and exten
sive types of wage-loss benefits). The Florida law also largely com
plies with aspect eight, which prescribes a reasonable deadline after
the date of MMI by which wage loss must be established in order for
a worker to be eligible for wage-loss benefits. Similarly, there is substan
tial compliance with the ninth aspect, which specifies the duration of
the break in earnings losses that will cause the worker's eligibility for
wage-loss benefits to lapse.
The Florida law partially complies with the third aspect, which re
quires the potential earnings of workers to be adjusted through time
to reflect changes in wages or prices. There is also compliance with
the tenth aspect of the limited type of wage-loss benefits, which requires
that benefits be paid for 350 weeks or until the worker reaches the nor
mal retirement age, whichever is sooner. The maximum duration of
525 weeks does not yet bring Florida into compliance with the tenth
aspect for the extensive type of wage-loss benefits, however, which re
quires wage-loss benefits until the worker reaches normal retirement
age even if the worker is injured ten or more years before that date.
The Florida legislation fails to meet several of the desirable aspects
for wage-loss benefits included in table 12.1. The second aspect, re
quiring a lag between the date of MMI and the initial date of eligibility
for wage-loss benefits, is clearly violated since workers are immediately
eligible for benefits. Many workers will begin to receive benefits in
the rehabilitation phase of their postinjury recovery period and are likely
to face serious disincentives to undergo rehabilitation and to return to
work. The disincentive problem is aggravated because 95 percent of
earnings losses above the threshold are replaced, a clear violation of
the seventh aspect. This is especially troublesome since the benefits in
Florida are tax-free. With a 95 percent replacement rate, some workers
will actually be worse off financially by increasing the amount of time
they work. (See Burton 1983, pp. 41-46.)
It is particularly difficult to evaluate the Florida legislation in terms
of aspects 4, 11, and 12. These aspects pertain to the definition of earn
ings shortfall and the assignment of burdens of proof to establish the
cause and magnitude of postinjury earnings losses. The statutory pro
visions and the court decisions in Florida were examined in chapter
9, and the best brief characterization is that Florida has not yet sue-
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cessfully resolved the problems of distinguishing compensable from noncompensable earnings losses. Unfortunately, the 1983 amendments ap
pear to have raised serious obstacles to workers in establishing their
eligibility, and we concluded these amendments were inappropriate.
Whether the Florida courts will apply the 1983 amendments in the spirit
in which they were apparently intended remains to be seen. Taken at
face value, the recent changes stand as a serious challenge to a primary
purpose of the wage-loss approach: to compensate workers who ex
perience losses of earnings that would not have occurred but for their
work-related injuries or diseases.
An overall evaluation of the 1979 Florida legislation dealing with per
manent disabilities is obviously difficult and dependent on subjective
values. We have identified some attributes of the law that agree with
our recommendations and some that do not, but the day when the ac
tual performance of the law can be evaluated in terms of adequacy, equi
ty, and efficiency may be long in coming, since (as remarked in chapter
9) no data on the operation of the Florida law are being collected that
will permit such an evaluation.
Conclusions
Several of our conclusions deserve to be briefly restated. One set of
conclusions addresses the criteria that are currently used in most jurisdic
tions to provide permanent partial disability benefits. Our 10-state study
has made clear that the dominant approach to compensating permanent
partial disabilities relies on proxies for wage loss that are evaluated before
the period when the actual wage loss occurs. The data from our wageloss study of California, Florida, and Wisconsin suggest that the pro
spective (or ex ante), proxy approach does a poor job of matching
benefits to actual wage loss and thus results in serious inequity. The
results also suggest that the ex ante approach can provide benefits that
on average are adequate, inadequate, or excessively generous. In short,
nothing inherent in the ex ante, proxy approach precludes success on
the adequacy criterion, but the prospects of achieving equity appear vir
tually nonexistent.
Another set of conclusions concerns the procedures that are current
ly used in most jurisdictions to provide permanent partial disability
benefits. In terms of the administrative functions identified in chapter
4, most jurisdictions place primary emphasis on adjudication rather than
record keeping, monitoring, and evaluation. The emphasis on adjudica-
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tion is seen to result in high delivery system costs, once expenditures
in the private sector, most notably attorneys' fees, are figured in. Our
data from part III indicate that California and Florida, which were much
more litigious than Wisconsin at the time of our wage-loss study, do
not achieve greater adequacy or equity as a result of the devotion of
substantial resources to litigation. In short, those delivery systems, which
are typical of most states' procedures for permanent partial disability
benefits, suffered from substantial inefficiency. Inefficiency is not in
herent in the provision of such benefits, as the example of Wisconsin
proves. With much less litigation than Florida and California, Wiscon
sin provided benefits that were more adequate and equitable than those
in the other jurisdictions.
The previous paragraphs provide a serious indictment of the criteria
and procedures used to provide permanent partial disability benefits in
most jurisdictions at the present time. The procedures and criteria pro
duce benefits that sometimes are inadequate, often are provided ineffi
ciently, and invariably are inequitable. We would like to end this study
by providing an easy solution, or an obvious solution, or at least a solu
tion that we are convinced will work, even if complicated and obscure.
Alas, we cannot even provide that degree of certitude. What we can
provide are some general guidelines that we believe represent the best
possible hope for reform of permanent partial disability benefits.
One set of guidelines concerns the procedures that hold the best prom
ise for adequate, equitable, and efficient benefits. Most states need to
significantly redirect the efforts of their workers' compensation agen
cies away from adjudication in favor of record keeping, monitoring,
and evaluation. Let justice be served by avoiding adjudication! And
coupled with this redirection of effort must be a recognition that tight
budgets for a workers' compensation agency often are a sign of myopia,
not fiscal prudence. We surely do not endorse every possible item in
a workers' compensation agency's budget, but we are convinced that
excessive stringency will curtail the ability of the agency to perform
the necessary record keeping, monitoring, and evaluation functions and
drive the delivery system toward excessive litigation. To be sure, the
cost of an agency subject to a tight budget may be less, but only at the
price of undue resources devoted to litigation. Needless to say, any
workers' compensation system will involve some litigation, but the use
of adjudication to process permanent partial disability claims should
be the exception rather than the rule.
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Another set of guidelines concerns the criteria that show the greatest
promise of promoting adequacy, equity, and efficiency. We have roundly
rejected the dominant approach currently used, namely the ex ante ap
proach. Although we do not believe this approach holds much promise
for reform, we have offered suggestions for an improved ex ante ap
proach in this chapter. Much more noteworthy is the wage-loss (or ex
post) approach, which provides benefits to workers after they have
demonstrated actual wage loss. This approach holds promise for greater
equity. Because of its adoption in Florida in 1979, the wage-loss ap
proach has generated considerable enthusiasm. The wage-loss approach
is not inherently adequate, and thus is not necessarily superior to the
ex ante approach on this ground. Nor is the wage-loss approach inherent
ly less expensive than the ex ante approach. Burton (1983) has
demonstrated that the nonscheduled permanent partial benefits in New
York are now accounting for more than half of all the dollars spent
on cash benefits in the state, and that these costs have increased rapidly
in the 1970s in response to deteriorating labor market conditions. These
nonscheduled permanent partial disability benefits in New York are a
variant on the wage-loss approach, and are obviously providing a lesson
different from that provided by the cost-reducing experience that Florida
has had with its version of wage-loss benefits.
In addition to these reservations concerning the adequacy and expense
of wage-loss benefits, a lesson from Florida concerning the difficulties
of administration bears repeating: the application of the wage-loss con
cept is not as easy as might appear at first glance. The problems Florida
has had in sorting out compensable from noncompensable wage loss
are not going to be easily solved elsewhere.
There are additional drawbacks to the pure wage-loss approach that
would begin permanent partial disability benefits on this basis as of the
date of maximum medical recovery. We have indicated our concern
over the disincentive to engage in rehabilitation or to return to work
that is aggravated if the wage-loss approach begins too soon. Our prefer
red solution is a hybrid approach, which would provide benefits without
regard to actual wage loss for a limited duration (perhaps six months)
after the date of MMI and then give way to benefits based on actual
wage loss. Like the ex ante and wage-loss approaches, there can be
considerable variations in design and administration of the hybrid ap
proach. The hybrid approach has a limited counterpart in New York
(See Burton 1983) and an intellectual history that predates our research. 17
We believe there is sufficient evidence to justify states in abandoning
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the traditional criteria and procedures for providing permanent partial
disability benefits, with their deficiencies in adequacy, equity, and ef
ficiency, and sufficient understanding of the wage-loss and hybrid ap
proaches to warrant the adoption of those approaches in more jurisdic
tions. With sufficient experimentation and with appropriate monitor
ing of the experiments, there is hope that the proper criteria and pro
cedures for permanent partial disability benefits can be identified with
more certainty in the next decade.
NOTES
1. Pennsylvania uses a limited wage-loss approach and yet does not permit compromise and release
agreements. As discussed in chapter 8, however, the Pennsylvania wage-loss benefits are limited
in duration and amount.
2. See the discussions of Michigan and Florida. Also see the evidence from Ohio discussed in
chapter 8.
3. Even those gains in equity may be illusory, however. Given the substantial problems in deciding,
even on a retrospective basis, what was the contribution of a work-related injury or disease to
a particular loss of earnings, it may be that weighing all the evidence pertaining to that issue on
a case-by-case basis may not do much to improve the record of matching workers' compensation
benefits to the wage losses caused by work-related injuries and disease. The recent court deci
sions in Florida discussed in chapter 9 illustrate the problems of identifying earnings losses due
to work-related causes.
4. The apparent purpose of the schedules is to use a relatively inexpensive procedure that pro
vides a rough estimate of earnings loss associated with certain injuries. In terms of graph 2.2,
the use of schedules can be considered a decision to choose a point in the lower portion of the
Quality/Cost Constraint Line because of a desire to minimize administrative costs. A policy that
pursues low administrative costs without regard for the consequences of the quality of benefits
represents myopic efficiency.
5. The specific factors used in California (age and occupation) may not be the best available predic
tions of the differences in earnings losses that will occur for workers with similar impairment
ratings. Other relatively "objective" factors that could be used include sex, educational level,
and extent of prior work experience. The essence of the California approach is not the specific
factors used, but the reliance on a formula approach to estimate the extent of work disability for
all types of injuries and diseases. In other states, nonscheduled injuries are often rated on the
basis of a relatively time-consuming investigation of the facts of each case.
6. There may be, however, no improvement in equity from evaluating the loss of earning capaci
ty by considering on a case-by-case basis all the factors that affect earning capacity, rather than
using a California-type schedule to estimate loss of earning capacity. Given our limited understanding
about the relationships between earnings and a worker's age, occupation, experience, etc., it is
not clear that consideration of all of these factors improves the accuracy of predictions about earn
ings losses compared to predictions based on formulas that consider only a few factors. The data
from chapter 10 indicate that California (which estimated loss of earning capacity by use of a
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schedule) and Florida (which estimated loss of earning capacity by using all of the relevant facts
in a case) both had serious equity problems with the statutes in effect in 1968.
7. The National Commission argued that when workers gave up their common law remedies,
they received the right to receive workers' compensation benefits without regard to the employer's
fault. As a result, the employer's liability for the consequences other than work disability should
be limited. (National Commission 1972, p. 38.)
8. Historically, the benefit levels in workers' compensation were inadequate (National Commis
sion 1972, pp. 60-62) and generally no higher than the benefits in other social insurance pro
grams. But the recent increases in workers' compensation benefits have made them generally higher
than benefits in other programs, according to Berkowitz (1977).
9. The contrast between the National Commission's view and Berkowitz's view on equity versus
efficiency is in effect a debate about whether policy option 2 or policy option 4 in graph 2.2 is
preferable. Policy option 4 involves greater equity and higher administrative costs, while policy
option 2 involves less equity and lower administrative costs. Since both options are on the quali
ty/costs constraint line, they represent equal panoramic efficiency.
10. The adequacy goal is also not achieved if there is a general tendency for a workers' compen
sation program to fail to distinguish between wage losses due to work-related injuries or diseases
and wage losses due to other causes. For example, the average replacement rate in a state could
be too high if the program provides benefits to many cases in which "wage losses" are due to
factors such as retirement at the normal retirement age.
11. For an extended discussion of the incentives to employees and employers in a wage-loss ap
proach, see Burton (1983), pp. 34-35.
12. A potential problem of an eligibility threshold is that the behavior of workers can be significantly
affected if, e.g., a small additional amount of earnings losses establishes the worker's eligibility
for a sizeable amount of benefits. This "notch" effect can be minimized if the workers who bare
ly qualify for some benefits only receive a nominal amount, as in the plan for wage-loss benefits
encompassed in table 12.1.
13. Work-related diseases pose a more serious problem for designing appropriate time limits for
eligibility for wage-loss benefits than do work-related injuries. In principle, the eligibility date
for a work-related disease should be based on the date when a worker is first disabled, rather
than on the date of exposure to the substance that produced the disease. In practice, given the
long latency period for some diseases and the multiple causes of many diseases, a well-designed
wage-loss system will have to consider such issues as the use of presumptions that help decide
whether the wage loss is due to a work-related disease or not. Thus a worker exposed to a par
ticular toxic substance at work who is subsequently disabled from a disease that might have been
caused by the toxic substance could use a presumption that the disease is work-related if the period
between exposure and disability is 10 years or less, but would have to overcome a presumption
that the disease is not work-related if the period is over 10 years.
14. A minimum duration of wage-loss benefits may be appropriate for workers injured near or
after their normal retirement ages. For example, a worker injured at age 68 in an industry in
which the normal retirement age is 65 could be eligible for a minimum of one year's wage-loss
benefits (assuming he met the other prerequisites for such benefits, such as demonstration of an
earnings shortfall). The minimum duration provision would have to be drawn carefully in order
to prevent wage-loss benefits from becoming a general retirement bonus.
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15. Wisconsin is an obvious exception to the typical pattern described in the text, and much of
the discussion concerning desirable changes in agency structure and procedure is inapplicable
to Wisconsin.
16. For an evaluation of the impairment benefits plus additional evaluations of the wage-loss benefits,
see Burton 1983, pp. 41-49.
17. Although the hybrid system has only limited counterparts in actual practice, it does have an
intellectual history that provides some reassurance for those concerned about sharp breaks in tradi
tion. Perhaps the most compelling precedent is the Report of the Permanent Partial Disabilities
Committee of the IAIABC (Reid 1966). Although the particulars of the Reid committee report
differ from the hybrid proposal in this chapter, its purposes and approaches are similar.
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C-92 awards, 151-153, 156, 259, 262
Calendar
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Epilepsy, 176
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Hand, 99-100, 112-114, 118-119, 130, 133, 153, 162, 203, 214-215, 251-252, 319
Hars v. Wells Fuel Oil Co., 245
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Industrial employment, 196
Informal hearing, SEE Hearing
Injury, 76, 78, 99, 103, 140, 159, 172-173, 303, 371
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work-related, 4-5, 11, 15, 18-20, 26, 86, 119,160, 171, 181, 317-361
Insanity, 143, 162, 224
Insult, 103
Insurance, 95, 184
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278, 281-282, 307
Lung, 228
MacKay, Senator, 274
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formal, 80
opening, 76

payment, 76
validation, 76
Processing, 200
Productivity, 11
Program design, 391-429
Provider of services, 77
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Snowdon v. Sambo's, 288
Social insurance programs, 399-400
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